Lubos vs. Galupo

Factual findings of the trial court, adopted and confirmed by the Court of Appeals, are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal; accordingly, a party claiming ownership by acquisitive prescription must establish possession in the concept of an owner for the statutory period, and absent just title and good faith, the thirty-year period under Article 1137 must be completed. An ancient document is admissible even if not translated from its Spanish text where no objection was made.

Victoriana Dulay was the original tax declarant of a 10.8224-hectare parcel in Sitio Naganaga, Barrio Cababtuan, Pambujan, Northern Samar. Respondents are the children and heirs of Mansueto Galupo, Sr., who inherited from Juan Galupo; petitioner Lina Abalon Lubos is the daughter of Juan F. Abalon and claims Victoriana Dulay as her great grandmother. The dispute turns on conflicting claims of title and the Civil Code rules on acquisitive prescription, including Articles 1134, 1137, and 1141.

The land subject of the controversy is a parcel of 10.8224 hectares, more or less, located in Sitio Naganaga, Barrio Cababtuan, Municipality of Pambujan, Northern Samar, originally tax declared in the name of Victoriana Dulay under Tax Declaration No. 17056 (Exh. A). Respondents Marites, Delia, Juan, Prudencio, Preciosa, and Mansueto Galupo, Jr. are the children of Mansueto Galupo, Sr. out of two marriages. Petitioner Lina Abalon Lubos is the daughter of Juan F. Abalon and claims Victoriana Dulay as her great grandmother.

According to respondents, on January 28, 1928, Victoriana Dulay and her son Restituto D. Merino sold the property to Juan Galupo through a private instrument written in Spanish entitled "Escritura de Compra y Venta" (Exh. B). Upon Juan Galupo's death, the property was inherited by his son Mansueto Galupo, Sr., who in 1952 caused the cancellation of Tax Declaration No. 17056 and obtained Tax Declaration No. 24041 (Exh. C) in his name. That declaration was superseded in 1985 by Tax Declaration No. 3393 (Exh. D) pursuant to the general revision under P.D. 1621. Mansueto Galupo, Sr. died in 1981, leaving the property to respondents as his heirs.

In 1984, respondents discovered that the land was occupied by tenant farmers of petitioner Lubos. Upon checking with the Office of the Municipal Assessor, they found that Tax Declaration No. 17056 had been "re-assessed" by Lubos, who obtained Tax Declaration No. 34286 (Exh. 3) in her name, while Tax Declaration No. 24041 in their father's name had been removed from the files. On or about November 16, 1990, Lubos sold a portion of the land, measuring 26,670 square meters, to Alicio Poldo, married to Teresita Poldo (Exh. H). Respondents sought annulment of that sale and a declaration that they are the lawful owners.

Petitioner Lubos, for her part, contended that the land was originally owned by Victoriana Dulay alone, her great grandmother, who sold it to her father Juan F. Abalon. According to Lubos, her father possessed the property for over thirty (30) days until 1975, when he sold it to her (Exh. 5); she then caused the cancellation of Tax Declaration No. 17056 and obtained Tax Declaration No. 34286 in her name. She later sold a portion to the spouses Poldo, who claimed to be purchasers in good faith.

The trial court found that the contract between Lubos and her father was fictitious, and the Court of Appeals adopted this finding. Lubos presented no documentary proof of any transaction between her father and Victoriana Dulay; she relied only on the testimonies of tenants who worked on the land. Those testimonies showed that Juan Abalon was in possession as early as 1963, but the nature of his possession could not be categorically determined: tenant Jose Morillo admitted that he did not exactly know who the owner was, while tenant Arturo Tuballas admitted that he did not know how Juan Abalon came to possess the land. At the time Juan Abalon sold the land to Lubos, the property was still declared in the name of Victoriana Dulay.

