Liwanag vs. Lustre

Guilt in an administrative case against a judge may be established by substantial evidence, and a judge who uses pending cases to sexually exploit a litigant's family member commits gross misconduct warranting the maximum fine when dismissal is no longer possible due to retirement.

Lualhati M. Liwanag is the wife of Jose B. Zafra, who filed twelve counts of violation of B.P. 22 against Oscar Chua, Dante Chua and Rowena Chua involving dishonored checks amounting to approximately P3.5 million. Those criminal cases were assigned to the Municipal Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, presided over by respondent Judge Paterno H. Lustre.

Prior to July 1994, Jose B. Zafra, husband of complainant Lualhati M. Liwanag, filed twelve counts of violation of B.P. 22 against Oscar Chua, Dante Chua and Rowena Chua for dishonored checks amounting to approximately P3.5 million. On July 22, 1994, the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Laguna filed twelve informations charging each accused with three counts, and the cases were assigned to the Municipal Trial Court of Calamba presided by respondent. After the accused posted bail, arraignment was postponed several times at their instance, and the November 16, 1994 hearing was reset to December 15, 1994 when respondent was absent.

On November 17, 1994 at about 8:30 a.m., Liwanag went to respondent's chamber to inquire why arraignment had not proceeded and to request monthly settings in January and February 1995 and thereafter. Respondent agreed and told her to return after the December 15 hearing at about 7:00 a.m. in his chamber. On December 15, 1994, counsel for the accused moved to transfer the hearing, and respondent reset the case to January 17 and February 1, 9 and 23, 1995. As instructed, Liwanag returned on December 16, 1994 at about 7:00 a.m., when respondent said he had prepared an order for the accused; she thanked him and said she and her husband would give him five percent as token if paid, to which he said he did not need money, then while handing the order touched her shoulder down to her breast, said he had acceded to her request, and told her he was available Mondays and Fridays and to return before January 17, 1995. She did not return before that date because of the molestation, and on January 17, 1995 respondent cancelled the February 1, 9 and 23 settings at the accused's request and reset to February 22 and 28 and March 7, 1995; on February 22 he cancelled the February 28 setting.

Sensing deliberate delay despite her lawyer's objections and needing termination to recover the money, Liwanag saw respondent on March 6, 1995 at about 10:00 a.m. to ask why hearings were cancelled. According to her, he reproached her for fooling him by not returning as requested though he had granted her request, said she must obey his wishes for the case to go smoothly since he alone would decide, then had her wait outside, boarded her in his white Toyota car Plate No. PLN-513, brought her to Canlubang Tollway, kissed her on the lips and caressed her breast while she submitted for fear of adverse action on the cases, and ordered her to come on March 13, 1995 at 7:00 a.m. to discuss April and May settings. On March 13 at about 7:10 a.m., with no one else present, he ushered her inside his chamber, kissed her and caressed her breast, exposed his penis and ordered her to masturbate him, which she obeyed while bloody fluid oozed, told her to have her lawyer file a motion for April and May settings, asked her to go to Laguna de Bay Inn which she refused, then warned the fate of the case was in his hands and ordered her to see him March 23, 1995 at 7:00 a.m. at Laguna de Bay Inn in Sucat. Her lawyer filed the motion but she did not go to the inn, and at the March 28, 1995 hearing no April or May dates were set, the case being set in June 1995 instead. After receiving on April 10, 1995 a subpoena for pre-trial and arraignment of new cases on May 3, 1995, she inquired on April 11 why the old case was not set then; he answered he had waited for her at the inn on March 23 and warned her not to fool him because it was bad when he got angry.

