Loza y Apolonio vs. People of the Philippines

Voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance may be appreciated even when an arrest warrant has already been issued, provided the totality of circumstances demonstrates the accused's spontaneity and intent to submit unconditionally to authorities—including where the accused, unaware of the warrant, voluntarily returns to a law enforcement office and immediately surrenders upon being informed of its existence.

Rodrigo Loza was charged with bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code for contracting a second marriage with Ivy Aringo y Tiansay on September 16, 2002, while his first marriage to Fe Dy Loza remained subsisting and undissolved. The Information was filed on January 23, 2003, with a warrant of arrest issued on January 30, 2003, and an alias warrant on September 30, 2003. The warrant enumerated five places where Loza might be found—Muntinlupa City, Legazpi City, Parañaque City, Pasig City, and Cavite City—but he could not be located at any of them. Loza had been residing in Sta. Rosa, Laguna for over ten years, where he had established his residence and business enterprises, and was living openly under his real name.

Rodrigo Loza was legally married to Fe Dy Loza, with the marriage subsisting and undissolved. On September 16, 2002, he contracted a second marriage with Ivy Aringo y Tiansay in a ceremony solemnized at the Municipal Trial Court in Legazpi City. Fe Dy Loza discovered the subsequent marriage on October 19, 2002. An Information for bigamy was filed on January 23, 2003, with the RTC issuing a warrant of arrest on January 30, 2003, and an alias warrant on September 30, 2003. The warrant enumerated five places where Loza might be found—Muntinlupa City, Legazpi City, Parañaque City, Pasig City, and Cavite City—but he could not be located at any of them. Loza had in fact been residing in Sta. Rosa, Laguna for over ten years, where he had established his residence and business enterprises.

Over thirteen years later, on August 30, 2016, Loza went to the NBI Laguna District Office in Sta. Rosa to apply for an NBI clearance. During processing, his name produced a "hit" indicating a pending case against a person named "Rodrigo Loza." When informed of this, Loza admitted to Special Investigator Mark Anthony G. Diaz that he had a pending case. SI Diaz, lacking records of the case at his office, instructed Loza to return in one week for further interview and allowed him to leave. SI Diaz then verified with the NBI Manila Office and received confirmation of a pending warrant of arrest issued by RTC-Legazpi City in Criminal Case No. 9878.

On September 7, 2016, Loza returned to the NBI Laguna District Office for his follow-up interview. SI Diaz informed him of the pending case in RTC-Legazpi City and the outstanding warrant of arrest. Upon being informed, Loza uttered "Masuko na lang ako" (I will surrender) and sought SI Diaz's help in posting bail. SI Diaz then served the warrant of arrest, informed Loza of his constitutional rights, and issued a Certificate of Detention for the posting of bail. SI Diaz also issued an Endorsement dated September 15, 2016 stating that Loza was "arrested by the operatives of the NBI Laguna District Office," though SI Diaz explained on cross-examination that he routinely used the term "arrested by the authority" in the return of the warrant without considering whether the person had voluntarily surrendered. A Certification dated September 13, 2017 was later issued by SI Diaz stating that Loza "voluntarily surrendered and posted no resistance to the operatives of the Laguna District Office."

Upon arraignment on November 28, 2016, Loza pleaded not guilty. He later filed a Motion to Withdraw Original Plea of Not Guilty on August 23, 2017, which the RTC granted on October 23, 2017, and he was re-arraigned under the same Information, changing his plea to guilty. The defense presented SI Diaz to prove voluntary surrender. The RTC convicted Loza of bigamy, crediting the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty but denying voluntary surrender, finding that Loza had already been "arrested" as indicated in the warrant's return and the order of release, and that his surrender was not spontaneous given the thirteen-year pendency of the warrant. The RTC also assumed Loza's knowledge of the arrest warrant and treated him as effectively a fugitive. The CA affirmed, holding that Loza's arrest was inevitable once his identity and pending case were confirmed, and that his utterance of "masuko na lang ako" was made because he had no other choice.

