Liwayway Publications, Inc. vs. Permanent Concrete Workers Union, et al.

A regular court has jurisdiction to enjoin picketing that interferes with a third party or innocent bystander who has no industrial connection to the labor dispute, because the Court of Industrial Relations' exclusive jurisdiction under Republic Act No. 875 attaches only where the controversy is a labor dispute between the picketing union and the party seeking relief; peaceful picketing may be regulated or localized to protect such third parties. A lessee may maintain a direct action against a third-person intruder for mere trespass under Article 1664 of the Civil Code, and the lessor is not liable for such mere trespass under Article 1654.

Liwayway Publications, Inc. held a bodega as second sublessee of a portion of the premises of Permanent Concrete Products, Inc. in Sta. Mesa, Manila, under Don Ramon Roces, the first lessee. Permanent Concrete Workers Union represented employees of Permanent Concrete Products, Inc., and the union had a labor dispute with that company pending before the Court of Industrial Relations. Republic Act No. 875, the Industrial Peace Act, vested the Court of Industrial Relations with exclusive jurisdiction over labor disputes and unfair labor practices, while the Civil Code governed lease relations, including the lessor's obligation to maintain the lessee in peaceful enjoyment and the lessee's remedy against third-person trespassers.

Liwayway Publications, Inc. was a second sublessee of a part of the premises of Permanent Concrete Products, Inc. at 1000 Cordeleria Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila, holding from Don Ramon Roces, the first lessee. Its premises were separated from the Permanent Concrete Products compound by a concrete and barbed wire fence, with its own entrance and road leading to the national road, distinct from the company's entrance road. Liwayway maintained a bodega for newsprint in the sublet property, which supplied its printing and publishing business.

On September 10, 1964, employees of Permanent Concrete Products, Inc. who were representatives and members of Permanent Concrete Workers Union declared a strike against their company. On October 3, 1964, the union and its members picketed, stopped, and prohibited Liwayway's truck from entering the compound to load newsprint from its bodega; according to Liwayway, this was for unknown reasons and without legal justification, and the union members intimidated and threatened with bodily harm the employees in the truck. On October 6, 1964, union members stopped and prohibited Liwayway's general manager, personnel manager, bodega-in-charge, and other employees from getting newsprint from the bodega.

Liwayway made repeated demands that defendants not intimidate or threaten its employees with bodily harm and not blockade, picket, or prohibit its truck from getting newsprint. Defendants refused and continued to refuse. As a consequence, Liwayway rented another bodega while union members prevented its employees from entering its bodega in the compound, incurring expenses for bodega rentals and for transporting newsprint from the pier to the temporary bodega.

The lower court issued a writ of preliminary injunction on December 14, 1964, enjoining the defendants from threatening and intimidating Liwayway's executive officers and representatives going to its bodega and its employees getting newsprint; from blockading or picketing the compound and gate; and from stopping, prohibiting, molesting, or interfering with Liwayway's free passage in going in and out of the bodega. The union moved to dismiss, but the lower court denied the motion and later declared defendants in default. The lower court rendered judgment on February 16, 1965, declaring the writ permanent and awarding damages.

The Supreme Court's factual findings relevant to its analysis were that the gate leading to Liwayway's bodega was about 200 meters from the gate leading to the employer's premises; Liwayway was not related to the striking union except as sublessee of a bodega in the company's compound; and Liwayway's business was exclusively publication of the magazines Bannawag, Bisaya, Hiligaynon, and Liwayway weekly, which had no relation or connection to the cause of the strike or the terms, conditions, or demands of the strikers. The union's picketing prevented Liwayway's personnel from reaching the bodega. The lower court found no labor dispute between Liwayway and the union.

• Jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations: Appellants argued that the case arose out of a labor dispute involving unfair labor practices and that the Court of First Instance had no jurisdiction to issue an injunction because such matters fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations, especially since the Court of Industrial Relations had already acquired jurisdiction over the dispute between Permanent Concrete Products, Inc. and the union in CIR Case No. 156-Inj., Charge 212-ULP, and Charge No. 1414-M.C.
• Labor Dispute Regardless of Employer-Employee Relationship: Appellants maintained that even absent an employer-employee relationship, the Court of First Instance had no jurisdiction to issue an injunction, citing cases holding that a labor dispute may exist regardless of whether the disputants stand in proximate relation of employer and employee, and that peaceful picketing is an extension of the freedom of speech guaranteed by the Constitution and cannot be enjoined.
• Real Party in Interest: Appellants contended that Liwayway was not the real party in interest under Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court; the real party was Permanent Concrete Products, Inc., against whom the strike and picket activities were directed and confined, as shown by the pending Court of Industrial Relations cases.
• Failure to State a Cause of Action / Article 1654: Appellants argued that the complaint stated no cause of action against them because Liwayway's remedy was against Don Ramon Roces, the first lessee, under Article 1654 of the New Civil Code, which obliges the lessor to maintain the lessee in peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the lease.
• Attachment / Article 1708: In opposing Liwayway's petition for attachment, appellants argued that any amount owing to the union from the company would be uncollected wages due strikers and could not be attached under Article 1708 of the New Civil Code.

• No Employer-Employee Relationship: Liwayway opposed the motion, alleging that there was no employer-employee relationship between it and the defendant union.
• No Labor Dispute: Liwayway alleged that there was no labor dispute between it and the defendants.
• Separate and Distinct Premises: Liwayway alleged that its compound was separate and distinct from the compound of the company where the defendants were employed.

• Existence of Labor Dispute: Whether the case involved or arose out of a labor dispute between Liwayway Publications, Inc. and the Permanent Concrete Workers Union.
• Jurisdiction over Injunction: Whether the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction to issue a writ of preliminary injunction considering the labor dispute between Permanent Concrete Products, Inc. and the appellants pending before the Court of Industrial Relations.
• Cause of Action / Real Party in Interest: Whether the lower court erred in denying the motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint stated no cause of action, in light of Article 1654 of the New Civil Code and the claim that the real party in interest was Don Ramon Roces or Permanent Concrete Products, Inc.

• Existence of Labor Dispute: No. Liwayway had no relation to the striking union or the employer except as sublessee; its publishing business was unrelated to the strike or the strikers' demands.
• Jurisdiction over Injunction: Yes. Because no labor dispute existed between Liwayway and the union, the Court of Industrial Relations' exclusive jurisdiction did not attach; the Rules of Court governed the injunction, and the Court of First Instance could regulate picketing to protect a third party or innocent bystander.
• Cause of Action / Real Party in Interest: Yes. The complaint stated a cause of action under Article 1664 of the New Civil Code; the union's acts were mere trespass, and the lessee had a direct action against the intruder.