When respondents filed the case on October 10, 1991, Lubos had been in possession for only twenty-eight (28) years counted from 1963, short of the thirty years required for extraordinary acquisitive prescription. Respondents, in contrast, presented the Escritura de Compra y Venta showing that Victoriana Dulay had sold the land to Juan Galupo; upon Juan Galupo's death, the property passed to Mansueto Galupo, Sr., and respondents inherited it upon their father's death in 1981. The trial court admitted the Escritura de Compra y Venta as an ancient document.

• Chain of Title through Juan F. Abalon: Petitioner contended that the land was originally owned by Victoriana Dulay, her great grandmother, who sold it to her father Juan F. Abalon; he possessed it until 1975, when he sold it to her, after which she caused cancellation of Tax Declaration No. 17056 and obtained Tax Declaration No. 34286 in her name.
• Admissibility of the Escritura de Compra y Venta: Petitioner assailed the admission of the Escritura de Compra y Venta because there was no translation thereof.
• Authenticity and Due Execution: Petitioner claimed that the authenticity and due execution of the Escritura de Compra y Venta must be proven.
• Relevance and Identity of the Land: Petitioner assailed the relevance of the document for failure to show that the land described therein is the same land subject of the controversy.
• Better Right or Title: Petitioner sought to set aside the Court of Appeals decision affirming the Regional Trial Court ruling that respondents are the absolute owners, maintaining that she had a better right or title to the subject lot.

• Ownership as Heirs of Juan Galupo: Respondents claimed that on January 28, 1928, Victoriana Dulay and her son Restituto D. Merino sold the property to Juan Galupo through an Escritura de Compra y Venta; upon Juan Galupo's death, it was inherited by Mansueto Galupo, Sr., and upon his death in 1981, by respondents as his children.
• Tax Declarations: Respondents maintained that Mansueto Galupo, Sr. caused cancellation of Tax Declaration No. 17056 and obtained Tax Declaration No. 24041 in 1952, later superseded by Tax Declaration No. 3393 in 1985; in 1984 they discovered that Lubos had obtained Tax Declaration No. 34286 in her name and that their father's Tax Declaration No. 24041 had been removed from the files.
• Annulment of Sale to Poldo: Respondents sought annulment of the November 16, 1990 sale by Lubos to the spouses Poldo and a declaration that they are the lawful owners of the land.
• Ancient Document: Respondents relied on the Escritura de Compra y Venta, which the trial court admitted as an ancient document.

• Better Right or Title: Whether, as between petitioner Lubos and respondents Galupos, respondents have a better right or title to the subject lot.
• Acquisitive Prescription: Whether petitioner Lubos acquired ownership of the land by acquisitive prescription.
• Admissibility of the Escritura de Compra y Venta: Whether the Escritura de Compra y Venta is admissible despite not being translated from Spanish and despite petitioner's claims that its authenticity, due execution, and relevance were not established.
• Finality of Factual Findings: Whether the factual findings of the trial court, adopted and confirmed by the Court of Appeals, may be reviewed on appeal.

• Better Right or Title: Respondents. The petition was denied and the Court of Appeals decision affirmed; respondents established a chain of title from Victoriana Dulay to Juan Galupo to Mansueto Galupo, Sr. to themselves, while petitioner failed to establish her claimed chain.
• Acquisitive Prescription: No. Petitioner did not acquire the land by prescription; she had no just title or good faith, and her possession from 1963 to October 10, 1991 lasted only twenty-eight years, short of the thirty-year period under Article 1137.
• Admissibility of the Escritura de Compra y Venta: Yes. The document is admissible even if not translated from Spanish because it was not objected to and was an ancient document.
• Finality of Factual Findings: No. Factual findings of the trial court, adopted and confirmed by the Court of Appeals, are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal.

