Luces vs. People of the Philippines

An affidavit of desistance obtained as an afterthought and disowned by the affiants through testimony is stripped of probative value and cannot overcome positive identification in open court. Additionally, voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance under Article 13(7) of the Revised Penal Code requires spontaneous acknowledgment of guilt and unconditional submission to authorities; a surrender made solely to disclaim responsibility and after a warrant of arrest has been issued does not qualify.

On the evening of November 11, 1997, Clemente Dela Gracia, Dante Reginio, and Nelson Magbanua were walking along a road at Barangay La Rioja, Patnongon, Antique, on their way to the house of Didoy Elican. They encountered Joel Luces, who collared Dela Gracia, uttered a threat, and immediately stabbed him in the chest with a Batangueño knife. The place was illuminated by a street light. Dela Gracia was rushed to the hospital but died from the stab wound. Luces fled. An Information for Murder qualified by treachery was filed against Luces.

• Prosecution’s Version: At around 6:30 p.m. on November 11, 1997, Dante Reginio, Nelson Magbanua, and victim Clemente Dela Gracia were walking along the road at Barangay La Rioja, Patnongon, Antique. Petitioner Joel Luces met them, collared Dela Gracia, and said, “Get it if you will not get it tonight, I will kill you.” Petitioner immediately stabbed Dela Gracia in the chest with a Batangueño knife. A street light three to four arm’s lengths away illuminated the area, allowing Reginio, a barangay mate of petitioner, to recognize him. The victim was rushed to the hospital while petitioner fled. On November 14, 1997, Reginio and Magbanua executed a sworn statement identifying petitioner as the culprit.

• Medical Evidence: Dr. Deogracias P. Solis examined the cadaver and found a stab wound about two centimeters long on the chest at the mid-sternal line, fracturing the fourth rib and injuring the right auricle, causing shock cardiogenic death. An incised muscle-deep wound was also noted on the left palm. The cause of death was determined as shock cardiogenic due to the stab wound.

• Defense’s Version: Petitioner claimed he was in San Jose, Antique at 6:00 p.m. on November 11, 1997, waiting for his wife to arrive from Iloilo City. They arrived home in Barangay La Rioja at about 7:30 p.m. The next day he learned he was a suspect, went into hiding, but was convinced by his mother to surrender. On November 25, 1997, he surrendered to the police station of San Jose, Antique, and denied authorship of the crime.

• Affidavit of Desistance: On November 14, 1997, an affidavit of desistance was purportedly executed by Reginio and Magbanua stating that, upon reflection, the assailant was not Joel Luces but “some other persons” because it was dark and they were far from the scene. When confronted, Reginio denied signing the affidavit and claimed his signature was forged. Magbanua admitted signing but stated he did so out of pity for petitioner’s pregnant wife and that Reginio was not with him when he signed at petitioner’s house. Atty. Maribeth T. Padios, the branch clerk of court before whom the affidavit was subscribed, testified that two individuals represented themselves as Reginio and Magbanua and signed in her presence; she did not verify their identities or explain the contents of the document.

• Flight and Surrender: Petitioner went into hiding after learning he was a suspect. He surrendered on November 25, 1997. At the time of surrender, a warrant of arrest had already been issued on November 14, 1997.

• Guilt Not Proven Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Petitioner argued that the prosecution failed to establish his identity as the perpetrator beyond reasonable doubt because the affidavit of desistance executed by the two key witnesses cast doubt on the identification.
• Probative Value of the Affidavit of Desistance: Petitioner contended that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in not giving weight and credence to the affidavit of desistance which explicitly stated that the true culprit was not Joel Luces but some other persons.
• Flight as Indication of Guilt: Petitioner maintained that his act of hiding and eventual surrender should not have been taken as an inference of guilt because he voluntarily surrendered to clear his name.
• Defense of Alibi: Petitioner asserted that his alibi—that he was in San Jose, Antique at the approximate time of the incident—should have been given credence, particularly in light of the affidavit of desistance that weakened the prosecution’s identification evidence.