• Existence of Labor Dispute: The determinative question was whether the case involved or arose out of a labor dispute. If it did, Section 9 of Republic Act No. 875 would apply; if not, the Rules of Court governed the issuance of the writ. The record showed that the union picketed the gate leading to Liwayway's bodega, about 200 meters from the gate leading to the employer's premises. Liwayway was not related to the striking union except as sublessee of a bodega in the company's compound. The picketers stopped Liwayway's truck and intimidated its employees; they also prevented its general manager, personnel manager, bodega-in-charge, and other employees from getting newsprint. Liwayway's business was exclusively publication of Bannawag, Bisaya, Hiligaynon, and Liwayway weekly magazines, which had no relation or connection to the cause of the strike or the terms, conditions, or demands of the strikers. Thus, Liwayway was a third party or innocent bystander whose rights were invaded and who was entitled to protection by the regular courts. The mere fact that Liwayway and Permanent Concrete Products were situated in the same premises did not make Liwayway's activities interwoven with the labor dispute pending in the Court of Industrial Relations.
• Jurisdiction over Injunction: The right to picket is a phase of freedom of speech and, if peacefully carried out, cannot be curtailed even in the absence of an employer-employee relationship. However, the right is not absolute. Courts may confine or localize the sphere of communication or demonstration to the parties to the labor dispute, including those with related interest, and may insulate establishments or persons with no industrial connection or having interest totally foreign to the context of the dispute. The right may be regulated at the instance of third parties or innocent bystanders if the inevitable result of its exercise is to create an impression that a labor dispute with which they have no connection or interest exists between them and the picketing union, or to constitute an invasion of their rights. Peaceful picketing is not totally banned but merely regulated. The cases cited by appellants—National Garment and Textile Workers' Union vs. Caluag, SMB Box Factory Workers' Union vs. Victoriano, and Erlanger & Galinger, Inc. vs. Erlanger & Galinger Employees Association-NATU—were not controlling because they involved situations where the issue was interwoven with unfair labor practice cases pending in the Court of Industrial Relations or where a labor dispute existed. Here, no labor dispute existed between Liwayway and the union. Under PAFLU vs. Tan, to ascertain what court has jurisdiction to issue an injunction, it is necessary to determine the nature of the controversy. The nature of the controversy here was not a labor dispute but an ordinary action to protect a third party's rights.
• Cause of Action / Real Party in Interest: Appellants' contention that the complaint stated no cause of action because Liwayway should have sued Don Ramon Roces under Article 1654 was without merit. Article 1654 obliges the lessor to maintain the lessee in peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the lease only when acts termed legal trespass (perturbacion de derecho) disturb, dispute, object to, or place difficulties in the way of the lessee's peaceful enjoyment and cast doubt upon the right of the lessor by virtue of which the lessor executed the lease. The acts complained of against the union members were mere acts of trespass (perturbacion de mero hecho). Under Article 1664 of the New Civil Code, the lessor is not obliged to answer for a mere act of trespass which a third person may cause on the use of the thing leased; the lessee has a direct action against the intruder. There is a mere act of trespass when the third person claims no right whatever. Goldstein vs. Roces explained that if the act of trespass is not accompanied or preceded by anything revealing a really juridic intention on the part of the trespasser, such that the lessee can only distinguish the material fact, stripped of all legal form or reasons, it is trespass in fact only. The union's acts were of this character; hence, Liwayway properly brought its action against the union as intruder, and the lower court correctly denied the motion to dismiss.

• Labor Injunction and Exclusive Court of Industrial Relations Jurisdiction — Under Republic Act No. 875, the Court of Industrial Relations has exclusive jurisdiction over labor disputes and unfair labor practices. A regular court may issue an injunction only where no labor dispute exists between the party seeking relief and the picketing union. In this case, because Liwayway had no labor dispute with the union, the Court of First Instance properly exercised jurisdiction under the Rules of Court.
• Picketing as Free Speech but Subject to Regulation — Picketing is a phase of the freedom of speech guaranteed by the Constitution; if peacefully carried out, it cannot be curtailed even in the absence of an employer-employee relationship. The right is not absolute. Courts may confine or localize the sphere of communication or demonstration to the parties to the labor dispute, including those with related interest, and may insulate establishments or persons with no industrial connection or having interest totally foreign to the context of the dispute. The right may be regulated at the instance of third parties or innocent bystanders if the inevitable result of its exercise is to create an impression that a labor dispute exists between them and the picketing union or to constitute an invasion of their rights. Peaceful picketing is not totally banned but merely regulated. The Court applied this doctrine to uphold the injunction protecting Liwayway as an innocent bystander.
• Mere Trespass vs. Legal Trespass in Lease — Under Article 1654 of the New Civil Code, the lessor is obliged to maintain the lessee in peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the lease only for legal trespass (perturbacion de derecho), which disturbs, disputes, objects to, or places difficulties in the lessee's peaceful enjoyment and casts doubt upon the lessor's right. Under Article 1664, the lessor is not obliged to answer for a mere act of trespass (perturbacion de mero hecho) caused by a third person; the lessee has a direct action against the intruder. There is a mere act of trespass when the third person claims no right whatever. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the union's acts were mere trespass and that Liwayway properly sued the union directly.

• "The right to picket as a means of communicating the facts of a labor dispute is a phrase of the freedom of speech guaranteed by the constitution. If peacefully carried out, it cannot be curtailed even in the absence of employer-employee relationship." — This passage, quoted from PAFLU vs. Cloribel, states the foundational rule that picketing is constitutionally protected speech and may exist even without an employer-employee relationship.
• "The right is, however, not an absolute one. While peaceful picketing is entitled to protection as an exercise of free speech, we believe that courts are not without power to confine or localize the sphere of communication or the demonstration to the parties to the labor dispute, including those with related interest, and to insulate establishments or persons with no industrial connection or having interest totally foreign to the context of the dispute." — This is the ratio decidendi on the regulation of picketing to protect third parties or innocent bystanders, and it is the doctrinal basis for allowing the injunction in this case.
• "The lessor is not obliged to answer for a mere act of trespass which a third person may cause on the use of the thing leased; but the lessee shall have a direct action against the intruder." — This verbatim quotation of Article 1664 of the New Civil Code is the controlling provision that allowed Liwayway to sue the union directly instead of suing its lessor.
• "Briefly, if the act of trespass is not accompanied or preceded by anything which reveals a really juridic intention on the part of the trespasser, in such wise that the lessee can only distinguish the material fact, stripped of all legal form or reasons, we understand it to be trespass in fact only (de mero hecho)." — This passage from Goldstein vs. Roces defines mere trespass and supports the conclusion that the union's acts did not trigger the lessor's liability under Article 1654.

• Phil. Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU) vs. Judge Gaudencio Cloribel, L-25878, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 465, 472 — Controlling precedent on the right to picket as free speech and on the power of courts to regulate or localize picketing to protect third parties or innocent bystanders. The Court quoted it extensively.
• Phil. Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU), et al. vs. Tan, 99 Phil. 854 — Cited for the rule that in order to ascertain what court has jurisdiction to issue an injunction, it is necessary to determine the nature of the controversy.
• National Garment and Textile Workers' Union (PAFLU) vs. Hon. Hermogenes Caluag, G.R. No. L-9104, September 10, 1956 — Cited by appellants but held not controlling because the facts were essentially and materially different; it involved a situation where the Court of Industrial Relations had already acquired jurisdiction over unfair labor practice cases.
• SMB Box factory Workers' Union vs. Hon. Gustavo Victoriano, G.R. No. L-12820, Dec. 29, 1957 — Distinguished; it held that the Court of First Instance cannot take cognizance of an action for injunction where the issue is interwoven with unfair labor practice cases pending in the Court of Industrial Relations, which was not the situation here.
• Erlanger & Galinger, Inc. vs. Erlanger & Galinger Employees Association-NATU, G.R. No. L-11907, June 24, 1958, 104 Phil. 17 — Distinguished; it held that the Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction to issue a restraining order if the labor dispute arose out of unfair labor practices, but here no labor dispute existed between Liwayway and the union.
• Goldstein vs. Roces, 34 Phil. 562 — Source of the doctrine distinguishing mere trespass (perturbacion de mero hecho) from legal trespass (perturbacion de derecho) and holding that the lessee has a direct action against the third-person trespasser.

• Section 9, Republic Act No. 875 (Industrial Peace Act) — Governs the issuance of injunctions in labor disputes. The Court held it did not apply because no labor dispute existed between Liwayway and the appellants.
• Section 5-a, Republic Act No. 875 — Vests the Court of Industrial Relations with exclusive jurisdiction over labor disputes and unfair labor practices. Cited by appellants; held not controlling because no labor dispute existed between Liwayway and the union.
• Article 1654, New Civil Code — Obliges the lessor to maintain the lessee in peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the lease for the entire duration of the contract. Appellants invoked it to argue that suit should be against Don Ramon Roces. The Court held it applies only to legal trespass, not to mere trespass by a third person.
• Article 1664, New Civil Code — Provides that the lessor is not obliged to answer for a mere act of trespass caused by a third person, but the lessee has a direct action against the intruder. Applied to uphold Liwayway's complaint against the union.
• Section 2, Rule 3, Rules of Court — Defines real party in interest. Invoked by appellants to argue Liwayway was not the proper plaintiff. The Court rejected the motion to dismiss on the cause-of-action ground, and its Article 1664 analysis confirmed the lessee's direct action against the intruder.
• Article 1708, New Civil Code — Provides that laborer's wages shall not be subject to execution or attachment except for debts incurred for food, shelter, clothing, and medical attendance. Appellants invoked it in opposing Liwayway's petition for attachment; the Supreme Court denied the petition without prejudice, so the provision was not applied on the merits.
• Article III, Section 1, Paragraph 8, 1935 Constitution — Guaranteed freedom of speech, press, and peaceful assembly. Cited in the footnote as the constitutional basis for the right to picket as a phase of free speech.

Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez, and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.