Lingating vs. COMELEC

A decision in an administrative case does not become final and executory—and thus cannot serve as a ground for disqualification under Section 40(b) of the Local Government Code—while a motion for reconsideration filed by the respondent remains unresolved by the disciplining authority, even if the applicable statute is silent on the availability of such a motion.

The case involves a petition for disqualification under Section 40(b) of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code), which bars from any elective local position any person "removed from office as a result of an administrative case." Respondent Cesar B. Sulong had served as mayor of Lapuyan, Zamboanga del Sur, having first won on January 18, 1988, and having been reelected in the May 11, 1992 and May 8, 1995 elections. During his first term, he was administratively charged before the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Zamboanga del Sur in AC No. 12-91 with dishonesty, falsification of public documents, malversation of public funds, and violation of Republic Act No. 3019.

On May 3, 2001, petitioner Atty. Miguel M. Lingating filed with the Provincial Election Supervisor in Pagadian City a petition for the disqualification of respondent Cesar B. Sulong as candidate for mayor of Lapuyan, Zamboanga del Sur in the May 14, 2001 elections, pursuant to Section 40(b) of Republic Act No. 7160. The petition alleged that during Sulong's first term as mayor, he had been administratively charged in AC No. 12-91 with dishonesty, falsification of public documents, malversation of public funds, and violation of Republic Act No. 3019, together with a municipal councilor and several other individuals. On February 4, 1992, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Zamboanga del Sur found Sulong guilty of the charges and ordered his removal from office. Petitioner claimed that this decision had become final and executory, and that the then vice-mayor, Vicente Imbing, took his oath as mayor vice Sulong on March 3, 1992. The highest-ranking municipal councilor, Romeo Tan, succeeded Imbing as vice-mayor. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan also issued Resolution No. 74 requesting the Philippine National Police to assist in enforcing its decision.

Respondent Sulong denied that the decision in AC No. 12-91 had become final and executory. He averred that after receiving a copy of the decision on February 17, 1992, he filed a motion for reconsideration and/or notice of appeal on February 18, 1992. On February 27, 1992, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan required the complainant in AC No. 12-91, Jim Lingating, to comment on Sulong's motion, but the complainant never complied, and the motion consequently remained pending. Sulong maintained that at no time had he been removed from office by virtue of the decision.

Because the COMELEC was unable to render judgment before the May 14, 2001 elections, Sulong was voted for and received 4,882 votes against petitioner's 3,611. On May 16, 2001, Sulong was proclaimed by the Municipal Board of Canvassers as duly elected mayor. The COMELEC First Division, on August 1, 2001, declared Sulong disqualified, finding that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan decision had become final and executory. Sulong moved for reconsideration, citing a certification dated August 7, 2001 from Provincial Secretary (OIC) Wilfredo Cimafranca that the decision "has not become final and executory as the final disposition thereof was overtaken by the local elections of May 1992." Petitioner opposed, arguing that Governor Ariosa's order enforcing the decision signified that Sulong's motion for reconsideration had not been given due course, and that Sulong's own filing of charges against Vicente Imbing for usurpation of official functions (I.S. No. 92-35)—in which Sulong attested under oath that Imbing had succeeded him as mayor—belied his claim that he had not been removed. Petitioner separately moved for execution and installation as mayor, but the First Division denied the motion on August 30, 2001, holding that disqualification of an elected candidate does not entitle the second-highest vote-getter to the office.

On April 4, 2002, the COMELEC en banc reversed the First Division and dismissed the petition, applying the condonation doctrine from Aguinaldo vs. Santos and holding that Sulong's reelection in 1992 and 1995 constituted condonation of the administrative misconduct. Petitioner elevated the matter to the Supreme Court via certiorari, contending that the COMELEC en banc erred in applying the condonation doctrine and citing Reyes vs. Commission on Elections, where the Court held that an elective local executive officer removed before the expiration of his term is disqualified under Section 40(b).

• Misapplication of the Condonation Doctrine: Petitioner contended that the COMELEC en banc erred in applying the ruling in Aguinaldo vs. Commission on Elections, which held that reelection operates as a condonation of an official's previous misconduct. Petitioner argued that the condonation doctrine was inapplicable because Section 40(b) of the Local Government Code, which disqualifies persons removed from office as a result of an administrative case, did not exist at the time the Aguinaldo cases were decided and could not be given retroactive effect.
• Applicability of Reyes vs. COMELEC: Petitioner cited Reyes vs. Commission on Elections, in which the Court held that an elective local executive officer removed before the expiration of the term for which he was elected is disqualified from being a candidate for a local elective position under Section 40(b) of the Local Government Code, arguing that the same rule should apply to Sulong.
• Evidence of Finality and Removal: Petitioner argued that Governor Ariosa's order enforcing the Sangguniang Panlalawigan decision signified that Sulong's motion for reconsideration had not been given due course, and that Sulong's claim he had not been removed was belied by his own filing of charges against Vicente Imbing for usurpation of official functions, in which Sulong attested under oath that Imbing had succeeded him as mayor.
• Entitlement to Office: Petitioner prayed that, as the candidate who obtained the second-highest number of votes, he be installed as mayor of Lapuyan, the votes cast in favor of Sulong being void.