• Positive Identification: Respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General, maintained that the positive and categorical identification of petitioner by eyewitness Dante Reginio, who bore no ill motive, was sufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt and must prevail over the recanted affidavit.
• Impeachment of Affidavit of Desistance: Respondent argued that the affidavit was legally worthless because the affiants disowned it in open court, either denying the signature or asserting it was signed under undue pressure, and because the subscribing officer failed to verify the identities of the persons who swore to it.
• Failure of Alibi: Respondent contended that the defense of alibi was inherently weak, could not stand against positive identification, and failed to meet the requirement of physical impossibility since San Jose, Antique was only a thirty-minute drive from the crime scene.
• Inference from Flight: Respondent asserted that petitioner’s flight, in the absence of a credible explanation, was correctly considered by the lower courts as a circumstance indicative of guilt.

• Identity of the Perpetrator: Whether the prosecution established petitioner’s identity as the assailant beyond reasonable doubt.
• Probative Value of the Affidavit of Desistance: Whether the affidavit of desistance executed by Dante Reginio and Nelson Magbanua should have been given weight and created reasonable doubt.
• Defense of Alibi: Whether the trial and appellate courts correctly rejected the defense of alibi.
• Flight as Circumstantial Evidence: Whether petitioner’s act of going into hiding was properly considered as a circumstance from which an inference of guilt could be drawn.
• Mitigating Circumstance of Voluntary Surrender: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in appreciating voluntary surrender in favor of petitioner.
• Proper Penalty: What the correct indeterminate penalty should be, considering the presence or absence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances.

• Identity of the Perpetrator: The prosecution proved petitioner’s identity beyond reasonable doubt. Dante Reginio’s positive identification was credible, consistent, and made under sufficient illumination by a street light; he had known petitioner as a barangay mate and had no ill motive to testify falsely. The trial court’s assessment of his credibility was not disturbed, no substantial fact having been overlooked.
• Probative Value of the Affidavit of Desistance: The affidavit of desistance was stripped of all probative value. Dante Reginio denied his signature, claiming forgery; Nelson Magbanua admitted signing only out of pity but affirmed his prior identification of petitioner. The subscribing officer did not verify the identities of the signatories nor explain the contents of the document. An affidavit of desistance obtained as an afterthought and through undue pressure cannot outweigh sworn testimony given in open court. Consequently, the affidavit did not create reasonable doubt.
• Defense of Alibi: The defense of alibi was correctly rejected. For alibi to prosper, the accused must demonstrate physical impossibility of being at the crime scene. San Jose, Antique was only a thirty-minute public utility vehicle ride from Patnongon, Antique, thus not physically impossible. Positive identification by the prosecution witness defeated the alibi.
• Flight as Circumstantial Evidence: Petitioner’s flight was properly weighed against him. He went into hiding upon learning he was a suspect and surrendered only after a warrant of arrest was issued. Absent a credible explanation, flight supports an inference of guilt because a truly innocent person would normally seize the first chance to defend himself and assert innocence.
• Mitigating Circumstance of Voluntary Surrender: Voluntary surrender should not have been appreciated. The requisites—(1) the offender has not actually been arrested; (2) he surrendered to a person in authority; and (3) the surrender was voluntary and spontaneous, showing an intent to submit unconditionally, either acknowledging guilt or saving the authorities trouble—were not fully met. Petitioner surrendered not to acknowledge the crime but to disclaim responsibility, as held in People v. Viernes. Moreover, a warrant of arrest had already been issued, making his arrest imminent, thus the surrender lacked the required spontaneity. Therefore, no mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender was credited.
• Proper Penalty: Homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code is punished by reclusion temporal. With no aggravating or mitigating circumstance present, the penalty must be imposed in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the correct indeterminate penalty is eight years and one day of prision mayor as minimum, to fourteen years and eight months of reclusion temporal as maximum. The awards of P50,000.00 civil indemnity and P10,000.00 nominal damages were sustained.

