Luego vs. Civil Service Commission

The Court held that the Civil Service Commission's authority under the Civil Service Decree (P.D. No. 807) is confined to verifying whether an appointee possesses the required civil service eligibility and qualifications. If the appointee is qualified, the Commission must attest to the appointment. The Commission has no power to revoke a permanent appointment on the ground that another person is better qualified, as this constitutes an impermissible encroachment on the discretionary appointing power of the official vested by law with that authority.

Petitioner Felimon Luego was appointed as Administrative Officer II in the Office of the City Mayor of Cebu City by then-Mayor Florentino Solon on February 18, 1983. The appointment was designated as "permanent" on the Civil Service form. The Civil Service Commission, however, approved it as "temporary," subject to the resolution of a protest filed by private respondent Felicula Tuozo and another employee. On March 22, 1984, after hearings, the Commission found Tuozo better qualified than Luego and ordered that Tuozo be appointed in place of Luego, whose appointment was thereby revoked. Tuozo was subsequently appointed by the new mayor. Luego challenged this order before the Supreme Court, invoking the protection of his permanent appointment.

• On February 18, 1983, Mayor Florentino Solon of Cebu City appointed petitioner Felimon Luego as Administrative Officer II. The appointment was denominated as "permanent."
• The Civil Service Commission approved the appointment as "temporary," conditioned on the resolution of a pending protest filed by private respondent Felicula Tuozo and another employee.
• On March 22, 1984, the Commission, after hearings, found Tuozo better qualified than Luego. It issued a resolution revoking Luego's appointment and directing that Tuozo be appointed to the position.
• On June 28, 1984, the new mayor, Ronald Duterte, appointed Tuozo as Administrative Officer II.
• Both parties were acknowledged by the Commission as qualified for the position.

• Petitioner maintained that his appointment was permanent and thus protected by the constitutional security of tenure. He argued the Commission had no authority to revoke it based on a finding that another person was better qualified.
• He contended that the Commission's power is limited to attesting to an appointee's qualifications, not to choosing between qualified candidates.

• The Solicitor General, representing the public respondent, argued that Luego's appointment was effectively temporary because the Commission's approval was temporary. Therefore, his appointment could be withdrawn at will, and he had no security of tenure.
• Private respondent Tuozo's position was implicitly aligned with the Commission's finding that she was the better-qualified candidate.

• Procedural Issues: Whether the petitioner properly availed himself of the remedy of certiorari to challenge the Commission's resolution.
• Substantive Issues: Whether the Civil Service Commission is authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on the ground that another person is better qualified and, on that basis, order the appointee's replacement.

• Procedural: The Court addressed the substantive issue without explicitly ruling on the procedural propriety of the petition, implying its acceptance of the remedy to resolve the fundamental question of the Commission's authority.
• Substantive: The Court ruled in favor of the petitioner. It held that the Commission's act of stamping "APPROVED as TEMPORARY" did not alter the permanent nature of the appointment made by the appointing authority. The Commission's role is limited to attestation—verifying compliance with Civil Service laws. Once it is determined that an appointee is qualified, the Commission's duty is to approve the appointment. It has no discretionary power to compare qualifications and revoke an appointment on the basis that another candidate is superior. Such an act usurps the discretionary appointing power vested by law in the city mayor.

• Discretionary Nature of Appointments and the Limited Role of the Civil Service Commission — The power of appointment is essentially discretionary and vested in the officer or body specified by law. The Civil Service Commission's authority is non-discretionary and confined to attesting that the appointee meets the minimum eligibility and qualification requirements prescribed by law. The Commission cannot substitute its judgment for that of the appointing authority on matters of wisdom or comparative merit.

• "Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law."
• "The Commission has no choice but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Laws."
• "To be sure, it had no authority to revoke the said appointment simply because it believed that the private respondent was better qualified for that would have constituted an encroachment on the discretion vested solely in the city mayor."

• In Re: Elvira C. Arcega (89 SCRA 318) — Cited for the principle that the determination of the kind of appointment to be extended lies with the appointing officer, not the Civil Service Commission, and that the Commission's role is limited to attestation when the appointee is qualified.
• Villanueva vs. Bellalo (9 SCRA 407), Said Benzar Ali vs. Teehankee (46 SCRA 728), Santos vs. Chico (25 SCRA 343), City of Manila vs. Subido (17 SCRA 231) — Cited collectively to support the established doctrine that the Civil Service Commission's attestation is merely a check on compliance with civil service laws, not a grant of discretionary power over appointments.

• Section 9(h), Article V of the Civil Service Decree (P.D. No. 807) — Cited by the Commission to justify its power to "approve" and "disapprove" appointments. The Court interpreted this provision strictly, holding that the power to "disapprove" is expressly limited to cases where "the appointees do not possess appropriate eligibility or required qualifications." It does not extend to disapproving an appointment because another person is better qualified.
• Section 19(5), Article VIII of P.D. No. 807 — Cited to note that vacancies may be filled by various means (transfer, reinstatement, etc.), indicating that the next-in-rank rule is not absolute.