Longno vs. Skanfil Maritime Services, Inc.

When a third doctor's medical assessment is ambiguous—simultaneously declaring a seafarer "permanently disabled" while assigning a partial disability grade—and the seafarer's incapacity to work persists beyond 240 days from repatriation, the disability is deemed permanent and total despite the partial disability grading.

Roger Galon Longno was employed as a Boatswain on board the bulk carrier "Nautical Loredana" by respondent Crown Shipmanagement, Inc., through its local agent, Skanfil Maritime Services, Inc., under a nine-month contract that incorporated the 2010 POEA-SEC and a Collective Bargaining Agreement (FESMAR/ITF) by operation of law. The dispute centers on the extent of disability benefits to which Roger is entitled after suffering a work-related back injury during the term of his employment, specifically whether his disability is partial (Grade 11) or total and permanent.

On October 4, 2017, Roger Galon Longno entered into a contract of employment with respondent Crown Shipmanagement, Inc., through its local agent, Skanfil Maritime Services, Inc., to serve as a Boatswain on board the bulk carrier "Nautical Loredana" for nine months at a basic monthly salary of USD 779.00. The contract incorporated the 2010 POEA-SEC and the parties' Collective Bargaining Agreement (FESMAR/ITF) by operation of law. After passing a routine pre-employment medical examination, Roger boarded the vessel on October 20, 2017.

Sometime in February 2018, while cleaning the hatch of the ship, Roger suddenly heard and felt his back snap after trying to reach the dirty bulkhead about 15 meters high with a bamboo pole. He tolerated the resulting pain and continued performing his daily duties. In April 2018, while cleaning the cargo hold, the pain intensified and his upper and lower extremities also felt numb. Roger was brought to a hospital in India, where he was diagnosed with Acute Lumbosacrum Strain, given medications, and eventually medically repatriated on June 5, 2018 for further evaluation and management.

On June 6, 2018, Roger appeared before the company-designated physician, Marine Medical Services (MMS). The designated orthopedic surgeon recommended cervical, thoracic MRI, and EMG-NGV studies of the upper extremities. On June 8, 2018, Roger was diagnosed with Upper Trapezius Muscle Strain and Mild Degenerative Disc Disease of the Cervical and Thoracic Spine, and was advised to begin conservative management, medication, physical therapy, and rehabilitation. On July 13, 2018, Roger underwent a Carpal Tunnel Release procedure to treat his Left Carpal Tunnel Syndrome. Two weeks after the operation, he returned to MMS with an improved left hand and dried post-operation wound, but complained of upper back pain and occasional weakness of his left knee. The orthopedic surgeon advised him to continue his rehabilitation program and medication. On August 31, 2018, Roger visited MMS again, reporting persistent pain in his upper back and weakness in his left-hand grip.

Despite constant treatment, Roger's condition persisted. On September 24, 2018, MMS issued a Medical Report giving Roger a final disability rating of Grade 12, referring to slight stiffness of his neck or 1/3 loss of motion. Acting on this rating, respondents offered Roger disability compensation of USD 5,225.00 corresponding to Grade 12 under Section 32 of the 2010 POEA-SEC. Roger refused to accept the assessment and sought a second opinion from his chosen physician, Dr. Renato Runas, who, after conducting physical examinations including Lumbosacral Spine and EMG-NGC tests, declared Roger unfit for sea duty in his assessment dated December 14, 2018, citing unrelenting episodes of moderate upper and lower back pain and affected activities of daily living.

On January 3, 2019, Roger sent respondents a letter signifying his intention to avail of a third doctor opinion pursuant to the 2010 POEA-SEC, to which respondents acceded. During mandatory conferences, the parties agreed to refer Roger's condition to Dr. David Alagar. After several tests and diagnostic x-rays, Dr. Alagar issued a Medical Report on April 12, 2019—312 days after Roger's repatriation on June 4, 2018—finding Roger "permanently disabled" and stating that he "fits the criteria of grade 11 (slight rigidity or 1/3 loss of motion or lifting power of the trunk) under the 2010 POEA-SEC schedule of disability." Dr. Alagar noted that Roger's chronic back pain was not responsive to therapy or medications, that returning to work may be dangerous to himself and others, and that a beginning symptomatic left knee arthritis could progress with time in a highly physical job. The parties nonetheless failed to settle, as Roger insisted on his claim for permanent and total disability benefits, while respondents maintained that Roger was entitled only to partial disability benefits corresponding to the Grade 11 rating, arguing that the third doctor's assessment was final and binding.

• Entitlement to Total and Permanent Disability: Petitioner maintained that he was entitled to full disability benefits, not merely partial disability of Grade 11, because Dr. Alagar himself found him "permanently disabled" in addition to assigning a Grade 11 rating. Petitioner further argued that his incapacity to work lasted beyond the 240-day period from repatriation, thus entitling him to permanent and total disability benefits under Article 192(c)(1) of the Labor Code.