• Affidavit of Desistance — An affidavit of desistance obtained after the execution of a prior sworn statement and repudiated in court by the affiants—either on the ground of forgery or undue pressure—is devoid of probative value. It cannot overcome the affiants’ positive and credible testimony identifying the accused. The sworn testimony in open court prevails over a retraction made outside of judicial proceedings.
• Voluntary Surrender — For voluntary surrender under Article 13(7) of the Revised Penal Code to be mitigating, the surrender must be spontaneous, made with intent to submit unconditionally to the authorities, and accompanied by either acknowledgment of guilt or the desire to save the State the trouble and expense of search and capture. A surrender made solely to clear one’s name, and after a warrant of arrest has been issued, does not satisfy the requisites.
• Alibi — The defense of alibi is inherently weak. To be credited, the accused must prove not merely that he was somewhere else but that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. Where the distance is easily traversable (e.g., a thirty-minute drive), alibi cannot succeed. Positive identification by a credible witness renders alibi unavailing.
• Flight — The flight of an accused, when unexplained, is a circumstance from which an inference of guilt may be drawn. A truly innocent person would normally grasp the first available opportunity to defend himself and assert his innocence.
• Treachery — Treachery requires: (1) that the means, methods, and forms of execution gave the victim no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and (2) that such means were deliberately and consciously adopted. A frontal attack, the presence of companions, and a defensive wound on the victim’s palm indicate that the victim had a real chance to defend himself. A casual encounter without evidence of deliberate planning precludes a finding of treachery.
• Credibility of Witnesses — The trial court’s findings of fact, especially on the credibility of witnesses, are accorded great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal unless facts or circumstances of substance and value have been overlooked that would affect the outcome.

• “An affidavit of desistance obtained as an afterthought and through intimidation or undue pressure attains no probative value in light of the affiant’s testimony to the contrary.”
• “Voluntary surrender presupposes repentance. … going to the police station to clear one’s name does not show any intent to surrender unconditionally to the authorities.”
• “The flight of an accused, in the absence of a credible explanation, would be a circumstance from which an inference of guilt may be established ‘for a truly innocent person would normally grasp the first available opportunity to defend himself and to assert his innocence.’”
• “The settled rule is that the findings of fact of the trial court should not be disturbed on appeal, unless some facts or circumstances of substance and value have been overlooked which, if considered, might well affect the result of the case.”

• People v. Acojedo, G.R. No. 138661, November 19, 2001 — Followed; established that an affidavit of desistance contradicted by the affiant’s testimony lacks probative value.
• People v. Viernes, G.R. Nos. 136733-35, December 13, 2001 — Followed; held that surrendering to clear one’s name does not show an unconditional intent to submit to authorities, thus voluntary surrender is not mitigating.
• People v. Nicholas, G.R. No. 142044, November 23, 2001 — Followed; recited the requisites of voluntary surrender and the necessity of spontaneity and acknowledgment of guilt.
• People v. Gelin, G.R. No. 135693, April 1, 2002 — Followed; affirmed that alibi is weak and cannot prevail over positive identification, and that physical impossibility must be shown.
• People v. Salva, G.R. No. 132351, January 10, 2002 — Followed; laid down the elements of treachery and required deliberate adoption of the mode of attack.
• People v. Del Mundo, G.R. No. 138929, October 2, 2001 — Followed; held that flight is a circumstance from which an inference of guilt may be drawn.

• Article 249, Revised Penal Code — Penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal. Applied as the basis for the penalty after the qualifying circumstance of treachery was not proved.
• Article 13(7), Revised Penal Code (Mitigating Circumstance — Voluntary Surrender) — Interpreted to require repentance, spontaneity, and unconditional submission; not applicable where surrender was made to disclaim guilt and after a warrant had issued.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No. 4103, as amended) — Used to fix the minimum and maximum periods of the indeterminate penalty for homicide.

Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Vitug, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ.