Liwayway Andres vs. Sta. Lucia Realty & Development, Inc.

An easement of right-of-way under Article 649 of the Civil Code may only be demanded by the owner of an immovable or by any person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate or use the same; lands of the public domain not yet expressly declared by the State as converted into patrimonial property are not susceptible to acquisition through prescription, pursuant to Article 1113 of the Civil Code, which provides that property of the State not patrimonial in character shall not be the subject of prescription.

Petitioners Liwayway Andres, Ronnie Andres, and Pablo B. Francisco, together with co-plaintiff Liza Andres, claim co-ownership and possession of three parcels of unregistered agricultural land totaling approximately 10,500 square meters in Pag-asa, Binangonan, Rizal. Respondent Sta. Lucia Realty & Development, Inc. acquired the lands surrounding the subject property, developed them into a residential subdivision known as Binangonan Metropolis East, and constructed a concrete perimeter fence that cut off petitioners' access to the nearest public road, Col. Guido Street. The subject property remains unregistered under the Land Registration Act, with no tax declaration issued in petitioners' names; the property is declared for taxation purposes under the name of Juanito Blanco, et al.

Petitioners Liwayway Andres, Ronnie Andres, and Pablo B. Francisco, together with co-plaintiff Liza Andres, filed a complaint for easement of right-of-way against respondent Sta. Lucia Realty & Development, Inc. before the RTC of Binangonan, Rizal on November 28, 2000. They alleged that they are co-owners and possessors for more than 50 years of three parcels of unregistered agricultural land in Pag-asa, Binangonan, Rizal, with a total area of approximately 10,500 square meters. Respondent had acquired the surrounding lands, developed them into the Binangonan Metropolis East subdivision, and built a concrete perimeter fence that denied petitioners access from the subject property to the nearest public road, Col. Guido Street. They prayed for a right-of-way through respondent's subdivision.

Pablo B. Francisco testified that he purchased a 4,000-square-meter portion of the subject property from Carlos Andres, the husband of Liwayway and father of Ronnie and Liza. He and his co-plaintiffs remained in possession, as evidenced by an April 13, 1998 certification issued by the Barangay Chairman of Pag-asa. Pablo clarified that the right-of-way sought would traverse respondent's subdivision for about 50 meters from the subject property to Victoria Village, which he co-owns and which in turn leads to Col. Guido Street. He claimed the prevailing market value of lands in the area was P600.00 per square meter. The subject property remained unregistered under the Land Registration Act, as no tax declaration had been issued to them despite an application with the Municipal Assessor of Binangonan. When required by the court to submit documents regarding the application, Pablo attached, among others, Carlos's letter of May 18, 1998 to the Municipal Assessor requesting issuance of a tax declaration and the reply dated August 5, 1998 from the Provincial Assessor of Rizal denying the request on the ground that the property was already declared for taxation purposes under the name of Juan Diaz and later under Juanito Blanco, et al.

Liwayway testified that she and her children Ronnie and Liza are the surviving heirs of Carlos, who owned the subject property after continuous, public, and peaceful possession for 50 years. Carlos had executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay stating that even before his birth in 1939, his father was already in possession and working on the land; that he started helping his father till the land in 1948; and that when his father became weak and died, he took over. Carlos had sought to register his ownership with the DENR and to declare the property for taxation purposes. His April 13, 1998 letter to the DENR, which petitioners assert was an application for registration of his claim, was in fact merely a request for the issuance of certain documents.

Respondent presented as its lone witness Virgilio Flordeliza, the then Municipal Assessor of Binangonan, who confirmed Carlos's letter-request for a tax declaration but referred the matter to the Provincial Assessor because the property was already declared under Juan Diaz's name. The tax declaration of Juan Diaz was later cancelled and replaced with one in the name of the Blancos, and the Provincial Assessor denied Carlos's application accordingly.

