Lugtu vs. Court of Appeals

The discharge of an accused as state witness under Section 9, Rule 119 is valid when there is absolute necessity for his testimony—such as when he alone can link a co-accused to the conspiracy—and the trial court's finding that the conditions exist is within its sound discretion.

Domingo V. Lugtu, Rosa L. Cancio, and Clodualdo F. Vitug were co-accused in Criminal Case No. 390 for estafa. Cancio was Lugtu's employer, while Vitug was an Acting Paying Teller of the Philippine National Bank. The governing rule is Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, which allows the discharge of one or more accused as state witnesses when specified conditions are present.

Domingo V. Lugtu, Rosa L. Cancio, and Clodualdo F. Vitug were charged in an information filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Bataan in the Court of First Instance of Bataan with estafa. The information alleged that the three accused, with intent to cause damage and defraud, conspired and mutually helped one another; Cancio and Vitug induced Lugtu to open a checking account with Continental Bank, Guagua Branch, and to purchase a checkbook; Lugtu signed the checks in blank and delivered them to Vitug, an Acting Paying Teller of the Philippine National Bank; Vitug, knowing Lugtu had insufficient funds, filled out the checks payable to "CASH," endorsed, encashed, and paid them to himself in the aggregate amount of P172,400; upon presentation to the drawee bank, the checks were dishonored for insufficiency of funds and/or "no arrangement"; and despite repeated demands, the accused failed and refused to remit, pay, or deposit the corresponding amounts to the damage and prejudice of the Philippine National Bank.

At arraignment, all accused pleaded not guilty. After presenting three witnesses, the Provincial Fiscal filed a motion to discharge Lugtu so he could be utilized as witness for the government. Judge Abraham P. Vera denied the motion. The Provincial Fiscal and private prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration, attaching Lugtu's affidavit dated 8 February 1974; Cancio filed an opposition, and the parties submitted reply, rejoinder, and comment. In an Order dated 19 June 1974, Judge Vera reconsidered his earlier order, found that the prosecution had fully complied with Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, and authorized Lugtu's discharge from the information so he could be used as government witness.

Cancio filed a motion for reconsideration of the 19 June 1974 Order, calling attention to Lugtu's earlier Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 10 March 1973 executed before the PC of Bataan. The trial court denied the motion in an Order dated 11 January 1975, and denied her second motion for reconsideration on 15 February 1975. In the 15 February 1975 Order, the trial court stated that after considering the arguments and scrutinizing Lugtu's Sinumpaang Salaysay before PC C2C Marino Ravelo at the Bataan Constabulary Command in Camp Tolentino, Balanga, Bataan on March 10, 1973, it found no reasonable ground to set aside its previous discharge order.

Cancio then filed with the CA a petition for certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion or excess of jurisdiction in the three orders, and praying for their reversal. On 17 September 1975, the CA promulgated its decision in CA-G.R. No. 04122-SP, set aside the three assailed orders, and ordered Lugtu's reinstatement to the information. The CA considered Lugtu's 10 March 1973 Sinumpaang Salaysay, in which he admitted his responsibility, and the testimony of the three prosecution witnesses on the modus operandi—Lugtu opened a checking account with Continental Bank in Guagua, Pampanga, issued checks cashed by Vitug with the PNB Branch in Balanga, Bataan, and the checks were not covered by sufficient funds—as direct evidence available to the prosecution, making Lugtu's testimony unnecessary.

The CA itself acknowledged that the three prosecution witnesses presented by the prosecution only mentioned Vitug and Lugtu and never brought Cancio into the picture, and that while the prosecution had adduced evidence of conspiracy between Lugtu and Vitug, Cancio's involvement in the conspiracy had not been clearly established. The trial judge, on the other hand, found Lugtu not to be the most guilty, noting that Lugtu, who was unable to post a bond, was introduced by his employer Cancio to Vitug, then a teller at the PNB Balanga branch; that upon prodding by Vitug and Cancio, Lugtu opened a current account with Continental Bank at Guagua, Pampanga; that Lugtu was told to buy a checkbook and sign all the checks in blank; and that when Lugtu protested why he was made to open the account and sign blank checks, he was told that if the account were in Vitug's name, the bank might learn about it and Vitug might lose his job.

