Linsangan vs. Office of the Ombudsman and Orig

A head of office may rely to a reasonable extent on the good faith and representations of his subordinates, and the mere signature or approval appearing on a document does not, without more, sustain a finding of gross neglect of duty or a presumption of liability. Liability depends upon the wrong committed, not solely on one's position as head of a government agency.

Leonardo O. Orig sought to verify the existence of several certificates of title with the Registry of Deeds of Cabanatuan City. The Registry issued a certification, signed by petitioner as Registrar of Deeds, stating that the titles could not be located and were recorded as severely mutilated and torn beyond recognition per a 1982 inventory. Orig later claimed to have found machine copies of some of the titles in the Registry's files, which he said proved the certification false. This led to an administrative complaint against petitioner and several Registry personnel.

On July 31, 2008, Leonardo O. Orig and his sister-in-law, Lourdes P. Francisco, went to the Registry of Deeds of Cabanatuan City to verify the existence of three Original Certificates of Title (OCT) with Nos. 19327, 19062, and 16947, as well as Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 13764. Orig's request for verification did not yield positive results, and despite demands, no positive feedback came from the Registry of Deeds. Soon after, they returned to the Registry of Deeds, where Orig was issued a certification signed by petitioner, the then Registrar of Deeds, verified by Vault Keeper Emilio De Guzman and checked by the Officer-in-Charge of the Records Section, Marlon B. Romero. The certification stated that OCT Nos. 19327, 19062, and 16947, and TCT No. 13764 could not be located despite diligent efforts, and that they were recorded as severely mutilated and torn beyond recognition as per an inventory dated 1982.

Unconvinced, Orig personally verified the existence of the certificates of title by checking the list of lost and missing titles in the custody of Romero. When they could not find the title numbers of the certificates of title they were looking for, Romero allegedly inserted the title numbers on the list. In his Reply, Orig attached machine copies of OCT Nos. 19062 and 19327, claiming that the existence of the certificates of title in the files of the Register of Deeds proved that the certification issued by petitioner was false and that his issuance thereof constituted gross negligence. In his defense, petitioner averred that he assumed office only on October 1, 1986, and was not yet the Registrar of Deeds when the inventory of lost titles was prepared.

In a letter dated March 11, 2013, the Acting Registrar of Deeds for the Province of Nueva Ecija, Atty. Fidel G. Ortaleza, revealed that petitioner had already been dismissed from service since April 25, 2012 after being found guilty of grave misconduct in a separate case filed against him. Meanwhile, in his rejoinder, petitioner stated that he had retired from the service on January 6, 2013, but he admitted that the certification issued to Orig contained an erroneous fact. He blamed De Guzman and Romero for the error, defending that when the infractions consist in reliance in good faith, albeit misplaced, by a head of office on a subordinate upon whom the primary responsibility rests, absent a clear case of conspiracy, the head of the office should not be held liable.

The Ombudsman found petitioner guilty of gross neglect of duty and meted out the penalty of dismissal from the service, ruling that the nature of petitioner's duties required him to examine and verify with greater detail the documents he was made to approve, and that he failed to do so when he merely relied on the representations of his subordinates without checking and verifying the documents. The CA affirmed insofar as petitioner was concerned, holding that his contention that he merely relied on the signatures of his subordinates appearing in the certification could not exculpate him from liability, and reiterating that his duties required him to examine and verify with greater detail the documents he approved.

• The primary responsibility to verify whether a title is intact, missing, or misplaced rests upon his subordinates, De Guzman and Romero; as head of the Registry of Deeds, he merely relied on them in good faith since they themselves signed the certification in their individual capacities.
• The penalty imposed by the Ombudsman was too severe and not commensurate to his infractions.
• Orig has no interest in the certificates of title in question since the Certification dated August 22, 2008 was issued to his sister-in-law and not to him; he merely accompanied her and therefore has no legal standing to file the administrative case.
• The complaint was filed with the LRA on November 14, 2008 and later with the Ombudsman on July 10, 2012; the duration of investigation before the LRA and the proceedings before the Ombudsman, covering almost six years, violated his right to the speedy disposition of his case.

• The Ombudsman maintained that petitioner cannot simply blame his subordinates for the erroneous statement in his certification; he should have checked and verified the supporting documents before giving his imprimatur thereto.
• Petitioner's reliance on the representations of his subordinates, coupled with his failure to check and verify the supporting documents necessary before the issuance of the certification, demonstrated his administrative guilt for gross neglect of duty.

