Luna vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

The welfare of the child is paramount in all questions relating to the care, custody, education, and property of children, and this consideration can override procedural rules and even the rights of parents to the custody of their children. Where the very life and existence of the minor is at stake and the child is of an age to exercise intelligent choice, courts must respect, enforce, and give meaning to that choice and uphold the child's right to live in an atmosphere conducive to her physical, moral, and intellectual development.

The private respondent Maria Lourdes Santos is the illegitimate child of petitioner Horacio Luna, who is married to co-petitioner Liberty Hizon-Luna. Maria Lourdes Santos is married to Sixto Salumbides, and they are the parents of Shirley Santos Salumbides, also known as Shirley Luna Salumbides, the subject of the child custody dispute. Two or four months after Shirley's birth on April 7, 1975, her parents gave her to the petitioners, a childless couple with considerable means, who raised her as their own. The case involves the tension between the procedural duty of lower courts to enforce final judgments and the substantive welfare of the child, governed by Article 363 of the Civil Code and Article 3(2) of the Child and Youth Welfare Code (PD 603).

Shirley Santos Salumbides, also known as Shirley Luna Salumbides, was born on April 7, 1975, to private respondents Maria Lourdes Santos and Sixto Salumbides. Two or four months after her birth, her parents gave her to the petitioners, Horacio Luna and Liberty Hizon-Luna, a childless couple with considerable means, who thereafter showered her with love and affection and brought her up as their very own. The couple doted upon Shirley, who called them "Mama" and "Papa," while she called her natural parents "Mommy" and "Daddy." When Shirley reached the age of four in 1979, she was enrolled at the Maryknoll College in Quezon City, where she was in Grade III at the time of the proceedings.

A few months before September 1980, the petitioners decided to take Shirley abroad to show her Disneyland and other places of interest in America. Shirley looked forward to this trip and was excited about it. However, when the petitioners asked for the respondents' written consent to the child's application for a U.S. visa, the respondents refused to give it, to the petitioners' surprise and chagrin. Shirley was utterly disappointed. As a result, the petitioners had to leave without Shirley, whom they left with the private respondents upon the latter's request. The petitioners left instructions with their chauffeur to take and fetch Shirley from Maryknoll College every school day.

When the petitioners returned on October 29, 1980, they learned that the respondents had transferred Shirley to the St. Scholastica College. The private respondents also refused to return Shirley to them and did not allow Shirley to visit the petitioners. In view thereof, the petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XV, against the private respondents to produce the person of Shirley and deliver her to their care and custody. After the filing of an answer and due hearing, a decision was rendered on March 9, 1981, declaring the petitioners entitled to the child's custody and forthwith granting the writ prayed for.

The private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the decision on April 7, 1982, ordering the petitioners to turn over Shirley to the private respondents. The petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied, and their subsequent petition for review was denied by the Supreme Court on November 10, 1982, for lack of merit. Upon finality of the judgment, the case was remanded to the Regional Trial Court, NCR Branch CXXXII Makati, presided over by respondent Judge Roque A. Tamayo, who issued an order directing the issuance of a writ of execution.

The execution of the judgment was vigorously opposed by the petitioners, who filed a motion for reconsideration and to set aside the writ of execution on the ground of supervening events and circumstances—more particularly, the subsequent emotional, psychological, and physiological condition of the child Shirley, which made the enforcement of the judgment unduly prejudicial, unjust, and unfair, and would cause irreparable damage to the welfare and interests of the child. The respondent judge called a conference among the parties and conducted hearings on the motion. During the hearing, Shirley made manifest that she would kill herself or run away from home if she should ever be separated from her "Mama" and "Papa" and forced to stay with the respondents. She testified that her biological parents were "cruel" to her, that they always spanked her and did not love her, and that she did not believe their expressions of love were sincere. Dra. Cynthia Dulay Bruce, a child psychologist, affirmed her findings that Shirley had grown more embittered, cautious, and distrusting of her biological parents, and that to get Shirley back in the emotionally charged transaction would hinder Shirley seeing them as truly loving and concerned parents. The respondent judge nonetheless denied the petitioners' motion to set aside the writ of execution, and the Intermediate Appellate Court dismissed the petitioners' subsequent petition for certiorari and prohibition, prompting the present recourse.

