Lontoc vs. MD Transit & Taxi Co., Inc.

Failure to reserve the right to file a separate civil action is not fatal, and a criminal acquittal based on failure to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt does not bar a separate civil action for damages, because a person not criminally liable may still be civilly liable unless the acquittal declares that the facts from which civil liability might arise did not exist.

A vehicular accident on October 31, 1970 along Taft Avenue, Manila involved a Holden car owned by Jose M. Lontoc and an MD Bus driven by Ignacio dela Cruz. Dela Cruz was charged with damage to property with physical injuries thru reckless imprudence and was acquitted because his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. Lontoc then filed a civil complaint for damages against dela Cruz and the bus operator, MD Transit & Taxi Co., Inc. The CFI dismissed the civil case, prompting Lontoc to appeal and the CA to certify the pure questions of law to the SC.

On October 31, 1970, at about 8:30 in the morning, a vehicular accident happened along Taft Avenue, Manila, involving a Holden car (Kingswood Plate No. 23-80 ’70) driven by Rodolfo Defeo and owned by Jose Lontoc and an MD Bus bearing Plate No. 48-1 (4-PUB-70) driven by Ignacio dela Cruz. As a result of this accident, Ignacio dela Cruz, the driver of the MD Bus, was charged with the crime of damage to property with physical injuries thru reckless imprudence before the CFI of Manila, docketed as Crim. Case No. 70-24847. After trial on the merits, the CFI rendered judgment finding the accused not guilty because his guilt had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt and acquitted him.

Jose Lontoc, the owner of the Holden car, then filed a complaint for recovery of damages against MD Transit & Taxi Co., Inc. and Ignacio dela Cruz before the CFI of Rizal, Seventh Judicial District (Quezon City), docketed as Civil Case No. Q-19145. The complaint alleged that the defendant driver, while driving an NM bus operated by his co-defendant MD Transit and Taxi Co., “in a careless, reckless, imprudent manner along Taft Avenue, Manila south bound to Pasay City, violently struck and bumped the rear right portion of a Holden car owned by the plaintiff causing actual, compensatory and exemplary damages.” The complaint also alleged negligence against the driver and an employer-employee relationship between him and his co-defendant MD Transit and Taxi Co.

Instead of filing an answer, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint failed to state a sufficient cause of action and that the cause of action as alleged in the complaint was barred by a prior final judgment rendered in Criminal Case No. 3774 entitled People of the Philippines vs. Ignacio dela Cruz y Pine and rendered by Branch XIX of the CFI of Manila, in which the plaintiff ventilated his claim for damages against the defendants. The trial court then issued an order dismissing the civil case because there was no reservation made by the complainant to file a separate civil action and the complainant through counsel intervened in the prosecution of the criminal case which led to the acquittal of the accused.

The plaintiff appealed the order to the CA. The CA certified the case to the SC on the ground that the issues raised are purely questions of law. The facts are not in dispute.

• The plaintiff-appellant’s position, as reflected in the certified issues and the SC’s resolution, was that his failure to reserve the right to file a separate civil action for damages was not fatal to the civil case.
• He argued that his intervention in the criminal case, through a private prosecutor, did not bar him from filing a separate civil action for damages, especially because the accused Ignacio dela Cruz was acquitted on the ground that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
• He maintained that the criminal case and the civil case were based on different causes of action: the criminal case was based solely on Ignacio dela Cruz’s violation of Article 365 of the Penal Code, while the civil complaint for damages was based on quasi-delict under Article 2180 of the Civil Code and included both the driver and the bus owner as defendants.
• He invoked the rule that a person, while not criminally liable, may still be civilly liable, and that an acquittal extinguishes civil liability only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which civil liability might arise did not exist.

• Defendants-appellees MD Transit & Taxi Co., Inc. and Ignacio dela Cruz moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it failed to state a sufficient cause of action.
• They also argued that the cause of action was barred by a prior final judgment rendered in Criminal Case No. 3774 entitled People of the Philippines vs. Ignacio dela Cruz y Pine, rendered by Branch XIX of the CFI of Manila, in which the plaintiff ventilated his claim for damages against the defendants.
• They pointed out that no reservation was made by the complainant to file a separate civil action and that the complainant, through counsel, intervened in the prosecution of the criminal case, which led to the acquittal of the accused.

• Non-Reservation: Whether the plaintiff-appellant’s non-reservation to file a separate action for damages is fatal to this action for damages.
• Bar by Acquittal and Intervention: Whether the judgment of acquittal of Ignacio dela Cruz in the criminal case, wherein through a private prosecutor the plaintiff-appellant presented evidence to prove damages, is a bar to the institution of a separate civil action for damages against both the operator of MD Transit and Taxi Co., Inc. and its driver, Ignacio dela Cruz.

• Non-Reservation: No. Under the facts of this case, the failure of the plaintiff-appellant to reserve his right to file a separate civil case is not fatal (Mendoza vs. Arrieta, 91 SCRA 113).
• Bar by Acquittal and Intervention: No. The plaintiff-appellant’s intervention in the criminal case did not bar him from filing a separate civil action for damages, especially because the accused Ignacio dela Cruz was acquitted “because his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.” The two cases were anchored on two different causes of action. The acquittal did not extinguish civil liability because the judgment did not declare that the facts from which civil liability might arise did not exist. Article 29 of the Civil Code allows a civil action for damages when the accused is acquitted on the ground that guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt, requiring only preponderance of evidence.

