Luna vs. Plaza

A municipal judge substantially complies with RA 3828 when he personally examines the witnesses under oath and adopts as his own the searching questions and answers previously taken by an investigator, provided the written statements are sworn to before him; any irregularity in the preliminary examination is waived by the accused's waiver of preliminary investigation and application for bail.

RA 3828, approved June 22, 1963, amended Section 87(e) of the Judiciary Act of 1948 to require that before any justice of the peace issues a warrant of arrest, he must first personally examine the witness or witnesses under oath, with the examination reduced to writing in the form of searching questions and answers. The amendment was aimed at preventing the issuance of warrants against persons based simply on affidavits of witnesses who made and swore to their statements before a person other than the judge before whom the criminal complaint is filed. The dispute turns on how far a municipal judge may rely on sworn statements already taken by an investigator in satisfying that requirement.

T-Sgt. Candido Patosa, PC investigator of Tandag, Surigao del Sur, commenced the criminal action by filing with Municipal Judge Lorenzo M. Plaza of the Municipal Court of Tandag criminal case No. 1138, charging Simon Luna with murder. Supporting the complaint were sworn statements of the prosecution witnesses in question-and-answer form, taken by T-Sgt. Patosa and subscribed and sworn to before Judge Plaza at the time of the filing of the complaint. The judge examined the prosecution witnesses by reading to them "all over again the questions and answers" in their statements, and the affiants declared before him that the questions were propounded by T-Sgt. Patosa and that the answers were made by them; they further declared that their answers were true and were freely and voluntarily made, that they fully understood the questions and answers, and that they were willing to sign their respective affidavits. The affiants signed their affidavits in the judge's presence, and he signed after the usual procedure of administering the oath.

Considering the affiants' answers, together with the post-mortem and autopsy report on the body of the victim Jaime Diaz Ng, the certificate of death, the sketch showing the position of the victim and the accused, and Exhibits 6, 7, 8, 12, and 13, Judge Plaza opined that there was reasonable ground to believe that the crime of murder had been committed and that the accused was probably guilty. He issued the order and warrant of arrest, specifying that no bail should be accepted for the provisional release of the accused. On February 20, 1967, upon Luna's motion that he be admitted to bail on the ground that the evidence of guilt was not strong, the judge issued an order granting bail fixed at P30,000.00; the judge later revoked that order, and Luna was denied bail.

The case was subsequently remanded to the CFI of Surigao del Sur after Luna filed a waiver of his right to preliminary investigation. On March 9, 1967, Provincial Fiscal Santos B. Beberino filed an information charging Luna with murder, and Luna was detained in the provincial jail under the custody of the Provincial Warden.

On April 5, 1967, Luna filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the CFI, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 105-New, claiming that he was being deprived of liberty without due process of law because the warrant of arrest had been issued by Judge Plaza in violation of RA 3828, and praying for annulment of the order for his arrest and his discharge from confinement. Respondents answered that RA 3828 had been substantially complied with, that a motion to quash rather than a petition for habeas corpus was the proper remedy, and that Luna's application for bail constituted a waiver of the right to question the validity of the arrest.

After trial, the CFI rendered its decision dated April 20, 1967, holding that Judge Plaza had substantially complied with RA 3828, denying the application for the writ, and dismissing the case. The CFI found as fact that there was no dispute that a valid complaint charging Luna with murder had been filed with the judge authorized to conduct the examination of the prosecution witnesses; that the complaint was supported by the witnesses' sworn statements in question-and-answer form and other documents; that before the warrant issued, the judge personally examined the prosecution witnesses on their statements taken by T-Sgt. Patosa by reading the questions and answers all over again to the affiants, who confirmed that their statements were true; that being satisfied that the questions and answers partook of the nature of searching questions and answers as required by law, the judge adopted them as his own personal examination for the purpose of determining probable cause; and that Luna had waived his right to preliminary investigation and applied to be admitted to bail.

• Personal Examination under RA 3828: Petitioner contended that RA 3828 imposes on a municipal judge, before he can issue a warrant of arrest, two specific duties — to personally examine the complainant and witnesses with "searching questions and answers," which means the judge must cross-examine them if their affidavits are presented, and to reduce that examination to writing as part of the records of the case.
• Absence of a Record of Examination: Petitioner urged that the absence of any document in the record showing that the judge performed the examination is positive proof that he did not perform his duty under the law.
• Credibility of the Judge's Testimony: Petitioner maintained that the judge's testimony that he adopted the questions propounded by T-Sgt. Patosa was self-serving, intended to cover up the failure to comply with the law, and should not have been believed by the CFI.
• Failure to Reduce the Adoption to Writing: Petitioner argued that even assuming the adoption of the investigator's questions constituted substantial compliance with the "searching questions" requirement, the second requirement — reducing the adoption to writing — was not complied with, so RA 3828 was still violated.
• Constitutional and Due Process Violation: Petitioner contended that the issuance of the warrant of arrest in violation of RA 3828 violated the Constitution and procedural due process.

• Substantial Compliance: Respondents alleged that Republic Act No. 3828 had been substantially complied with.
• Proper Remedy: Respondents argued that a motion to quash, and not a petition for habeas corpus, was the proper remedy.
• Waiver: Respondents argued that petitioner's application for bail constituted a waiver of the right to question the validity of the arrest.

• Compliance with RA 3828: Whether the municipal judge complied with the requirements of Republic Act No. 3828 before issuing the warrant of arrest.
• Due Process: Whether the warrant of arrest was issued in violation of the Constitution and of procedural due process.
• Waiver: Whether petitioner waived any defect in the preliminary examination by waiving his right to preliminary investigation and applying for bail.
• Habeas Corpus: Whether the writ of habeas corpus was properly denied.

• Compliance with RA 3828: Yes. The judge personally examined the witnesses under oath, adopted the investigator's searching questions as his own, and the examination was reduced to writing and sworn to before him, satisfying the three conditions of the amendatory law.
• Due Process: No. The constitutional requirement of examination of the witnesses under oath was fulfilled, and probable cause was determined by the judge as shown in his order of arrest.
• Waiver: Yes. Waiving preliminary investigation and applying for bail amounted to an implied admission of probable cause and a waiver of whatever irregularity attended the arrest.
• Habeas Corpus: No. Section 4, Rule 102 bars the writ where the person is in custody under process issued by a court or judge that had jurisdiction to issue it.