• Ordinary Acquisitive Prescription: Petitioners argued that they acquired ownership of the subject property through ordinary acquisitive prescription under Article 1134 of the Civil Code, since their possession became adverse against the Blancos when Carlos formally registered his claim of ownership with the DENR and sought to declare the property for taxation purposes in 1998, and more than 10 years had lapsed without the Blancos contesting their continued possession.
• Extraordinary Acquisitive Prescription: In the alternative, petitioners asserted ownership through extraordinary acquisitive prescription, citing their open, continuous, and peaceful possession for more than 50 years; the subject property being alienable and disposable as depicted in a survey plan they caused to be prepared; Carlos's filing of a claim of ownership with the DENR; and Carlos's willingness to declare the property for taxation purposes, which gave notice of his adverse claim and strengthened his bona fide claim of ownership.
• Entitlement to Easement: As owners of the subject property intended to be the dominant estate, petitioners contended they are entitled to demand an easement of right-of-way from respondent under Article 649 of the Civil Code.

• Lack of Ownership or Real Right: Respondent argued that petitioners were neither able to prove that they were owners nor that they had any real right over the subject property intended to be the dominant estate, and therefore were not entitled to demand an easement of right-of-way.
• Inadequate Allegation of Requisites: Respondent pointed out that petitioners failed to sufficiently allege in their complaint the existence of the requisites for the grant of an easement of right-of-way.
• Denial of Possession: Respondent denied knowledge of any property adjoining its subdivision owned by petitioners and Liza, and denied the allegation that petitioners had been in possession of the subject property for more than 50 years.
• Availability of Other Routes: Respondent contended that petitioners failed to establish that the only route available from their property to Col. Guido Street is through respondent's subdivision.

• Entitlement to Easement of Right-of-Way: Whether petitioners are entitled to demand an easement of right-of-way from respondent.

• Entitlement to Easement of Right-of-Way: No. Petitioners failed to establish ownership or any real right over the subject property, which is unregistered public agricultural land of the public domain not yet expressly declared by the State as converted into patrimonial property, and hence not susceptible to acquisition by prescription under Article 1113 of the Civil Code.

• Entitlement to Easement of Right-of-Way: Under Article 649 of the Civil Code, an easement of right-of-way may be demanded only by the owner of an immovable or by any person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate or use the same. Petitioners anchored their claim of ownership on prescription — ordinary and extraordinary. The argument based on ordinary acquisitive prescription was raised for the first time on appeal, first in their motion for reconsideration before the CA, and is barred under the established rule that points of law, theories, issues, and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court need not be considered by a reviewing court, as basic considerations of fairness and due process impel this rule. Even on the merits, both modes of prescription fail. As clarified in Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic of the Philippines, only lands of the public domain subsequently classified or declared as no longer intended for public use or for the development of national wealth, or removed from the sphere of public dominion and converted into patrimonial lands, may be alienated or disposed through any of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code. If the mode of acquisition is prescription, whether ordinary or extraordinary, it must first be shown that the land has already been converted to private ownership prior to the requisite prescriptive period; otherwise, Article 1113 applies, providing that property of the State not patrimonial in character shall not be the subject of prescription. The subject property is an unregistered public agricultural land, and petitioners presented no proof of an express declaration by the State — through either a law enacted by Congress or a proclamation issued by the President — that the property is no longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth or has been converted into patrimonial property. Without such proof, the land remains property of public dominion and is not susceptible to acquisition by prescription. Petitioners' claim of ownership therefore necessarily fails, and they cannot demand an easement of right-of-way for lack of personality. Additionally, there was no showing that Carlos filed a claim of ownership with the DENR; his April 13, 1998 letter was merely a request for the issuance of certain documents, and his application for a tax declaration was denied because a tax declaration had already been issued to the Blancos.

