Lopez vs. David

The one-year reglementary period for filing an unlawful detainer suit under Section 1, Rule 70 is counted from the date of demand, and upon its lapse, the action converts into an accion publiciana cognizable by the RTC; estoppel by laches does not bar a party from questioning jurisdiction when that party has consistently challenged the lower court's jurisdiction from the outset of the proceedings.

The parties are family members connected through Cirila Sadsad Vda. de David — petitioner Salud D. Lopez is Cirila's daughter, while respondents Robert P. David Jr. and Cleopatra David Campo-Ruiz are Cirila's grandchildren. The disputed property is a 540-square-meter parcel of land at No. 174 Sct. Fuentebella, Quezon City, covered by TCT No. RT-109698 (26613) registered in the name of Jose C. Lopez, Salud's deceased husband. Petitioners claim ownership of the property, purchased from the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation, while respondents assert it was held in trust for Cirila's children and that they have been in possession since 1951.

The subject property is a 540-square-meter parcel of land located at No. 174 Sct. Fuentebella, Quezon City, covered by TCT No. RT-109698 (26613) registered in the name of Jose C. Lopez, the deceased husband of petitioner Salud D. Lopez and father of the rest of the petitioners. Petitioners claim to be co-owners of the property, which was purchased from the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation.

In 1954, at the request of Cirila Sadsad Vda. de David — Salud's mother and respondents' grandmother — Cirila was allowed by Salud to build a residential house on the subject property and to stay there until she could find a suitable residence of her own. Cirila occupied the property without paying rentals and without a written contract, through the sheer tolerance of petitioners. Upon Cirila's death, respondents continued occupying the property, again without paying rentals and through the mere tolerance of petitioners, occupying two separate units.

Respondents disputed petitioners' ownership, alleging that the subject property was owned in common by Cirila's children — Salud, Robert S. David Sr. (father of respondent Robert P. David), and Celestina S. David (mother of respondent Cleopatra David Campo-Ruiz). According to respondents, the property was placed in Lopez's name upon an agreement that it would be held in trust for Cirila's children. They further claimed that Salud, Ligaya S. David, and Celestina S. David built a three-door apartment on the property that equally belonged to them. Respondents asserted they had been in peaceful possession of the premises since 1951.

Petitioners withdrew their consent to respondents' occupancy and, through their lawyer, sent a demand letter dated August 10, 1995 requiring respondents to vacate the property on or before September 15, 1995. Respondents did not heed the demand. Petitioners thereafter filed an ejectment complaint before the MeTC of Quezon City on September 24, 1996 — more than one year after the expiration of the period given in the demand letter, when respondents' continued possession became unlawful. The MeTC rendered a decision on August 15, 1997 ordering respondents to vacate and pay rentals, attorney's fees, and costs. The RTC affirmed the MeTC decision en toto on December 17, 1999. The Court of Appeals reversed, dismissing the ejectment case for lack of MeTC jurisdiction, finding that the suit was filed beyond the one-year reglementary period and thus constituted an accion publiciana cognizable by the RTC.

• Estoppel by Laches: Petitioners contended that respondents, having participated in the trial of the case and having belatedly raised the issue of jurisdiction for the first time on appeal with the CA, were estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the MeTC. Petitioners principally anchored their argument on Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, where the Court applied the doctrine of estoppel by laches to bar a party from questioning jurisdiction after failing to do so at an earlier stage.

• Lack of MeTC Jurisdiction: Respondents argued that the MeTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter because the ejectment suit was filed beyond the one-year period from the unlawful withholding of possession, making the case an accion publiciana cognizable by the RTC. They asserted in their Answer with affirmative defenses and counterclaim that the court lacked jurisdiction because the real issue was ownership and there was no lessor-lessee relationship between the parties.
• Continuous Possession Exceeding One Year: Respondents maintained that they had been in continuous and uninterrupted possession of the premises since 1951 — a period of over forty years — and that even an owner cannot wrest possession from one who has been in physical possession for more than one year through a summary action for ejectment.
• Jurisdictional Challenge from the Outset: Respondents asserted that they had consistently challenged the MeTC's jurisdiction from the beginning, raising it in their Answer, their pretrial brief, and their Memorandum on appeal to the RTC, thereby negating any presumption of abandonment or decline to assert the right to question jurisdiction.

• Jurisdiction: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the ejectment case on the ground of lack of MeTC jurisdiction over the subject matter.
• Estoppel: Whether respondents are estopped from questioning the MeTC's jurisdiction by reason of laches, given their participation in the proceedings before the MeTC and RTC.

• Jurisdiction: No. The MeTC had no jurisdiction because the ejectment complaint was filed on September 24, 1996 — more than one year after respondents' possession became unlawful on September 16, 1995, the day after the deadline in the demand letter. The proper action was an accion publiciana cognizable by the RTC.
• Estoppel: No. Respondents were not estopped from questioning the MeTC's jurisdiction, having consistently challenged it from the time of their Answer with affirmative defenses, in their pretrial brief, and in their Memorandum on appeal to the RTC. The doctrine of estoppel by laches in Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy was inapplicable.

• Jurisdiction: The jurisdiction of the court and the nature of the action are determined by the averments in the complaint, which must on its face show sufficient grounds for the court to assume jurisdiction without resort to parol testimony. The complaint alleged that petitioners owned the property, allowed respondents to occupy it by tolerance, withdrew their consent, and demanded that respondents vacate by September 15, 1995. These averments established a case of unlawful detainer, but the one-year reglementary period under Section 1, Rule 70 is counted from the date of demand, as possession becomes unlawful only upon the lapse of the period stated in the demand. Because the complaint was filed on September 24, 1996 — more than one year after September 15, 1995 — the MeTC was without jurisdiction. The summary nature of ejectment proceedings requires strict observance of the one-year bar; after its lapse, the plaintiff must file an accion publiciana — a plenary action to recover the right of possession — in the RTC. The CA was correct in so ruling.

