Lovina vs. Moreno

Republic Act No. 2056 does not constitute an unlawful delegation of judicial power to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, as the determination of facts necessary to enforce the statute's general rule against encroachments on navigable waters is merely incidental to the executive power to clear public streams of unauthorized obstructions, provided the party affected is given opportunity to be heard.

Primitivo and Nelly Lovina owned a fishpond in the Municipality of Macabebe, Province of Pampanga, covered by T.C.T. No. 15905 and originally registered under the Torrens system in 1916. The fishpond was created by their predecessor-in-interest, Jose de Jesus, who closed a portion of Sapang Bulati — a creek alleged to have flowed across the property — by constructing dams and dikes at both sides. Republic Act No. 2056 empowers the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, after due notice and hearing, to order the removal of dams, dikes, or other works encroaching into public navigable waters, and to effect removal at the owner's expense if the order is not complied with within thirty days. The Secretary's authority to investigate and clear public streams of unauthorized encroachments traces back to Act 3208 of the old Philippine Legislature.

Primitivo and Nelly Lovina owned a fishpond in the Municipality of Macabebe, Province of Pampanga, covered by T.C.T. No. 15905. The property had been registered under the Torrens system in 1916. According to the findings of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, the Sapang Bulati creek originally flowed across the property, connecting the Nasi river with Sapang Manampil. In 1926 or thereabouts, the creek was approximately two meters deep at high tide and half a meter at low tide, and the people of Macabebe used it as fishing grounds and as a communication way, navigating along its length in bancas. The former registered owner, Jose de Jesus, closed a portion of the creek's course that lay within the lot by constructing dams or dikes at both sides and converting the area into a fishpond.

Numerous residents of Macabebe thereafter petitioned the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, complaining that the Lovinas had blocked Sapang Bulati, a navigable river, and sought removal of the obstructions under Republic Act No. 2056. After notice and hearing, with both the complainants and the Lovinas appearing, investigator Benjamin Yonzon conducted proceedings. The Secretary found the constructions to be a public nuisance in navigable waters and, in his decision dated August 11, 1959, ordered the Lovinas to remove five closures of Sapang Bulati within thirty days; otherwise, the Secretary would effect removal at their expense.

The Lovinas then filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Manila to restrain the Secretary from enforcing his decision. The trial court conducted a hearing and received evidence de novo, including the 1916 registration plan (Exhibit C), which showed the property merely bounded by the Bulati creek on the southeast, and testimony — introduced over the objection of government counsel — that the creek did not enter the property. The CFI found that the Bulati creek "was a mere estero and could not be considered a navigable stream then," granted a permanent injunction, and ruled in effect that Republic Act No. 2056 was unconstitutional. The Government appealed.

The Lovinas contended that Republic Act No. 2056 was unconstitutional as an unlawful delegation of judicial power, arguing that it invested the Secretary with sweeping, unrestrained, final, and unappealable authority to determine whether a river is public and navigable, whether a dam encroaches upon such waters and constitutes a public nuisance, and whether the law applies to the state of facts. They relied on their registration plan and testimony before the CFI to dispute the existence of a navigable stream within their property. Their own caretaker, Yambao, however, had shown investigator Yonzon the old course of the Bulati within the fishpond, and the cross-section profile of the ground near the dams revealed the old channel of the creek. The Lovinas' plan, Exhibit C, itself showed parallel reentrant lines around point 65 and between points 44 and 45 indicating the existence of a stream connecting Sapang Bulati on the southeast and Sapang Manampil on the northwest, which the surveyor apparently failed to delimit. The westward continuation of the Bulati creek west of point 65 was labelled "Etero Mabao," further corroborating the government's evidence.

• Jurisdiction of Trial Court: Appellants questioned the jurisdiction of the trial court to entertain the petition.
• Unconstitutionality of R.A. 2056: Appellants argued that the trial court erred in holding, in effect, that Republic Act No. 2056 is unconstitutional.
• De Novo Reception of Evidence: Appellants maintained that the trial court erred in receiving evidence de novo at the trial of the case, rather than resolving the matter upon the evidence submitted to the Secretary.
• Substitution of Judgment: Appellants argued that the trial court erred in substituting its judgment for that of the Secretary and in reversing the latter's finding that the stream is a navigable river illegally closed by the plaintiffs.
• Navigability of Sapang Bulati: Appellants contended that the trial court erred in holding that Sapang Bulati is a private stream.
• Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: Appellants argued that the lower court erred in not holding that plaintiffs should first exhaust administrative remedies before filing the petition.

