Lopez vs. De los Reyes

A House of the Philippine Legislature possesses only a limited implied power to punish non-members for contempt, and imprisonment imposed thereunder must terminate with adjournment of the session in which the contempt occurred and cannot be revived by confirmatory resolution at a subsequent session.

Candido B. Lopez was a private citizen with no membership in the legislature, while Jose De los Reyes was Assistant Chief of the Constabulary acting as peace officer to execute a legislative warrant. The House of Representatives was one House of the Philippine Legislature, vested under the Organic Act with general legislative powers practically coextensive with those of the United States Congress within its sphere. No express Organic Act grant authorized either House to punish non-members for contempt, although Senators and Representatives were privileged from arrest during attendance and travel, and statutes such as Act No. 1755 and Section 102 of the Administrative Code separately punished disturbances and recalcitrant witnesses through the courts.

On October 23, 1929, Candido B. Lopez attacked and assaulted Representative Jose D. Dimayuga while the latter was going to the hall of the House of Representatives to attend sessions about to begin. As a result, Dimayuga was unable to attend the sessions on that day and the two days next following because of threats made by Lopez, committed with knowledge that Dimayuga was a member of the House proceeding to session. Lopez thereafter appeared before the Committee on Privileges, where he was notified of the contempt charge, given opportunity to defend personally and by counsel, and allowed to adduce evidence.

On November 6, 1929, the House adopted a resolution declaring Lopez guilty of contempt for violating the privileges of a member and ordering confinement in Bilibid Prison, Manila, for twenty-four hours, with the corresponding order of arrest to be signed by the Speaker, stamped with the House Seal, and addressed to Sergeant-At-Arms Alfredo Javier. The second session of the Philippine Legislature adjourned at midnight on November 8, 1929, without the order having been served because Lopez concealed himself and employed subterfuges to avoid compliance. On petition for reconsideration, the Committee on Privileges concluded there was no ground to modify or revoke the resolution.

During the third session, on September 16, 1930, the House adopted a confirmatory resolution reciting non-compliance and ratifying the 1929 resolution, ordering and authorizing the Sergeant-At-Arms, his agents, any Insular Police official or member, or any peace officer to arrest Lopez to serve the twenty-four hours. Pursuant thereto, the Speaker issued a new warrant on September 17, 1930, and Colonel Jose De los Reyes, Assistant Chief of the Constabulary, took Lopez into custody on September 19, 1930. Lopez immediately obtained a writ of habeas corpus from Auxiliary Judge Mariano Albert, alleging principally lack of House authority to try and imprison a citizen and loss of jurisdiction after adjournment of the 1929 session. No traverse to the return was interposed and no exception was taken to denial of permission to offer evidence, leaving only questions of law, with the facts recited in the House resolution not subject to inquiry into their correctness.

• Lack of Power to Try and Imprison: Petitioner argued that the House of Representatives was absolutely lacking in authority and jurisdiction to try and punish any citizen with imprisonment for alleged assault, the power to try and punish for violation of law lying exclusively within the judicial department.
• Expiration with Adjournment: Petitioner argued that the House had lost jurisdiction over his person and the offense because the act was committed October 23, 1929, the session adjourned at midnight November 8, 1929, and any order issued after that session was without force and effect.

• Inherent Contempt Power: Respondent maintained that the Philippine House of Representatives has power to order commitment of persons guilty of contempt against it and the Speaker is empowered to issue the warrant of arrest.
• Separation of Powers Bar to Judicial Inquiry: Respondent argued that the court has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition in view of separation of powers among the Executive, Legislative and Judicial Departments.
• Conclusiveness of Legislative Findings: Respondent argued that the court has no power to inquire into the correctness of the facts recited in the House resolution punishing petitioner for contempt.

• Judicial Review via Habeas Corpus: Whether courts may inquire on habeas corpus into the legality of restraint under a legislative contempt commitment despite separation of powers.
• Power to Punish Non-Member for Contempt: Whether the House of Representatives of the Philippine Legislature possesses implied power to punish a non-member for contempt by assault preventing a member's attendance.
• Duration and Revival After Adjournment: Whether imprisonment for legislative contempt may be enforced beyond the session in which the contempt occurred through a confirmatory resolution and new warrant at a subsequent session.

• Judicial Review via Habeas Corpus: Yes. Where liberty is concerned, legality of legislative punishment for contempt is properly inquirable on habeas corpus, though correctness of recited facts is not reexamined.
• Power to Punish Non-Member for Contempt: Yes. A limited power to punish non-members for contempt resides in the House as necessary to preserve and carry out granted legislative power.
• Duration and Revival After Adjournment: No. Imprisonment must terminate with adjournment of the session in which the contempt occurred; the second-session order, unenforced before November 8, 1929 adjournment, could not be resuscitated in the third session.

• Judicial Review via Habeas Corpus: No factual issue was presented, only jurisdiction, since no traverse was interposed and correctness of the facts recited in the contempt resolution need not be inquired into. Separation of powers does not preclude inquiry where personal liberty is restrained, as recognized in Zagala vs. Ilustre, Lorenzo vs. Director of Health, Burnham vs. Morrissey, and Kilbourn vs. Thompson.
• Power to Punish Non-Member for Contempt: British parliamentary power derived from origin as courts of judicature does not transfer to dependencies, and the United States Congress possesses only limited implied contempt power necessary to preserve legislative power, not general punishment, described as a means to an end and not the end itself. The same necessity applies to the Philippine Houses under the Organic Act, which must be assumed to possess self-preservative authority to deal with assaults preventing attendance, as in Re Chapman, Anderson vs. Dunn, Marshall vs. Gordon, and McGrain vs. Daugherty. Enactment of Act No. 1755 and Administrative Code Section 102 did not divest this inherent power, since the legislature could not divert it, the same act may support both contempt proceedings and criminal prosecution under U.S. vs. Houston, and contempt is coercive vindication of privilege distinct from punitive criminal proceedings.
• Duration and Revival After Adjournment: Conceding arguendo that finding Lopez in contempt was within fair discretion, imprisonment directly imposed without criminal prosecution is limited to the session of the body affected, per Stockdale vs. Hansard for the Commons, Anderson vs. Dunn and Marshall vs. Gordon for Congress, and In re Davis for the states. The Philippine Legislature convenes annually July 16 for not longer than one hundred days exclusive of Sundays, with three distinct sessions per legislature, so the session in which the contempt occurred was the second session adjourned without enforcement. Adjournment and session were used in the constitutional sense, not as final triennial dissolution, consistent with the Pocket Veto Case, and mere reapproval at the third session without new hearing added nothing once legislative power to act in the prior session had ceased.

