Llamado vs. Court of Appeals

An application for probation under Section 4 of the Probation Law of 1976, as amended by P.D. No. 1990, must be filed within the period for perfecting an appeal, and no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected an appeal from the judgment of conviction. The phrase "period for perfecting an appeal" refers to the fifteen-day period established by procedural law, and the perfection of an appeal by filing a notice of appeal operates as a bar to a subsequent application for probation.

Petitioner Ricardo A. Llamado was the Treasurer of Pan Asia Finance Corporation. Together with Jacinto N. Pascual, Sr., the corporation's President, petitioner was prosecuted for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 49. The two had co-signed a postdated check payable to private respondent Leon Gaw in the amount of P186,500.00, which check was dishonored for lack of sufficient funds. The Probation Law of 1976 (P.D. No. 968) had been amended twice — first by P.D. No. 1257 on 1 December 1977, and subsequently by P.D. No. 1990 on 5 October 1985 — with the latter amendment significantly narrowing the period within which an application for probation could be filed.

Petitioner Ricardo A. Llamado, as Treasurer of Pan Asia Finance Corporation, was prosecuted together with the corporation's President, Jacinto N. Pascual, Sr., for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 in Criminal Case No. 85-38653 before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 49. The two had co-signed a postdated check payable to private respondent Leon Gaw in the amount of P186,500.00, which check was dishonored for lack of sufficient funds. In a decision dated 10 March 1987, the trial court convicted petitioner alone, since jurisdiction over the person of Pascual, who had fled the country, had not been obtained. Petitioner was sentenced to imprisonment for one year of prision correccional, to pay a fine of P200,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to reimburse respondent Gaw the amount of P186,500.00 plus the cost of suit.

On 20 March 1987, after the decision of the trial court was read to him, petitioner through counsel orally manifested that he was taking an appeal. The trial court on the same day ordered the forwarding of the records of the case to the Court of Appeals. On 9 July 1987, petitioner through his counsel received from the Court of Appeals a notice to file his Appellant's Brief within thirty days. Petitioner secured several extensions of time within which to file his brief, the last extension expiring on 18 November 1987. Even while his Appellant's Brief was being finalized by his then counsel of record, petitioner sought advice from another counsel. On 30 November 1987, petitioner, with the assistance of his new counsel, filed in the Regional Trial Court a Petition for Probation invoking Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended. The Petition was not accepted by the lower court, since the records of the case had already been forwarded to the Court of Appeals.

Petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a "Manifestation and Petition for Probation" dated 16 November 1987, enclosing a copy of the Petition for Probation he had submitted to the trial court. He asked the Court of Appeals to grant his Petition for Probation or, in the alternative, to remand the Petition back to the trial court, together with the records of the criminal case, for consideration and approval under P.D. No. 968, as amended. At the same time, petitioner prayed that the running of the period for the filing of his Appellant's Brief be held in abeyance until after the Court of Appeals shall have acted on his Petition for Probation. In a "Manifestation and Motion" dated 3 March 1988, petitioner formally withdrew his appeal, conditioned on the approval of his Petition for Probation.

Complying with a Resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a Comment stating that it had no objection to petitioner's application for probation. Private respondent-complainant, upon the other hand, sought and obtained leave to file a Comment on petitioner's application for probation, to which petitioner filed a Reply. Private respondent then filed his "Comment" on the Office of the Solicitor General's Comment of 18 March 1988. In a Resolution dated 17 June 1988, the Court of Appeals, through Mr. Justice Magsino, denied the Petition for Probation. A dissenting opinion was filed by Mr. Justice Bellosillo while Mr. Justice Santiago submitted a concurring opinion. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which Motion was denied by the Court of Appeals on 23 August 1988, with another, briefer, dissenting opinion from Mr. Justice Bellosillo.

• Interpretation of "Period for Perfecting an Appeal": Petitioner urged that the phrase "period for perfecting an appeal" and the clause "if the defendant has perfected an appeal from the judgment of conviction" found in Section 4 in its current form should not be interpreted to refer to Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Court, and that the "whereas" or preambulatory clauses of P.D. No. 1990 did not specify a period of fifteen days for perfecting an appeal.
• Legislative Intent: Petitioner urged that the true legislative intent of the amendment (P.D. No. 1990) should not apply to him, who filed his Petition for Probation at the earliest opportunity then prevailing and withdrew his appeal.
• Liberal Construction of Penal Statutes: Petitioner invoked the dissenting opinion rendered by Mr. Justice Bellosillo in the Court of Appeals and asked the Court to have recourse to the cardinal rule in statutory construction that penal laws should be liberally construed in favor of the accused, and to avoid a too literal and strict application of the proviso in P.D. No. 1990 which would defeat the manifest purpose or policy for which the probation law was enacted.
• Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals: Petitioner argued that since Section 4 of the Probation Law as amended vested in the trial court the authority to grant the application for probation, the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to entertain the same and should have remanded the records to the lower court.

