Lumiguis vs. People

Inflicting wounds on the victim after the principal has delivered the fatal blow shows actual participation in the criminal design and makes the co-accused an accomplice, not merely one guilty of physical injuries; abuse of superior strength cannot be appreciated against accomplices where only one accused is the principal and the others did not cooperate to weaken the victim’s defense. Under Article 110 of the Revised Penal Code, the principal and accomplices are each liable severally among themselves for their quotas and subsidiarily for those of the others.

Kamba Lumiguis was the brother of Banagan Lumiguis and the nephew of Dungo-an Abao; Sedinan Subano and Ramon Subano were relatives of Kamba. The case also involved Section 106 of the Administrative Code of the Department of Mindanao and Sulu, which governs sentences upon Moros and non-Christian inhabitants and allows the trial court, in its discretion, to ignore minimum penalties and impose a penalty not in excess of the highest provided by law after considering the accused’s state of enlightenment and degree of moral turpitude.

On the afternoon of Sunday, April 12, 1959, at the beach of Diculum, Zamboanga del Norte, Godo Idlay engaged Kamba Lumiguis in a fistic fight. They were surrounded by Kamba’s brother Banagan Lumiguis, Kamba’s uncle Dungo-an Abao, and Kamba’s relatives Sedinan Subano and Ramon Subano. Godo, the better boxer, knocked Kamba down. As Kamba fell, Dungo-an Abao struck Godo on the back of his head with a piece of wood about three feet long, causing Godo to fall to the ground face downward.

While Godo was in that position, Kamba stood up, took a piece of wood about three feet long and the size of his wrist, and struck Godo on the right forehead. Banagan, Ramon, and Sedinan then followed and alternately hit Godo on the back. Banagan used a piece of bamboo about two and a half feet long and about the size of his wrist, while Ramon and Sedinan used a piece of wood about three and a half feet long and the size of their arm. At that point, Bay-Abbu arrived and Banagan immediately struck him on the forehead with a piece of bamboo, causing him to fall to the ground. Codalis Idlay, Godo’s brother, then arrived and was also struck by Banagan; the blow was parried by Codalis, and when he tried to grab the bamboo from Banagan, Banagan and his companions ran away.

Laydan Alimbac, a spectator, approached and helped Codalis lift Godo from the ground and bring him to the house of Abdul Hosen Chiong in a very serious condition. Abdul Hosen Chiong, a barrio lieutenant, asked Godo what happened, and Godo answered that he had a fistic fight with Kamba and that Kamba’s co-appellants — Banagan Lumiguis, Dungo-an Abao, Sedinan Subano, and Ramon Subano — struck him. When Abdul asked the cause of the fight, Godo related that he fought Kamba because Kamba got mad when he tried to collect the amount of P12 as his indebtedness. Abdul tried to give Godo some porridge, but Godo was unable to take it because he vomited blood. Abdul then tried to bring Godo to the town proper of Siocon for medical treatment, but Godo said he could not endure the trip and that he would die. Godo died at dawn on April 13, 1959.

Before Godo’s cadaver was buried, Provincial Sanitary Inspector David Z. Alpuerto examined the body in the house of Abdul Hosen Chiong. The examination disclosed a contusion at the right forehead; a fracture of the skull behind the right ear; a contused wound therein; a bruised neck; and bruises on the body (Exh. A). Alpuerto affirmed at trial that a skull bone seven inches long and two and a half inches wide protruded from the fractured skull; that the contused wound in the fractured skull behind the right ear was one and a half inches deep; and that there were bruises on the neck, on the breast, and at the back of the body. The CA found these facts, including that after Dungo-an Abao delivered the mortal blow, the petitioners followed and attacked the deceased with clubs.

• Accomplice Liability and Physical Injuries: Petitioners argued that Banagan Lumiguis and Ramon Subano should be convicted at most of physical injuries, not as accomplices in homicide, because the mortal blow was delivered by Dungo-an Abao and their blows merely caused bruises on different parts of the deceased’s body; they also argued that Kamba Lumiguis should be acquitted because the injuries he sustained in the quarrel, as shown by medical certificate Exh. 10, more than compensated for the blow he delivered against the deceased.
• Abuse of Superior Strength and Lack of Instruction/Ignorance: Petitioners argued that the CA erred in considering the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength and in not considering the mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction and/or ignorance in their favor, on the assumption that the four co-accused of Abao were guilty as accomplices; they invoked Section 106 of the Administrative Code of the Department of Mindanao and Sulu.
• Civil Liability: Petitioners argued that their civil liability should be based on the extent of their actual participation.