• Lack of Knowledge of Warrant: Petitioner argued that he was unaware of any outstanding warrant of arrest when he applied for NBI clearance, and that he was not even aware a case had been filed against him, since a person knowing of a pending warrant would not apply for an NBI clearance given the probability of arrest.
• Uncertainty of Identity: Petitioner maintained that at the time of his first visit, both he and the NBI officer were uncertain whether he and the "Rodrigo Loza" in NBI records were one and the same person, and that a "hit" does not necessarily mean the applicant is the person with a pending warrant, as decided, terminated, and withdrawn cases may still appear in NBI records.
• Spontaneous Surrender: Petitioner argued that upon learning of both the pending case and the warrant during his second visit, his utterance of "Masuko na lang ako" and his submission to NBI authority constituted clear spontaneous acts of voluntary surrender, as he could have chosen not to return.
• No Evidence of Flight or Search: Petitioner contended that there was no record of any search conducted by police or NBI to locate and arrest him, and that he had been living openly in Sta. Rosa, Laguna for over ten years under his real name, negating any indication of evasion.
• SI Diaz's Certification: Petitioner emphasized SI Diaz's Certification dated September 13, 2017, which stated that Loza "voluntarily surrendered and posted no resistance" during the conduct of interview for his NBI clearance application.

• Question of Fact: Respondent argued that whether Loza knew about the case filed against him at the time he went to the NBI was a question of fact not within the province of a Rule 45 petition, and that no exceptions to this rule were alleged, substantiated, or proved.
• Knowledge of Pending Case: Respondent maintained that both the CA and RTC found, through SI Diaz's testimony, that Loza in fact knew of his pending case when he went to the NBI, and that since the warrant had been outstanding for thirteen years, he should have surrendered earlier if his intent were genuine.
• Inevitability of Arrest: Respondent contended that Loza's arrest was inevitable once his identity and pending case were confirmed, making his utterance of "masuko na lang ako" immaterial since procedure mandated his arrest regardless of his declaration.
• Incomplete Elements: Respondent argued that the first and third elements of voluntary surrender—that the accused had not been actually arrested and that the surrender was voluntary—were not present, as Loza's arrest was already inevitable and his surrender was not spontaneous.

• Voluntary Surrender: Whether Loza is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender under Article 13(7) of the Revised Penal Code, given that he submitted himself to NBI authorities upon learning of an outstanding warrant during an NBI clearance follow-up interview.

• Voluntary Surrender: Yes. The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender was appreciated, the totality of circumstances demonstrating that Loza had not been actually arrested, surrendered to a person in authority, and did so voluntarily and spontaneously upon learning of the warrant's existence.

• Voluntary Surrender: The Court distilled six guiding principles from competing jurisprudential trains on voluntary surrender. First, voluntariness requires either acknowledgment of guilt or intent to save authorities the trouble and expense of search and capture, as articulated in People vs. Sakam. Second, the circumstances of surrender exist independent of the fact of arrest warrant issuance; the totality of circumstances trumps the mere existence of a warrant, consistent with People vs. Yecla and People vs. Braña, and as clarified in De Vera vs. De Vera. Third, the length of time an accused has evaded the law is only one factor among several, not the sole criterion for negating spontaneity. Fourth, imminence of arrest must be viewed in conjunction with indicators of flight or a fugitive situation, not with the mere issuance of an arrest warrant. Fifth, the accused's intention must be assessed in totality, and surrender at the first opportunity is not required, per People vs. Saul. Sixth, while doubt should not be resolved in favor of the accused per People vs. Banzales, courts must not assume facts not in evidence.

Applying these principles, the Court found that the first two elements were satisfied. The trial court erred in concluding that Loza had been arrested based on documents using the term "arrested," when SI Diaz's testimony confirmed that Loza's words of capitulation were uttered before the warrant was served, and this was not contradicted on cross-examination. SI Diaz also explained that his use of "arrested by the authority" in the warrant return was routine and did not consider whether the person had voluntarily surrendered. SI Diaz, as an NBI agent, was unquestionably a person in authority.

