Lumauig vs. People

Prior notice or demand for liquidation of cash advances is not a condition sine qua non before an accountable public officer may be held liable under Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code; liability attaches upon failure to render accounts for two months after they should have been rendered. An acquittal under Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 does not bar conviction under Article 218 for the same cash advance because the elements of the two offenses differ.

Petitioner Aloysius Dait Lumauig was the Municipal Mayor of Alfonso Lista, Ifugao, and, as such, an accountable public officer of the municipality. The case concerns the statutory duty of accountable public officers to render accounts to the Commission on Audit or a provincial auditor under Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code, as implemented by COA Circular No. 90-331. A separate charge under Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 arose from the same cash advance.

Sometime in January 1998, Commission on Audit (COA) Auditor Florence L. Paguirigan examined the year-end reports involving the municipal officials of Alfonso Lista, Ifugao. In the course of her examination of the municipality’s records and related documents, she came across a disbursement voucher for ₱101,736.00 prepared for petitioner Aloysius Dait Lumauig, a former mayor of the municipality, as cash advance for the payment of freight and other cargo charges for 12 units of motorcycles supposed to be donated to the municipality. The amount was covered by Land Bank Check No. 11894200 dated August 29, 1994, with petitioner as payee. Her further investigation of the accounting records revealed that no payment intended for the charge was made to Royal Cargo Agencies for August 1994. On June 4, 2001, petitioner paid the subject cash advance before the treasurer of the municipality, for which incumbent Mayor Glenn D. Prudenciano executed an Affidavit of Desistance. Paguirigan issued a certification to this effect on November 29, 2001. She likewise claimed that she prepared two letters to inform petitioner of his unliquidated cash advance, but the letters were not sent because she could not get his exact address despite efforts exerted.

Petitioner admitted having obtained the cash advance of ₱101,736.00 during his incumbency as municipal mayor. The amount was intended for the payment of freight and insurance coverage of 12 units of motorcycles to be donated to the municipality by the City of Manila. Instead of motorcycles, however, he was able to secure two buses and five patrol cars. He claimed that it never came to his mind to settle or liquidate the amount advanced since the vehicles were already turned over to the municipality. He alleged that he was neither informed nor did he receive any demand from COA to liquidate his cash advances. It was only in 2001, while he was claiming for separation pay, that he came to know that he still had an unliquidated cash advance; to avoid prolonging the issue, he paid ₱101,736.00 to the municipal treasurer on June 4, 2001.

The Information dated January 25, 2001 under which petitioner was tried and convicted alleged that in or about August 1994, or immediately prior or subsequent thereto, in Alfonso Lista, Ifugao, petitioner, then Municipal Mayor and as such an accountable public officer responsible for ₱101,736.00 received by way of cash advance for payment of the insurance coverage of 12 motorcycles purchased by the Municipality, and with the corresponding duty under the law to account for the same, did willfully and feloniously fail to liquidate and account for the same to the damage and prejudice of the Government. From the same facts stemmed an Information for violation of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019, docketed as Criminal Case No. 26527, against petitioner for having allegedly utilized the cash advance for a purpose other than that for which it was obtained.

The Sandiganbayan found that petitioner received the cash advance in 1994 and liquidated it only on June 4, 2001. It considered the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, as on June 1, 2001 petitioner voluntarily surrendered and posted his cash bail bond, but it did not consider the mitigating circumstance of return or full restitution of the funds previously unliquidated. The Supreme Court treated the facts as matters of record or otherwise undisputed.

• Effect of Acquittal in Anti-Graft Case: Petitioner asserted that since the cases for which he was indicted involved the same subject cash advance of ₱101,736.00, his exoneration in the anti-graft case should likewise exculpate him from further liability in the present case.
• Prior Demand or Reminder to Liquidate: Petitioner maintained that he was not reminded of his unliquidated cash advances and relied on United States vs. Saberon to argue that prior demand was required before liability under Article 218 could attach.
• Mitigating Circumstances and Penalty: Petitioner argued that, assuming liability, a lesser penalty should be imposed because he subsequently liquidated the cash advance when he later discovered and was confronted with his delinquency, and because the COA did not immediately inform him of his unliquidated cash advance.

• No Prior Demand Required: The Office of the Special Prosecutor countered that Article 218 does not require the COA or the provincial auditor to first make a demand before the public officer should render an account; it is sufficient that there is a law or regulation requiring him to render an account.
• Saberon Inapplicable: The OSP maintained that the present case differs from Saberon, which involved a violation of Act No. 1740 where prior demand was required, whereas this case involves Article 218, under which prior demand is not required.