• Unconstitutional Delegation of Judicial Power: Appellees argued that Republic Act No. 2056 is unconstitutional because it invests the Secretary of Public Works and Communications with sweeping, unrestrained, final, and unappealable authority to pass upon whether a river or stream is public and navigable, whether a dam encroaches upon such waters and constitutes a public nuisance, and whether the law applies to the state of facts, thereby constituting an unlawful delegation of judicial power.
• Confiscation of Private Property: Appellees contended that the action of the Secretary amounts to a confiscation of private property.
• Navigability Disputed: Appellees relied on the 1916 registration plan of the property (Exhibit C), showing it to be merely bounded by the Bulati creek on the southeast, as well as on testimony introduced at the hearing that the Bulati creek did not enter the property.
• American Rulings on Summary Abatement: Appellees invoked American rulings that abatement as nuisances of properties of great value cannot be done except through court proceedings.

• Constitutionality of R.A. 2056: Whether Republic Act No. 2056 constitutes an unlawful delegation of judicial power to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications.
• Scope of Judicial Review: Whether the trial court erred in receiving evidence de novo and substituting its judgment for that of the Secretary.
• Navigability of Sapang Bulati: Whether Sapang Bulati is a navigable stream that was illegally closed by the registered owner's predecessor.
• Effect of Torrens Title on Navigable Streams: Whether the absence of mention of a navigable stream in a Torrens title precludes subsequent investigation and determination of its existence.
• Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: Whether the Lovinas should have exhausted administrative remedies before filing the petition.

• Constitutionality of R.A. 2056: No. Republic Act No. 2056 does not constitute an unlawful delegation of judicial power; the quasi-judicial functions conferred upon the Secretary are merely incidental to the executive power to clear navigable streams of unauthorized obstructions, provided the party affected is given opportunity to be heard.
• Scope of Judicial Review: Yes, the trial court erred. Judicial review of executive decisions does not import a trial de novo but only an ascertainment of whether the executive findings are constitutional, legal, free from fraud or imposition, and supported by substantial evidence.
• Navigability of Sapang Bulati: Yes, Sapang Bulati is a navigable stream. The Secretary's findings, supported by substantial evidence including the Lovinas' own registration plan and their caretaker's testimony, established that the creek was navigable and was illegally closed.
• Effect of Torrens Title on Navigable Streams: No. The issuance of a Torrens title does not confer title to navigable streams within registered property, nor is it conclusive on their non-existence, unless the boundaries of such streams had been expressly delimited in the registration plan.
• Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: No. The Lovinas cannot be charged with failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the Secretary's decision being that of the President in the absence of disapproval.

• Constitutionality of R.A. 2056: Republic Act No. 2056 merely empowers the Secretary to remove unauthorized obstructions or encroachments upon public streams — constructions that no private person was entitled to make, because the bed of navigable streams is public property and ownership thereof is not acquirable by adverse possession. While the exercise of the Secretary's power necessarily involves the determination of some questions of fact, such as the existence of the stream and its previous navigable character, these functions — whether judicial or quasi-judicial — are merely incidental to the exercise of the executive power granted by law to clear navigable streams. Such functions are validly conferable upon executive officials provided the party affected is given opportunity to be heard, as expressly required by Section 2 of the Act. The statute itself prescribes the general rule applicable to all navigable waters and merely charges the Secretary with the duty of ascertaining, upon notice to the parties concerned, whether a particular case falls within that rule. This is not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative or judicial power, as directly held in the U.S. "Bridge cases" upholding the constitutionality of the River and Harbor Act of 1899. The absence of an express appeal to the courts under R.A. 2056 is not a substantial difference, because due process does not have to be judicial process, and judicial review of the Secretary's decision remains available whenever his act violates the law or the Constitution or imports abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.