• Accomplice Liability: Whether Banagan Lumiguis and Ramon Subano should be convicted only of physical injuries and Kamba Lumiguis acquitted, instead of being convicted as accomplices in the crime of homicide.
• Abuse of Superior Strength: Whether the CA erred in considering abuse of superior strength as an aggravating circumstance against petitioners as accomplices.
• Lack of Instruction/Ignorance: Whether the CA erred in not considering lack of instruction and/or ignorance as a mitigating circumstance under Section 106 of the Administrative Code of the Department of Mindanao and Sulu.
• Civil Liability: Whether petitioners’ civil liability should be based on the extent of their actual participation rather than on a joint and several liability for the full P6,000 indemnity.
• Penalty: Whether the indeterminate penalty imposed on petitioners as accomplices should be reduced under Article 52 of the Revised Penal Code and the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

• Accomplice Liability: No. Infliction of wounds by co-accused after the principal delivered the fatal blow shows actual participation in the criminal design and makes them accomplices; the blows by Banagan and Ramon were not merely physical injuries, and Kamba’s claimed injuries did not warrant acquittal.
• Abuse of Superior Strength: Yes, insofar as the CA appreciated abuse of superior strength. Such aggravating circumstance is inconsistent with a finding that only one accused is principal and the others are accomplices, absent proof that the accomplices cooperated to weaken the victim’s defense.
• Lack of Instruction/Ignorance: No. Section 106 of the Administrative Code of the Department of Mindanao and Sulu leaves the application of the special penalty provision to the trial court’s discretion, and no abuse of discretion was shown.
• Civil Liability: Yes. Under Article 110 of the Revised Penal Code, the principal and accomplices are each liable severally among themselves for their quotas and subsidiarily for those of the others; the P6,000 indemnity must be apportioned.
• Penalty: Yes. As accomplices, petitioners are subject to the penalty next lower in degree than that for the consummated felony, prision mayor; with no mitigating or aggravating circumstance and under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum was reduced from 11 to 10 years of prision mayor.

• Accomplice Liability: The SC rejected the contention as devoid of merit. It treated as established that after Dungo-an Abao delivered the mortal blow, the petitioners followed and attacked the deceased with clubs. Under the rule applied in People vs. Tumayao, 56 Phil. 587 and People vs. Azcona, 59 Phil. 580, infliction of wounds by a co-accused after the principal has delivered the fatal blow shows actual participation in the criminal design, and the co-accused is guilty as an accomplice. The SC also quoted People vs. Cortes, et al., 55 Phil. 143: where three accused attacked a third person, one inflicting a fatal blow on the forehead with a club while the other two immediately thereafter inflicted minor injuries with similar weapons, the first is a principal in homicide and the two companions are accomplices. Thus Banagan and Ramon were not merely guilty of physical injuries, and Kamba’s claim based on his own injuries did not warrant acquittal.
• Abuse of Superior Strength: The SC found the claim tenable. It quoted People vs. Cortes, 55 Phil. 143: the estimation of abuse of superior strength is essentially inconsistent with a finding that only one of three accused is guilty as principal while the other two participated only as accomplices. Where abuse of superior strength is to be estimated from the mere fact that more than one person participated, it must appear that the accused cooperated together in some way designed to weaken the defense; if the accomplices really participated in the sense necessary to estimate the aggravating circumstance, they would be principals. Since only one accused was the principal and the others did not cooperate in the way necessary to make them principals, the single principal could not be said to have taken advantage of superior strength, nor could the aggravating circumstance be estimated against the accomplices.
• Lack of Instruction/Ignorance: The SC noted that petitioners invoked Section 106 of the Administrative Code of the Department of Mindanao and Sulu, which allows the judge, in pronouncing sentence upon a Moro or other non-Christian inhabitant, to ignore any minimum penalty and impose such penalty not in excess of the highest provided by law after considering the circumstances, including the accused’s state of enlightenment and degree of moral turpitude. The SC held that application of this special provision is within the discretion of the trial court, citing People vs. Pawin, 85 Phil. 528 and People vs. Salazar, 56 O. G. 6334; such discretion should not be disturbed on appeal absent abuse, and no abuse was committed.
• Civil Liability: The SC held the claim tenable. Article 110 of the Revised Penal Code provides that principals, accomplices, and accessories, each within their respective class, shall be liable severally (in solidum) among themselves for their quotas, and subsidiarily for those of the other persons liable. Under People vs. Bantagan, 54 Phil. 834 and People vs. Cortes, 55 Phil. 143, the sole principal in homicide or murder is primarily liable for his own part of the indemnity and subsidiarily for the portion adjudged against his accomplices in case of their insolvency; the several accomplices are jointly and severally liable for the portion adjudged against them and subsidiarily liable for the portion of their principal in case of his insolvency. The CA’s joint and several liability of all five for the full P6,000 was therefore modified: Dungo-an Abao, the principal, was primarily liable for half, and the four petitioners, including Sedinan Subano, were primarily and in solidum liable for the other half, with subsidiary liability under Article 110.
• Penalty: The SC held that under Article 52 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed for the consummated felony is imposed upon accomplices, which in this case is prision mayor. Considering the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum range of the indeterminate penalty imposable upon each of the three petitioners was from 6 months and 1 day to 6 years, and the maximum range was from 8 years and 1 day to 10 years. The CA’s maximum of 11 years was reduced to 10 years of prision mayor.

