Lorenzana vs. Fajardo

An appointive government official who accepts a second public office not authorized by law or by the primary functions of the original position violates the constitutional prohibition on dual appointments, and a government lawyer who habitually holds himself out to the public as a private practitioner without the requisite written permission engages in unauthorized private practice, each offense independently warranting disciplinary sanction for breach of the Attorney’s Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Respondent Atty. Cesar G. Fajardo was employed as Legal Officer V at the Urban Settlement Office in Manila until his retirement on May 15, 2002. While holding that full-time government position, he concurrently served as a member of the People’s Law Enforcement Board (PLEB) of Quezon City and as a member of the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay Novaliches Proper. He also maintained a private law office and appeared as counsel of record in several court cases. Complainant Francisco Lorenzana, on whose family’s property respondent resided, filed a disbarment complaint charging respondent with violations of the Civil Service Law and the Code of Professional Responsibility.

• The Complaint: Francisco Lorenzana alleged that Atty. Cesar G. Fajardo, while employed as Legal Officer V at the Manila Urban Settlement Office and up to his retirement on May 15, 2002, concurrently held the position of member of the People’s Law Enforcement Board (PLEB) of Quezon City with a monthly honorarium of ₱4,000.00, and served as member of the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay Novaliches Proper with a monthly allowance or honorarium. Lorenzana further charged that respondent engaged in the private practice of law, receiving acceptance fees ranging from ₱20,000.00 to ₱50,000.00, and that respondent resided without paying rent on a house and lot owned by the complainant’s family and refused to vacate.
• Respondent’s Answer: Fajardo countered that his PLEB membership was a civic duty compensated only by per diems under Section 43(c) of Republic Act No. 6975, and that his Lupon designation was authorized by Sections 406 and 393 of the Local Government Code, with allowances allowed by law. He admitted appearing as counsel in several cases but maintained that his clients were relatives and friends, including complainant’s father and brother, and that his services were rendered pro bono. He denied the property belonged to complainant’s family, asserting the issue was pending in an accion publiciana case before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 100.
• IBP Findings: Investigating Commissioner Doroteo B. Aguila ruled that the Lupon membership was lawful under the Local Government Code and that honoraria were authorized. The PLEB appointment, however, was not covered by any exception to the prohibition on dual appointments. On the private practice charge, the Commissioner found that complainant had failed to prove respondent received compensation; thus, the court appearances did not constitute private practice. Nevertheless, respondent was held liable for violation of Civil Service Rules because he failed to present written permission from his superior to appear as counsel. The IBP Board of Governors adopted the report, recommending a one-month suspension for the PLEB appointment and a reprimand for failing to secure written permission.
• Supreme Court’s Factual Determination on Private Practice: Rejecting the Commissioner’s conclusion, the Supreme Court found that respondent’s appearances as counsel were not isolated. Evidence showed that while a government legal officer, he maintained a law office at Room 201 7 JA Building, 244 Gen. Luis St., Novaliches, Quezon City, and used a professional letterhead identifying himself as “Attorney and Counsellor-at-Law.” Pleadings he signed as “counsel” filed with the courts bore that address, demonstrating habitual and customary holding out to the public as a lawyer.

• Violation of Civil Service Law: Complainant contended that respondent violated the Civil Service Law by simultaneously holding the position of Legal Officer V and serving as PLEB member and Lupon member, receiving honoraria from both.
• Unauthorized Private Practice: Complainant argued that respondent engaged in the private practice of law while in government service, demanding and receiving acceptance fees.
• Unlawful Detention and Moral Turpitude: Complainant asserted that respondent’s continued stay on family property without paying rent and his refusal to leave constituted conduct unbecoming a member of the bar and grounds for disbarment.

• PLEB Membership as Civic Duty: Respondent maintained that PLEB membership carried no fixed compensation but only per diems under Section 43(c) of Republic Act No. 6975, and thus did not constitute a prohibited dual appointment or double compensation.
• Lupon Membership Allowed by Law: Respondent argued that the Local Government Code of 1991, specifically Sections 406 and 393, expressly authorized his designation as a Lupon member and the receipt of honoraria and allowances.
• Pro Bono Service, Not Private Practice: Respondent claimed his court appearances were exclusively for relatives and friends without receiving any compensation, and that such isolated, gratuitous representation did not amount to private practice.
• Property Dispute Prejudicial: Respondent denied the property ownership claim, citing a pending accion publiciana case and arguing the issue was premature.

• Prohibition on Dual Appointments: Whether respondent’s simultaneous service as Legal Officer V of the Manila Urban Settlement Office and as a member of the People’s Law Enforcement Board (PLEB) of Quezon City violated Section 7, Article IX-B of the Constitution and related statutory prohibitions.
• Validity of Lupon Membership: Whether respondent’s concurrent office as a member of the Lupong Tagapamayapa was allowed by law.
• Unauthorized Private Practice of Law: Whether respondent’s repeated court appearances and maintenance of a law office while holding a government legal position constituted private practice of law, and whether the absence of written permission from his superior rendered such acts violative of the Revised Civil Service Rules.
• Appropriate Penalty: What administrative sanction was commensurate with the violations established.