The June 6 hearing proceeded while the June 13 hearing was cancelled at the accused's instance. On June 15, 1995 at about 7:00 a.m., Liwanag requested monthly July and August hearings after learning the next setting would be in September; respondent said he would oblige if she followed his wishes while touching her breast, exposed his penis and told her to perform fellatio, which she refused, and ordered her return the next day. On June 16 at about 7:00 a.m., she waited at Calamba Church as ordered, he fetched her in the white Toyota and brought her to Riverview Resort and Sports Complex in Crossing, Calamba, where inside a room he promised July and August settings, ordered both to undress, and ordered her to perform fellatio, which she obeyed while blood oozed from his penis and she noted black rashes on his legs, before ordering her to return July 10. The same conduct recurred on June 23, 1995 at the same resort after a 7:00 a.m. office meeting. The June 28 hearing proceeded, but she did not appear July 10 or July 11 at Jollibee Calamba, and on July 27 the hearing proceeded but prior schedules were cancelled in favor of November 1995. On August 15, 1995 at 7:00 a.m., when she went to obtain an order referring Rowena Chua's specimen signatures to the NBI, he again kissed and touched her, which she did not resist for fear of retaliation.

Liwanag filed her September 19, 1995 complaint with sworn statement detailing each incident, eleven photographs showing her and respondent together including coming out of a room marked D, a Riverview receipt dated June 23, 1995, and two transcripts of phone conversations. Respondent denied all charges, presented a utility worker's affidavit that he arrives at 7:45 a.m., a practitioner's attestation to his ethics, and a medical certification for coronary artery disease, atrial fibrillation and diabetes, and later took his own resort photographs to dispute the location. The investigating judge found her allegations beyond comprehension, noted the photographs showed no immorality, and stressed her failure to testify for cross-examination, while the OCA found her narration finely etched with earmarks of truth and rage, revulsion and disgust.

• Credibility and Detail: Complainant maintained that her narration bore earmarks of truth, being finely etched with rage, revulsion and disgust, and graphically detailing each incident, which precluded wild imagining.
• Early-Morning Meetings: Complainant argued that respondent deliberately set meetings at 7:00 a.m. knowing no staff reported that early, and required her to leave before 7:30 a.m., explaining how misconduct could occur in chambers.
• Physical Capacity: Complainant countered that respondent did not engage in intercourse but only in foreplay and oral sex, so diabetes may have diminished but did not erase sexual urge.
• Delay as Coercion: Complainant alleged that respondent deliberately delayed prosecution through repeated postponements and hostility toward her husband and lawyer, prolonging abusive acts and forcing submission to obtain continuous trial settings.

• Denial and Improper Motive: Respondent strongly denied the charges as vile products of a malicious mind, claiming complainant and her common-law husband retaliated after he refused to hastily schedule, continuously try and arbitrarily decide the B.P. 22 cases and refused the offered 5% reward.
• Impossibility of Time and Place: Respondent argued that he could not have been in chambers at 7:00 a.m. since he arrives five to ten minutes before 8:00 a.m., corroborated by a utility worker's affidavit stating 7:45 a.m., and that his unlocked room adjoining the only comfort room precluded illicit conduct.
• Physical Incapacity: Respondent pointed out that at age 67 with heart ailment and diabetes, sex was beyond his physical capacity and he would die in the attempt, supported by medical certification for coronary artery disease, atrial fibrillation and diabetes mellitus.
• Insufficiency of Photographs: Respondent maintained that nothing indecent appeared in the photographs, denied they were taken at Riverview Resort based on his own pictures showing absence of letter D and anti-vandalism sign, and noted the receipt did not show he was with complainant.
• Extortion: Respondent averred that complainant's real intent was to extort P3.5 million to settle the case.

• Standard of Proof: Whether guilt in an administrative case against a judge must be proved beyond reasonable doubt or only by substantial evidence.
• Credibility and Culpability: Whether respondent committed gross misconduct and immorality through sexual molestation and use of pending cases as leverage, notwithstanding denial, photographs showing no sexual congress, and failure of complainant to undergo cross-examination.
• Penalty: Whether dismissal with forfeiture of all retirement benefits or a lesser sanction is proper where respondent has already retired from service.

• Standard of Proof: No. Only substantial evidence is required in administrative cases under Rule 133, Sec. 5 of the Revised Rules of Evidence, not proof beyond reasonable doubt.
• Credibility and Culpability: Yes. Respondent was guilty of gross misconduct, complainant's affidavit and corroborating circumstances constituting substantial evidence that he violated judicial integrity and propriety.
• Penalty: No dismissal with total forfeiture. A maximum fine of P40,000.00 under Rule 140, Sec. 10, deductible from retirement benefits, with bar from government employment, was imposed, respondent having retired November 1, 1998.