• Supervening Events: Petitioners claimed that the child's manifestation to the trial court that she would kill herself or run away from home if she should be forced to live with the private respondents is a supervening event that would justify the cancellation of the execution of the final decision rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-12212.
• Welfare of the Child: Petitioners argued that the subsequent emotional, psychological, and physiological condition of the child made the enforcement of the judgment sought to be executed unduly prejudicial, unjust, and unfair, and would cause irreparable damage to the welfare and interests of the child.

• No Supervening Developments: Respondents maintained that there were no supervening developments and circumstances since these events were not new, as the Court of Appeals had taken into account the physiological and emotional considerations of the transfer of custody of Shirley when it reversed the decision of the trial court and gave to the private respondents the custody of the child.
• Parental Right Paramount: Respondents argued that the wishes and desires of the child are no hindrance to the parents' right to her custody, since the right of the parents to the custody of their children is paramount.

• Execution of Final Judgment vs. Child's Welfare: Whether procedural rules—more particularly the duty of lower courts to enforce a final decision of appellate courts in child custody cases—should prevail over and above the desire and preference of the child to stay with her grandparents instead of her biological parents, where the child had signified her intention to kill herself or run away from home if she should be separated from her grandparents and forced to live with her biological parents.

• Execution of Final Judgment vs. Child's Welfare: No. The execution of the final judgment should be restrained. The child's manifestation that she would kill herself or run away from home if taken from the petitioners and forced to live with the private respondents is a circumstance that would make the execution of the judgment inequitable, unfair, and unjust, if not illegal. Article 363 of the Civil Code provides that in all questions relating to the care, custody, education, and property of children, the latter's welfare is paramount, and this means that the best interest of the minor can override procedural rules and even the rights of parents to the custody of their children.

• Execution of Final Judgment vs. Child's Welfare: The Court acknowledged the well-known doctrine that when a judgment of a higher court is returned to the lower court, the only function of the latter court is the ministerial one of issuing the order of execution. The lower court cannot vary the mandate of the superior court, or examine it for any other purpose than execution, nor review it upon any matter decided on appeal or error apparent, nor intermeddle with it further than to settle so much as has been demanded. However, the Court equally recognized that a stay of execution of a final judgment may be authorized whenever it is necessary to accomplish the ends of justice, as when there had been a change in the situation of the parties which makes such execution inequitable; or when it appears that the controversy had never been submitted to the judgment of the court; or when it appears that the writ of execution has been improvidently issued; or that it is defective in substance; or is issued against the wrong party; or that the judgment debt has been paid or otherwise satisfied; or when the writ has been issued without authority.

Applying these principles, the Court found merit in the petitioners' claim. The manifestation of the child Shirley that she would kill herself or run away from home if she should be taken away from the petitioners and forced to live with the private respondents—made during the hearings on the petitioners' motion to set aside the writ of execution and reiterated in her letters to the members of the Court dated September 19, 1984 and January 2, 1985, and during the hearing of the case before the Court—is a circumstance that would make the execution of the judgment rendered in Spec. Proc. No. 9417 inequitable, unfair, and unjust, if not illegal. Article 363 of the Civil Code provides that in all questions relating to the care, custody, education, and property of the children, the latter's welfare is paramount. This means that the best interest of the minor can override procedural rules and even the rights of parents to the custody of their children. Since the very life and existence of the minor is at stake and the child is in an age when she can exercise an intelligent choice, the courts can do no less than respect, enforce, and give meaning and substance to that choice and uphold her right to live in an atmosphere conducive to her physical, moral, and intellectual development, citing Article 356(4) of the Civil Code. The Court noted that the threat may be proven empty, but Shirley has a right to a wholesome family life that will provide her with love, care, understanding, guidance, and counseling, and moral and material security, citing Article 3(2) of the Child and Youth Welfare Code (PD 603). The Court further observed that in her letters to the members of the Court, Shirley depicted her biological parents as selfish and cruel, who beat her often and do not love her. As pointed out by the child psychologist, Shirley has grown more embittered, cautious, and distrusting of her biological parents. To return her to the custody of the private respondents to face the same emotional environment which she complained of would be indeed traumatic and cause irreparable damage to the child.