• No Objection to Probation: The Office of the Solicitor General filed a Comment stating that it had no objection to petitioner Llamado's application for probation.
• Opposition to Probation: Private respondent-complainant sought and obtained leave to file a Comment on petitioner's application for probation, to which Comment petitioner filed a Reply. Private respondent then filed his "Comment" on the Office of the Solicitor General's Comment of 18 March 1988, opposing the grant of probation.

• Timeliness of Probation Application: Whether petitioner's application for probation, which was filed after a notice of appeal had been filed with the trial court, after the records of the case had been forwarded to the Court of Appeals and the Court of Appeals had issued the notice to file Appellant's Brief, after several extensions of time to file Appellant's Brief had been sought from and granted by the Court of Appeals but before actual filing of such brief, is barred under P.D. No. 968, as amended.
• Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals: Whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to entertain petitioner's application for probation or whether it should have remanded the records to the trial court.

• Timeliness of Probation Application: Yes. Petitioner's application for probation was barred under P.D. No. 968, as amended by P.D. No. 1990, because he had already perfected his appeal from the judgment of conviction. Section 4, as amended, expressly provides that no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected an appeal from the judgment of conviction.
• Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals: No. The trial court lost jurisdiction over the case when petitioner perfected his appeal, and the Court of Appeals was not in a position to remand the case except for execution of judgment. Moreover, having invoked the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, petitioner was not at liberty to attack that jurisdiction when exercised adversely to him.

• Timeliness of Probation Application: The Court examined the history of Section 4 of the Probation Law. As originally enacted by P.D. No. 968, the trial court could grant probation "at any time" after conviction and sentencing, and the filing of the application was deemed an automatic withdrawal of a pending appeal. As amended by P.D. No. 1257, the period was extended to "after [the trial court] shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant but before he begins to serve his sentence," which could occur even after judgment by the appellate court. However, P.D. No. 1990 drastically narrowed this period, requiring that the application be filed "within the period for perfecting an appeal" and adding a proviso that "no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected an appeal from the judgment of conviction." The Court held that the period for perfecting an appeal from a judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court is fifteen days from the promulgation or notice of the judgment appealed from, under Section 39 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, Section 19 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines for the Implementation of B.P. Blg. 129, and Section 5 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Court. The Court noted that petitioner had manifested orally and in open court his intention to appeal at the time of promulgation of the judgment of conviction, a manifestation at least equivalent to a written notice of appeal and treated as such by the Regional Trial Court. The Court rejected petitioner's argument that the "whereas" clauses of P.D. No. 1990 should control the interpretation of Section 4, holding that whereas clauses do not form part of the operative language of a statute and cannot control the specific terms of the statute. The Court also rejected the invocation of liberal construction of penal statutes, noting that the Probation Law is not a penal statute, and that courts have no authority to invoke "liberal interpretation" or "the spirit of the law" where the words of the statute themselves, as illuminated by the history of that statute, leave no room for doubt or interpretation. The Court emphasized that the first duty of a judge is to take and apply a statute as he finds it, not as he would like it to be, citing Yangco vs. Court of First Instance of Manila.
• Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals: The Court held that the trial court lost jurisdiction over the case when petitioner perfected his appeal. The Court of Appeals was not, therefore, in a position to remand the case except for execution of judgment. Moreover, having invoked the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, petitioner was not at liberty casually to attack that jurisdiction when exercised adversely to him. In any case, the argument was mooted by the conclusion that petitioner's right to apply for probation was lost when he perfected his appeal from the judgment of conviction.

• Statutory Interpretation — Plain Meaning Rule — Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, courts must apply the statute as written and may not invoke "liberal interpretation" or "the spirit of the law" to deviate from the clear meaning of the words. The Court applied this doctrine in reading Section 4 of the Probation Law as amended by P.D. No. 1990, holding that the phrase "period for perfecting an appeal" clearly refers to the fifteen-day period established by procedural law, and that the proviso prohibiting probation where an appeal has been perfected is unambiguous.
• Statutory Interpretation — Whereas Clauses — Whereas clauses or preambulatory clauses do not form part of a statute, strictly speaking; they are not part of the operative language of the statute. While they may be helpful in articulating the general purpose or reason underlying a new enactment, they cannot control the specific terms of the statute. The Court applied this doctrine in rejecting petitioner's argument that the whereas clauses of P.D. No. 1990 should modify the clear terms of Section 4.
• Perfection of Appeal — An appeal is taken or perfected by simply filing a notice of appeal with the Regional Trial Court which rendered the judgment appealed from and by serving a copy thereof upon the People of the Philippines. The period for perfecting an appeal from a judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court is fifteen days from the promulgation or notice of the judgment appealed from. The Court applied this doctrine in determining that petitioner had perfected his appeal when he orally manifested his intention to appeal at the time of promulgation of the judgment of conviction.
• Probation Law — Effect of Perfected Appeal — Under Section 4 of the Probation Law of 1976, as amended by P.D. No. 1990, no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected an appeal from the judgment of conviction. The filing of the application for probation shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal. The Court applied this doctrine in affirming the denial of petitioner's application for probation.