• Compliance with RA 3828: Section 87(e) of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended by RA 3828, requires three conditions before a municipal judge may issue a warrant of arrest: (1) he must examine the witnesses personally; (2) the examination must be under oath; and (3) the examination must be reduced to writing in the form of searching questions and answers. The first condition was fulfilled. The trial court found as fact that the judge personally examined the prosecution witnesses, having read the questions and answers in the written statements all over again to them and asked whether the answers were theirs and whether they were true, to which the witnesses answered in the affirmative. RA 3828 does not prohibit the municipal judge from adopting the questions asked by a previous investigator. The circumstance that the sworn statements recite that they were "taken by T-Sgt. Candido L. Patosa" was explained by the fact that the statements already taken by T-Sgt. Patosa were delivered to the judge, who adopted the questions because he considered them searching questions and presumably did not consider it necessary to change the introductory remarks; that he made the examination personally cannot be doubted, as recited in his February 18, 1967 order. Doce vs. Branch II of the Court of First Instance of Quezon was held inapplicable because there the warrant rested on mere affidavits sworn to before Judge Cabungcal, not before Judge Juntereal who issued the warrant, and there were no searching questions and answers. The second condition was also fulfilled: the complaint was supported by statements of the witnesses under oath, and Exhibits B, C, D, E, and F were subscribed and sworn to before the respondent judge. The third condition was likewise fulfilled, the examination having been written down in the form of searching questions and answers. The term "searching questions and answers" means such questions as have a tendency to show the commission of a crime and the perpetrator thereof, taking into account the purpose of the preliminary examination, which is to determine whether there is reasonable ground to believe that an offense has been committed and the accused is probably guilty so that a warrant may issue and the accused held for trial. What counts as searching depends on what is sought to be inquired into — the nature of the offense, the date, time, and place of its commission, the possible motives, the subject's age, education, status, financial and social circumstances, attitude toward the investigation, social attitudes, and opportunities to commit the offense, and the victim's age, status, family responsibilities, financial and social circumstances, and characteristics. The trial court found that the judge was satisfied that the questions and answers partook of the nature of searching questions and answers, and so he adopted them. The SC nonetheless stressed that the ruling was not intended to sanction a return to the former practice of municipal judges simply relying on affidavits or sworn statements accompanying complaints, and emphasized strict compliance with the provision to avoid malicious or unfounded criminal prosecution.
• Due Process: Section 1(3), Article III of the Constitution provides that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. That requirement was fulfilled, as shown by the personal examination under oath. The existence of probable cause depended to a large degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination, and the respondent judge found that there was probable cause, as stated in his order of arrest reciting that after examining the witnesses personally and under oath there was reasonable ground to believe that murder had been committed and that Luna was probably guilty. The claim that the warrant violated procedural due process because of an alleged defective preliminary examination has no leg to stand on; preliminary examination is not an essential part of due process of law, and it may be conducted by the municipal judge prior to the issuance of the warrant either in the presence or in the absence of the accused.
• Waiver: The record shows that Luna waived the preliminary investigation before the respondent judge and instead filed a petition for bail, which was at first granted but later revoked. This conduct indicates that he had waived his objection to whatever defect, if any, there was in the preliminary examination conducted prior to the issuance of the warrant. His acts subsequent to his arrest constitute an implied admission on his part that there was probable cause for the issuance of the warrant and a waiver of whatever irregularity attended his arrest. He has no substantial, much less legal, ground to complain that he was denied due process of law.
• Habeas Corpus: Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides that if it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed. All the conditions for denying the writ are present. Luna was detained in the custody of the Provincial Warden by virtue of the order of arrest dated February 18, 1967 and the order dated February 21, 1967 of the respondent judge to confine him in the provincial jail. It is not disputed that the respondent judge had jurisdiction to issue the warrant of arrest and the order of commitment under Section 47, Republic Act No. 409, as amended by Republic Act No. 1201, and the challenge to the warrant's validity on the ground of violation of RA 3828 was found untenable. At any rate, the remedy available to petitioner was not a petition for habeas corpus but a petition to quash the warrant of arrest or a petition for reinvestigation of the case.

• Substantial compliance with RA 3828 — Before a municipal judge may issue a warrant of arrest, three conditions must be fulfilled: (1) he must examine the witnesses personally; (2) the examination must be under oath; and (3) the examination must be reduced to writing in the form of searching questions and answers. The SC found all three satisfied where the judge read the investigator's questions and answers back to the affiants, asked whether the answers were theirs and true, and the statements were sworn to before him.
• Adoption of an investigator's questions — RA 3828 does not prohibit the municipal judge from adopting the questions asked by a previous investigator. What the law forbids is reliance on affidavits sworn to before someone other than the judge; it does not require the judge to frame the questions himself.
• "Searching questions and answers" — The term means such questions as have a tendency to show the commission of a crime and the perpetrator thereof, considering that the purpose of the preliminary examination is to determine whether there is reasonable ground to believe that an offense has been committed and the accused is probably guilty so that a warrant may issue and the accused held for trial. What is searching depends on what is sought to be inquired into: the nature of the offense, its date, time, and place, possible motives, the subject's age, education, status, financial and social circumstances, attitude toward the investigation, social attitudes, and opportunities to commit the offense, and the victim's age, status, family responsibilities, financial and social circumstances, and characteristics.
• Waiver of defects in the arrest — An accused who waives his right to preliminary investigation and applies for bail makes an implied admission that there was probable cause for the issuance of the warrant and waives whatever irregularity attended his arrest.
• Habeas corpus unavailable where custody is under valid process — Under Section 4, Rule 102, the writ shall not be allowed where the person is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge that had jurisdiction to issue the process or make the order. The proper remedy against a defective warrant is a motion to quash the warrant or a petition for reinvestigation, not habeas corpus.
• Preliminary examination is not an essential part of due process — It may be conducted by the municipal judge prior to the issuance of the warrant of arrest either in the presence or in the absence of the accused.
• Finality of the trial court's factual findings — Where the appeal is taken directly to the SC, only questions of law may be raised and the right to raise questions of fact is waived; findings of fact of the trial court, including those on the credibility of witnesses, are deemed final and binding absent a showing that the trial court overlooked facts of substance and value that might affect the result.