• Estoppel: The general rule is that a question of jurisdiction may be raised at any time, as any decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity. An exception arises when a party is barred by estoppel by laches, as held in Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, where failure to raise the jurisdictional question at an earlier stage barred the party from doing so later. However, this doctrine is merely an exception to the time-honored principle that jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or estoppel. Estoppel by laches requires a failure or neglect, through negligence or omission, to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party has abandoned or declined to assert it. Here, respondents could not be presumed to have abandoned their right to question jurisdiction, because from the very beginning they challenged the MeTC's jurisdiction in their Answer with affirmative defenses, raised it as an issue in their pretrial brief, and reiterated it in their Memorandum on appeal to the RTC. Their consistent position was that the MeTC lacked jurisdiction because the dispossession had exceeded one year, making the controversy cognizable by the RTC. Even assuming the one-year bar issue was raised only before the CA, doing so was consistent with respondents' theory throughout and did not violate fair play. The Court also found it necessary to apply a strict interpretation of the jurisdictional rule given that respondents had been in possession since 1954, that ejectment proceedings are summary in nature, and that the one-year time bar complements that summary character.

• One-year bar in ejectment proceedings — Under Section 1, Rule 70, an action for unlawful detainer must be filed within one year from the unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession. The one-year period is counted from the date of demand, because possession becomes unlawful only upon the lapse of the period stated in the demand. After the lapse of this period, the summary ejectment remedy is no longer available; the plaintiff must file an accion publiciana in the RTC. The Court applied this by finding that the complaint, filed on September 24, 1996, was beyond one year from the September 15, 1995 deadline in the demand letter, thereby divesting the MeTC of jurisdiction.

• Accion publiciana — A suit for recovery of the right to possess, an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty independently of title. It refers to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year from the accrual of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty, and is cognizable by the RTC. The Court held that because the one-year period had lapsed, petitioners' action had become an accion publiciana properly belonging to the RTC.

• Estoppel by laches on jurisdictional questions — While the general rule is that jurisdiction may be questioned at any time and is not lost by waiver or estoppel, estoppel by laches may bar a party from raising the issue if the party failed to assert it within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption of abandonment or decline to assert the right. This doctrine, established in Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, is merely an exception. The Court held it inapplicable here because respondents consistently challenged the MeTC's jurisdiction from the outset — in their Answer, pretrial brief, and Memorandum on appeal — negating any presumption of abandonment.

• Jurisdiction determined by averments in the complaint — The jurisdiction of the court and the nature of the action are determined by the averments in the complaint, not by the defenses raised or the evidence presented. The complaint must on its face show sufficient grounds for the court to assume jurisdiction without resort to parol testimony. The Court applied this by examining the complaint's allegations — ownership, occupation by tolerance, withdrawal of consent, and demand to vacate — to determine that the case was one of unlawful detainer but filed beyond the one-year period.

• "Ejectment proceedings must observe jurisdictional requirements to complement their summary nature. Among them is the one-year bar within which to bring the suit." — The Court's opening statement, framing the ratio decidendi that the summary nature of ejectment requires strict adherence to the one-year jurisdictional period.

• "After the lapse of this period, plaintiffs can no longer avail themselves of the summary suits in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) or the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), but must litigate in the Regional Trial Court in an ordinary action to recover possession." — States the consequence of the one-year bar: the remedy shifts from a summary ejectment suit to an accion publiciana in the RTC.

• "It is settled that any decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck down at any time, even on appeal before this Court." — Articulates the general rule on jurisdiction that underlies the Court's refusal to apply estoppel, emphasizing that jurisdictional defects cannot be cured by participation in proceedings.

• "Considering these established facts, we find that the Tijam doctrine is inapplicable." — The Court's conclusion on the estoppel issue, distinguishing Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy on the ground that respondents had consistently challenged jurisdiction from the outset.

• Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, 131 Phil. 556 (1968) — Established the doctrine of estoppel by laches as an exception to the general rule that jurisdiction may be questioned at any time. The Court distinguished and held it inapplicable because respondents consistently challenged the MeTC's jurisdiction from the outset.
• Heirs of Fernando Vinzons vs. CA, 315 SCRA 541 (1999) — Cited for the proposition that when unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession exceeds one year, the MeTC is divested of jurisdiction and the case becomes an accion publiciana cognizable by the RTC.
• Sarmiento vs. CA, 320 Phil. 146 (1995) — Cited for the rule that jurisdiction and the nature of the action are determined by the averments in the complaint.
• Arcal vs. CA, 348 Phil. 813 (1998) — Cited for the requirement that the complaint must show on its face sufficient grounds for the court to assume jurisdiction without resort to parol testimony.
• De Guzman vs. CA, 271 SCRA 728 (1997) — Cited for the principle that forcible entry and unlawful detainer are quieting processes and the one-year time bar is in pursuance of the summary nature of the action.
• Sarona vs. Villegas, 131 Phil. 365 (1968) — Cited for the rule that the one-year period for filing an unlawful detainer suit is counted from the date of demand.
• Calimlim vs. Hon. Ramirez, 204 Phil. 25 (1982) — Cited for the principle that the Tijam doctrine of estoppel by laches is merely an exception to the general rule that jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or estoppel.

• Section 1, Rule 70, Rules of Court (1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) — Provides that a person against whom possession of land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession may, within one year from such unlawful deprivation or withholding, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court for restitution of possession, damages, and costs. The Court applied this provision to determine that the MeTC lacked jurisdiction because the complaint was filed beyond one year from the date respondents' possession became unlawful.

Davide Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.