Lopez vs. Court of Appeals

A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in an administrative disciplinary case imposing a penalty other than public censure, reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine not equivalent to one month's salary is not final and immediately executory; a timely appeal from such decision stays its implementation. The right to appeal granted by the Ombudsman Act carries with it the stay of the decision pending appeal; otherwise, the essential nature of these judgments as appealable would be rendered nugatory.

Private respondent Romeo A. Liggayu was the Manager of the Legal Department and Resident Ombudsman of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO), a government-owned and controlled corporation. He was administratively charged before the Office of the Ombudsman with two offenses: (1) Violation of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) for issuing a subpoena without authority, and (2) complicity in anomalous contracts entered into by PCSO and Golden Lion Films. The statutory framework governing the case is Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770, which prescribes the effectivity and finality of Ombudsman decisions, and Rule III, Section 7 of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, which implements the same provision.

Private respondent Atty. Romeo A. Liggayu, Manager of the Legal Department and Resident Ombudsman of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO), was administratively charged before the Office of the Ombudsman with: (1) Violation of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989), for issuing a subpoena without authority purportedly in relation to OMB-0-99-0571 entitled "FACT-FINDING AND INTELLIGENCE BUREAU versus MANUEL MORATO, et al."; and (2) complicity in the anomalous contracts entered into by PCSO and Golden Lion Films for the production of 1,092 episodes of "Ang Pangarap Kong Jackpot," subject matter of OMB-0-99-0571 and 0572 entitled "FFIB vs. MANUEL MORATO, et al." and OMB-ADM-0-99-0254 entitled "FFIB vs. ISRAEL G. ESTRELLA, et al."

On January 6, 2000, the Office of the Ombudsman dismissed the charge against private respondent in connection with the anomalous contracts of the PCSO but found him guilty of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service for issuing a subpoena in relation to OMB-0-99-0571 in excess of his authority as Resident Ombudsman of PCSO. The Office of the Ombudsman imposed upon him the penalty of one (1) year suspension without pay. Later, the penalty was modified to six (6) months and one (1) day suspension without pay. Private respondent's motion for reconsideration was denied.

On March 6, 2000, private respondent filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals via Rule 43 of the Rules of Court and prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the execution of the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman. Meanwhile, on March 8, 2000, petitioners implemented the suspension of private respondent in compliance with the directive of the Office of the Ombudsman. On March 16, 2000, the Court of Appeals issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the Office of the Ombudsman from implementing the suspension order against private respondent. On March 20, 2000, private respondent filed an amended petition impleading the herein petitioners. On motion of the Office of the Solicitor General, the Court of Appeals dropped the names of the impleaded members of the Office of the Ombudsman pursuant to Section 6, Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

On May 18, 2000, a resolution was issued granting private respondent's prayer for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction against the execution of private respondent's suspension. In the same resolution, petitioners were asked to explain why they should not be cited in contempt of court for failing to comply with the Temporary Restraining Order dated March 16, 2000. On May 31, 2000, petitioners, by way of Explanation, manifested to the Court of Appeals that they could not have complied with or implemented the TRO since they were not yet parties to the case at the time of its issuance, and that even assuming the order was applicable to them, the same was rendered moot and academic by petitioner's suspension on March 8, 2000. On June 27, 2000, petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied, and on the same date, the Court of Appeals ordered petitioners, under pain of contempt, to reinstate private respondent to his former position pending resolution of his appeal. Hence, on July 7, 2000, private respondent was reinstated as Manager of the Legal Department and Resident Ombudsman of PCSO.

• Immediate Executory Nature of the Suspension: Petitioners contended that the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in enjoining the execution of the suspension pending appeal, arguing that the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman was immediately executory.
• Applicability of Rule 43, Section 12: Petitioners claimed that the applicable provision is Rule 43, Section 12 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that "[t]he appeal shall not stay the award, judgment, final order or resolution sought to be reviewed unless the Court of Appeals shall direct otherwise upon such terms as it may deem just."
• Equal Protection: Petitioners claimed that the stay of execution pending appeal from the order, directive, or decision of the Office of the Ombudsman violates the equal protection clause for being unfair to government employees charged under the Civil Service Law, where the decisions in disciplinary cases are immediately executory.

N/A — The decision does not recount the specific arguments raised by private respondent before the Supreme Court.

• Immediate Executory Nature of the Suspension: Whether decisions of the Ombudsman imposing the penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day suspension without pay are immediately executory pending appeal.
• Applicability of Rule 43, Section 12: Whether Rule 43, Section 12 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that an appeal shall not stay the award, judgment, final order, or resolution sought to be reviewed, applies to appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman.
• Equal Protection: Whether the stay of execution pending appeal from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman violates the equal protection clause for being unfair to government employees charged under the Civil Service Law.

• Immediate Executory Nature of the Suspension: No. A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman imposing a penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day suspension without pay is not immediately executory pending appeal. Under Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770, only decisions imposing public censure, reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine not equivalent to one month's salary are final and unappealable; all other decisions are appealable, and a timely appeal stays their implementation.
• Applicability of Rule 43, Section 12: No. While the Court in Fabian vs. Desierto declared unconstitutional Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 insofar as it provided that administrative appeals from the Office of the Ombudsman shall be taken to the Supreme Court, the provisions regarding finality and execution of decisions are not affected and still stand. The proper forum for administrative appeals is the Court of Appeals, but the stay of execution pending appeal remains a matter of right.
• Equal Protection: No. The legislature has seen fit to grant a stay of execution pending appeal from disciplinary cases where the penalty imposed by the Office of the Ombudsman is not public censure, reprimand, or suspension of not more than one month, or a fine not equivalent to one month's salary. Courts may not, in the guise of interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute and include therein situations not provided or intended by the lawmakers.

• Immediate Executory Nature of the Suspension: Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 provides that all provisionary orders of the Office of the Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory, and that any order, directive, or decision imposing the penalty of public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month's salary shall be final and unappealable. In all other administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives, or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice. Rule III, Section 7 of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman similarly states that where the respondent is convicted and the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine not equivalent to one month's salary, the decision shall be final and unappealable; in all other cases, the decision shall become final after the expiration of ten (10) days from receipt thereof by the respondent, unless a motion for reconsideration or petition for certiorari shall have been filed. Construing these provisions, the Court in Lapid vs. Court of Appeals held that only orders, directives, or decisions imposing the enumerated penalties are final and unappealable and hence immediately executory. In all other disciplinary cases, the law gives the respondent the right to appeal, and the order, directive, or decision becomes final and executory only after the lapse of the period to appeal if no appeal is perfected, or after the denial of the appeal. The fact that the Ombudsman Act gives parties the right to appeal from its decisions should generally carry with it the stay of these decisions pending appeal; otherwise, the essential nature of these judgments as being appealable would be rendered nugatory. The legal maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius finds application: the express mention of the things included excludes those that are not included. The clear import of these statements taken together is that all other decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman which impose penalties that are not enumerated in Section 27 are not final, unappealable, and immediately executory. An appeal timely filed will stay the immediate implementation of the decision.
• Applicability of Rule 43, Section 12: While it is true that in Fabian vs. Desierto, the Court declared unconstitutional Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 and all other provisions of law implementing the same, the declaration should be interpreted to mean that the said provisions are void only insofar as they provide that administrative appeals from the Office of the Ombudsman shall be taken to the Supreme Court. Under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the proper forum for administrative appeals from the Office of the Ombudsman is the Court of Appeals. The provisions of Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 and the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman with respect to the finality and execution of decisions are not affected by the ruling in Fabian vs. Desierto and therefore still stand. It is a fundamental principle in statutory construction that a statute may be constitutional in one part and unconstitutional in another, and that if the invalid part is severable from the rest, the portion which is unconstitutional may stand while that which is constitutional is stricken out and rejected. The separability clause found in Section 40 of Republic Act No. 6770 creates the presumption that the legislature intended separability, rather than complete nullity of the statute.
• Equal Protection: The claim that the stay of execution pending appeal violates the equal protection clause for being unfair to government employees charged under the Civil Service Law is unavailing. The legislature has seen fit to grant a stay of execution pending appeal from disciplinary cases where the penalty imposed by the Office of the Ombudsman is not public censure, reprimand, or suspension of not more than one month, or a fine not equivalent to one month's salary. Courts may not, in the guise of interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute and include therein situations not provided or intended by the lawmakers. An omission at the time of enactment, whether careless or calculated, cannot be judicially supplied notwithstanding that later wisdom may recommend the inclusion.