• Gross Negligence: Whether there is gross negligence on petitioner's part.
• Penalty: Whether the penalty imposed was too harsh.
• Locus Standi of Complainant: Whether the complaint against petitioner should be dismissed considering that Orig, the complainant, has no personal interest in the matter.
• Speedy Disposition: Whether petitioner's constitutional right to the speedy disposition of the case was violated.

• Gross Negligence: No. The SC held that petitioner can invoke the protective mantle of the Arias doctrine, under which heads of office may rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates. The fact that petitioner was the head of the Registry of Deeds did not automatically make him the party ultimately liable for the negligence of his subordinates, and mere signature on the certification, without more, cannot be considered a presumption of liability.
• Penalty: No penalty may be imposed, as the finding of administrative guilt was set aside. The SC found no need to further discuss the other issues raised by petitioner.
• Locus Standi of Complainant: Not resolved. The SC found no need to discuss this issue in light of its conclusion on the first issue.
• Speedy Disposition: Not resolved. The SC found no need to discuss this issue in light of its conclusion on the first issue.

Gross Negligence: The SC held that the CA erred in presuming petitioner's liability based on his position as head of the Registry of Deeds of Nueva Ecija and in requiring him to exercise a higher degree of circumspection and to go beyond or countercheck the work of his subordinates. The Arias doctrine teaches that heads of office could rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates. The SC quoted the ratio from Arias v. Sandiganbayan, which explained that it would set a bad precedent if a head of office plagued by common problems — dishonest or negligent subordinates, overwork, multiple assignments or positions, or plain incompetence — is suddenly swept into a conspiracy conviction simply because he did not personally examine every single detail, painstakingly trace every step from inception, and investigate the motives of every person involved in a transaction before affixing his signature as the final approving authority. The SC noted that all heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates and on the good faith of those who prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter into negotiations, and that there must be some added reason why a head should examine each document in such detail.

The SC also relied on Nicolas v. Desierto, where the Court noted that while petitioner Nicolas ordered the release of the cargo, he did so in good faith as there was no intimation that he had foreknowledge of any irregularity; the negligence of subordinates cannot always be ascribed to their superior in the absence of evidence of the latter's own negligence. The SC further cited Miralles v. Commission on Audit, where the Court found the COA's refusal to apply the Arias doctrine arbitrary because it stood on highly speculative grounds, and held that the petitioner should have instead been presumed to have acted in the regular performance of his official duty because no evidence showed bad faith and gross negligence.

Applying these principles, the SC held that the fact that petitioner was the head of the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija did not automatically make him the party ultimately liable for the negligence of his subordinates. He cannot be held liable just because he was the authority who signed the certification and because the employees/officers who processed and prepared it were under his supervision. Being the head of his agency, petitioner was practically responsible for the whole province of Nueva Ecija; with the amount of paperwork that normally passes through his office and the numerous documents he had to sign, it would be counterproductive to require him to specifically and meticulously examine or countercheck each and every document that passed his office. Though not impossible, it would be improbable and impractical for him to check every detail and personally conduct a physical inspection of the titles subject of his certification. The SC held that petitioner had the right to rely mainly on the designations, recommendations, and certifications of his subordinates signing the documents.

The SC also held that every person who signs or initials documents in the course of transit through standard operating procedures does not automatically become a conspirator in a crime which transpired at a stage where he had no participation. Mere signature of the petitioner in the certification in question, without anything more, cannot be considered as a presumption of liability; liability depends upon the wrong committed and not solely by reason of being the head of the government agency. Assuming that petitioner committed a mistake in not ensuring that the certification was correct, the SC held that not every mistake committed by a public officer is actionable absent any clear showing that it was motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith. In petitioner's case, there was no showing that he was motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith, nor was there any showing that he was motivated by bad faith in failing to verify the correctness of his certification.

Penalty, Locus Standi, and Speedy Disposition: In light of the SC's conclusion that no gross negligence attended petitioner's act, it found no need to further discuss the other issues raised by petitioner.