• Scope of Judicial Review: The findings of fact of the Secretary cannot be enervated by new evidence not laid before him, for that would be tantamount to holding a new investigation and substituting the discretion and judgment of the court for that of the Secretary, to whom the statute entrusted the case. It is immaterial whether the action is one for prohibition or injunction or one for certiorari; in either event the case must be resolved upon the evidence submitted to the Secretary, since judicial review of executive decisions does not import a trial de novo but only an ascertainment of whether the executive findings are not in violation of the Constitution or the laws, are free from fraud or imposition, and find reasonable support in the evidence. Findings of fact in executive decisions in matters within their jurisdiction are entitled to respect from the courts in the absence of fraud, collusion, or grave abuse of discretion, none of which was shown to exist. The proof preponderates in favor of the Secretary's decision.

• Navigability of Sapang Bulati: The Secretary found from the evidence before him that Sapang Bulati originally flowed across the property, connecting the Nasi river with Sapang Manampil; that in 1926 it was two meters deep at high tide and half a meter at low tide; and that the people used it as fishing grounds and as a communication way in bancas. This version was corroborated by the Lovinas' own registration plan (Exhibit C), which showed parallel reentrant lines around point 65 and between points 44 and 45 indicating a stream connecting Sapang Bulati and Sapang Manampil, and by the label "Etero Mabao" on the westward continuation of the Bulati creek. The caretaker Yambao showed investigator Yonzon the old course of the Bulati within the fishpond, and the cross-section profile of the ground near the dams clearly revealed the old channel. The Lovinas never attempted to prove that the plan prepared by the investigator was incorrect. The CFI's conclusion that the creek was a mere estero was not supported by its premises, as it was based solely on the fact that the creek did not appear to run within the registered lot on Exhibit C.

• Effect of Torrens Title on Navigable Streams: By law, the issuance of a Torrens title does not confer title to navigable streams — which are fluvial highways — within registered property, nor is it conclusive on their non-existence, unless the boundaries of such streams had been expressly delimited in the registration plan. Delimitation of their course may be made even after the decree of registration has become final. In the present case, the surveyor apparently failed to delimit the stream for some undisclosed reason, so its absence from the plan did not preclude subsequent investigation and determination of its existence. Ownership of a navigable stream or of its bed is not acquirable by prescription.

• Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: The Lovinas cannot be charged with failure to exhaust administrative remedies because the Secretary's decision is that of the President in the absence of disapproval, pursuant to the doctrine in Villena vs. Secretary of the Interior. The Court also reserved the Lovinas' right to bring an action against their vendor, given the possibility that they were not informed of the illegal closure of the Bulati creek when they purchased the property.

• Incidental Quasi-Judicial Functions of Executive Officers — The delegation by Congress to executive or administrative agencies of functions of a judicial or quasi-judicial nature is valid when such functions are merely incidental to the exercise of the agency's executive or administrative powers, provided the party affected is given opportunity to be heard. This does not violate the separation of powers or due process. The statute prescribes the general rule, and the executive officer is merely charged with ascertaining whether a particular case falls within that rule.

• Judicial Review of Administrative Findings of Fact — Findings of fact in executive decisions in matters within their jurisdiction are entitled to respect from the courts in the absence of fraud, collusion, or grave abuse of discretion. Judicial review of executive decisions does not import a trial de novo but only an ascertainment of whether the executive findings are not in violation of the Constitution or the laws, are free from fraud or imposition, and find reasonable support in the evidence. New evidence may not be introduced to enervate findings made before the administrative officer.

• Torrens Title and Navigable Streams — The issuance of a Torrens title does not confer title to navigable streams within registered property, nor is it conclusive on their non-existence, unless the boundaries of such streams had been expressly delimited in the registration plan. Delimitation of the course of navigable streams may be made even after the decree of registration has become final. Ownership of a navigable stream or of its bed is not acquirable by prescription.

