Lopez, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections

Presidential Decree No. 824 creating Metropolitan Manila is constitutional and valid. The plebiscite requirement of Article XI, Section 3 of the 1973 Constitution was satisfied by the February 27, 1975 referendum in which the residents of the affected cities and municipalities authorized the President to restructure their local governments into an integrated unit. A law susceptible of two constructions, one that maintains and another that destroys its constitutionality, must be construed in favor of its validity — "to doubt is to sustain."

Presidential Decree No. 824, issued on November 7, 1975, was a response to the felt need for a central government to establish and administer programs and provide services common to the cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay, and Caloocan, as well as thirteen surrounding municipalities. The unchecked population growth in the area since World War II had resulted in the ever-increasing inability of the separate local governments to cope with serious problems. The decree created a public corporation known as Metropolitan Manila, vested with corporate powers and administered by a Commission. At the time of the decree's issuance, there was no Local Government Code in existence — Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 was not enacted until February 10, 1983 — and no interim Batasang Pambansa had yet been constituted, with the President then entrusted with legislative authority during the period of Martial Law.

Presidential Decree No. 824, issued on November 7, 1975, created Metropolitan Manila as an integrated local government unit comprising the cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay, and Caloocan, and the municipalities of Makati, Mandaluyong, San Juan, Las Piñas, Malabon, Navotas, Pasig, Pateros, Parañaque, Marikina, Muntinlupa, and Taguig in the province of Rizal, and the municipality of Valenzuela in the province of Bulacan. The decree's preamble cited "the referendum held on February 27, 1975 [wherein] the residents of the Greater Manila Area authorized the President to restructure the local governments of the four cities and 13 municipalities thereof into an integrated unit of the manager or commission form of government," with the terms and conditions left to the discretion of the President. The decree noted the rapid growth of population and the corresponding increase of social and economic requirements in the contiguous communities, and the need for public services to be administered more efficiently and economically through integration and harmonization under a system of central planning.

The petitioners, Gemiliano C. Lopez, Jr. (later an Assemblyman of Metropolitan Manila) and Reynaldo B. Aralar, filed two petitions. In the first, they assailed the constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 824, relying on Article XI, Section 3 of the 1973 Constitution, which provided that no province, city, municipality, or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code, and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected. The Local Government Code was not enacted until 1983. In the second petition, Lopez sought a writ of mandamus to require the Commission on Elections to order elections for members of the Sangguniang Panglungsod and Sangguniang Bayan in the four cities and thirteen towns of Metropolitan Manila.

The Solicitor General argued that the mandamus petition was itself an admission of the validity of Presidential Decree No. 824, and that the decree provided that the Sangguniang Bayan shall be composed of as many barangay captains as may be determined and chosen by the Commission, and such number of representatives from other sectors of society as may be appointed by the President upon recommendation of the Commission. The petitioners also raised an equal protection challenge, arguing that unless Presidential Decree No. 824 were construed to require elections for the Sangguniang Bayan along with the rest of the other cities and municipalities, there would be a denial of the equal protection provision of the Constitution.

• Plebiscite Requirement: Petitioners argued that Presidential Decree No. 824 was unconstitutional for violating Article XI, Section 3 of the 1973 Constitution, which required that the creation of local government units be in accordance with criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of votes cast in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected. The Local Government Code was not enacted until 1983, and the February 27, 1975 referendum did not constitute a valid plebiscite.

• Mandamus for Sangguniang Bayan Elections: Petitioner Lopez argued that the Commission on Elections should be compelled to order elections for members of the Sangguniang Panglungsod and Sangguniang Bayan in the four cities and thirteen towns of Metropolitan Manila, as there was no duly constituted Sangguniang Bayan in the Metro Manila Area.

• Equal Protection: Petitioners argued that unless Presidential Decree No. 824 were construed to require elections for the Sangguniang Bayan along with the rest of the other cities and municipalities, there would be a denial of the equal protection provision of the Constitution, since the membership of the Sangguniang Bayan in Metropolitan Manila would not be identical with those of other cities or municipalities.

• Validity of the Decree: Respondent Commission on Elections, through the Solicitor General, argued that the petition's charge that there was no duly constituted Sangguniang Bayan in the Metro Manila Area was untrue, and that the citizenry therein did have a voice in decision-making through the respective Sangguniang Bayans of each of the political units therein, as provided in Presidential Decree No. 824 itself.

• Constitutional Recognition: Respondent Commission argued that it would show lack of fidelity to the Constitution if the prayer for the abolition of Metropolitan Manila, which is expressly authorized and recognized by the fundamental law, were granted, citing Article VIII, Section 2 of the Constitution as amended on January 27, 1984.