• Arias Doctrine (Reliance on Subordinates) — Heads of office may rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates and on the good faith of those who prepare documents, and are not expected to personally examine every single detail, painstakingly trace every step from inception, and investigate the motive of every person involved in a transaction before affixing their signature as the final approving authority. The SC applied this doctrine to absolve petitioner, holding that as head of the Registry of Deeds for the whole province, it would be counterproductive and impractical to require him to meticulously examine or countercheck every document passing through his office; he had the right to rely mainly on the designations, recommendations, and certifications of his subordinates.
• Mere Signature Does Not Presume Liability — Every person who signs or initials documents in the course of transit through standard operating procedures does not automatically become a conspirator in a crime which transpired at a stage where he had no participation. Mere signature on a document, without anything more, cannot be considered a presumption of liability; liability depends upon the wrong committed and not solely by reason of being the head of a government agency.
• Mistakes of Public Officers Not Actionable Absent Bad Faith — Not every mistake committed by a public officer is actionable absent any clear showing that it was motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith. The SC found no showing of malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith on petitioner's part.

• "As a public official, he cannot be expected to 'personally examine every single detail, painstakingly trace every step from inception, and investigate the motive of every person involved in a transaction before affixing his signature as the final approving authority.'"
• "We would be setting a bad precedent if a head of office plagued by all too common problems — dishonest or negligent subordinates, overwork, multiple assignments or positions, or plain incompetence — is suddenly swept into a conspiracy conviction simply because he did not personally examine every single detail, painstakingly trace every step from inception, and investigate the motives of every person involved in a transaction before affixing his signature as the final approving authority."
• "All heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates and on the good faith of those who prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter into negotiations."
• "There should be other grounds than the mere signature or approval appearing on a voucher to sustain a conspiracy charge and conviction."
• "The negligence of subordinates cannot always be ascribed to their superior in the absence of evidence of the latter's own negligence."
• "In fact, mere signature of the petitioner in the certification in question without anything more cannot be considered as a presumption of liability. Liability depends upon the wrong committed and not solely by reason of being the head of the government agency."
• "Assuming, for the nonce, that petitioner committed a mistake in not ensuring that the certification was correct, it is settled that not every mistake committed by a public officer are actionable absent any clear showing that they were motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith."

• Arias v. Sandiganbayan, 259 Phil. 794 (1989) — Controlling precedent. The SC invoked the doctrine that heads of office may rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates, and quoted its ratio at length as the primary basis for absolving petitioner.
• Nicolas v. Desierto, 488 Phil. 158 (2004) — Followed. The SC cited it for the rule that the negligence of subordinates cannot always be ascribed to their superior in the absence of evidence of the latter's own negligence, and that a head is not mandated or expected to verify personally each document that appears on its face to have been regularly issued.
• Miralles v. Commission on Audit, 818 Phil. 380 (2017) — Followed. The SC cited it for the ruling that the COA's refusal to apply the Arias doctrine was arbitrary because it stood on highly speculative grounds, and that a public officer should be presumed to have acted in the regular performance of official duty absent evidence of bad faith and gross negligence.
• Joson III v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 223762, November 7, 2017, 844 SCRA 220 — Cited for the rule that liability depends upon the wrong committed and not solely by reason of being the head of a government agency, and that mere signature does not create a presumption of liability.
• Albert v. Chairman Gangan, 406 Phil. 231 (2001) — Cited (through Joson III and Miralles) for the rule that every person who signs or initials documents in the course of transit through standard operating procedures does not automatically become a conspirator, and that not every mistake of a public officer is actionable absent malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith.
• Salva v. Carague, 540 Phil. 279 (2006) — Cited (through Joson III) for the principle that liability depends upon the wrong committed and not solely on one's position as head of a government agency.
• Gov. Garcia, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman, 744 Phil. 445 (2014) — Cited (through Joson III) for the rule that mere signature on a document, without more, cannot be considered a presumption of liability.

• Rule 45, Rules of Court — The procedural basis for the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner seeking to reverse and set aside the CA Decision and Resolution.
• Constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases — Raised by petitioner as an issue (the complaint was filed with the LRA on November 14, 2008 and with the Ombudsman on July 10, 2012, a span of almost six years), but the SC found no need to discuss it in light of its ruling on the gross negligence issue.

Perlas-Bernabe, S.A.J. (Chairperson), Hernando, Inting, Delos Santos, and Gaerlan, JJ., concur. (Gaerlan, J. was designated as an additional member per Special Order No. 2780 dated May 11, 2020.)

None.