• Non-Reservation: The SC held that the failure to reserve the right to file a separate civil case is not fatal under the facts. It cited Mendoza vs. Arrieta, 91 SCRA 113. The complaint in Civil Case No. Q-19145 was based on quasi-delict under Article 2180 of the Civil Code because it alleged negligence against the driver and an employer-employee relationship between him and his co-defendant MD Transit and Taxi Co. (Poblete vs. Fabros, 93 SCRA 200). The non-reservation did not bar the action.
• Bar by Acquittal and Intervention: The SC reasoned that the plaintiff-appellant’s intervention in the criminal case did not bar the separate civil action, especially since the accused was acquitted “because his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.” The criminal case was based solely on Ignacio dela Cruz’s violation of Article 365 of the Penal Code. The trial court in Criminal Case No. 3774 stated that the guilt of the accused was not proven beyond reasonable doubt and that the owner of the bus was not included in the criminal case. The civil complaint, on the other hand, was based on quasi-delict and included both the driver and the bus owner as defendants. Thus, the two cases were anchored on two different causes of action. The SC applied the well-settled doctrine that a person, while not criminally liable, may still be civilly liable. The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist (Padilla vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 558, cited in People vs. Rogelio Ligon y Tria, et al., G.R. No. 74041, July 29, 1987; Filomeno Urbano vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72964, January 7, 1988). Article 29 of the Civil Code provides that when the accused is acquitted on the ground that guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted, requiring only a preponderance of evidence. It was plain from the judgment in the criminal case that the aspect of civil liability was not passed upon and resolved. Therefore, the plaintiff-appellant had the right to institute a separate civil action for damages.

• Non-Reservation of Separate Civil Action — Failure to reserve the right to file a separate civil case is not fatal. Applied: Lontoc did not reserve but could still file the damages suit.
• Intervention in Criminal Case — Intervention in the criminal case does not bar a separate civil action for damages, especially when the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt. Applied: Lontoc’s intervention did not bar his civil suit.
• Separate Causes of Action — Criminal case based solely on Article 365 of the Penal Code; civil case based on quasi-delict under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Applied: The two cases had different causes of action, so the criminal judgment did not bar the civil case.
• Civil Liability Despite Acquittal — A person, while not criminally liable, may still be civilly liable. The judgment of acquittal extinguishes civil liability only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which civil liability might arise did not exist. Applied: Dela Cruz’s acquittal on reasonable doubt did not extinguish civil liability because the judgment did not declare that the facts from which civil liability might arise did not exist.
• Article 29, Civil Code — When the accused is acquitted on the ground that guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted; such action requires only a preponderance of evidence. Applied: Lontoc could institute the separate civil action for damages.
• Quasi-Delict and Employer Liability — Complaint based on quasi-delict under Article 2180 of the Civil Code due to negligence of the driver and employer-employee relationship with the bus operator. Applied: The complaint included both the driver and the bus owner as defendants.

• “Under the facts of this case, the failure of the plaintiff-appellant to reserve his right to file a separate civil case is not fatal”
• “The fact that the plaintiff-appellant intervened in the criminal case did not bar him from filing a separate civil action for damages especially considering that the accused in the criminal case, Ignacio dela Cruz, was acquitted \"because his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt\" (Emphasis supplied).”
• “The two cases were anchored on two different causes of action.”
• “The well-settled doctrine is that a person, while not criminally liable, may still be civilly liable.”
• “The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil hability of the accused only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.”
• “When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence. ...”
• “It is plain from the judgment in the criminal case that the aspect of civil hability was not passed upon and resolved.”

• Poblete vs. Fabros, 93 SCRA 200 — Cited to support that the complaint was based on quasi-delict under Article 2180 of the Civil Code because it alleged negligence and an employer-employee relationship.
• Mendoza vs. Arrieta, 91 SCRA 113 — Cited for the rule that failure to reserve the right to file a separate civil case is not fatal; also cited for the right to institute a separate civil action after acquittal on reasonable doubt.
• Padilla vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 558 — Cited for the doctrine that a judgment of acquittal extinguishes civil liability only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which civil liability might arise did not exist.
• People vs. Rogelio Ligon y Tria, et al., G.R. No. 74041, July 29, 1987 — Cited as a source of the doctrine on the effect of acquittal on civil liability.
• Filomeno Urbano vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72964, January 7, 1988 — Cited for the same doctrine on the effect of acquittal on civil liability.

• Article 2180, Civil Code — Basis of the complaint as quasi-delict; employer liability for the negligence of an employee. Applied because the complaint alleged negligence by the driver and an employer-employee relationship with MD Transit and Taxi Co.
• Article 365, Penal Code — The criminal case was based solely on Ignacio dela Cruz’s violation of this article. Applied to distinguish the criminal cause of action from the civil quasi-delict action.
• Article 29, Civil Code — When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted; such action requires only a preponderance of evidence. Applied to allow Lontoc’s separate civil action for damages.

• Fernan (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

• None.