• Prohibition on Dual Appointments: The acceptance of the PLEB appointment while employed as Legal Officer V transgressed Section 7, Article IX-B of the Constitution, which prohibits an appointive official from holding any other office or employment in the Government unless allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position. Section 43(c) of Republic Act No. 6975 addresses only the compensation of PLEB members and cannot be construed as an exception to the constitutional ban. Respondent also failed to show that his primary functions allowed the PLEB appointment. The act was declared contra legem, thus violating Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Attorney’s Oath.
• Validity of Lupon Membership: The Lupon membership was lawful. Section 406(b) of the Local Government Code explicitly provides that government officials and employees, whether in public or private employment, may serve as Lupon or Pangkat members and are deemed on official time without diminution in compensation from their primary employment.
• Unauthorized Private Practice of Law: Respondent was found to have engaged in the private practice of law. Private practice is defined as a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding oneself out to the public as a lawyer. The evidence — repeated court appearances as counsel, maintenance of a separate law office, and use of professional letterhead — established habitual practice beyond isolated, pro bono service. Compensation need not be proved where the indicia of regular practice are present. Furthermore, respondent failed to obtain the written permission from his department head required under Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules, independently warranting administrative discipline.
• Appropriate Penalty: A six-month suspension from the practice of law was imposed, increasing the IBP’s recommended one-month suspension, because the violations involved not merely civil service rules but the Constitution itself, the attorney’s oath, and Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The suspension was accompanied by a reprimand and stern warning against repetition, pursuant to Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.

• Constitutional Prohibition on Dual Appointments — Under Section 7, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, an appointive official may not hold any other office or employment in the Government, unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position. A statutory provision dealing only with the compensation of the second office does not function as an exception to this prohibition. Accepting a prohibited secondary office constitutes a violation of the Constitution and, for lawyers, breaches the sworn duty to uphold the Constitution and obey the law under the Attorney’s Oath and Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
• Definition and Scope of Private Practice of Law — Private practice of law is “a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding one’s self to the public as a lawyer,” and requires more than an isolated appearance; it consists in frequent or customary action. Proof of monetary compensation is not an indispensable element where the lawyer maintains a law office, signs pleadings as counsel, and uses professional stationery. A government employee who engages in any private profession must first secure written permission from the department head, failing which, disciplinary liability attaches independently of the prohibition on private practice.
• Statutory Authorization for Lupon Membership — Section 406(b) of the Local Government Code expressly permits government officials and employees, whether in public or private employment, to serve as Lupon or Pangkat members without suffering diminution in compensation from their primary employment. This constitutes a direct statutory authorization that takes such service outside the constitutional prohibition on dual appointments.

• “The lawyer’s paramount duty to society is to obey the law. For of all classes and professions, it is the lawyer who is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws, for he is their sworn servant.” — Articulating the foundational duty of an attorney, cited as the standard respondent failed to meet by accepting a prohibited appointment.
• “It is clear that this provision pertains only to the compensation of PLEB members. It cannot be construed as an exception to the Constitutional and statutory prohibition against dual or multiple appointments of appointive public employees.” — Rejecting the argument that Section 43(c) of R.A. No. 6975 authorized the second position.
• “Private practice of law contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding one’s self to the public as a lawyer. Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary action a succession of acts of the same kind.” — Defining the threshold between isolated pro bono representation and disciplined private practice.

• In Re: Gutierrez, 115 Phil. 647 (1962) — Cited as the source of the principle that the lawyer’s paramount duty is obedience to the law, used to underscore respondent’s breach.
• Office of the Court Administrator vs. Ladaga, 350 SCRA 326 (2001) — Relied upon for the definition of private practice as habitual or customary acts holding out to the public.
• People vs. Villanueva, 121 Phil. 894 (1965) — Cited for the interpretation that the practice of law by government attorneys falls within the prohibition when it customarily holds out to the public and demands payment, used to differentiate established practice from mere isolated appearances.

• Section 7, Article IX-B, 1987 Constitution — Prohibits appointive officials from holding dual government offices; respondent’s PLEB appointment was declared a violation of this constitutional mandate.
• Section 54(3), Chapter 7, Title I(A), Book V, Administrative Code of 1987; Section 94(a), Local Government Code of 1991 — Statutory reiterations of the prohibition on multiple appointments; cited as additional legal bases for the finding of violation.
• Section 43(c), Republic Act No. 6975 — Provision allowing per diems for PLEB members; held inapplicable to validate the dual appointment because it merely addresses compensation.
• Sections 406(b) and 393, Local Government Code of 1991 — Expressly authorize government employees to serve as Lupon members, with honoraria, and without diminution of pay; applied to exonerate respondent for the Lupon membership.
• Canon 1, Code of Professional Responsibility — Mandates that a lawyer uphold the Constitution and obey the laws; respondent’s conduct was found to have breached this duty.
• Section 12, Rule XVIII, Revised Civil Service Rules — Requires written permission from the department head before a government employee engages in any private profession; respondent’s failure to secure such permission was an independent ground for discipline.
• Section 27, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court — Enumerates grounds for suspension and disbarment, including violation of the attorney’s oath; served as the basis for the imposition of the six-month suspension.

Panganiban (Chairman), Corona, Carpio-Morales, and Garcia, JJ., concurred.