• Effect of Acquittal in Anti-Graft Case: Whether petitioner’s acquittal in Criminal Case No. 26527 for violation of Section 3 of RA 3019 bars his conviction in Criminal Case No. 26528 for failure to render an account under Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code.
• Prior Demand for Liquidation: Whether prior notice or demand for liquidation is a condition sine qua non for liability under Article 218.
• Mitigating Circumstances and Penalty: Whether petitioner is entitled to a reduced penalty on account of his subsequent liquidation and the COA’s alleged failure to immediately inform him, and whether return or full restitution is a mitigating circumstance.
• Applicability of the Indeterminate Sentence Law: Whether the Indeterminate Sentence Law applies where the maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed one year.

• Effect of Acquittal in Anti-Graft Case: No. The acquittal under RA 3019 does not bar conviction under Article 218 because the offenses have different elements and require different evidence.
• Prior Demand for Liquidation: No. Article 218 does not require prior demand; liability attaches upon failure to render accounts for two months after they should have been rendered.
• Mitigating Circumstances and Penalty: Yes, in part. Voluntary surrender and return or full restitution are mitigating circumstances; with no aggravating circumstance, the penalty next lower to the prescribed penalty is imposed.
• Applicability of the Indeterminate Sentence Law: No. The Indeterminate Sentence Law does not apply where the maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed one year; a straight penalty is proper.

• Effect of Acquittal in Anti-Graft Case: The two charges stemmed from the same incident, but the same act may give rise to two or more separate and distinct charges. Section 3(e) of RA 3019 requires, among others, that the public officer cause undue injury to any party or give unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference, and that he act with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence. Article 218 requires that the offender be a public officer, that he be an accountable officer for public funds or property, that he be required by law or regulation to render accounts to the COA or a provincial auditor, and that he fail to do so for two months after such accounts should be rendered. Because the elements differ, the evidence needed to establish guilt or innocence in each case also differs; acquittal in the anti-graft case therefore provided no refuge in the Article 218 case.
• Prior Demand for Liquidation: Article 218 contains no requirement of prior demand. The law is clear and unambiguous; courts may not introduce exceptions or conditions or engraft qualifications not contemplated. Petitioner’s reliance on United States vs. Saberon was misplaced because Saberon involved a violation of Act No. 1740, which required prior demand, whereas Article 218 merely requires that the public officer be required by law or regulation to render an account. In the revision or codification of laws, parts of old laws omitted in the revised statute or code are deemed repealed unless the code provides otherwise. Under Section 5 of COA Circular No. 90-331, an accountable officer must liquidate petty operating expenses and field operating expenses within 20 days after the end of the year. Since petitioner received the cash advance in 1994, he was required to liquidate it on or before January 20, 1995, and to avoid Article 218 liability he should have liquidated within two months from that due date, or on or before March 20, 1995. He liquidated only on June 4, 2001, over six years later. Liability under Article 218 was therefore established.
• Mitigating Circumstances and Penalty: The Sandiganbayan correctly considered voluntary surrender, as petitioner voluntarily surrendered and posted his cash bail bond on June 1, 2001. It failed to consider return or full restitution. In malversation of public funds, payment, indemnification, or reimbursement of misappropriated funds may be considered a mitigating circumstance analogous to voluntary surrender. Although Article 218 is not Article 217, it is the succeeding article in the same chapter, and the same reasoning applies to the return or full restitution of previously unliquidated funds. The prescribed penalty for Article 218 is prisión correccional in its minimum period, or six months and one day to two years and four months, or a fine ranging from ₱200.00 to ₱6,000.00, or both. With two mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance, Article 64(5) of the Revised Penal Code requires imposition of the penalty next lower to the prescribed penalty, which is arresto mayor in its maximum period, or four months and one day to six months.
• Applicability of the Indeterminate Sentence Law: Section 2 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law excludes cases where the maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed one year. In determining whether an indeterminate sentence is proper, what is considered is the penalty actually imposed by the trial court after considering attendant circumstances, not the imposable penalty. Since the maximum of the imposable penalty is six months, the possible maximum term that can actually be imposed is less than one year. The Indeterminate Sentence Law was therefore inapplicable, and a straight penalty of four months and one day of arresto mayor was proper, with the fine deleted.

