Loong vs. COMELEC

A petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy on the ground of false representation must be filed within twenty-five (25) days from the filing of the certificate, as prescribed by Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881). A procedural rule issued by the COMELEC that extends this period cannot supersede the clear mandate of a legislative enactment.

Petitioner Benjamin T. Loong filed his certificate of candidacy for Regional Vice-Governor of the Mindanao Autonomous Region on January 15, 1990. The election was held on February 17, 1990. Private respondent Nurshussein Ututalum, a rival candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Loong (SPA No. 90-006) on March 5, 1990, alleging false representation as to Loong's age. The COMELEC Second Division denied Loong's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the petition was timely filed under a reasonable-time-from-discovery standard, citing Frivaldo v. COMELEC and Sections 6 and 7 of Republic Act No. 6646. Loong was proclaimed elected on July 3, 1990, prompting the filing of this certiorari petition.

• Nature of the Action: This is a special civil action for certiorari seeking to annul COMELEC resolutions that assumed jurisdiction over a candidate's disqualification case.
• Candidacy and Election: Petitioner Benjamin T. Loong filed his certificate of candidacy for Regional Vice-Governor of the Mindanao Autonomous Region on January 15, 1990, the last day for filing. The election was held on February 17, 1990.
• The Disqualification Petition: On March 5, 1990 (49 days after the certificate was filed and 16 days after the election), private respondent Nurshussein Ututalum filed SPA No. 90-006 before the COMELEC, alleging Loong made a false representation in his certificate of candidacy regarding his age, thus failing to meet the 35-year age requirement for the office.
• COMELEC's Ruling: The COMELEC Second Division, citing Frivaldo v. COMELEC and Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. No. 6646, held that a petition to declare a candidate ineligible is seasonable if brought within a reasonable time from the discovery of ineligibility, even if filed after the period prescribed for attacking a certificate of candidacy and before proclamation.
• Proclamation and Petition to Supreme Court: Loong was proclaimed elected on July 3, 1990. He filed the instant petition on July 9, 1990, arguing the COMELEC lacked jurisdiction as the disqualification petition was filed out of time.

• Prescription under Section 78: Petitioner argued that SPA No. 90-006 was a petition to cancel a certificate of candidacy due to false representation, governed by Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, which requires filing within 25 days from the certificate's filing. The petition, filed 49 days later, was therefore barred.
• COMELEC Rule Cannot Supersede Statute: Petitioner contended that Section 3, Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, which allowed filing until the date of proclamation, was a mere procedural rule that could not amend or override the clear 25-day prescriptive period in Section 78, a legislative enactment.
• Prematurity of Quo Warranto: Petitioner asserted that the COMELEC could not treat the petition as one for quo warranto under Section 253 of the Code, as it was filed before any proclamation had been made.

• Timeliness under COMELEC Rules: Respondent Ututalum and the COMELEC countered that the petition was timely filed under Section 3, Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, which allows a disqualification petition to be filed any time after the last day for filing certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation.
• Application of Frivaldo Doctrine: Respondents argued that, pursuant to Frivaldo v. COMELEC, the substantive issue of qualification cannot be defeated by a procedural gap. A petition to declare ineligibility is seasonable if filed within a reasonable time from discovery, even if filed after the period prescribed for attacking the certificate.
• Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. No. 6646: The COMELEC maintained that these provisions, read in light of Frivaldo, modified the procedural rules to allow disqualification cases based on ineligibility to be filed beyond the 25-day period.

• Prescription: Whether a petition to disqualify a candidate for false representation of age in a certificate of candidacy is subject to the 25-day prescriptive period under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.
• COMELEC Rule vs. Legislative Enactment: Whether Section 3, Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, which extends the period for filing a disqualification petition, can validly supersede the prescriptive period fixed by Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.
• Applicability of the Frivaldo Doctrine: Whether the ruling in Frivaldo v. COMELEC, which allowed a disqualification petition based on citizenship to be filed at any time, applies to a case involving a false representation as to age.