• Immediate Executory Nature of Ombudsman Decisions — Under Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770, only decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases imposing the penalty of public censure, reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine not equivalent to one month's salary are final and unappealable and hence immediately executory. In all other disciplinary cases where the penalty imposed is other than those enumerated, the law gives the respondent the right to appeal, and the decision becomes final and executory only after the lapse of the period to appeal if no appeal is perfected, or after the denial of the appeal. A timely appeal stays the immediate implementation of the decision.
• Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius — The express mention of things included in a statute excludes those that are not included. The Court applied this maxim to Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770: because the statute expressly enumerates the penalties that are final, unappealable, and immediately executory (public censure, reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine not equivalent to one month's salary), all other decisions imposing penalties not enumerated are not final, unappealable, and immediately executory.
• Severability of Statutes — A statute may be constitutional in one part and unconstitutional in another, and if the invalid part is severable from the rest, the portion which is unconstitutional may be stricken out while that which is constitutional stands. The separability clause found in Section 40 of Republic Act No. 6770 creates the presumption that the legislature intended separability, rather than complete nullity of the statute. The Court applied this doctrine in interpreting the effect of Fabian vs. Desierto, which declared unconstitutional Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 only insofar as it provided that administrative appeals from the Office of the Ombudsman shall be taken to the Supreme Court, leaving intact the provisions regarding finality and execution of decisions.

• "The fact that the Ombudsman Act gives parties the right to appeal from its decisions should generally carry with it the stay of these decisions pending appeal. Otherwise, the essential nature of these judgments as being appealable would be rendered nugatory." — This passage articulates the core ratio decidendi of the case: the right to appeal from Ombudsman decisions in administrative disciplinary cases carries with it the stay of execution pending appeal.
• "The express mention of the things included excludes those that are not included. The clear import of these statements taken together is that all other decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman which impose penalties that are not enumerated in the said section 27 are not final, unappealable and immediately executory. An appeal timely filed, such as the one filed in the instant case, will stay the immediate implementation of the decision." — This passage applies the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius to Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770, establishing that penalties not enumerated in the statute are appealable and not immediately executory.
• "The provisions of Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 and the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman with respect to the finality and execution of decisions are not affected by the ruling in Fabian v. Desierto, and therefore still stand." — This passage clarifies the scope of the Fabian vs. Desierto ruling, holding that only the appeal route provision was declared unconstitutional, not the provisions on finality and execution of decisions.

• Lapid vs. Court of Appeals, 334 SCRA 738 (2000) — Controlling precedent. The Court relied on this case for the proposition that only orders, directives, or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases imposing the penalty of public censure, reprimand, or suspension of not more than one month, or a fine not equivalent to one month's salary shall be final and unappealable and hence immediately executory. In all other disciplinary cases, the decision becomes final and executory only after the lapse of the period to appeal or after the denial of the appeal.
• Fabian vs. Desierto, 295 SCRA 470 (1998) — Distinguished. The Court interpreted this case as declaring unconstitutional Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 only insofar as it provided that administrative appeals from the Office of the Ombudsman shall be taken to the Supreme Court. The provisions regarding finality and execution of decisions were not affected and still stand.

• Section 27, Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) — Provides for the effectivity and finality of decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman. The Court applied this provision to determine that only decisions imposing public censure, reprimand, suspension of not more than one month's salary, or a fine not equivalent to one month's salary are final and unappealable; all other decisions are appealable, and a timely appeal stays their implementation.
• Rule III, Section 7, Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman (Administrative Order No. 07, April 10, 1990) — Provides for the finality of decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman. The Court applied this rule in conjunction with Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 to determine that in all cases where the penalty imposed is other than public censure, reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine not equivalent to one month's salary, the decision becomes final only after the expiration of ten (10) days from receipt thereof by the respondent, unless a motion for reconsideration or petition for certiorari shall have been filed.
• Section 40, Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) — Contains the separability clause. The Court applied this provision to create the presumption that the legislature intended separability, rather than complete nullity of the statute, in interpreting the effect of the Fabian vs. Desierto ruling.
• Rule 43, Section 12, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Provides that an appeal shall not stay the award, judgment, final order, or resolution sought to be reviewed unless the Court of Appeals shall direct otherwise. The Court found this provision inapplicable because the provisions of Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 regarding finality and execution of decisions still stand.

Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Vitug, J., and Carpio, J., concurred in the decision.

N/A — No dissenting opinions are noted in the provided case text.