• Mandamus as Admission: The Solicitor General stated that the fact that the petition was a suit for mandamus was an admission of the validity of Presidential Decree No. 824.

• Plebiscite Requirement: Whether the February 27, 1975 referendum satisfied the plebiscite requirement of Article XI, Section 3 of the 1973 Constitution for the creation of Metropolitan Manila.

• Presidential Authority: Whether the President had the authority to issue Presidential Decree No. 824 creating Metropolitan Manila in 1975.

• Mandamus: Whether mandamus lies to compel the Commission on Elections to order elections for members of the Sangguniang Panglungsod and Sangguniang Bayan in the four cities and thirteen towns of Metropolitan Manila.

• Equal Protection: Whether the non-identical membership of the Sangguniang Bayan in Metropolitan Manila constitutes a denial of the equal protection provision of the Constitution.

• Presidential Control: Whether Section 13 of Presidential Decree No. 824, conferring on the President the power of control over the Metropolitan Manila Commission, is constitutional.

• Plebiscite Requirement: No. The February 27, 1975 referendum constituted sufficient compliance with the constitutional provision, the voters in the four cities and thirteen municipalities now composing Metropolitan Manila having manifested their will. The absence of a Local Government Code at the time of the referendum did not invalidate the creation.

• Presidential Authority: Yes. The President had the authority to issue Presidential Decree No. 824, there being no interim Batasang Pambansa at the time, and the President being entrusted with such responsibility during the period of Martial Law, as held in Aquino, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections.

• Mandamus: No. Mandamus cannot lie because Presidential Decree No. 824 itself provides that the Sangguniang Bayan shall be composed of as many barangay captains as may be determined and chosen by the Commission, and such number of representatives from other sectors of society as may be appointed by the President upon recommendation of the Commission.

• Equal Protection: No. The classification is reasonable, based on substantial distinctions which make real differences, germane to the purposes of the law, and applies equally to each member of the class. There is ample justification for the distinction in the membership of the Sangguniang Bayan in Metropolitan Manila.

• Presidential Control: No. Section 13 is not unconstitutional, being susceptible of a saving construction. The presidential power of control over acts of the Metro Manila Commission is limited to those that may be considered national in character; where acts appertain to local government functions, the power of the President is confined to general supervision.

• Plebiscite Requirement: The Court relied on Paredes vs. Executive Secretary, which dismissed a similar challenge based on Article XI, Section 3 of the Constitution. In that case, the Court held that the constitutional provision on the need for a majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected would be satisfied even if voters not from the barangay to be separated were excluded in the plebiscite. Applying the same reasoning, the plebiscite held in the areas affected to constitute Metropolitan Manila in the referendum on February 27, 1975 was sufficient compliance with the constitutional provision. The Court noted that at the time of such plebiscite, there was no Local Government Code, but this did not render the creation invalid.

• Presidential Authority: The Court cited Aquino, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, decided in January 1975, which dispelled all doubts as to the legality of the President's law-making authority during the period of Martial Law. The entire paragraph of Section 3(2) of the Transitory Provisions of the 1973 Constitution is not a grant of authority to legislate, but a recognition of such power as already existing in favor of the incumbent President during the period of Martial Law.

• Mandamus: The Court held that the Decree itself supplies the refutation to the contention of petitioner. The Sangguniang Bayan in Metropolitan Manila is composed of barangay captains determined and chosen by the Commission, and representatives from other sectors appointed by the President upon recommendation of the Commission. The Solicitor General plausibly asserted that the citizenry in the Metro Manila Area do have a voice in decision-making through the respective Sangguniang Bayans of each of the political units therein.

• Equal Protection: The Court reiterated the concept of equal protection: the government act assailed must be shown to be prompted by the spirit of hostility or discrimination that finds no support in reason. The laws must operate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances. Classification on a reasonable basis, not made arbitrarily or capriciously, is permitted. The classification must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences, must be germane to the purposes of the law, must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class. All such elements are present in the creation of Metropolitan Manila. The compelling reasons that called for its creation — the continued growth of population and the complexity of attendant problems — were a response to a great public need. It is not a condition for the validity of the Sangguniang Bayans provided for in the four cities and thirteen municipalities that the membership be identical with those of other cities or municipalities.