• Prescription: The petition to disqualify was filed out of time. Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code explicitly provides a 25-day period from the filing of the certificate of candidacy within which to file a petition to deny due course to or cancel the same on the ground of false representation. SPA No. 90-006, filed 49 days after the certificate was filed, clearly violated this mandatory period.
• COMELEC Rule vs. Legislative Enactment: Section 3, Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure cannot prevail over Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. The COMELEC, though a constitutional body, has no legislative power. Its rule-making authority cannot be exercised to amend, modify, or supplant the clear provisions of a statute enacted by the legislature.
• Applicability of the Frivaldo Doctrine: The Frivaldo doctrine is not controlling. The disqualification ground in Frivaldo was lack of Philippine citizenship—an overriding and fundamental qualification. The present case involves a false representation as to age, a different and less fundamental ground. Furthermore, Justice Gutierrez's concurrence in Frivaldo expressly limited its application to citizenship or disloyalty cases, stating that for grounds like age or residence, the prescriptive periods should be strictly applied. The proper remedy for discovering ineligibility after the 25-day period is a quo warranto petition filed within ten days from proclamation, as provided in Section 253 of the Code.

• Strict Adherence to Statutory Prescriptive Periods in Election Cases — The periods fixed by law for filing election protests or petitions, such as the 25-day period under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code for canceling a certificate of candidacy, are mandatory and jurisdictional. They are designed to provide a certain and definite time for settling election disputes and to ensure stability in the electoral process.
• Hierarchy of Election Remedies — The Omnibus Election Code provides distinct, time-bound remedies for challenging a candidate's eligibility. A petition to cancel a certificate of candidacy for false representation (Sec. 78) must be filed within 25 days from the certificate's filing. If this period lapses, the proper post-proclamation remedy is a quo warranto petition (Sec. 253), which must be filed within ten days from proclamation. These remedies are separate and cannot be interchanged or conflated to circumvent statutory deadlines.
• Limits on COMELEC's Rule-Making Power — While the COMELEC has the power to promulgate rules of procedure to expedite the disposition of election cases, such rules must be consistent with the Constitution and existing statutes. A COMELEC rule that effectively amends or nullifies a clear legislative enactment, such as by extending a prescriptive period, is invalid for usurping legislative power.

• "The periods fixed by law for the filing of a protest — whether quo warranto or election contest — is mandatory and jurisdictional." — Cited from Justice Gutierrez's concurring opinion in Frivaldo, emphasizing the strict nature of statutory deadlines in election disputes.
• "The purpose of the law in not allowing the filing of protests beyond the period fixed by law is to have a certain and definite time within which petitions against the results of an election should be filed and to provide summary proceedings for the settlement of such disputes." — Also from Justice Gutierrez's concurrence, explaining the rationale for mandatory prescriptive periods.
• "Respondent Commission may have seen the need to remedy this so-called 'procedural gap', but it is not for it to prescribe what the law does not provide, its function not being legislative." — The Court's holding on the limits of the COMELEC's authority, underscoring the separation of powers.

• Frivaldo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 87193, June 23, 1989, 174 SCRA 245 — Cited by the COMELEC to justify its ruling. The Supreme Court distinguished it, holding that its liberal application of procedural rules was limited to the fundamental issue of citizenship and did not extend to other grounds for disqualification like age.
• Aznar v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 83820, May 25, 1990, 185 SCRA 703 — Noted as a case where a disqualification petition filed beyond the 25-day period was deemed out of time, though the Court proceeded to rule on the merits due to public interest in ascertaining citizenship.
• Dr. Tocod D. Macaraya, et al. v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 93404; Zorayda Y.A. Tamano, et al. v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 93405, August 2, 1990 — An en banc resolution affirming the COMELEC's dismissal of a disqualification petition for being filed out of time, reinforcing the mandatory nature of the 25-day period.

• Section 78, Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881) — Provides that a verified petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy on the ground of false representation may be filed "within twenty-five days from the time the certificate was filed." This was the controlling prescriptive period applied by the Court.
• Section 253, Omnibus Election Code — Provides that a voter may file a petition for quo warranto against a winning candidate on the ground of ineligibility "within ten days from the proclamation of the results of the election." The Court identified this as the proper remedy after the 25-day period under Section 78 has lapsed.
• Sections 6 and 7, Republic Act No. 6646 (The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987) — The COMELEC relied on these to extend the filing period. The Court held that these sections only prescribe the effects of a disqualification case and affirm the procedure under Section 78 of the Code; they do not modify the prescriptive periods.
• Section 3, Rule 25, COMELEC Rules of Procedure — Allowed the filing of a disqualification petition "any day after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation." The Court invalidated this rule insofar as it conflicted with Section 78 of the Code.

Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Campos, Jr., JJ., concur.

N/A — The decision indicates that Commissioner Dimaampao dissented at the COMELEC level, but no dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court Justices is recorded in the provided text.