• Accomplice Liability for Post-Mortal Blows — Infliction of wounds by a co-accused after the principal has delivered the fatal blow shows actual participation in the criminal design; such co-accused is guilty as an accomplice. Applied to Banagan, Kamba, Sedinan, and Ramon, who attacked Godo after Dungo-an Abao’s mortal blow.
• Abuse of Superior Strength Inconsistent with Accomplice Liability — Abuse of superior strength cannot be appreciated against accomplices where only one accused is the principal and the others did not cooperate to weaken the victim’s defense; if they had so cooperated, they would be principals. Applied to remove the aggravating circumstance.
• Discretion under Section 106, Administrative Code of the Department of Mindanao and Sulu — In imposing penalty on a non-Christian inhabitant, the trial court has discretion to apply the special provision; absent abuse, the appellate court will not disturb it. Applied: no abuse was found.
• Apportionment of Civil Liability among Principal and Accomplices — Under Article 110 of the Revised Penal Code, principals, accomplices, and accessories, each within their class, are severally (in solidum) liable among themselves for their quotas and subsidiarily for those of others. Applied: Dungo-an Abao was primarily liable for half of the P6,000 indemnity, and the four petitioners were primarily and in solidum liable for the other half, with subsidiary liability under Article 110.
• Penalty for Accomplices — Under Article 52 of the Revised Penal Code, accomplices are subject to the penalty next lower in degree than that for the consummated felony; with the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the indeterminate penalty ranges are fixed accordingly. Applied: prision mayor, with the maximum reduced from 11 to 10 years.

• "It has been held that infliction of wounds by a co-accused after the principal accused has delivered the fatal blow shows actual participation in the criminal design and such co-accused is guilty in the character of accomplice (People vs. Tumayao, 56 Phil. 587; People vs. Azcona, 59 Phil. 580)." — This is the core rule holding Banagan, Kamba, Sedinan, and Ramon liable as accomplices for attacking Godo after Dungo-an Abao’s mortal blow.
• "The estimation of this circumstance is essentially inconsistent with the finding that only one of three accused is guilty in the character of principal, while the other two participated in the character of accomplices only." — This explains why abuse of superior strength cannot be appreciated against accomplices where only one accused is the principal.
• "In the imposition of penalty on a non-Christian inhabitant, it is within the discretion of the trial court to apply the special provision above-quoted" — This states the discretionary nature of Section 106 of the Administrative Code of the Department of Mindanao and Sulu.
• "the principals, accomplices, and accessories, each within their respective class, shall be liable severally (in solidum) among themselves for their quotas, and subsidiarily for those of the other persons liable." — This is the Article 110 rule used to apportion the civil indemnity between the principal and the accomplices.

• People vs. Tumayao, 56 Phil. 587 — Relied on for the rule that infliction of wounds by a co-accused after the principal delivered the fatal blow shows actual participation and makes the co-accused an accomplice.
• People vs. Azcona, 59 Phil. 580 — Cited with Tumayao for the same rule on accomplice liability.
• People vs. Cortes, et al., 55 Phil. 143 — Relied on for accomplice liability where companions inflicted minor injuries after the fatal blow, and for the rule that abuse of superior strength cannot be appreciated against accomplices where only one is principal.
• People vs. Pawin, 85 Phil. 528 — Relied on for the discretionary application of Section 106 of the Administrative Code of the Department of Mindanao and Sulu.
• People vs. Salazar, 56 O. G. 6334 — Cited with Pawin on the same discretionary application.
• People vs. Bantagan, 54 Phil. 834 — Relied on for the apportionment of civil liability between principal and accomplices under Article 110.

• Article 110, Revised Penal Code — Provides that principals, accomplices, and accessories, each within their respective class, are liable severally (in solidum) among themselves for their quotas and subsidiarily for those of the other persons liable; applied to apportion the P6,000 indemnity between Dungo-an Abao and the four petitioners.
• Article 52, Revised Penal Code — Provides that the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed for the consummated felony is imposed upon accomplices; applied to hold that prision mayor is the proper penalty and to reduce the maximum from 11 to 10 years.
• Section 106, Administrative Code of the Department of Mindanao and Sulu — Provides that in pronouncing sentence upon a Moro or other non-Christian inhabitant, the judge may ignore any minimum penalty and impose such penalty not in excess of the highest provided by law after considering the circumstances, including the accused’s state of enlightenment and degree of moral turpitude; applied as a discretionary provision, with no abuse found.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Applied to fix the minimum and maximum ranges of the indeterminate penalty for the accomplices.