• Conditions under Section 9, Rule 119: Petitioners contended that the CA erred in finding that the conditions required under Section 9, Rule 119 were not present when the trial court approved Lugtu's discharge.
• Timing and Consideration of the Sinumpaang Salaysay: Petitioners argued that Lugtu's Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 10 March 1973 was not yet presented or before the trial court when it resolved their motion for reconsideration of its first order denying discharge; it was only brought to the trial judge's attention after Cancio filed her motion for reconsideration of the 19 June 1974 order, and the trial judge in fact passed upon it in his 15 February 1975 order.
• Corroboration by Prosecution Witnesses: Petitioners asserted that the testimony of the three prosecution witnesses can substantially corroborate Lugtu's testimony in its material points, as the trial court correctly ruled; their testimony centered on the modus operandi of the swindle.
• Lugtu Not Most Guilty: Petitioners maintained that the trial court, after thoroughly and exhaustively examining and evaluating the facts and evidence on record, found Lugtu not to be the most guilty; being a poor and ignorant man, he was easily convinced by Vitug and Cancio, his employer, to open the account with Continental Bank in Guagua, which led to the commission of the offense.
• No Prior Conviction: Petitioners stated that both the trial court and the CA found that Lugtu had not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Respondent Cancio alleged that the trial judge committed grave abuse of discretion or acted in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the three orders authorizing Lugtu's discharge.

• Discharge under Section 9, Rule 119: Whether the CA erred in finding that the conditions required under Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court were not present when the trial court approved Lugtu's discharge from the information.
• Absolute Necessity and No Other Direct Evidence: Whether there was absolute necessity for Lugtu's testimony and no other direct evidence available for the prosecution, considering the testimony of the three prosecution witnesses and Lugtu's 10 March 1973 Sinumpaang Salaysay.
• Most Guilty: Whether Lugtu appeared to be the most guilty, thus disqualifying him from discharge as a state witness.
• Admissibility of the Sinumpaang Salaysay: Whether Lugtu's 10 March 1973 Sinumpaang Salaysay could be considered as direct evidence against the discharge, given that it was executed without counsel in compliance with Article IV, Section 20 of the 1973 Constitution.

• Discharge under Section 9, Rule 119: Yes. The CA erred; the trial court's discharge of Lugtu was valid because the conditions under Section 9, Rule 119 were present.
• Absolute Necessity and No Other Direct Evidence: Yes. There was absolute necessity for Lugtu's testimony and no other direct evidence, because the three prosecution witnesses did not implicate Cancio and the 10 March 1973 Sinumpaang Salaysay was inadmissible.
• Most Guilty: No. Lugtu did not appear to be the most guilty; the trial court found he was not the most guilty and that finding was within its sound discretion.
• Admissibility of the Sinumpaang Salaysay: No. The 10 March 1973 Sinumpaang Salaysay was inadmissible because there was no showing it was executed in the presence or with the aid of counsel in compliance with Article IV, Section 20 of the 1973 Constitution.

• Discharge under Section 9, Rule 119: Section 9, Rule 119 permits the competent court, before the accused enter their defense, to discharge one or more accused with their consent as state witnesses when in the court's judgment the five conditions are present. The trial court found that the prosecution had fully complied with Section 9, Rule 119 and authorized Lugtu's discharge. The SC held that the discharge of an accused lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, which has the exclusive responsibility to see that the conditions prescribed by the Rule exist. The trial judge was in a position to evaluate the evidence available so far, and the SC found no abuse of discretion. Thus the CA erred in setting aside the discharge orders.
• Absolute Necessity and No Other Direct Evidence: The information charged the three accused with conspiring and confederating in estafa. The CA treated the testimony of the three prosecution witnesses and Lugtu's 10 March 1973 Sinumpaang Salaysay as direct evidence available to the prosecution, making Lugtu's testimony unnecessary. The SC disagreed. The CA itself acknowledged that the three prosecution witnesses only mentioned Vitug and Lugtu and never brought Cancio into the picture, and that while evidence of conspiracy between Lugtu and Vitug had been adduced, Cancio's involvement was not clearly established. Lugtu's testimony was therefore the direct evidence to link the events from the opening of the checking account up to the time the checkbook reached the PNB branch in Balanga. The SC reiterated that discharge is proper only when there is absolute necessity for the accused's testimony, as when he alone has knowledge of the crime, not when his testimony would merely corroborate or strengthen the prosecution's evidence. The 10 March 1973 Sinumpaang Salaysay merely complemented and supplemented the 8 February 1974 affidavit and did not contain all the details.
• Most Guilty: The CA's finding that Lugtu was just as guilty as Vitug and therefore should not be discharged was untenable. The Rules do not disqualify an accused from being discharged as a state witness merely because he committed falsification or actually committed the crime charged. The requirement is that the accused does not appear to be the "most guilty." The candid admission of an accused of his participation in a crime is a guaranty that he will testify truthfully, so even an accused who actually participated in the offense charged may still be made a witness. The trial judge found Lugtu not to be the most guilty, noting that Lugtu was a poor and ignorant man who was easily convinced by Vitug and Cancio, his employer, to open the account with Continental Bank in Guagua, which led to the offense.
• Admissibility of the Sinumpaang Salaysay: The 10 March 1973 Sinumpaang Salaysay was executed before a constabulary soldier who asked the questions of Lugtu. There was no showing that Lugtu executed it in the presence or with the aid of counsel in compliance with Article IV, Section 20 of the 1973 Constitution. The SC therefore held it inadmissible in evidence. It also noted that the statement merely complemented and supplemented the 8 February 1974 affidavit and did not contain all the details compared to the later statement.