• Prior demand not required under Article 218, Revised Penal Code — Article 218 punishes an accountable public officer who fails to render accounts to the COA or provincial auditor for two months after they should be rendered. The provision does not require prior notice or demand; where the law is clear, courts may not introduce exceptions or conditions. The Court applied this to hold petitioner liable despite his claim that he was not reminded.
• Elements of Article 218, Revised Penal Code — The offense requires: (1) that the offender is a public officer, whether in the service or separated therefrom; (2) that he must be an accountable officer for public funds or property; (3) that he is required by law or regulation to render accounts to the COA or to a provincial auditor; and (4) that he fails to do so for a period of two months after such accounts should be rendered. The Court used these elements to distinguish Article 218 from the anti-graft offense.
• Same act may give rise to separate and distinct charges — A single act may constitute violations of two or more penal provisions. Acquittal in one does not necessarily bar conviction in another where the elements of the offenses differ. The Court applied this to hold that petitioner’s acquittal under Section 3(e) of RA 3019 did not preclude conviction under Article 218.
• Return or full restitution as a mitigating circumstance — In malversation, payment, indemnification, or reimbursement of misappropriated funds may mitigate liability as analogous to voluntary surrender. The Court extended the same reasoning to Article 218, treating petitioner’s return of the unliquidated cash advance as a mitigating circumstance.
• Article 64(5), Revised Penal Code — When two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstances are present, the penalty next lower to that prescribed by law shall be imposed. The Court applied this to reduce the penalty to arresto mayor in its maximum period.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law inapplicable where maximum term does not exceed one year — Section 2 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law excludes cases where the maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed one year. The Court considered the penalty actually imposed by the trial court, not the imposable penalty, and held that a straight penalty was proper.
• COA Circular No. 90-331 liquidation periods — Accountable officers must liquidate petty operating expenses and field operating expenses within 20 days after the end of the year. The Court used this to fix January 20, 1995 as the deadline for petitioner’s 1994 cash advance and March 20, 1995 as the deadline to avoid Article 218 liability.

• "A prior notice or demand for liquidation of cash advances is not a condition sine qua non before an accountable public officer may be held liable under Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code." — States the ratio decidendi on the central issue of whether prior demand is required.
• "The acquittal of petitioner in the anti-graft case is not a bar to his conviction for failure to render an account in the present case." — States the holding on the effect of the prior acquittal under RA 3019.
• "The question has been settled in Manlangit v. Sandiganbayan where we ruled that prior demand to liquidate is not necessary to hold an accountable officer liable for violation of Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code:" — Identifies the controlling precedent on the demand requirement.
• "The Indeterminate Sentence Law, under Section 2, is not applicable to, among others, cases where the maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed one year." — States the rule that led to imposition of a straight penalty rather than an indeterminate sentence.

• Manlangit vs. Sandiganbayan, 558 Phil. 166, 174 (2007) — Controlling precedent; held that prior demand to liquidate is not necessary to hold an accountable officer liable under Article 218 and listed its elements.
• Suero vs. People, 490 Phil. 760, 771 (2005) — Cited for the rule that the same act may give rise to two or more separate and distinct charges.
• Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans vs. Desierto, 585 Phil. 1, 14-15 (2008) — Cited for the elements of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019.
• Kimpo vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 95604, April 29, 1994, 232 SCRA 53, 62 — Cited for the rule that payment, indemnification, or reimbursement in malversation may be a mitigating circumstance analogous to voluntary surrender.
• Ladino vs. Garcia, 333 Phil. 254, 259 (1996) and People vs. Dimalanta, 92 Phil. 239, 242 (1952) — Cited for the rule that ISL applicability is determined by the penalty actually imposed by the trial court, not the imposable penalty.
• United States vs. Saberon — Distinguished; involved Act No. 1740 where prior demand was required, unlike Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code.

• Article 218, Revised Penal Code — Defines failure of accountable officer to render accounts and prescribes prisión correccional in its minimum period, or a fine from ₱200.00 to ₱6,000.00, or both. The Court applied it to affirm petitioner's conviction.
• Section 3(e), Republic Act No. 3019 — Defines the anti-graft offense for which petitioner was acquitted. The Court compared its elements with Article 218 to hold that the acquittal did not bar conviction.
• Section 5, COA Circular No. 90-331 — Requires accountable officers to liquidate petty operating expenses and field operating expenses within 20 days after the end of the year. The Court used it to determine that petitioner's 1994 cash advance was due for liquidation on or before January 20, 1995.
• Article 64(5), Revised Penal Code — Requires imposition of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by law when two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstances are present. The Court applied it to reduce the penalty.
• Section 2, Indeterminate Sentence Law — Excludes from the ISL cases where the maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed one year. The Court applied it to impose a straight penalty.
• Article 217, Revised Penal Code — Malversation of public funds; cited by analogy for treating payment, indemnification, or reimbursement as a mitigating circumstance. The Court extended the reasoning to Article 218.

Antonio T. Carpio (Chairperson), Arturo D. Brion, Jose Portugal Perez, and Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe.