Lopez Vda. de Baluyut vs. Judge Luciano

A finding that a person is incompetent must be anchored on clear, positive, and definite evidence, adduced after the psychiatrist's or commissioner's report has been set for hearing and after the alleged incompetent has been examined; a declaration of incompetency issued on the report alone, without notice and hearing, violates due process. Relatedly, where the very question of a person's competency is already in issue as an incident in a case pending before the ordinary court, the guardianship proceeding must be suspended and must await that court's adjudication, pursuant to the last sentence of Section 29-A of the charter of Quezon City.

Sotero Baluyut, a resident of Quezon Boulevard Extension, Quezon City, died at the age of eighty-six, leaving an estate allegedly valued at not less than two million pesos and survived by his seventy-five-year-old widow, Encarnacion Lopez. Alfredo G. Baluyut, an alleged nephew of the decedent, sought to control the estate, and in that effort was joined by the widow's own sisters, Cristeta Lopez Vda. de la Cuesta and Guadalupe Lopez Viray; the widow's ally was Jose G. Espino, an alleged natural child of the decedent. The statutory backdrop is the charter of Quezon City (Republic Act No. 537, as amended by Republic Act No. 4836), Section 29-A of which confers on the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court exclusive original jurisdiction over guardianship cases but provides in its last sentence that if any question involving any of the matters placed within that jurisdiction should arise as an incident in any case pending in the ordinary court, the incident shall be determined in the main case; Section 29-B of the same charter authorizes that court to avail itself of the consultative services of psychiatrists, psychologists, and other qualified specialists.

Sotero Baluyut, a resident of 59 Quezon Boulevard Extension, Quezon City, died at the age of eighty-six years, leaving an estate allegedly valued at not less than two million pesos and survived by Encarnacion Lopez, his seventy-five-year-old widow. Soon after his death, his alleged nephew, Alfredo G. Baluyut, exerted efforts to control the decedent's estate, assisted by the widow's sisters, Cristeta Lopez Vda. de la Cuesta and Guadalupe Lopez Viray. Their antagonists were the widow and her ally, Jose G. Espino, an alleged natural child of Sotero Baluyut.

On February 20, 1975, or forty-five days after Sotero Baluyut's demise, Alfredo filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City for the settlement of the decedent's estate, alleging that Mrs. Baluyut was mentally incapable of administering her affairs and the estate or of acting as executrix of any will, and praying that he be appointed administrator and, in the meantime, special administrator. On that same day, he filed in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City a petition to declare Mrs. Baluyut an incompetent and to place her under guardianship, alleging that due to a head injury she had suffered impairment of her mental faculties and was no longer competent, physically and mentally, to manage her affairs, and claiming that he was able, qualified, and ready to act as her guardian. After the petition was partially heard, Mrs. Baluyut learned of the guardianship proceeding and filed a verified opposition denying the allegations of mental incompetency. She alleged that the petition was filed after Alfredo's attempts to get possession of the estate were aborted and after her residence was ransacked on February 12, resulting in the loss of important papers and cash of not less than one hundred thousand pesos; that the documents being used against her were the product not only of an illegal seizure but of a plain and simple robbery; that the filing of the petition was an act of disrespect to the deceased, since Alfredo and his cohorts had been cuddled and reared by the spouses Sotero Baluyut and Encarnacion Lopez; and that because of the malicious petition she suffered sleepless nights and serious anxiety.

On April 7, Alfredo filed a motion praying that Mrs. Baluyut be subjected to a neuropsychiatric examination, and she filed a countermotion to expunge that motion from the record. On April 15, Alfredo filed an amended petition praying that Mrs. Cuesta and Mrs. Viray be appointed guardians of the person and property of their sister, which the latter vehemently opposed; he later moved orally that he be considered disqualified to act as guardian in view of his appointment as special administrator. In its order of April 28, 1975, the lower court granted Alfredo's motions that he be considered disqualified as guardian and that Mrs. Baluyut undergo a neuropsychiatric examination scheduled on May 7 at the Philippine General Hospital before Doctors Lourdes V. Lapuz or Baltazar Reyes, and advised Mrs. Cuesta and Mrs. Viray to file their own petition for appointment as guardians. On June 20, 1975, the lower court dismissed Alfredo's petition for guardianship, ending the first round of the guardianship incident.

The second round began on May 6, 1975, when Mrs. Cuesta and Mrs. Viray filed in the same court their petition dated April 28, praying that Mrs. Baluyut be declared an incompetent and that they be appointed as her guardian. On the following day, May 7, they filed an urgent ex-parte motion praying that Mrs. Baluyut be ordered to remain at the conjugal residence and that she be placed under the court's protection or in her sisters' custody so that she could be available for psychiatric examination; without hearing Mrs. Baluyut, the lower court granted the motion on May 8. On May 16, the sisters filed an amended petition dated May 8 to cure the deficiencies of their original petition; on May 21, Mrs. Baluyut filed a motion to set aside the May 8 order; and on May 22, she filed a motion to strike out the original petition, alternatively labelled as an opposition, both of which were denied in the order of June 23, 1975. On June 18, Mrs. Cuesta and Mrs. Viray filed a new petition for guardianship without mentioning their petitions of April 28 and May 8, and Mrs. Baluyut's counsel claimed that no filing fee was paid for docketing it. On July 21, the lower court appointed Doctor Lapuz as commissioner to determine Mrs. Baluyut's competency at an examination scheduled on August 12 at her residence and to report whether she should be placed under guardianship; on August 11, her counsel manifested that she was ready to submit to neuropsychiatric examination at her new domicile at 53 East Maya Street, Phil-Am Life Homes, Quezon City.

On September 25, the lower court issued the questioned order declaring Mrs. Baluyut an incompetent on the basis of Doctor Lapuz's report. Mrs. Baluyut had first been examined by Ma. Paz U. Guzman, a psychologist, who found that as of September 11 Mrs. Baluyut was "an integrated well-functioning individual," "an aware and responsive individual who has a mind of her own," and "competent enough to understand her position relative to the case involving her." Doctor Lapuz, for her part, found that Mrs. Baluyut was aware of what the present court case was all about; that she spontaneously declared that she preferred to associate with the Espino spouses because they treated her kindly; and that she said her other relatives were probably envious and desired to get hold of her assets. The psychiatrist's report did not categorically recommend that a guardian be appointed; it stated that Mrs. Baluyut needed "kind and consistent guidance in the handling of her affairs" and required "help regarding details and more complex procedures," while the psychological tests showed functioning at the dull normal level but otherwise integrated and in touch with reality. Mrs. Baluyut's counsel observed that the lower court's order was "issued in a blitz manner," without any hearing on the psychiatrist's report, without giving her notice, and without giving her a copy of the report.

On October 6, she filed a motion for reconsideration of the order declaring her incompetent, calling attention to the fact that in the administration proceeding Judge Vicente G. Ericta had declared her "competent" in his order of March 24, 1975, and that Judge Ernani Cruz Paño, Judge Ericta's successor, had in his order of November 27, 1975 appointed her as administratrix after concluding that she was competent to act as such. The lower court had scheduled a hearing on October 8 to determine who should be appointed guardian; her counsel did not appear, perhaps because of his pending motion for reconsideration, and at that hearing Mrs. Cuesta, Mrs. Viray, her husband Atty. Fortunato Viray, Sr., and Alfredo G. Baluyut testified on direct examination for the purpose of proving that Mrs. Viray was competent to act as guardian. On October 20, the lower court motu proprio issued another order justifying its prior declaration of incompetency and scheduled the cross-examination of Doctor Lapuz on October 24, but the hearing was not held due to the psychiatrist's indisposition. On December 10, the lower court issued an order denying Mrs. Baluyut's motion for reconsideration, ruling that as a socio-legal court it was duly empowered under Section 29-B of the charter of Quezon City to avail itself of the consultative services of psychiatrists, psychologists, and other qualified specialists, and that the declaration of incompetency was interlocutory and that a prompt resolution of the issue was imperative in view of the verified statements of her two sisters and nephew-in-law that more than one million pesos had been withdrawn by her through the machinations of third persons. The petition for review was filed on December 29, 1975.

• Jurisdiction of the Guardianship Court: Petitioner assailed for the first time the lower court's jurisdiction to declare her an incompetent, contending that her competency was already involved in the administration proceedings pending in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, which court — and not the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court — had jurisdiction over the issue of her competency. She invoked Section 29-A of the Quezon City charter, which confers exclusive original jurisdiction on the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court in guardianship cases but provides in its last sentence that if any question involving any of the matters within that jurisdiction should arise as an incident in any case pending in the ordinary court, the incident shall be determined in the main case.
• Denial of Due Process: Petitioner contended that she was denied due process of law when the guardianship court summarily announced its verdict on her incompetency notwithstanding that her lawyer had not cross-examined the psychiatrist, and when the order was issued without any hearing on the psychiatrist's report, without notice to her, and without giving her a copy of the report.
• Non-Payment of Filing and Legal Research Fees: Petitioner's counsel repeatedly asserted that Mrs. Viray and Mrs. Cuesta did not pay the corresponding filing and legal research fees for the docketing of their petition for guardianship, and that the payments reflected on the cover of the expediente corresponded instead to their petition in Special Proceeding No. QC-00925, which had been dismissed.

• Suspension of the Guardianship Proceeding: Whether the resolution in the guardianship proceeding of the question as to Mrs. Baluyut's alleged incompetency should await the adjudication in the administration proceeding pending in the probate court of the issue as to her competency to act as administratrix.
• Denial of Due Process: Whether Mrs. Baluyut was denied due process when the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court summarily declared her an incompetent just one day after it received the psychiatrist's report and before that report was set for hearing.
• Filing and Legal Research Fees: Whether the lower court should determine whether the docket and legal research fees fixed in Section 5[e], Rule 141 of the Rules of Court were duly paid by Mrs. Viray and Mrs. Cuesta for their petition for guardianship.

• Suspension of the Guardianship Proceeding: Yes. Although the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court has exclusive original jurisdiction over the guardianship proceeding, that proceeding must be suspended and must await the final verdict of the Court of First Instance on Mrs. Baluyut's competency to act as executrix or administratrix, in consonance with the last sentence of Section 29-A of the charter of Quezon City.
• Denial of Due Process: Yes. A finding of incompetency must be anchored on clear, positive, and definite evidence, and the lower court's precipitate declaration — issued the day after it received the psychiatrist's report, without setting the report for hearing and without examining the alleged incompetent — was not the offspring of fundamental fairness.
• Filing and Legal Research Fees: The lower court must first determine whether the legal fees fixed in Section 5[e], Rule 141 of the Rules of Court were duly paid by Mrs. Viray and Mrs. Cuesta, since the point was never squarely resolved below and the questioned orders were silent on the matter.

