Loney vs. People

A single act may give rise to multiple prosecutions under distinct laws without constituting duplicity of charges, provided each information charges only one offense and each law requires proof of an additional fact or element not required by the others.

Marcopper Mining Corporation stored tailings from its mining operations in a pit in Mt. Tapian, Marinduque. At the base of the pit ran a drainage tunnel leading to the Boac and Makalupnit rivers, where Marcopper had placed a concrete plug at the tunnel's end. On 24 March 1994, tailings gushed out of or near the tunnel's end, discharging millions of tons of tailings into the Boac and Makalupnit rivers.

• The Marcopper Tailings Spill: Petitioners John Eric Loney, Steven Paul Reid, and Pedro B. Hernandez were the President and CEO, Senior Manager, and Resident Manager for Mining Operations, respectively, of Marcopper Mining Corporation. On 24 March 1994, mine tailings gushed out of or near the drainage tunnel at the base of the Mt. Tapian pit, discharging millions of tons of tailings into the Boac and Makalupnit rivers.
• The Criminal Charges: In August 1996, the Department of Justice charged each petitioner with four separate offenses in the Municipal Trial Court of Boac. The charges consisted of: (1) violation of Article 91(B), sub-paragraphs 5 and 6 of PD 1067 (Water Code) for dumping mine tailings without permission; (2) Section 8 of PD 984 (National Pollution Control Decree) for causing pollution; (3) Section 108 of RA 7942 (Philippine Mining Act) for willful violation or gross neglect of the Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC); and (4) Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property. Each offense was charged in a separate information.

• Duplicity of Charges: Petitioners argued that the informations were duplicitous because the Department of Justice charged more than one offense for a single act of polluting the rivers through the dumping of mine tailings.
• Absorption by Reckless Imprudence: Petitioners maintained that the charge for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property under Article 365 of the RPC absorbs the charges for violations of PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942, because the element of lack of necessary or adequate precaution, negligence, recklessness, and imprudence is common among them.
• Applicability of People v. Relova: Petitioners contended that the multiple prosecutions contravene the doctrine laid down in People v. Relova, which prohibits harassing an accused with multiple prosecutions for offenses that are constituted by a common set or overlapping sets of technical elements.

• No Duplicity: Respondent countered that duplicity of informations is not a ground to quash under Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court.
• Distinct Elements: Respondent argued that the laws charged could not absorb one another because the elements of each crime are different, with each law requiring proof of an additional fact or element which the others do not, even if they stemmed from a single act.
• Relova Inapplicability: Respondent maintained that the Relova doctrine does not squarely apply because petitioners are being prosecuted for violations of four national statutes, not for an act punished by both an ordinance and a national statute.

• Duplicity of Charges: Whether all charges except one should be quashed for duplicity, leaving only the charge for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property.
• Applicability of People v. Relova: Whether the ruling in People v. Relova bars the multiple prosecutions arising from a single act.

• Duplicity of Charges: No duplicity of charges exists. Duplicity occurs only when a single information charges more than one offense; here, the prosecution filed separate informations, each charging only one offense. A single act may offend against two or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law, justifying multiple prosecutions, provided each law requires proof of an additional fact or element not required by the others. The distinct additional elements are: for PD 1067, the absence of a permit to dump tailings; for PD 984, the existence of actual pollution; for RA 7942, the willful violation or gross neglect of the ECC; and for Art. 365 RPC, the lack of necessary or adequate precaution resulting in damage to property. Furthermore, a mala in se felony (reckless imprudence) cannot absorb mala prohibita crimes (violations of special laws), as the former is defined by criminal intent or negligence, while the latter is defined by the special laws themselves.
• Applicability of People v. Relova: The Relova ruling is inapplicable. Relova was decided under the second sentence of Section 21, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, which bars multiple prosecutions when an act is punished by both a law and an ordinance. Petitioners are being prosecuted under four national statutes, bringing the case under the first sentence of the same provision, which prohibits multiple prosecutions only for the "same offense," not for distinct offenses arising from the same act.

• Duplicity of Charges — Occurs when a single complaint or information charges more than one offense. The prohibition aims to avoid confusing the accused in preparing a defense. Filing multiple separate informations for distinct offenses arising from a single act does not constitute duplicity.
• Same Offense Test (Doriquez Doctrine) — Two or more offenses arising from the same act are not considered the "same offense" for double jeopardy purposes if one provision of law requires proof of an additional fact or element which the other does not. Prior jeopardy as to one is no obstacle to the prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime involves some important act which is not an essential element of the other.
• Mala in se vs. Mala prohibita Absorption — A mala in se felony (such as reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property) cannot absorb mala prohibita crimes (such as violations of special laws). What makes the former a felony is criminal intent or negligence; what makes the latter crimes are the special laws enacting them.

• "A single act or incident might offend against two or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law thus justifying the prosecution of the accused for more than one offense."
• "[W]here two different laws (or articles of the same code) define two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime involves some important act which is not an essential element of the other."
• "[A] mala in se felony (such as Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property) cannot absorb mala prohibita crimes (such as those violating PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942). What makes the former a felony is criminal intent (dolo) or negligence (culpa); what makes the latter crimes are the special laws enacting them."

• People v. Relova, 148 SCRA 292 (1986) — Distinguished. Relova barred a subsequent prosecution under the RPC after an acquittal under a city ordinance because the Constitution explicitly prohibits multiple prosecutions when an act is punished by both a law and an ordinance. It does not apply where all charges stem from national statutes.
• People v. Doriquez, 133 Phil. 295 (1968) — Followed. Established the test for determining whether two offenses are the same for double jeopardy purposes: if each crime requires proof of an additional fact or element which the other does not, they are not the same offense.

• Section 13, Rule 110, Rules of Court — Provides that a complaint or information must charge but one offense. Applied to clarify that duplicity exists only when a single information charges multiple offenses, which was not the case here.
• Section 3(e), Rule 117, Rules of Court — Lists the grounds for a motion to quash, including that more than one offense is charged in a single information. Applied to show that duplicity was not a valid ground to quash the separate informations filed.
• Section 21, Article III, 1987 Constitution — Prohibits twice putting a person in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. The second sentence provides that if an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either bars another prosecution for the same act. Applied to distinguish the general rule (first sentence) from the exception for laws and ordinances (second sentence), demonstrating that multiple national statute prosecutions for the same act do not violate the provision.
• Article 91(B), PD 1067 (Water Code) — Penalizes dumping mine tailings into rivers without permission. Applied to identify the distinct element of lack of permit.
• Section 8, PD 984 (National Pollution Control Decree) — Penalizes causing pollution without a permit. Applied to identify the distinct element of actual pollution.
• Section 108, RA 7942 (Philippine Mining Act) — Penalizes willful violation or gross neglect of the ECC causing environmental damage. Applied to identify the distinct element of ECC violation.
• Article 365, Revised Penal Code — Penalizes reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property. Applied to identify the distinct element of lack of necessary precaution, distinguishing it from mala prohibita offenses.

Leonardo A. Quisumbing, Dante O. Tinga