• Better Right or Title: The issue raised is factual. It is a well-settled rule that factual findings of the trial court, adopted and confirmed by the Court of Appeals, are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal. The trial court found the contract between Lubos and her father fictitious, and the Court agreed. Petitioner failed to establish the chain of title through which the land passed to her; no proof was presented that Victoriana Dulay transferred the land to Juan Abalon. Respondents, however, presented the Escritura de Compra y Venta showing that Victoriana Dulay sold the land to Juan Galupo; upon Juan Galupo's death, it was inherited by Mansueto Galupo, Sr., and respondents inherited it upon their father's death in 1981. Thus, respondents had a better right or title.

• Acquisitive Prescription: Article 1141 of the Civil Code provides that real actions over immovables prescribe after thirty years, without prejudice to acquisition of ownership by prescription. To determine whether respondents could still recover the realty, the Court examined whether Lubos had acquired the land by acquisitive prescription. Acquisitive prescription may be ordinary or extraordinary, depending on whether the property is possessed in good faith and with just title for the time fixed by law. Under Article 1134, ordinary prescription of immovables requires ten years; under Article 1137, extraordinary prescription requires uninterrupted adverse possession for thirty years, without need of title or good faith. Just title exists when the adverse claimant came into possession through a mode recognized by law for acquiring ownership or real rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right. Good faith consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom the possessor received the thing was its owner but could not transmit ownership. The trial court found the contract between Lubos and her father fictitious, so she had no just title. Her lack of good faith was apparent because she offered no documentary proof of the transaction between her father and Victoriana Dulay; she presented only tenant testimonies. Those testimonies showed Juan Abalon was in possession as early as 1963, but the nature of his possession could not be categorically determined: one tenant did not exactly know who the owner was, and another did not know how Juan Abalon came to possess the land. The property was still declared in Victoriana Dulay's name when Juan Abalon sold it to Lubos. Possession must be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful, and uninterrupted; possession with a juridical title, such as by a usufructuary, trustee, lessee, agent, or pledgee, cannot ripen into ownership by acquisitive prescription unless the juridical relation is first expressly repudiated and communicated to the other party. Assuming Lubos and her father possessed in the concept of owner, prescription still had not run: from 1963 to the filing of the case on October 10, 1991, Lubos had been in possession for only twenty-eight years, short of the required thirty years of uninterrupted adverse possession without just title and good faith.

• Admissibility of the Escritura de Compra y Venta: The Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that the Escritura de Compra y Venta is admissible even if not translated from its Spanish text because it was not objected to and was an ancient document. The trial court admitted it as an ancient document. Petitioner's failure to establish her own chain of title contrasted with respondents' evidence: the Escritura showed that Victoriana Dulay transferred the land to Juan Galupo, from whom respondents traced their inheritance through Mansueto Galupo, Sr. Thus, the document supported respondents' claim.

• Finality of Factual Findings: The issue raised was factual. It is well-settled that factual findings of the trial court, adopted and confirmed by the Court of Appeals, are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal. The Court therefore did not disturb the lower courts' factual findings.

• Finality of factual findings — Factual findings of the trial court, adopted and confirmed by the Court of Appeals, are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal. The Court applied this rule because the issue of who had a better right or title was factual, and the lower courts' findings were affirmed.
• Acquisitive prescription of immovables — Ownership and other real rights over immovable property may be acquired by ordinary prescription through ten years of possession (Article 1134) or by extraordinary prescription through thirty years of uninterrupted adverse possession without need of title or good faith (Article 1137). Real actions over immovables prescribe after thirty years (Article 1141). Possession must be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful, and uninterrupted. The Court applied these rules and found that petitioner's twenty-eight years of possession did not ripen into ownership.
• Just title — For prescription, there is just title when the adverse claimant came into possession through one of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right. The Court found no just title because the contract between petitioner and her father was fictitious.
• Good faith — Good faith consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom the possessor received the thing was its owner but could not transmit ownership. The Court found petitioner lacked good faith because she offered no documentary proof of the transaction between her father and Victoriana Dulay and the property remained declared in Dulay's name when her father sold it to her.
• Possession in the concept of an owner — Possession with a juridical title, such as by a usufructuary, trustee, lessee, agent, or pledgee, is not possession in the concept of an owner and cannot ripen into ownership by acquisitive prescription unless the juridical relation is first expressly repudiated and communicated to the other party. The Court noted that the nature of Juan Abalon's possession could not be categorically determined from the tenant testimonies.
• Ancient documents — An ancient document is admissible even if not translated from its Spanish text where it was not objected to. The Court upheld the admission of the Escritura de Compra y Venta on this basis.
• Chain of title — A claimant of ownership must establish the chain of title through which the property passed to him or her. Petitioner failed to do so, while respondents traced their title from Victoriana Dulay to Juan Galupo to Mansueto Galupo, Sr. to themselves.