• Presidential Control: The Court acknowledged that doubts may arise as to the validity of Section 13 insofar as it confers the power of control on the President over the Metropolitan Manila Commission. The President exercises control over the ministries under the present Constitution, but his power over local governments extends no further than general supervision. However, citing Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, the Court applied the doctrine that "to doubt is to sustain" — when a law is susceptible of two constructions, one of which will maintain and the other destroy it, the courts will always adopt the former. The saving construction is that the presidential power of control over acts of the Metro Manila Commission is limited to those that may be considered national in character. The fact that the Local Government Code does not include the Metro Manila Commission is a clear recognition that some of its attributes are those of a national character. Where the acts of the Metro Manila Commission may be considered as properly appertaining to local government functions, the power of the President is confined to general supervision. As thus construed, Section 13 clearly appears to be free from any constitutional infirmity.

• Plebiscite Requirement under Article XI, Section 3 of the 1973 Constitution — The creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of the boundary of any province, city, municipality, or barrio requires compliance with the criteria established in the local government code and approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected. The Court applied this doctrine by holding that the February 27, 1975 referendum, in which the voters in the four cities and thirteen municipalities now composing Metropolitan Manila manifested their will, satisfied the constitutional provision, notwithstanding the absence of a Local Government Code at the time.

• Presidential Legislative Authority during Martial Law — Under Section 3(2) of the Transitory Provisions of the 1973 Constitution, the President's law-making authority during the period of Martial Law was recognized as already existing, not granted. The Court applied this doctrine to uphold the President's authority to issue Presidential Decree No. 824 in 1975, when there was no interim Batasang Pambansa as yet.

• Equal Protection and Reasonable Classification — Classification on a reasonable basis, not made arbitrarily or capriciously, is permitted under the equal protection clause. To be reasonable, the classification must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences, must be germane to the purposes of the law, must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class. The Court applied this doctrine to reject the equal protection challenge, finding that the non-identical membership of the Sangguniang Bayan in Metropolitan Manila was justified by the compelling reasons that called for the creation of the integrated unit.

• Saving Construction — "To Doubt is to Sustain" — When a law is susceptible of two constructions, one of which will maintain and the other destroy its constitutionality, the courts will always adopt the former. The Court applied this doctrine to uphold Section 13 of Presidential Decree No. 824 by construing the presidential power of control over the Metropolitan Manila Commission as limited to acts national in character, with general supervision applying to local government functions.

• Constitution Enters Into and Forms Part of Every Statute — Every statute must be construed in light of the Constitution, and a construction that would save the statute from constitutional infirmity is preferred over one that would destroy it. The Court applied this doctrine in construing Section 13 of Presidential Decree No. 824 to avoid any doubt as to its validity.

• "To doubt is to sustain." — This is the canonical formulation from Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad that the Court applied to uphold the constitutionality of Section 13 of Presidential Decree No. 824, holding that doubts as to the validity of the presidential power of control over the Metropolitan Manila Commission do not suffice to nullify the provision.

• "The recognition of the existence of Metropolitan Manila cannot be expressed any clearer. There can be no legal justification then for a declaration of unconstitutionality. Presidential Decree No. 824 is not tainted with constitutional infirmity." — This passage states the Court's conclusion that Article VIII, Section 2 of the Constitution, as amended on January 27, 1984, expressly recognized the juridical entity known as Metropolitan Manila, removing any last vestige of doubt as to the decree's validity.

• "It cannot be argued therefore that the plebiscite held in the areas affected to constitute Metropolitan Manila in the referendum on February 27, 1975 was not a sufficient compliance with the constitutional provision. With the voters in such four cities and thirteen municipalities, now composing Metropolitan Manila, having manifested their will, the constitutional provision relied upon by petitioners has been satisfied." — This passage articulates the Court's holding that the February 27, 1975 referendum satisfied the plebiscite requirement of Article XI, Section 3 of the 1973 Constitution.

• "Succinctly put, that construction that would save is to be preferred as against one that will destroy." — This passage states the saving construction doctrine that the Court applied to uphold Section 13 of Presidential Decree No. 824, limiting the presidential power of control to acts national in character.

• Paredes vs. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 55628, March 2, 1984, 128 SCRA 6 — Controlling precedent. The Court relied on this case, which dismissed a similar challenge based on Article XI, Section 3 of the Constitution, holding that the constitutional provision on the need for a majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected would be satisfied even if voters not from the barangay to be separated were excluded in the plebiscite.

• Aquino, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, L-40004, January 31, 1975, 62 SCRA 275 — Controlling precedent. The Court cited this case for the proposition that the President had law-making authority during the period of Martial Law, with Section 3(2) of the Transitory Provisions of the 1973 Constitution being a recognition of such power as already existing.

• Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385 (1925) — Controlling precedent. The Court applied the doctrine from this case that "to doubt is to sustain" and that when a law is susceptible of two constructions, one of which will maintain and the other destroy it, the courts will always adopt the former.