• Suspension of the Guardianship Proceeding: The Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court has exclusive original jurisdiction to entertain the proceeding for the guardianship of Mrs. Baluyut as an alleged incompetent, as settled by the rulings on that court's original exclusive jurisdiction. However, Mrs. Baluyut's competency to act as administratrix was in issue in Special Proceeding No. Q-19794 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, instituted by Alfredo G. Baluyut for the settlement of the estate of Sotero Baluyut, in which Alfredo alleged that Mrs. Baluyut was mentally incapable of administering the estate and in which she prayed in a counter-petition that she be appointed administratrix. The probate court appointed her as administratrix after finding that she was sui juris or was still in possession of her capacidad de obrar o capacidad de ejercicio, and she qualified as administratrix on November 29, 1975. This Court in Baluyut vs. Judge Paño set aside that appointment, not because Mrs. Baluyut was an incompetent, but because of the lack of an adequate opportunity to be heard and to present evidence. The last sentence of Section 29-A of the charter of Quezon City, which divests the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of jurisdiction or authority to resolve questions already in issue as an incident in any case pending in the ordinary court, has the salutary purpose of obviating the rendition of conflicting rulings on the same issue by the Court of First Instance and the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court. It is true that incompetency to act as executor or administrator cannot be equated with the incompetency that justifies the placing of a person under guardianship, and from the fact that a person may be incompetent to act as executor or administrator it does not follow that he could be placed under guardianship; but if a person is competent to act as executor or administrator, then he is not the incompetent person envisaged in the law of guardianship. Accordingly, the guardianship proceedings should be suspended and should await the adjudication of the issue as to Mrs. Baluyut's competency to act as administratrix.
• Denial of Due Process: The lower court appointed Doctor Lapuz as commissioner to determine Mrs. Baluyut's competency and directed her to recommend whether a guardian was needed for her person and property; the commissioner took her oath and referred Mrs. Baluyut to Ma. Paz U. de Guzman for psychological evaluation, and the psychologist found Mrs. Baluyut to be "an integrated well-functioning individual" and "competent enough to understand her position relative to the case involving her." Doctor Lapuz interviewed Mrs. Baluyut alone for a psychiatric evaluation, and her report did not categorically recommend that a guardian be appointed; she stated only that Mrs. Baluyut needed "kind and consistent guidance in the handling of her affairs" and required "help regarding details and more complex procedures." The lower court did not notify the parties of the filing of the psychiatrist's report, did not give them a chance to register their objections, and did not set the report for hearing as required in Sections 9 to 11, Rule 33 of the Rules of Court; instead, on the day following its receipt of the report, it declared Mrs. Baluyut an incompetent within the meaning of Rule 92, which defines "incompetent" to include "persons not being of unsound mind, but by reason of age, disease, weak mind, and other similar causes, cannot, without outside aid, take care of themselves and manage their property, becoming thereby an easy prey for deceit and exploitation." The declaration was made although the guardianship court had not examined the alleged incompetent, even after her counsel had called attention to Judge Ericta's order of March 24, 1975 finding her "healthy and mentally qualified" and to Judge Paño's order of November 27, 1975 confirming that finding. The lower court should at least have tried to take judicial notice of what was happening in the administration proceeding, and the voice of prudence should have cautioned it to avoid issuing a declaration contradicting the probate court's pronouncement on Mrs. Baluyut's capacity to act. A finding that a person is incompetent should be anchored on clear, positive, and definite evidence, as held in Yangco vs. Court of First Instance of Manila; that kind of proof had not yet been presented to the guardianship court to justify its precipitate conclusion. The case presented the spectacle of two courts of Quezon City making divergent findings on Mrs. Baluyut's capacity to act under Article 37 of the Civil Code; the guardianship court took the second step before having taken the first, declaring her an incompetent and only then scheduling the cross-examination of the psychiatrist so that the parties could ascertain whether the declaration was correct. The guardianship court should first have set the psychiatrist's report for hearing and examined Mrs. Baluyut before prematurely adjudging her an incompetent; its hasty and premature pronouncement, with its derogatory implications, was not the offspring of fundamental fairness, which is the essence of due process. Moreover, the lower court should have adhered strictly to the procedure laid down in Rule 93 of the Rules of Court for the appointment of guardians, which provides that after the filing of the petition the court should fix a time and place for hearing and give the proper notices, and that at the hearing the alleged incompetent must be present if able to attend, the required notice must be shown to have been given, and the court shall then hear the evidence of the parties in support of their respective allegations. Instead, before hearing the evidence of the parties, particularly Mrs. Baluyut, the lower court immediately subjected her to a psychiatric examination — an unorthodox procedure that was not warranted, since the normal procedure is to hear first the evidence of the parties and examine the prospective ward, whose testimony has peculiar cogency in the determination of whether he should be placed under guardianship.
• Filing and Legal Research Fees: The cover of the expediente of Special Proceeding No. QC-00939 showed that on May 6, 1975 the sums of thirty-two pesos and two pesos were paid as docket fee and legal research fee under Official Receipts Nos. 8981855 and 8982309, respectively, but Mrs. Baluyut's counsel contended that those payments corresponded to the petition of Mrs. Viray and Mrs. Cuesta in Special Proceeding No. QC-00925, which was dismissed. Because Mrs. Baluyut did not ask the lower court to resolve the point squarely and because the orders being questioned were silent on the matter, the lower court should first determine whether the legal fees fixed in Section 5[e], Rule 141 of the Rules of Court were duly paid by Mrs. Viray and Mrs. Cuesta.