• Binding Nature of Third Doctor's Assessment: Respondents argued that Roger could only claim partial disability benefits corresponding to the Grade 11 disability rating given by the third doctor, Dr. Alagar, whose assessment is final and binding between the parties under the 2010 POEA-SEC.

• Extent of Disability: Whether the CA committed reversible error in reversing the NLRC's award of permanent and total disability benefits to Roger, given the ambiguous assessment of the third doctor and the persistence of incapacity beyond 240 days.

• Extent of Disability: Yes. The CA committed reversible error. Roger is entitled to permanent and total disability benefits because the third doctor's assessment was ambiguous and his incapacity to work persisted beyond 240 days from repatriation, rendering the disability permanent and total under Article 192(c)(1) of the Labor Code notwithstanding the Grade 11 partial disability grading.

• Extent of Disability: The entitlement of an overseas seafarer to disability benefits is governed by law, the employment contract, and medical findings. Under the 2010 POEA-SEC, when the company-designated physician and the seafarer's chosen physician render conflicting assessments, the matter is referred to a third doctor whose findings are final and binding. However, as held in Sunit vs. OSM Maritime Services, Inc., the third doctor's assessment must be definite and conclusive to be valid and binding. Here, Dr. Alagar's assessment was equivocal: he simultaneously declared Roger "permanently disabled" and assigned a Grade 11 partial disability rating, leaving room for varied interpretations. Beyond the ambiguous language, Dr. Alagar stated that Roger's chronic back pain was not responsive to therapy or medications and that returning to work would be dangerous to Roger and others, effectively declaring him unfit to return to work. Critically, Roger's incapacity persisted for 312 days from his repatriation on June 4, 2018—well beyond the 240-day maximum period under Rule X, Section 2 of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation. While the third doctor is not bound to render his assessment within the 240-day period, Roger's disability and incapacity to resume work clearly continued beyond 240 days. Applying the doctrine in Kestrel Shipping Co., Inc. vs. Munar, if partial and permanent disabilities (Grades 2 to 14) would incapacitate a seafarer from performing usual sea duties for more than 120 or 240 days, the seafarer is, under legal contemplation, totally and permanently disabled. Accordingly, Roger's disability was deemed permanent and total despite the Grade 11 grading. The Court further noted that in disability compensation, it is not the injury itself that is compensated but the incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of earning capacity, and that where evidence may be reasonably interpreted in two divergent ways, the balance must be tilted in favor of labor consistent with the principle of social justice.

• 120/240-Day Rule for Disability Assessment — Under Article 192(c)(1) of the Labor Code and Rule X, Section 2 of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation, a temporary total disability lasting continuously for more than 120 days (extendible to 240 days where further medical treatment is required) is deemed permanent and total. The company-designated physician must issue a final medical assessment within 120 days; failure to do so without justification renders the disability permanent and total. If further treatment is needed, the period extends to 240 days, and failure to assess within that extended period likewise renders the disability permanent and total regardless of justification. In this case, Roger's incapacity persisted for 312 days from repatriation, exceeding the 240-day ceiling, thus converting his disability to permanent and total.

• Partial Disability Becoming Total and Permanent — Under Kestrel Shipping Co., Inc. vs. Munar, injuries or disabilities classified as Grades 2 to 14 under Section 32 of the POEA-SEC are partial and permanent. However, if such partial and permanent disabilities incapacitate a seafarer from performing usual sea duties for more than 120 or 240 days, the disability is deemed total and permanent under legal contemplation. The Court applied this doctrine to Roger's Grade 11 rating, which was superseded by the duration of his incapacity exceeding 240 days.

• Third Doctor Referral Mechanism — Under the 2010 POEA-SEC and as elaborated in Bunayog vs. Foscon Shipmanagement, Inc., when the company-designated physician and the seafarer's chosen physician render conflicting findings, the matter is referred to a third doctor mutually agreed upon by the parties, whose findings are final and binding. The third doctor's assessment must be definite and conclusive to be valid and binding. Where the third doctor's assessment is ambiguous—simultaneously declaring the seafarer permanently disabled while assigning a partial disability grade—the assessment cannot be treated as definitive, and the labor tribunals and courts may look to other factors, including the duration of incapacity, to determine the proper classification of disability.

• Social Justice in Labor Cases — Where evidence may be reasonably interpreted in two divergent ways, one prejudicial and the other favorable to labor, the balance must be tilted in favor of the worker, consistent with the constitutional mandate to afford full protection to labor, local and overseas.