• Welfare of the Child is Paramount — In all questions relating to the care, custody, education, and property of children, the latter's welfare is paramount. The best interest of the minor can override procedural rules and even the rights of parents to the custody of their children. The Court applied this doctrine to restrain the execution of a final judgment in a child custody case where the child threatened to kill herself or run away if separated from her foster parents, holding that the very life and existence of the minor was at stake.
• Ministerial Duty of Lower Courts to Execute Final Judgments — When a judgment of a higher court is returned to the lower court, the only function of the latter court is the ministerial one of issuing the order of execution. The lower court cannot vary the mandate of the superior court, or examine it for any other purpose than execution, nor review it upon any matter decided on appeal or error apparent, nor intermeddle with it further than to settle so much as has been demanded. However, a stay of execution of a final judgment may be authorized whenever it is necessary to accomplish the ends of justice, as when there had been a change in the situation of the parties which makes such execution inequitable; or when it appears that the controversy had never been submitted to the judgment of the court; or when it appears that the writ of execution has been improvidently issued; or that it is defective in substance; or is issued against the wrong party; or that the judgment debt has been paid or otherwise satisfied; or when the writ has been issued without authority. The Court applied this exception to find that the child's manifestation constituted a supervening event making execution inequitable, unfair, and unjust.

• "Article 363 of the Civil Code provides that in all questions relating to the care, custody, education and property of the children, the latter's welfare is paramount. This means that the best interest of the minor can override procedural rules and even the rights of parents to the custody of their children." — This passage states the ratio decidendi of the case, establishing that the welfare of the child is the controlling consideration that can override procedural rules and parental rights.
• "Since, in this case, the very life and existence of the minor is at stake and the child is in an age when she can exercise an intelligent choice, the courts can do no less than respect, enforce and give meaning and substance to that choice and uphold her right to live in an atmosphere conducive to her physical, moral and intellectual development." — This passage articulates the Court's application of the welfare principle to the specific facts, emphasizing the child's age of discernment and the stakes involved.
• "The threat may be proven empty, but Shirley has a right to a wholesome family life that will provide her with love, care and understanding, guidance and counseling, and moral and material security. But what if the threat is for real?" — This passage captures the Court's reasoning on the risk assessment, weighing the potential irreparable harm to the child against the procedural interest in enforcing the final judgment.

• N/A — The decision does not cite any prior case law as controlling precedent in the majority opinion.

• Article 363, Civil Code — Provides that in all questions relating to the care, custody, education, and property of children, the latter's welfare is paramount. The Court applied this provision to hold that the best interest of the minor can override procedural rules and even the rights of parents to the custody of their children.
• Article 356(4), Civil Code — Cited by the Court in support of the child's right to live in an atmosphere conducive to her physical, moral, and intellectual development.
• Article 3(2), Child and Youth Welfare Code (PD 603) — Cited by the Court in support of the child's right to a wholesome family life that will provide her with love, care, understanding, guidance, and counseling, and moral and material security.

• Justice Abad Santos
• Justice Escolin
• Justice Cuevas

Separate Opinion (Concurring): Justice Aquino concurred, stating that a judgment for the custody of the child, like a judgment for support, is not final and irrevocable. The welfare of the child is the paramount consideration, and it would be for Shirley's welfare to remain in the custody of the petitioners.

• Justice Makasiar — Dissented, arguing that the resolution of the issue on who should have custody over the nine-year-old girl had been viewed from a limited approach, focused more on the personal assessment of the child rather than on the general and specific laws and jurisprudence that should govern the case. Justice Makasiar argued that a nine-year-old child, brainwashed by material luxury and constant attention from doting grandparents, cannot possibly appreciate the incomparable love and solicitude her natural parents have for her. He emphasized that parental authority (patria potestas) is inalienable and cannot be renounced or transferred except in cases of guardianship or adoption approved by the courts, citing Article 313 of the Civil Code. He invoked the parental preference rule, under which a natural parent of good character who is a proper person to have custody of the child and is reasonably able to provide for such child is ordinarily entitled to custody as against all persons, including grandparents. He further argued that the preference of a child is only one factor to be considered and is not controlling, decisive, or determinative, and that the respondents had not been shown to be unfit, unsuitable, or financially incapable of keeping and caring for Shirley.