• "It is a well-settled rule that factual findings of the trial court, adopted and confirmed by the Court of Appeals, are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal." — This states the threshold rule that disposed of the factual issue and explains why the lower courts' findings on ownership and possession were no longer reviewable.
• "Acquisitive prescription is a mode of acquiring ownership by a possessor through the requisite lapse of time. In order to ripen into ownership, possession must be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful and uninterrupted. Thus, possession with a juridical title, such as by a usufructuary, a trustee, a lessee, agent or a pledgee, not being in the concept of an owner, cannot ripen into ownership by acquisitive prescription unless the juridical relation is first expressly repudiated and such repudiation has been communicated to the other party." — This is the Court's canonical formulation of the requisites of acquisitive prescription and the rule on juridical possession.
• "When the respondents filed the instant case on October 10, 1991, petitioner Lubos was in possession of the property for only twenty-eight (28) years counted from 1963 as testified to by petitioner's witnesses. This is short of the required thirty years of uninterrupted adverse possession without just title and good faith." — This applies the thirty-year extraordinary prescription period and shows why petitioner's claim failed.
• "With respect to the admissibility of the escritura de compra y venta, we agree with the Court of Appeals that it is admissible even if not translated from its Spanish text because it was not objected to and was an ancient document." — This resolves the evidentiary challenge to the document that established respondents' chain of title.

• Manufacturers Building, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116847, March 16, 2001 — Cited for the rule that factual findings of the trial court, adopted and confirmed by the Court of Appeals, are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal.
• Heirs of Seraspi vs. Court of Appeals, 331 SCRA 293 (2000) — Cited for the rules on ordinary and extraordinary acquisitive prescription and good faith under the Civil Code.
• Tay vs. Court of Appeals, 355 Phil. 381 (1998) — Cited for the principle that possession with a juridical title, not being in the concept of an owner, cannot ripen into ownership by acquisitive prescription unless the juridical relation is first expressly repudiated and communicated to the other party.

• Article 1141, Civil Code — Real actions over immovables prescribe after thirty years, without prejudice to acquisition of ownership and other real rights by prescription. The Court cited this in determining whether respondents could still recover the land.
• Article 1134, Civil Code — Ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired by ordinary prescription through possession of ten years. The Court cited this to distinguish ordinary prescription, which requires good faith and just title.
• Article 1137, Civil Code — Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession for thirty years, without need of title or good faith. The Court applied this because petitioner's possession lasted only twenty-eight years.
• Article 1129, Civil Code — Defines just title for purposes of prescription. The Court used this to conclude that petitioner had no just title because the contract with her father was fictitious.
• Article 1127, Civil Code — Defines good faith for purposes of prescription. The Court used this to conclude that petitioner lacked good faith.
• Rule 45, Revised Rules of Court — The petitioner's appeal to the Supreme Court was taken under Rule 45. The Court gave due course to the petition and resolved it on the merits.
• P.D. 1621 — Cited as the basis for the 1985 general revision of tax declarations, under which Tax Declaration No. 3393 superseded Tax Declaration No. 24041.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.