On voluntariness, the Court found no evidence that Loza knew of the arrest warrant prior to September 7, 2016—only that he knew of the pending case. The prosecution presented no evidence of flight or fugitive status; Loza lived openly under his real name for over a decade and even applied for an NBI clearance, which inherently requires disclosing one's identity. Imminence could not be established without proof of flight, as one cannot realize the imminence of arrest when one does not sense authorities closing in. Loza's intention during his first visit—to secure a clearance—was distinct from his intention during his second visit, when he returned knowing his name had a "hit" and most likely knowing he might not emerge free. His immediate, unprompted, and unconditional capitulation upon being informed of the warrant demonstrated spontaneity. The Court noted that Loza could have avoided returning but chose to face the matter, sparing the authorities the trouble of locating and arresting him. The Court also admonished trial courts against assuming facts not in evidence, such as treating Loza as a fugitive without any evidentiary support, and emphasized that the purpose of the mitigating circumstance is both to benefit the accused and to incentivize peaceful submission to lawful custody.

• Voluntary Surrender as a Mitigating Circumstance — Requires three elements: (1) the offender had not been actually arrested; (2) the offender surrendered to a person in authority or the latter's agent; and (3) the surrender was voluntary. Voluntariness requires spontaneity and intent to submit unconditionally, either because the accused acknowledges guilt or wishes to save authorities the trouble and expense of search and capture. The Court distilled six guiding principles: (a) voluntariness requires one of two intentions from Sakam; (b) circumstances of surrender exist independent of arrest warrant issuance, per Yecla and Braña; (c) length of evasion is only one factor, not the sole criterion; (d) imminence of arrest must be viewed alongside flight or fugitive status, not alongside warrant issuance; (e) intention must be assessed in totality, and surrender at the first opportunity is not required per Saul; and (f) doubt should not be resolved in favor of the accused per Banzales, but courts must not assume facts not in evidence.

• Independence of Arrest Warrant from Voluntary Surrender — The mere issuance or existence of an arrest warrant does not automatically negate the voluntariness of a surrender. The totality of circumstances surrounding the act of giving oneself up determines whether the surrender is voluntary, consistent with People vs. Yecla and People vs. Braña, as clarified in De Vera vs. De Vera.

• Imminence of Arrest — Imminence of arrest should be evaluated in conjunction with indicators of flight or a fugitive situation, not with the mere issuance of an arrest warrant. One cannot realize the imminence of arrest or the impossibility of further evasion when one does not sense authorities closing in, which presupposes continuing evasion in the first place.

• "In order that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender may be taken into consideration in favor of an accused, it is necessary that the same be spontaneous in such manner that it shows the intent of said accused to surrender unconditionally to the authorities, either because he acknowledges guilt or because he wishes to save them the trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search and capture." — The canonical formulation from People vs. Sakam (1934), cited as the foundational definition of the spontaneity requirement for voluntary surrender, establishing the two intentions that satisfy voluntariness.

• "The fact that the order of arrest of the appellant had already been issued is no bar to the consideration of this circumstance, because the law does not require that the surrender be prior to the order of arrest." — From People vs. Yecla (1939), establishing that a prior arrest warrant does not per se bar appreciation of voluntary surrender, a principle reaffirmed in People vs. Braña and De Vera vs. De Vera.

• "imminence should not be seen in the context of the issuance of the arrest warrant, but instead it should be viewed in conjunction with any indication of flight or a fugitive situation." — The Court's distilled principle clarifying that imminence relates to actual pursuit or fugitive status, not to the mere existence of a warrant, resolving a tension in prior jurisprudence.

• "The law may be harsh, but it need not be harsher." — The Court's closing admonition that trial courts should apply mitigating circumstances with considerate and broad-minded judgment based on the totality of circumstances, and should not assume facts not in evidence when denying applications for mitigating circumstances.