• Clear, positive, and definite evidence as the quantum for a declaration of incompetency — A finding that a person is incompetent must be anchored on clear, positive, and definite evidence, not on a psychiatrist's or commissioner's report standing alone. The Court applied this standard, first articulated in Yangco vs. Court of First Instance of Manila, and concluded that the kind of proof required had not yet been presented to the guardianship court when it declared Mrs. Baluyut incompetent on the day following its receipt of the psychiatrist's report.
• Suspension of guardianship proceedings under the Section 29-A exception — Where a question involving any of the matters placed within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court arises as an incident in a case pending in the ordinary court, the incident must be determined in the main case, and the guardianship proceeding must be suspended to await that court's adjudication. The Court held that the provision's purpose is to obviate the rendition of conflicting rulings on the same issue by the Court of First Instance and the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, and that the guardianship proceeding had to await the probate court's final verdict on Mrs. Baluyut's competency to act as executrix or administratrix.
• Incompetency to act as executor or administrator distinguished from incompetency justifying guardianship — Incompetency to act as executor or administrator cannot be equated with the incompetency that justifies placing a person under guardianship; from the fact that a person may be incompetent to act as executor or administrator, it does not follow that he could be placed under guardianship. The converse, however, holds: if a person is competent to act as executor or administrator, then he is not the incompetent person envisaged in the law of guardianship. This asymmetry supplied the rationale for suspending the guardianship proceeding pending the probate court's determination.
• Due process in guardianship proceedings — A declaration of incompetency, with its derogatory implications, must be the offspring of fundamental fairness. The Court held that due process requires that the psychiatrist's or commissioner's report be set for hearing, with notice to the parties and an opportunity to register objections, as required by Sections 9 to 11 of Rule 33, and that the alleged incompetent be examined before being adjudged incompetent; the guardianship court's practice of declaring incompetency first and scheduling the cross-examination of the psychiatrist afterwards inverted the prescribed order.
• Mandatory procedure under Rule 93 for the appointment of guardians — After the filing of the petition, the court must fix a time and place for hearing and give the proper notices; at the hearing, the alleged incompetent must be present if able to attend, it must be shown that the required notice has been given, and the court shall then hear the evidence of the parties in support of their respective allegations. The Court held that the lower court should have adhered strictly to this procedure instead of immediately subjecting Mrs. Baluyut to a psychiatric examination before hearing the evidence of the parties.
• Peculiar cogency of the alleged incompetent's testimony — The testimony of the alleged incompetent himself has peculiar cogency in the determination of whether he should be placed under guardianship. The Court relied on this principle in faulting the guardianship court for not examining Mrs. Baluyut before declaring her incompetent, notwithstanding that the probate judge had earlier placed her on the witness stand and found her healthy and mentally qualified.

• "A finding that a person is incompetent should be anchored on clear, positive and definite evidence (Yangco vs. Court of First Instance of Manila, 29 Phil. 183, 190). That kind of proof has not yet been presented to the guardianship court to justify its precipitate conclusion that Mrs, Baluyut is an incompetent." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on the evidentiary quantum required before a person may be declared incompetent, and it is the formulation for which the case is commonly cited.
• "In the nature of things, the guardianship court should have first set for hearing the psychiatrist's report and examined Mrs. Baluyut before prematurely adjudging that she is an incompetent. Its hasty and premature pronouncement, with its derogatory implications, was not the offspring of fundamental fairness which is the essence of due process." — This passage defines the procedural due process standard governing guardianship proceedings and explains why the order of September 25, 1975 was set aside.
• "It is true, as observed by Justices Barredo and Antonio during the deliberation on this case, that the incompetency to act as executor or administrator cannot be equated with the incompetency that justifies the placing of a person under guardianship. From the fact that a person may be incompetent to act as executor or administrator, it does not follow that he could be placed under guardianship. But if a person is competent to act as executor or administrator, then he is not the incompetent person envisaged in the law of guardianship." — This passage distinguishes the two species of incompetency and supplies the analytical bridge between the probate court's finding of competency and the suspension of the guardianship proceeding.
• "Section 29-A in divesting the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of jurisdiction or authority to resolve questions already in issue as an incident in any case pending in the ordinary court has a salutary purpose. That provision or exception is designed to obviate the rendition of conflicting rulings on the same issue by the Court of First Instance and the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court." — This passage articulates the purpose behind the exception clause of Section 29-A of the Quezon City charter and is the basis for the directive to suspend the guardianship proceeding.