• Discharge of an Accused as State Witness under Section 9, Rule 119 — When two or more persons are charged with an offense, the competent court, before they enter their defense, may direct one or more of them to be discharged with their consent so they may be witnesses for the government when in the court's judgment: (a) there is absolute necessity for the testimony of the defendant whose discharge is requested; (b) there is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of said defendant; (c) the testimony of said defendant can be substantially corroborated in its material points; (d) said defendant does not appear to be the most guilty; and (e) said defendant has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude. The SC applied this by upholding the trial court's discharge of Lugtu after finding full compliance with the conditions.
• Sound Discretion of the Trial Court — The discharge of an accused lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, which has the exclusive responsibility to see that the conditions prescribed by the Rule exist. The SC applied this by deferring to the trial judge's evaluation of the evidence and finding no abuse of discretion.
• Absolute Necessity for the Accused's Testimony — Discharge is proper only when there is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested, as when he alone has knowledge of the crime, and not when his testimony would simply corroborate or otherwise strengthen the evidence in the hands of the prosecution. The SC applied this because Lugtu's testimony was needed to link Cancio to the conspiracy, while the three prosecution witnesses did not implicate her.
• "Most Guilty" Requirement — The Rules do not disqualify an accused from being discharged as a state witness merely because he committed falsification or actually committed the crime charged; the requirement is that he does not appear to be the "most guilty." The candid admission of an accused of his participation in a crime is a guaranty that he will testify truthfully, so even an accused who actually participated in the offense charged may still be made a witness. The SC applied this by upholding the trial court's finding that Lugtu was not the most guilty.
• Admissibility of an Uncounseled Sworn Statement — A Sinumpaang Salaysay is inadmissible when there is no showing that it was executed in the presence or with the aid of counsel in compliance with Article IV, Section 20 of the 1973 Constitution. The SC applied this to Lugtu's 10 March 1973 Sinumpaang Salaysay.

• "The discharge of an accused should be availed of only when there is absolute necessity for the testimony of said accused whose discharge is requested, as when he alone has knowledge of the crime, and not when his testimony would simply corroborate or otherwise strengthen the evidence in the hands of the prosecution." — The SC states the absolute necessity requirement for discharging an accused as a state witness.
• "The Rules do not disqualify an accused sought to be discharged as witness for the state merely on the ground that he has committed a falsification himself, or that he had actually committed the crime charged. The Rules say that it is necessary that the said defendant does not appear to be the 'most guilty,' from which the conclusion follows that the guilt of an accused of the crime charged is no reason why he may not be excluded as witness for the State." — The SC explains that actual participation in the crime does not bar discharge; the accused must simply not appear to be the most guilty.
• "It is settled that the discharge of an accused lies within the sound discretion of the trial court which has the exclusive responsibility to see that the conditions prescribed by the Rule (for discharge of an accused) exist." — The SC states the standard of review over the trial court's discharge order.
• "Moreover, since there is no showing that the said Sinumpaang Salaysay of 10 March 1973 was executed by Lugtu in the presence or with the aid of counsel in compliance with Article IV, Section 20, of the (1973) Constitution, the same is inadmissible in evidence." — The SC rules on the inadmissibility of Lugtu's earlier sworn statement.

• Flores vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 63677, August 12, 1983, 124 SCRA 109 — Cited for the rule that discharge is proper only when there is absolute necessity for the accused's testimony, as when he alone has knowledge of the crime.
• People vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 55532, July 31, 1984, 131 SCRA 107 — Cited for the rule that an accused is not disqualified as a state witness merely because he committed the crime charged or falsification; he must not appear to be the most guilty.
• People vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 62881, August 30, 1983, 124 SCRA 338 — Cited for the rule that the discharge of an accused lies within the sound discretion of the trial court.
• People vs. Tabayoyong, G.R. No. L-31084, May 29, 1981, 104 SCRA 724 — Cited for the same rule on the trial court's sound discretion in discharging an accused as a state witness.

• Section 9, Rule 119, Rules of Court — Provides the conditions for discharge of one or more accused as state witnesses: (a) absolute necessity for the testimony; (b) no other direct evidence available except the testimony; (c) substantial corroboration in material points; (d) accused does not appear most guilty; and (e) no prior conviction of an offense involving moral turpitude. The SC applied it by upholding the trial court's finding that the prosecution had fully complied with the section and that Lugtu's discharge was valid.
• Article IV, Section 20, 1973 Constitution — The SC applied it by holding Lugtu's 10 March 1973 Sinumpaang Salaysay inadmissible because there was no showing it was executed in the presence or with the aid of counsel in compliance with this provision.