• People vs. Sakam, 61 Phil. 27 (1934) — Foundational case defining the spontaneity requirement for voluntary surrender; the two intentions (acknowledgment of guilt or saving authorities trouble and expense) originate here. Followed as the canonical formulation.

• People vs. Yecla, 68 Phil. 740 (1939) — Established that the prior issuance of an arrest warrant does not bar appreciation of voluntary surrender. Followed and reaffirmed as the correct rule.

• People vs. Roldan, 132 Phil. 376 (1968) — Considered the issuance of an arrest warrant as depriving surrender of spontaneity. Distinguished and not followed as the controlling rule; represented one of two competing jurisprudential trains.

• People vs. Braña, 140 Phil. 668 (1969) — Reaffirmed Yecla; held that issuance of an arrest warrant does not detract from the voluntary character of surrender absent proof of service. Followed.

• De Vera vs. De Vera, 602 Phil. 877 (2009) — Clarified that notwithstanding the pendency of a warrant, an accused may still be entitled to voluntary surrender depending on the actual facts surrounding the act of giving himself up. Followed and applied.

• People vs. Mazo, 419 Phil. 750 (2001) — Appreciated voluntary surrender where the accused could have fled after encountering a police officer but instead submitted unconditionally hours later. Applied by analogy to Loza's voluntary return to the NBI office.

• People vs. Saul, 423 Phil. 924 (2001) — Held that surrender at the first opportunity is not a requirement for voluntary surrender. Followed to support the proposition that Loza's intention during his first visit should not be the sole determinative factor.

• People vs. Banzales, 232 Phil. 605 (1987) — Held that where the record does not clearly show voluntary surrender, doubt cannot be resolved in favor of the accused. Cited with the caveat that courts must not assume facts not in evidence.

• People vs. Clemente, 128 Phil. 268 (1967) — Held that surrender induced by fear of retaliation does not negate spontaneity. Applied by analogy to Loza's capitulation motivated by resignation to a likely fate.

• Delos Santos vs. People, 868 Phil. 621 (2020) — Held that intent is a state of mind verified through external acts. Applied to assess Loza's intention during his second visit to the NBI office.

• Article 13(7), Revised Penal Code — Provides that voluntary surrender to a person in authority or their agents is a mitigating circumstance. Applied to Loza's surrender to SI Diaz at the NBI Laguna District Office upon being informed of the outstanding warrant.

• Article 349, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes bigamy with prisión mayor (six years and one day to twelve years). Loza was convicted under this provision for contracting a second marriage while his first marriage remained subsisting.

• Article 64(5), Revised Penal Code — Provides that when there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstances, the court shall impose the penalty next lower to that prescribed by law, in the period that it may deem applicable. Applied because Loza had two mitigating circumstances (plea of guilty and voluntary surrender) and no aggravating circumstances, warranting imposition of prisión correccional instead of prisión mayor.

Gesmundo, C.J., Leonen, SAJ., Hernando, Lazaro-Javier, Intting, Zalameda, Rosario, J. Lopez, Dimaampao, Marquez, Kho, Jr., and Villanueva, JJ., concurred.

Caguioa, J., filed a concurring opinion elaborating on several dimensions of the totality of circumstances. He emphasized that knowledge of a pending case is not equivalent to knowledge of an arrest warrant, and that without evidence that Loza was aware a warrant had been issued, the argument that he delayed his surrender is speculative. He noted that Loza lived openly under his real name for over a decade and affirmatively sought out a government agency for an NBI clearance, which strongly militates against any finding of evasive behavior. He distinguished Loza's situation from cases involving fugitive accused, and argued that the standard administrative steps taken by the NBI in processing a "hit" do not rise to the level of burden that the law contemplates in denying voluntary surrender. He also underscored that Loza's later change of plea to guilty remains a relevant factor in assessing the sincerity of his earlier submission. Singh, J., was on leave.