• Limited implied legislative contempt power — Each House possesses by implication only so much contempt authority as is necessary to preserve and carry out granted legislative power, resting solely on self-preservation and exercisable as auxiliary to make express powers effective. Applied to sustain the House's authority to declare contempt for a knowing assault that prevented a member from attending sessions.
• Contempt distinguished from crime — Legislative contempt is coercive and vindicatory of House privilege, while criminal punishment is punitive and brought by the State before courts; the two proceedings are distinct. Applied to reject the claim that Act No. 1755, Section 102 of the Administrative Code, or Penal Code provisions divested or delegated the House's inherent power, following Re Chapman.
• Session limitation on legislative imprisonment — Direct imprisonment for legislative contempt, even when justified, is limited to imprisonment terminating with adjournment and may not be extended beyond the session of the body in which the contempt occurred. Applied to void enforcement in the third session of a second-session 24-hour commitment never executed before adjournment.
• Habeas corpus review of legislative restraint — Where liberty is at stake, courts may inquire into jurisdiction and legality of legislative contempt commitment, but not into correctness of facts recited in the resolution. Applied to entertain the petition while accepting the House's factual recitals as given.

• "It is a means to an end and not the end itself." — Quoted from Chief Justice White to define the preservative, non-punitive nature of implied congressional contempt power and its strict limits.
• "And although the legislative power continues perpetual, the legislative body ceases to exist on the moment of its adjournment or periodical dissolution. It follows, that imprisonment must terminate with that adjournment." — Epitomizes the Anderson vs. Dunn limitation adopted to hold that legislative imprisonment ends with the session.
• "And the essential nature of the power also makes clear the cogency and application of the two limitations which were expressly pointed out in Anderson vs. Dunn, supra, that is , that the power even when applied to subjects which justified its exercise is limited to imprisonment and such imprisonment may not be extended beyond the session of the body in which the contempt occurred." — States the controlling two-fold limitation applied to bar revival of the Lopez commitment in the next session.

• Anderson vs. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204 — Controlling authority for both the existence of limited implied contempt power and its termination with adjournment; followed on both branches.
• Marshall vs. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521 — Controlling authority reaffirming Anderson vs. Dunn limitations to imprisonment not extending beyond the session; followed to invalidate third-session enforcement.
• Kilbourn vs. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 — Cited for the limited nature of congressional contempt power and for availability of habeas inquiry into legislative restraint; followed.
• Re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661 — Authority that a criminal statute punishing contempt as misdemeanor does not divest Houses of inherent contempt power; followed to reject the Act No. 1755 divestiture argument.
• McGrain vs. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 — Cited as recent reaffirmation of implied legislative contempt authority in aid of legislative power; followed on existence of power.

• Sec. 18, Jones Law (Organic Act); Secs. 94, 98, Administrative Code — Govern annual convening July 16, one-hundred-day limit, and three numbered sessions per legislature; applied to identify the second session as the session in which the contempt occurred and the third as a distinct, subsequent session.
• Act No. 1755, Sec. 1 — Punishes by fine up to P2,000 or imprisonment up to five years willful prevention or disturbance of legislative meetings and disorderly conduct tending to interrupt proceedings; held not to divest inherent House contempt power because contempt and crime are distinct.
• Sec. 102, Administrative Code — Punishes contempt of legislative body or committee by recalcitrant witnesses with fine or imprisonment; cited as parallel criminal provision that leaves inherent contempt authority intact.

Street, J. and Villa-Real, J. concurred without separate opinion.

• Avanceña, C.J. (concurring and dissenting in part) — Agreed the Legislature has inherent power to impose 24 hours imprisonment but voted to affirm, reasoning under Anderson vs. Dunn that the penalty is limited only by existence of the legislative body until final periodical dissolution, not by the particular session, since self-preservation endures throughout its three-year term.
• Villamor and Ostrand, JJ. (concurring and dissenting) — Agreed the result discharging petitioner but on the ground the House had no power at all, reasoning Philippine legislative power derives from an Act of Congress, not a sovereign constitution, and Act No. 1755 and Administrative Code Sec. 102 vested punishment in courts; warned affirming inherent power would expose one act to triple punishment by the House, under Act No. 1755, and under Penal Code Art. 587.
• Romualdez, J. (concurring and dissenting in part) — Agreed power exists a fortiori from members' immunity from arrest while attending or traveling to sessions, but dissented on duration, reading Marshall vs. Gordon to limit only execution of imprisonment, not power to punish, and deeming delay excused because petitioner evaded arrest without House negligence or condonation.
• Johnson, J. (dissenting) — Voted to affirm per Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, reasoning inherent power to punish assaults on members exists and imprisonment need only terminate with final adjournment when the particular three-year legislative entity ceases to exist, the 1929 and 1930 bodies being the same entity not yet finally adjourned sine die.