• Yangco vs. Court of First Instance of Manila, 29 Phil. 183, 190 — Controlling precedent on the quantum of proof required for a declaration of incompetency; cited for the rule that such a finding must be anchored on clear, positive, and definite evidence.
• Baluyut vs. Judge Paño, L-42088, May 7, 1976 — Prior related litigation between the same parties; this Court set aside Mrs. Baluyut's appointment as administratrix, not because she was incompetent but because of the lack of an adequate opportunity to be heard and to present evidence. The Court also relied on Judge Paño's order of November 27, 1975 confirming Judge Ericta's finding of competency.
• Perez vs. Tuason de Perez, 109 Phil. 54; In re Angela Tuason de Perez, L-28114, October 30, 1970, 35 SCRA 608; Rayray vs. Chae Kyung Lee, L-18176, October 26, 1966, 18 SCRA 450; Paterno vs. Paterno, L-23060, June 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 585; Bartolome vs. Bartolome, L-23661, December 20, 1967, 21 SCRA 1324; Eusebio vs. Eusebio, L-39581, March 31, 1976 — Cited collectively as the rulings establishing the original exclusive jurisdiction of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, on which the Court relied in holding that the lower court had exclusive original jurisdiction over the guardianship proceeding.
• Viray vs. Espino, L-42183 — Referenced in a footnote as a related habeas corpus proceeding instituted by Mrs. Cuesta and Mrs. Viray to obtain custody of Mrs. Baluyut's person, which was referred to the Court of First Instance of Quezon City and dismissed in a decision dated April 30, 1976.
• 22 ALR 2nd 762 — Cited for the principle that the testimony of the alleged incompetent himself has peculiar cogency in the determination of whether he should be placed under guardianship.

• Section 29-A, Republic Act No. 537 (charter of Quezon City), as amended by Republic Act No. 4836 — Confers on the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court exclusive original jurisdiction in guardianship cases but provides in its last sentence that if any question involving any of the matters within that jurisdiction should arise as an incident in any case pending in the ordinary court, the incident shall be determined in the main case. The Court applied the exception clause to direct the suspension of the guardianship proceeding pending the probate court's final verdict on Mrs. Baluyut's competency to act as executrix or administratrix.
• Section 29-B, Republic Act No. 537 (charter of Quezon City), as amended by Republic Act No. 4836 — Empowers the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, as a socio-legal court, to avail itself of the consultative services of psychiatrists, psychologists, and other qualified specialists. The lower court invoked this provision to justify its recourse to Doctor Lapuz; the Court did not dispute the authority but held that the manner in which the resulting report was used violated due process.
• Section 2, Rule 92, Rules of Court — Defines the word "incompetent" to include "persons not being of unsound mind, but by reason of age, disease, weak mind, and other similar causes, cannot, without outside aid, take care of themselves and manage their property, becoming thereby an easy prey for deceit and exploitation." The lower court declared Mrs. Baluyut incompetent within the meaning of this Rule on the day following its receipt of the psychiatrist's report.
• Section 5, Rule 93, Rules of Court — Requires that after the filing of the petition the court fix a time and place for hearing and give the proper notices, that the alleged incompetent be present if able to attend, that it be shown that the required notice has been given, and that the court then hear the evidence of the parties in support of their respective allegations. The Court held that the lower court should have adhered strictly to this procedure instead of immediately subjecting Mrs. Baluyut to a psychiatric examination.
• Sections 9 to 11, Rule 33, Rules of Court — Govern the submission of a commissioner's report and require that it be set for hearing so that the parties may register their objections. The Court held that the lower court violated these provisions when it declared Mrs. Baluyut incompetent on the day following its receipt of the psychiatrist's report without notifying the parties, without giving them a chance to object, and without setting the report for hearing.
• Section 5[e], Rule 141, Rules of Court — Fixes the legal fees for the docketing of petitions. The Court directed the lower court to determine whether Mrs. Viray and Mrs. Cuesta paid these fees for their petition for guardianship, since the point had not been squarely resolved below and the questioned orders were silent on it.
• Article 37, Civil Code — Governs capacity to act. The Court cited it in noting the divergent findings of two Quezon City courts on Mrs. Baluyut's capacity to act.

Fernando (Chairman), Barredo, Antonio, and Martin, JJ., concurred. Concepcion, Jr., J., was on leave. Martin, J., was designated to sit in the Second Division.