• "No warrant of arrest shall be issued by any justice of the peace in any criminal case filed with him unless he first examines the witness or witnesses personally, and the examination shall be under oath and reduced to writing in the form of searching questions and answers." — The RA 3828 amendment quoted by the SC; it supplies the three conditions the rest of the decision applies to the municipal judge's examination.
• "Republic Act No. 3828 does not prohibit the municipal Judge from adopting the questions asked by a previous investigator." — The core holding on personal examination, rejecting the claim that the judge must himself frame the questions put to the witnesses.
• "The term 'searching questions and answers' means only, taking into consideration the purpose of the preliminary examination which is to determine 'whether there is a reasonable ground to believe that an offense has been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof so that a warrant of arrest may be issued and the accused held for trial,' such questions as have tendency to show the commission of a crime and the perpetrator thereof." — The canonical definition of the statutory phrase, followed by the list of factors that determine what counts as searching in a given case.
• "Those acts of the petitioner constitute a waiver of whatever irregularity, if any there was, that attended his arrest." — The waiver doctrine applied to Luna's waiver of preliminary investigation and his application for bail.

• People vs. Sinaon, G.R. No. L-15631 (May 27, 1966) — Controlling on credibility; appellate courts will not generally disturb the trial court's findings on the credibility of witnesses absent a showing that it overlooked facts of substance and value that might affect the result.
• Doce vs. Branch II of the Court of First Instance of Quezon, G.R. No. L-26437 (March 13, 1968), 22 SCRA 1028 — Distinguished; the warrant there was irregularly issued because it rested on mere affidavits sworn to before Judge Cabungcal, not before Judge Juntereal who issued the warrant, and there were no searching questions and answers.
• People vs. Olandag, 92 Phil. 286, 289 — Followed; preliminary examination is not an essential part of due process of law.
• Abijuela vs. Dolosa, G.R. No. L-14245 (December 29, 1960) — Cited for the rule that the findings of fact of the trial court are final and binding upon the SC.
• Millar vs. Nadres, 74 Phil. 307; Portea vs. Pabellon, 47 O.G. 655; Flores vs. Plasina, 50 O.G. 1073 — Cited for the rule that an appeal taken directly to the SC raises only questions of law.

• Section 87(e), Judiciary Act of 1948 (RA 296), as amended by RA 3828 (approved June 22, 1963) — Requires the personal examination of the witnesses under oath, reduced to writing in the form of searching questions and answers, before a warrant of arrest may issue; the SC applied its three conditions and found them substantially complied with.
• Section 1(3), Article III, Constitution — No warrant shall issue but upon probable cause to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce; held satisfied by the judge's personal examination and his finding of probable cause in the order of arrest.
• Section 4, Rule 102, Rules of Court — The writ of habeas corpus shall not be allowed where the person is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge that had jurisdiction to issue the process or make the order; applied to deny the writ.
• Section 47, Republic Act No. 409, as amended by Republic Act No. 1201 — Confers on the municipal judge jurisdiction to issue the warrant of arrest and the order of commitment; invoked to uphold the validity of Luna's detention.
• Section 1, Rule 112, Rules of Court — Defines the purpose of the preliminary examination, which the SC used to fix the meaning of "searching questions and answers."