• Easement of Right-of-Way (Article 649, Civil Code) — The owner, or any person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate or use any immovable which is surrounded by other immovables pertaining to other persons and without adequate outlet to a public highway, is entitled to demand a right of way through the neighboring estates after payment of proper indemnity. The Court applied this provision by holding that petitioners, lacking proven ownership or any real right over the subject property, had no personality to demand the easement.
• Prescription of Public Lands — Only lands of the public domain subsequently classified or declared as no longer intended for public use or for the development of national wealth, or removed from the sphere of public dominion and converted into patrimonial lands, may be acquired through prescription. The State must expressly declare, through either a law enacted by Congress or a proclamation issued by the President, that the property is no longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth or has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the land remains property of public dominion and is not susceptible to prescription under Article 1113 of the Civil Code, which provides that property of the State not patrimonial in character shall not be the subject of prescription.
• Issues Raised for the First Time on Appeal — Points of law, theories, issues, and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court need not be considered by a reviewing court, as they cannot be raised for the first time at that late stage. Basic considerations of fairness and due process impel this rule. The Court applied this doctrine to bar petitioners' argument based on ordinary acquisitive prescription, which was raised only in their motion for reconsideration before the CA.

• "Not all may demand for an easement of right-of-way. Under the law, an easement of right-of-way may only be demanded by the owner of an immovable property or by any person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate or use the same." — This opening statement frames the entire decision and articulates the threshold requirement for standing to demand an easement of right-of-way under Article 649.
• "without an express declaration by the State, the land remains to be a property of public dominion and hence, not susceptible to acquisition by virtue of prescription." — This passage states the controlling rule on the inapplicability of prescription to lands of the public domain absent an express State declaration of conversion to patrimonial status, drawing from Republic vs. Aboitiz.
• "Settled is the rule that points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court need not be considered by a reviewing court, as they cannot be raised for the first time at that late stage. Basic considerations of fairness and due process impel this rule." — This quotation articulates the procedural bar applied to petitioners' ordinary acquisitive prescription argument, citing Krystle Realty Development Corporation vs. Alibin.

• Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 179987, Sept. 3, 2013, 704 SCRA 561 — Controlling authority on the requirement that lands of the public domain must first be classified or declared as no longer intended for public use or converted into patrimonial lands before they may be acquired through prescription. The Court relied on this case to hold that the subject property, being unregistered public agricultural land without proof of State declaration of conversion, is not susceptible to prescription.
• Republic vs. Aboitiz, G.R. No. 174626, Oct. 23, 2013, 708 SCRA 388 — Followed for the proposition that without an express declaration by the State that the land is no longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth or has been converted into patrimonial, the land remains property of public dominion and is not susceptible to acquisition by prescription.
• Krystle Realty Development Corporation vs. Alibin, G.R. No. 196117, Aug. 13, 2014, 733 SCRA 1 — Followed for the procedural rule that points of law, theories, issues, and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court need not be considered by a reviewing court.
• Republic vs. Rizalvo, Jr., 659 Phil. 578 (2011) — Cited for the proposition that prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code.
• Tan vs. Ramirez, 640 Phil. 370 (2010) — Cited for the distinction between ordinary acquisitive prescription (requiring possession in good faith and just title for 10 years) and extraordinary prescription (uninterrupted adverse possession for 30 years without need of title or good faith).

• Article 649, Civil Code — Provides that the owner, or any person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate or use any immovable surrounded by other immovables without adequate outlet to a public highway, is entitled to demand a right of way through neighboring estates after payment of proper indemnity. Applied as the legal basis for the easement claim; the Court held petitioners could not invoke it absent proven ownership or real right.
• Article 1137, Civil Code — Provides that ownership and other real rights over immovables prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession for 30 years, without need of title or of good faith. This was the basis of petitioners' claim of extraordinary acquisitive prescription before the RTC, which the Court rejected for lack of proof that the subject property had been converted to patrimonial status.
• Article 1134, Civil Code — Provides that ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired by ordinary prescription through possession of 10 years. Petitioners invoked this in their motion for reconsideration before the CA; the Court declined to consider it as it was raised for the first time on appeal.
• Article 1113, Civil Code — Provides that property of the State not patrimonial in character shall not be the subject of prescription. Applied as the controlling provision barring petitioners' prescription claim, since the subject property remained land of the public domain not yet declared patrimonial.

Carpio (Chairperson), Mendoza, and Jardeleza, JJ., concurred. Leonen, J., wrote a separate concurring opinion, the text of which was not provided.