• Non-Finality of the Administrative Decision: Respondent Sulong denied that the decision in AC No. 12-91 had become final and executory, averring that he filed a motion for reconsideration and/or notice of appeal on February 18, 1992, that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan required the complainant to comment on February 27, 1992, and that the complainant never filed a comment, leaving the motion pending and unresolved.
• Certification of Non-Finality: Sulong cited a certification dated August 7, 2001 from Provincial Secretary (OIC) Wilfredo Cimafranca that the decision "has not become final and executory as the final disposition thereof was overtaken by the local elections of May 1992."
• Denial of Removal: Sulong maintained that at no time had he been removed from office by virtue of the decision in AC No. 12-91.

• Finality of Administrative Decision: Whether the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Zamboanga del Sur in AC No. 12-91, finding respondent Sulong guilty of administrative offenses and ordering his removal, had become final and executory so as to constitute a ground for disqualification under Section 40(b) of the Local Government Code.
• Applicability of the Condonation Doctrine: Whether the COMELEC en banc erred in applying the condonation doctrine from Aguinaldo vs. Santos to hold that Sulong's reelection in 1992 and 1995 condoned the administrative misconduct.
• Entitlement to Office of Second-Highest Vote-Getter: Whether petitioner, as the candidate who obtained the second-highest number of votes, is entitled to be installed as mayor of Lapuyan.

• Finality of Administrative Decision: No. The decision in AC No. 12-91 never became final and executory because Sulong's motion for reconsideration, filed on February 18, 1992, remained unresolved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. The filing of the motion prevented the decision from becoming final, even though R.A. No. 7160 is silent on the filing of motions for reconsideration in disciplinary actions.
• Applicability of the Condonation Doctrine: Not reached as the controlling basis. While the COMELEC en banc applied the condonation doctrine, the Supreme Court found it unnecessary to resolve whether that application was correct, because the decision never became final in the first place. The Court noted that Reyes vs. COMELEC, cited by petitioner, could not be applied for the same reason.
• Entitlement to Office of Second-Highest Vote-Getter: Not reached. Having concluded that Sulong was not disqualified, the Court found it unnecessary to pass upon petitioner's contention that he was entitled to be installed as mayor.

• Finality of Administrative Decision: The Court examined the records and found that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan rendered judgment in AC No. 12-91 on February 4, 1992; that Sulong received a copy on February 17, 1992; that he filed a motion for reconsideration and/or notice of appeal on February 18, 1992; that on February 27, 1992, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan required the complainant Jim Lingating to comment; and that the complainant never filed a comment nor did the Sangguniang Panlalawigan resolve Sulong's motion. The filing of the motion for reconsideration prevented the decision from becoming final. Although R.A. No. 7160 on disciplinary actions is silent on motions for reconsideration, the Court held that such silence cannot be interpreted as a prohibition, citing Halimao vs. Villanueva, where it was held that a motion for reconsideration may be filed in proceedings even when the governing rule does not expressly provide for it. The Court reasoned that the filing of such a motion should be encouraged as a matter of exhaustion of administrative remedies, to afford the agency the opportunity to correct any error it may have committed. The Court further held that the succession of the vice-mayor and the highest-ranking councilor to the offices of mayor and vice-mayor could not be considered proof that the decision had become final, because it appeared to have been made pursuant to Section 68 of the Local Government Code, which makes decisions in administrative cases immediately executory. The Court also noted the Provincial Secretary's certification that the decision had not become final and executory, as the final disposition was overtaken by the local elections of May 1992. Finally, the Court observed that it would be unfair to the electorate to be told after voting for Sulong that he was disqualified, especially since the Sangguniang Panlalawigan decision had been rendered nearly ten years before the elections.

• Applicability of the Condonation Doctrine: The Court acknowledged petitioner's contention that the COMELEC en banc erred in applying the condonation doctrine from Aguinaldo vs. Santos and that Reyes vs. COMELEC should instead control. The Court noted the distinction drawn in Reyes: the condonation doctrine in the Aguinaldo cases applied because, before the petition questioning the administrative decision could be decided, the term of office during which the alleged misconduct was committed had expired, and removal cannot extend beyond that term. In Reyes, by contrast, the administrative decision had become final during the same term, so Section 40(b) applied. However, the Court found that Reyes could not be applied to this case because the 1992 decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan had never become final. Since there was no final decision finding Sulong guilty, neither the condonation doctrine nor the rule in Reyes had any operative effect.