• "if those injuries or disabilities with a disability grading from 2 to 14, hence, partial and permanent, would incapacitate a seafarer from performing his [or her] usual sea duties for a period of more than 120 or 240 days, depending on the need for further medical treatment, then he [or she] is, under legal contemplation, totally and permanently disabled." — This passage from Kestrel Shipping Co., Inc. vs. Munar, as quoted and applied by the Court, articulates the controlling doctrine by which a partial disability grade is converted into total and permanent disability when incapacity exceeds the 240-day period.

• "the appointed third-party physician must likewise arrive at a definite and conclusive assessment of the seafarer's disability or fitness to return to work before his or her opinion can be valid and binding between the parties." — This formulation from Sunit vs. OSM Maritime Services, Inc. establishes the requirement that the third doctor's assessment must be definitive and conclusive, which the Court found Dr. Alagar's equivocal assessment failed to satisfy.

• "in disability compensation, it is not the injury which is compensated, but rather, the incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of one's earning capacity." — This passage from Seacrest Maritime Management, Inc. vs. Bernarte articulates the fundamental principle that disability compensation is keyed to loss of earning capacity, not merely the nature of the injury, supporting the Court's conclusion that Roger's prolonged incapacity warranted total and permanent benefits.

• Jebsen Maritime, Inc. vs. Ravena, 743 Phil. 371 (2014) — Followed. Established the tripartite framework governing a seafarer's entitlement to disability benefits: law, employment contract, and medical findings. The Court applied this framework to confirm Roger's compensable injury and the governing provisions.

• Sunit vs. OSM Maritime Services, Inc., 806 Phil. 505 (2017) — Followed. Held that the third doctor's assessment must be definite and conclusive to be binding, and that a seafarer's disability is permanent and total despite a partial disability grading when incapacity persists beyond 240 days. The Court found this directly controlling on Roger's situation.

• Hanseatic Shipping Philippines, Inc. vs. Ballon, 769 Phil. 567 (2015) — Cited through Sunit for the definitions of permanent and total disability.

• Kestrel Shipping Co., Inc. vs. Munar, 702 Phil. 717 (2013) — Followed. Established the doctrine that partial and permanent disabilities (Grades 2–14) become total and permanent under legal contemplation when they incapacitate a seafarer beyond 120 or 240 days. The Court applied this to convert Roger's Grade 11 rating into total and permanent disability.

• Elburg Shipmanagement Phils., Inc. vs. Quiogue, 765 Phil. 341 (2015) — Followed. Laid down the four-step process for claims of total and permanent disability, including the 120/240-day assessment periods. The Court confirmed Roger's compliance with these procedures.

• Bunayog vs. Foscon Shipmanagement, Inc., 941 Phil. 383 (2023) — Followed. Established comprehensive guidelines for the third doctor referral mechanism, including the requirement that the third doctor's assessment be final and binding. The Court applied these guidelines in evaluating Dr. Alagar's ambiguous assessment.

• Seacrest Maritime Management, Inc. vs. Bernarte, 901 Phil. 366 (2021) — Cited for the principle that disability compensation compensates incapacity to work, not the injury itself.

• Article 192(c)(1), Labor Code — Provides that temporary total disability lasting continuously for more than 120 days shall be deemed total and permanent, except as otherwise provided in the Rules. The Court applied this provision to Roger's incapacity, which persisted for 312 days, well beyond the 120-day (extendible to 240-day) period.

• Rule X, Section 2, Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation (IRR of Book IV, Labor Code) — Provides that income benefits for temporary total disability shall not be paid longer than 120 consecutive days, except where injury or sickness still requires medical attendance beyond 120 days but not to exceed 240 days. The Court relied on this provision to establish the 240-day maximum treatment period, beyond which Roger's disability became permanent and total.

• Section 20-B, 2010 POEA-SEC — Governs the seafarer's claim for disability compensation and prescribes the procedures for medical evaluation, including the referral to a third doctor in case of conflicting assessments. The Court confirmed Roger's compliance with these procedures.

• Section 32, 2010 POEA-SEC — Contains the Schedule of Disabilities, classifying disabilities into Grades 1 (total and permanent) through 14 (partial and permanent). The Court noted that Grade 11, assigned by the third doctor, is partial and permanent, but applied the Kestrel doctrine to convert it to total and permanent due to the duration of incapacity.

• Article 2208, New Civil Code — Allows recovery of attorney's fees in actions for recovery of wages of laborers and actions for indemnity under employer's liability laws. The Court awarded 10% attorney's fees (USD 6,000.00) on this basis.

• Article II, Section 18 and Article XIII, Section 3, 1987 Constitution — Affirm labor as a primary social economic force and mandate full protection to labor, local and overseas. The Court invoked these provisions to support the principle of tilting the balance in favor of labor where evidence admits of divergent interpretations.

Caguiao (Chairperson), Gaerlan, and Dimaampao, JJ., concurred. Inting, J., was on official business.