• "In sharp contrast with Section 4 as amended by PD No. 1257, in its present form, Section 4 establishes a much narrower period during which an application for probation may be filed with the trial court: 'after [the trial court] shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant and — within the period for perfecting an appeal —.' As if to provide emphasis, a new proviso was appended to the first paragraph of Section 4 that expressly prohibits the grant of an application for probation 'if the defendant has perfected an appeal from the judgment of conviction.'" — This passage articulates the Court's reading of the controlling provision of P.D. No. 1990, which narrowed the period for filing an application for probation and prohibited probation where an appeal has been perfected.
• "Whereas clauses do not form part of a statute, strictly speaking; they are not part of the operative language of the statute. Nonetheless, whereas clauses may be helpful to the extent they articulate the general purpose or reason underlying a new enactment, in the present case, an enactment which drastically but clearly changed the substantive content of Section 4 existing before the promulgation of P.D. No. 1990. Whereas clauses, however, cannot control the specific terms of the statute." — This passage states the Court's doctrine on the limited interpretive value of preambulatory clauses, which cannot override the clear operative terms of a statute.
• "The first duty of a judge is to take and apply a statute as he finds it, not as he would like it to be. Otherwise, as this Court in Yangco v. Court of First Instance of Manila warned, confusion and uncertainty in application will surely follow, making, we might add, stability and continuity in the law much more difficult to achieve." — This passage articulates the Court's fundamental principle of judicial restraint in statutory interpretation, emphasizing that judges must apply statutes as written rather than according to their own preferences.
• "The words to be given meaning whether they be found in the Constitution or in a statute, define and therefore limit the authority and discretion of the judges who must apply those words. If judges may, under cover of seeking the 'true spirit' and 'real intent' of the law, disregard the words in fact used by the law-giver, the judges will effectively escape the constitutional and statutory limitations on their authority and discretion." — This passage articulates the constitutional basis for the plain meaning rule, grounding it in the separation of powers and the limits on judicial authority.

• Yangco vs. Court of First Instance of Manila, 29 Phil. 188 (1915) — Cited as controlling authority for the proposition that where statutory language is plain, courts should not engage in subtle refinements that distort the meaning of the words. The Court quoted this case to support its refusal to adopt petitioner's proposed interpretation of Section 4 of the Probation Law.
• Yazoo & Mississippi Valley R. Co. vs. Thomas, 132 US 174 (1889) — Cited in support of the doctrine that whereas clauses or preambulatory clauses do not form part of the operative language of a statute and cannot control its specific terms.

• Section 4, Presidential Decree No. 968 (Probation Law of 1976) — The provision governing the grant of probation, which was amended by P.D. No. 1257 and subsequently by P.D. No. 1990. The Court applied the provision as amended by P.D. No. 1990, which requires that an application for probation be filed within the period for perfecting an appeal and prohibits the grant of probation where the defendant has perfected an appeal.
• Section 4, Presidential Decree No. 1257 — The first amendment to the Probation Law, which extended the period for filing an application for probation to "after [the trial court] shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant but before he begins to serve his sentence." The Court discussed this amendment to illustrate the history of the provision and the drastic change effected by P.D. No. 1990.
• Section 4, Presidential Decree No. 1990 — The second amendment to the Probation Law, which narrowed the period for filing an application for probation to "within the period for perfecting an appeal" and added the proviso that "no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected an appeal from the judgment of conviction." The Court applied this provision to bar petitioner's application for probation.
• Section 39, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 — The provision establishing the period for perfecting an appeal from a judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court, which the Court identified as fifteen days from the promulgation or notice of the judgment appealed from.
• Section 19, Interim Rules and Guidelines for the Implementation of B.P. Blg. 129 — Cited by the Court as one of the sources establishing the fifteen-day period for perfecting an appeal from a judgment of the Regional Trial Court.
• Section 5, Rule 122, Revised Rules of Court — The procedural rule establishing the fifteen-day period for perfecting an appeal from the promulgation or notice of the judgment appealed from.
• Section 3(a), Rule 122, Revised Rules of Court — The procedural rule providing that an appeal is taken or perfected by filing a notice of appeal with the Regional Trial Court which rendered the judgment appealed from and by serving a copy thereof upon the People of the Philippines.

Fernan (C.J.), Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin, and Cortes, JJ., concurred in the decision.

• Justice Bellosillo — Filed a dissenting opinion in the Court of Appeals when it denied the Petition for Probation, and a briefer dissenting opinion when the Motion for Reconsideration was denied. The dissenting opinion, which petitioner asked the Supreme Court to adopt, argued that petitioner's application for probation should have been granted. The Supreme Court, however, found itself unable to accept the arguments of the dissenting opinion, holding that Section 4 as it now stands clearly bars an application for probation filed after the defendant has perfected an appeal.