• Entitlement to Office of Second-Highest Vote-Getter: Having concluded that Sulong was not disqualified, the Court found it unnecessary to pass upon petitioner's contention that, as the candidate who obtained the second-highest number of votes, he was entitled to be installed as mayor because the votes cast in favor of Sulong were void.

• Doctrine of Condonation (Aguinaldo Doctrine) — A public official who is reelected to office is deemed to have been condoned by the electorate for misconduct committed during a prior term, such that an administrative case predicated on that misconduct becomes moot and academic. The rationale is that removal cannot extend beyond the term during which the alleged misconduct was committed; if the official is not removed before that term expires and is thereafter reelected, he can no longer be removed for the prior misconduct. In this case, the COMELEC en banc applied the doctrine to hold that Sulong's reelection in 1992 and 1995 condoned the administrative misconduct. The Supreme Court did not disturb this application on its own terms but found the doctrine unnecessary to the disposition because the administrative decision had never become final.

• Availability of Motion for Reconsideration in Administrative Proceedings — Even when the statute or rule governing an administrative proceeding is silent on the filing of a motion for reconsideration, such a motion is not prohibited and may be filed. The filing of a motion for reconsideration prevents the decision from becoming final and executory, and should be encouraged as a matter of exhaustion of administrative remedies to afford the deciding body the opportunity to correct its own errors. The Court applied this principle to hold that Sulong's unresolved motion for reconsideration before the Sangguniang Panlalawigan prevented the decision in AC No. 12-91 from becoming final, drawing support from Halimao vs. Villanueva, which allowed a motion for reconsideration in disbarment proceedings under Rule 139-B despite the rule's silence on the matter.

• Immediate Executory Nature of Administrative Decisions Under Section 68, Local Government Code — Section 68 of R.A. No. 7160 provides that an appeal shall not prevent a decision in an administrative case from becoming final or executory, effectively allowing execution pending appeal. The Court held that the succession of the vice-mayor and councilor to the positions of mayor and vice-mayor, respectively, was made pursuant to this provision and could not be taken as proof that the decision had become final and executory in the sense contemplated by Section 40(b).

• "While R.A. No. 7160 on disciplinary actions is silent on the filing of a motion for reconsideration, the same cannot be interpreted as a prohibition against the filing of a motion for reconsideration." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi: that the silence of the Local Government Code on motions for reconsideration in disciplinary actions does not bar their filing, and the filing of such a motion prevents the administrative decision from becoming final.

• "There is thus no decision finding respondent guilty to speak of." — This sentence crystallizes the Court's conclusion that, because Sulong's motion for reconsideration was never resolved, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan's decision never attained finality, and consequently there was no final adjudication of guilt that could trigger disqualification under Section 40(b).

• "Indeed, considering the failure of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to resolve respondent's motion, it is unfair to the electorate to be told after they have voted for respondent Sulong that after all he is disqualified, especially since, at the time of the elections on May 14, 2001, the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan had been rendered nearly ten years ago." — This passage reflects the Court's equitable concern for the electorate's will, reinforcing the practical injustice of disqualifying a duly proclaimed candidate based on a stale, non-final administrative decision.

• Aguinaldo vs. Santos, 212 SCRA 768 (1992) — The condonation doctrine case. The COMELEC en banc applied it to hold that Sulong's reelection in 1992 and 1995 condoned the administrative misconduct. The Supreme Court did not explicitly overturn or affirm this application, finding it unnecessary to resolve because the administrative decision had never become final. The Court distinguished the Aguinaldo cases on the ground that, in those cases, the term during which the misconduct was committed had expired before the administrative decision could be decided, whereas in this case the decision was never finalized at all.

• Reyes vs. Commission on Elections, 254 SCRA 514 (1996) — Cited by petitioner for the proposition that an elective local executive officer removed before the expiration of his term is disqualified under Section 40(b). The Court acknowledged the distinction drawn in Reyes between the condonation doctrine and the disqualification rule but found Reyes inapplicable because the administrative decision in this case had never become final.

• Halimao vs. Villanueva, 253 SCRA 1 (1996) — Followed for the proposition that a motion for reconsideration may be filed in proceedings even when the governing rule does not expressly provide for it, and that the filing of such a motion should be encouraged as a matter of exhaustion of administrative remedies. The Court relied on this case to hold that Sulong's motion for reconsideration before the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was proper and prevented the decision from becoming final.

• Section 40(b), Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code) — Disqualifies from running for any elective local position "those removed from office as a result of an administrative case." The Court held that this provision could not be applied to Sulong because the administrative decision ordering his removal had never become final and executory, there being no final adjudication of guilt to speak of.

• Section 68, Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code) — Provides that an appeal shall not prevent a decision in an administrative case from becoming final or executory, effectively allowing execution pending appeal. The Court held that the succession of the vice-mayor and councilor to the positions of mayor and vice-mayor was made pursuant to this provision and could not be taken as proof that the decision had become final in the sense contemplated by Section 40(b).

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Corona, Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concurred. Austria-Martinez, J., on leave.