• Standard of Proof: The investigating judge egregiously misapplied law by requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt. Under Rule 133, Sec. 5, a fact in administrative or quasi-judicial cases is deemed established if supported by substantial evidence, that amount of relevant evidence a reasonable mind might accept as adequate. The record was therefore reviewed under that standard, citing Lachica vs. Flordeliza and Betguen vs. Masangcay.
• Credibility and Culpability: Complainant's narration was found credible for its precise etching of dates, places, car plate, and acts, and her willingness to expose herself to shame negated fabrication merely to retaliate for delays. The absence of sexual congress in photographs was understandable since such acts are not proper subjects of photographs, and respondent, while not denying he appeared with complainant, offered no plausible legitimate explanation for being seen coming out of an apparent private room, raising his own resort photos only as an afterthought almost a year later. Failure to cross-examine was not fatal because her re-subscribed affidavit stood in lieu of testimony and could have been the basis for cross-examination, the omission being respondent's fault. Vindictiveness and alleged extortion demand did not excuse conduct, which grossly violated the duty under Canons 1 and 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct to uphold judiciary integrity and avoid impropriety in public and private life, to the grave prejudice of justice.
• Penalty: Disgraceful conduct merited sanction even after retirement on November 1, 1998. While the OCA recommended dismissal with forfeiture and prejudice to reemployment, total forfeiture was declined as it might adversely affect innocent dependent family members. The maximum P40,000.00 fine for a serious charge under Rule 140, Sec. 10 was deemed sufficient, with bar from employment in all government branches including government-owned and controlled corporations.

• Substantial evidence in administrative cases — A fact filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies is deemed established if supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required. Applied to reverse the investigating judge's dismissal standard and sustain the complaint against respondent.
• Judicial integrity and propriety — Under Canons 1 and 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, a judge must uphold the integrity of the judiciary and avoid impropriety not only in public but in private life. Applied to hold that using pending B.P. 22 cases to coerce sexual favors grossly violated judicial duty to the grave prejudice of justice.
• Continued sanctionability despite retirement — Retirement does not preclude sanction for serious misconduct committed in office; where dismissal or suspension can no longer be imposed, a fine deductible from retirement benefits and disqualification from reemployment may be imposed. Applied to impose the maximum fine on respondent who retired November 1, 1998.

• "As a rule, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not necessary in deciding administrative cases. Only substantial evidence is required," — States the controlling evidentiary standard that justified rejecting the investigating judge's beyond-reasonable-doubt requirement.
• "It is true that the pictures do not show respondent and complainant actually engaging in any form of sexual congress." — Acknowledges the photographic limitation while explaining why absence of explicit depiction did not defeat the charge.
• "The Court cannot countenance any act or omission, on the part of the officials at every level in the administration of justice, which erodes rather than enhances the public's faith and trust in the judiciary." — Articulates the policy basis for sanctioning respondent despite retirement and alleged ulterior motive of complainant.

• Lachica vs. Flordeliza, 254 SCRA 278 (1996) — Cited as authority that only substantial evidence is required in administrative cases.
• Betguen vs. Masangcay, 238 SCRA 475 (1994) — Cited as additional authority for the substantial evidence rule in administrative cases.

• Sec. 5, Rule 133, Revised Rules of Evidence — Provides that in cases before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if supported by substantial evidence; applied to evaluate complainant's affidavit, photographs and corroboration.
• Sec. 10, Rule 140, Rules of Court — Provides sanctions for serious charges including dismissal with forfeiture, suspension for three months, or fine of P20,000.00 to P40,000.00; applied to impose the P40,000.00 maximum fine deductible from retirement benefits.
• Canons 1 and 2, Code of Judicial Conduct — Require judges to uphold integrity of the judiciary and avoid impropriety in public and private life; applied to find gross violation warranting sanction.
• B.P. 22, Bouncing Checks Law — The statute underlying the twelve informations for dishonored checks that respondent was handling and allegedly used as leverage for sexual demands.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.