• Due Process Need Not Be Judicial Process — The absence of an express appeal to the courts under a statute does not render it unconstitutional, because due process does not have to be judicial process. Judicial review of an executive officer's decision remains available even if not expressly granted, whenever the act violates the law or the Constitution or imports abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.

• "the delegation by Congress to executive or administrative agencies of functions of judicial, or at least, quasi-judicial functions is incidental to the exercise by such agencies of their executive or administrative powers, is not in violation of the Separation of Powers so far as that principle is recognized by the Federal Constitution nor is it in violation of due process of law." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi on the constitutionality of R.A. 2056, establishing that incidental quasi-judicial functions may be validly delegated to executive officers without violating separation of powers or due process.

• "a judicial review of executive decisions does not import a trial de novo, but only an ascertainment of whether the executive findings are not in violation of the constitution or of the laws, and are free from fraud or imposition, and whether they find reasonable support in the evidence." — This defines the canonical formulation of the scope of judicial review over administrative findings of fact, frequently cited in subsequent Philippine administrative law jurisprudence.

• "the issuance of a Torrens title does not confer title navigable streams (which are fluvial highways) within registered property, nor is it conclusive on their non-existence, unless the boundaries of such streams had been expressly delimited in the registration plan" — This states the rule that a Torrens title does not extinguish the public character of navigable streams traversing registered land, a principle with enduring significance in property and natural resources law.

• "due process does not have to be judicial process; and moreover, the judicial review of the Secretary's decision would always remain, even if not expressly granted, whenever his act violates the law or the Constitution, or imports abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction." — This passage establishes that procedural due process is not limited to judicial proceedings and that the availability of judicial review is inherent even absent an express statutory grant.

• Palanca vs. Commonwealth, 69 Phil. 449 — Controlling precedent followed. Established that the bed of navigable streams is public property and ownership thereof is not acquirable by adverse possession, and that the Secretary's power to investigate and clear public streams of unauthorized encroachments was validly conferred. Applied to reject the Lovinas' claim of ownership over the closed creek portion.

• Meneses vs. Commonwealth, 69 Phil. 647 — Followed. Upheld the Secretary's authority to investigate and clear public streams, and applied the rule that a Torrens title does not preclude subsequent determination of the existence of navigable streams within registered property.

• Union Bridge Co. vs. United States, 204 U.S. 364 — Persuasive foreign authority followed. Upheld the constitutionality of the U.S. River and Harbor Act of 1899, which empowered the Secretary of War to order removal or alteration of bridges unreasonably obstructing navigation. Applied as direct precedent for the proposition that delegating to an executive officer the duty of ascertaining whether a particular case falls within a statutory general rule is not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative or judicial power.

• Villena vs. Secretary of the Interior, 67 Phil. 451 — Followed. Established that the decision of a department secretary is that of the President in the absence of disapproval. Applied to hold that the Lovinas could not be charged with failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

• Commissioner of Customs vs. Valencia, 54 O.G. 3505 — Followed. Articulated the rule that findings of fact in executive decisions in matters within their jurisdiction are entitled to respect from the courts in the absence of fraud, collusion, or grave abuse of discretion. Applied to sustain the Secretary's findings.

• Sections 1 and 2, Republic Act No. 2056 — Empower the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, after due notice and hearing, to order removal of dams, dikes, or other works encroaching into public navigable waters or constructed in communal fishing grounds, and to effect removal at the owner's expense if the order is not complied with within thirty days. Upheld as constitutional; the quasi-judicial functions conferred are merely incidental to the executive power to clear navigable streams.

• Section 39, Act 496 (Land Registration Act) — Provides that the issuance of a Torrens title does not confer title to navigable streams within registered property, nor is it conclusive on their non-existence, unless the boundaries of such streams had been expressly delimited in the registration plan. Applied to reject the Lovinas' contention that the absence of the creek from their registration plan precluded a finding of navigability.

• Act 3208 — The old Philippine Legislature statute that originally granted the Secretary of Public Works the power to investigate and clear public streams of unauthorized encroachments and obstructions. Cited to show that the power upheld in this case has a long statutory pedigree and had been previously sustained by the Supreme Court.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Barrera, Paredes, Regala, and Makalintal, JJ., concurred.