Lopez, Jr. vs. Civil Service Commission

A special law’s specific grant of appointing power to a city council is not repealed by implication by later general decentralization laws unless the repugnancy is very clear; the special law prevails over the general law regardless of their dates of passage.

The City of Manila, through its City Council and City Mayor, is governed by Republic Act No. 409, its special charter, which specifically allocates appointing power over Council officers and employees. Republic Act No. 5185, the Decentralization Law, and Batas Blg. 337, the Local Government Code, are general laws vesting appointment authority in local executives. The case requires reconciling those statutes.

Hon. Gemiliano C. Lopez, Jr. was the City Mayor of Manila, while Hon. Danilo R. Lacuna was the Vice-Mayor and Presiding Officer of the City Council of Manila. On September 13, 1988, Lacuna submitted to the Civil Service Commission, through the Regional Director of the National Capital Region, the appointments of nineteen officers and employees in the Executive Staff of the Office of the Presiding Officer, City Council of Manila. The appointments were submitted pursuant to Section 15 of Republic Act No. 409, as amended, which states that “The Board shall appoint and the Vice Mayor shall sign all appointments of the other employees of the Board.”

The City Budget Officer of Manila later sought from the Personnel Bureau of the Mayor’s office “comment and/or recommendation” on whether the payroll of the newly appointed employees of the City Council may be paid on the basis of appointments signed by the Vice-Mayor. The Personnel Bureau forwarded the query to the City Legal Officer, who, in a 3rd endorsement dated September 19, 1988, rendered an opinion that the proper appointing officer is the City Mayor and not the City Council. This opinion was transmitted by the Secretary to the City Mayor to the Commission.

On February 1, 1989, the Commission promulgated Resolution No. 89-075. Contrary to the opinion of the City Legal Officer, the Commission held that it is the City Council to which the appointing power is vested. The Commission ruled that the proper appointing authority of the officers and employees of the City Council of Manila is the City Council and that the signatory of individual appointments thus issued is the City Vice-Mayor of Manila.

The City Mayor then brought the present petition, which was denominated as a direct appeal from the Commission’s resolution. The petition was filed on March 2, 1989, after a copy of Resolution No. 89-075 was received on February 15, 1989.

• Repeal by Implication: Petitioner argued that Section 15 of Republic Act No. 409, as amended, had been repealed by Section 4 of Republic Act No. 5185 and Section 171(h) of Batas Blg. 337, which vest appointment power in city mayors.

• Propriety of the Direct Appeal: Whether a direct appeal lies from a resolution of the Civil Service Commission, or the aggrieved party must file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 within thirty days from receipt.
• Appointing Power of the City Council: Whether Section 15 of Republic Act No. 409, as amended, was repealed by Republic Act No. 5185 and Batas Blg. 337, thereby divesting the City Council of Manila of its power to appoint Council officers and employees and vesting it in the City Mayor.

• Propriety of the Direct Appeal: No. No appeal lies from CSC decisions; the aggrieved party must file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 within thirty days from receipt, pursuant to Article IX, Section 7 of the Constitution. The SC nonetheless accepted the petition as a certiorari petition because it was filed within the thirty-day period.
• Appointing Power of the City Council: No. Section 15 of RA 409, the special charter of Manila, was not repealed by implication by RA 5185 or Batas Blg. 337; a special law prevails over a general law, and repeal by implication is not favored absent clear repugnancy.

• Propriety of the Direct Appeal: Article IX, Section 7 of the Constitution provides that any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the SC on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt. The SC held, citing Dario vs. Mison, that no appeal lies from CSC decisions; the CSC is the single arbiter of all contests relating to the civil service, and its judgments are unappealable and subject only to the SC’s certiorari jurisdiction. The petitioner’s direct appeal was therefore improper, but the SC accepted the petition and considered it as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 because of the important public interest involved and because it was filed within the thirty-day period.
• Appointing Power of the City Council: The SC characterized Republic Act No. 409, which specifically provides for the organization of the Government of the City of Manila, as a special law, while Republic Act No. 5185 and Batas Blg. 337, which apply to municipal governments in general, are general laws. It applied the canon that a special law prevails over a general law regardless of their dates of passage, with the special law remaining an exception to the general. It also stressed that every effort must be exerted to avoid a conflict between statutes and that laws must be reconciled if a reasonable construction is possible. Repeals by implication are not favored, and the mere repugnancy between two statutes must be very clear to warrant a holding that the later law repeals the earlier one. The SC quoted the rationale that the Legislature, having specially considered all the facts and circumstances in granting a special charter, will not be considered to have intended to amend, repeal, or modify the special act by adopting a general law containing repugnant provisions without mentioning its intention to do so. It noted that Republic Act No. 5185 did not divest the Mayor of Manila of his power under the charter to approve the city budget. The SC agreed with the CSC that the provisions of Republic Act No. 5185 giving mayors the power to appoint officials entirely paid out of city funds, and those of Batas Blg. 337 empowering local executives to appoint all officers and employees of the city, were meant not to vest city mayors per se with comprehensive powers but to transfer the power of appointment over local officials and employees from the President to the local governments and to highlight local autonomy. They were not meant to deprive the City Council of Manila of its appointing power granted by existing statute, and that arrangement was sufficient to accomplish the objectives of both the Decentralization Act and the Local Government Code, that is, to provide teeth to local autonomy. The SC therefore found no grave abuse of discretion committed by the CSC.