• People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937) — Followed. The Court cited Justice Laurel's formulation of the reasonable classification test under the equal protection clause: classification must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences, must be germane to the purposes of the law, must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class.

• Sison, Jr. vs. Ancheta, G.R. No. 59431, July 25, 1984, 130 SCRA 654 — Followed. The Court reiterated the concept of equal protection as stated in this recent decision.

• Free Telephone Workers Union vs. Minister of Labor, G.R. No. 58184, October 30, 1981, 108 SCRA 757 — Cited for the proposition that the 1981 amendments to the Constitution established a single, not plural, Executive.

• Crowell vs. Benson, 285 US 22 (1931) — Cited for the cardinal principle that if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, the Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.

• Article XI, Section 3, 1973 Constitution — Provides that no province, city, municipality, or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code, and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected. The Court held that the February 27, 1975 referendum satisfied this requirement.

• Article VIII, Section 2, 1973 Constitution (as amended January 27, 1984) — Expressly recognizes the existence of Metropolitan Manila by providing for the election of representatives from "districts in Metropolitan Manila" to the Batasang Pambansa. The Court held that this express constitutional affirmation calls for the dismissal of the petitions.

• Article VII, Section 10, 1973 Constitution — Provides that the President shall have control of the ministries. The Court distinguished this power of control from the President's power over local governments, which extends no further than general supervision.

• Article VII, Section 18, 1973 Constitution — Provides that all powers vested in the President of the Philippines under the 1935 Constitution and the laws of the land which are not otherwise provided for or conferred upon any official shall be deemed and are hereby vested in the President. The Court cited this provision in connection with the President's power of general supervision over local governments.

• Section 3(2), Transitory Provisions, Article XVII, 1973 Constitution — Provides that all proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, and acts promulgated, issued, or done by the incumbent President shall be part of the law of the land. The Court cited Aquino, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections for the proposition that this provision is not a grant of authority to legislate but a recognition of such power as already existing during the period of Martial Law.

• Presidential Decree No. 824, Sections 1, 2, 4, 9, and 13 — Section 1 creates Metropolitan Manila as a public corporation; Section 2 defines its territorial jurisdiction over the four cities and thirteen municipalities; Section 4 vests it with corporate powers; Section 9 provides for the composition of the Sangguniang Bayan; Section 13 places the Commission under the direct supervision and control of the President. The Court upheld the decree's constitutionality and construed Section 13 to limit presidential control to acts national in character.

• Presidential Decree No. 1296, Section 12, Article II (Election Code of 1978) — Provides for regional representation to the interim Batasang Pambansa, with Region IV comprising "Metro Manila as follows: Cities of Manila, Quezon, Caloocan, and Pasay; and the municipalities of Valenzuela, Malabon, Navotas, Makati, Paranaque, Las Pinas, Mandaluyong, San Juan, Pasig, Muntinlupa, Marikina, Pateros, and Taguig." The Court cited this as acknowledgment in law of the creation of Metropolitan Manila.

• Presidential Decree No. 1396, Section 3 — Declares and establishes the Metropolitan Manila Region as the National Capital Region of the Republic of the Philippines. The Court cited this as further acknowledgment of Metropolitan Manila's existence.

• Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 (Local Government Code, 1983) — The Court noted that the Local Government Code does not include the Metro Manila Commission, which is a clear recognition that some of its attributes are those of a national character.

• Aquino, Melencio-Herrera, Escolin, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente, Cuevas, and Alampay, JJ. — Concurred in the majority opinion.
• Teehankee, J. — Joined in the dissent of Justice Abad Santos.
• Makasiar, J. — Concurred on another ground, specifically estoppel.
• Concepcion and Plana, JJ. — On leave.

• Abad Santos, J. (dissenting) — Justice Abad Santos held a contrary view, voting to grant the petitions. His dissent was based on two grounds. First, the referendum of February 27, 1975 did not satisfy the prohibition contained in Article XI, Section 3 of the 1973 Constitution: there was then no local government code so there were no criteria; the grant of power to restructure the four cities and thirteen municipalities "under such terms and conditions as the President may decide" was so broad that it was in fact not an intelligent decision on the part of the people, as a grant of power must be definite to be valid and must not be nebulous and uncircumscribed so as to amount to a total abdication thereof; and the referendum did not include all of the peoples of Bulacan and Rizal to ascertain if they were willing to give up some of their towns to Metropolitan Manila. Second, the January 27, 1984 amendment to the Constitution providing for representation in the Batasang Pambansa and allocating representatives to "districts in Metropolitan Manila" cannot be construed to constitutionally validate Presidential Decree No. 824, because the issue before the people when the amendment was submitted for ratification was not the creation of the Metropolitan Manila Commission.