• CSC decisions are unappealable and subject only to certiorari — The CSC is the single arbiter of all contests relating to the civil service; its decisions, orders, or rulings may be brought to the SC only on certiorari under Rule 65 within thirty days from receipt. Applied: the SC treated the City Mayor’s direct appeal as a certiorari petition and accepted it because it was filed within the thirty-day period.
• Special law prevails over general law — A special law specifically addressing a particular case prevails over a general law covering municipal governments in general, regardless of their dates of passage; the special law remains an exception to the general. Applied: RA 409, the Manila charter, prevailed over RA 5185 and Batas Blg. 337.
• Repeal by implication is not favored — A later general law does not repeal an earlier special law by implication unless the repugnancy is very clear; every effort must be exerted to avoid conflict and to reconcile the statutes if reasonably possible. Applied: no clear repugnancy existed between Section 15 of RA 409 and the general appointment provisions of RA 5185 and Batas Blg. 337.
• Decentralization laws do not automatically divest special charter appointing power — RA 5185 and Batas Blg. 337 were meant to transfer appointment power from the President to local governments and to highlight local autonomy, not to vest city mayors with comprehensive powers or to deprive the City Council of Manila of its appointing power under its existing statute. Applied: the City Council retained the power to appoint Council officers and employees, with the Vice-Mayor signing the appointments.

• “it is a canon of statutory construction that a special law prevails over a general law — regardless of their dates of passage — and the special is to be considered as remaining an exception to the general.” — The SC uses this canon to reject the City Mayor’s claim that the general decentralization laws repealed the Manila charter.
• “Repeals of laws by implication moreover are not favored, and the mere repugnancy between two statutes should be very clear to warrant the court in holding that the later in time repeals the other.” — The SC applies this rule to hold that RA 5185 and Batas Blg. 337 did not impliedly repeal Section 15 of RA 409.
• “The Legislature having specially considered all of the facts and circumstances in the particular case in granting a special charter, it will not be considered that the Legislature, by adopting a general law containing provisions repugnant to the provisions of the charter, and without making any mention of its intention to amend or modify the charter, intended to amend, repeal, or modify the special act.” — The SC quotes this rationale to explain why a general law does not amend a special charter absent an express intent to do so.
• “They were not meant, however, to deprive the City Council of Manila for instance, its appointing power granted by existing statute, and after all, that arrangement is sufficient to accomplish the objectives of both the Decentralization Act and the Local Government Code, that is, to provide teeth to local autonomy.” — The SC agrees with the CSC that the decentralization laws did not strip the City Council of its appointing power.

• Dario vs. Mison, G.R. Nos. 81954, 81967, 82023, 83737, 85310, 85335, 86241, August 8, 1989, 176 SCRA 84 — Cited for the rule that CSC decisions are unappealable and subject only to the SC’s certiorari jurisdiction.
• Butuan Sawmill, Inc. vs. City of Butuan, No. L-21516, April 29, 1966, 16 SCRA 755 — Cited for the canon that a special law prevails over a general law.
• Manila Railroad Co. vs. Rafferty, 40 Phil. 224, 228 (1919) — Cited for the rule that repeals by implication are not favored and require clear repugnancy.
• Lewis vs. Cook County, 74 I11. App., 151 — Cited in the quoted rationale that a general law does not amend or repeal a special charter absent an intention to do so.
• Philippine Railway Co. vs. Nolting, 34 Phil., 401 — Cited in the same quoted rationale on the precedence of a special charter over a general law.
• Cabigao vs. Villegas, No. L-31463, August 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 632 — Cited to show that RA 5185 did not divest the Mayor of Manila of his power under the charter to approve the city budget.

• Section 15, Republic Act No. 409, as amended by Republic Act No. 1571 — Vests the appointing power over the other employees of the Board in the Board and requires the Vice-Mayor to sign all appointments of those employees. Applied: the City Council’s appointing power over the nineteen Council officers and employees.
• Section 4, Republic Act No. 5185 (Decentralization Law) — Provides that the City Mayor appoints heads of offices entirely paid out of city funds and their assistants or deputies, and that all other employees paid out of local funds are appointed by the provincial governor, city or municipal mayor upon recommendation of the office head concerned. Applied: invoked by petitioner, but held not to repeal the Manila charter.
• Section 171(h), Batas Blg. 337 (Local Government Code) — Provides that the city mayor appoints all officers and employees of the city whose appointments are not otherwise provided in the Code. Applied: invoked by petitioner, but held not to divest the City Council of Manila of its appointing power.
• Article IX, Section 7, 1987 Constitution — Provides that any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the SC on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt. Applied: no appeal lies from CSC decisions; the SC treated the direct appeal as a certiorari petition.
• Rule 65, Rules of Court — Governs the petition for certiorari. Applied: the SC considered the petition as one for certiorari.
• Article VIII, Section 5(2)(e), 1987 Constitution and Section 9(3), Batas Blg. 129 — Invoked by petitioner as the basis for a direct appeal to the SC. Applied: the SC held that no appeal lies from CSC decisions and treated the petition as one for certiorari.