Limson vs. Gonzalez

A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 must raise only questions of law, not questions of fact; and the Secretary of Justice does not commit grave abuse of discretion where the dismissal of criminal charges is supported by the evidence and the law, absent any showing of arbitrariness, capriciousness, or whimsicality. Variations of a person's true name caused by inadvertence or error — not fictitious names used for deceptive purposes — do not constitute illegal aliases under the Anti-Alias Law.

Petitioner Revelina Limson and respondent Eugenio Juan Gonzalez are private individuals whose dispute centers on whether Gonzalez's use of various name combinations constitutes falsification of public documents and illegal use of aliases under Republic Act No. 6085 (the Anti-Alias Law, amending Commonwealth Act No. 142). Gonzalez is a person who, from youth through professional practice as an architect, used combinations of his given names and surnames — at times with erroneous middle names or misspellings — which Limson contended were aliases and evidence of imposture. The case traversed the prosecutorial level (Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City), the Department of Justice, and the Court of Appeals before reaching the Supreme Court via Rule 45.

On or about December 1, 1997, Revelina Limson filed a criminal charge for falsification against Eugenio Juan Gonzalez before the Prosecutor's Office of Mandaluyong City. Limson's charge rested on her assertion that in the records of the Professional Regulatory Commission (PRC), a certain "EUGENIO GONZALEZ" is registered as an architect, and that Gonzalez, who uses the name "EUGENIO JUAN GONZALEZ" and pretends to be said registered architect, is an impostor guilty of falsification.

Gonzalez filed a counter-affidavit explaining that his full name is EUGENIO (first given name) JUAN (second given name) GONZALEZ (father's family name) y REGALADO (mother's family name). He stated that in his youth, during grade school and high school, he used the name EUGENIO GONZALEZ y REGALADO and/or EUGENIO GONZALEZ. Thereafter, he transferred to the University of Santo Tomas, took up architecture, and upon commencing his professional practice in 1943, began using his second name JUAN, identifying himself as Arch. Eugenio Juan Gonzalez because the surname GONZALEZ was and remains a very common surname in the Philippines and he wished to distinguish himself. He supported his allegations with various documents.

After receiving affidavits and evidentiary documents from both parties, the prosecutor dismissed the criminal charge on March 30, 1998, finding that EUGENIO JUAN R. GONZALEZ is indeed the architect registered with the PRC. Limson elevated the matter to the Secretary of Justice, reiterating her arguments. The Secretary of Justice dismissed her appeal, affirming and expanding the prosecutor's findings. Limson's motion for reconsideration was denied with finality on September 15, 2000.

Notwithstanding that final dismissal, on September 25, 2000, Limson filed a new letter complaint with the Secretary of Justice alleging the same basic facts, evidence, and charges, but now adding an accusation that Gonzalez had violated Republic Act No. 6085 (the Anti-Alias Law) because he used various combinations of his name with different signatures on different occasions. She suppressed from the Secretary of Justice the prior adverse resolutions already rendered. The Secretary referred the complaint to the OCP, which docketed it as I.S. No. 01-44001-B. The prosecutor dismissed the new complaint as a rehash of the previously resolved case (I.S. No. 97-11929). Limson's motion for reconsideration was denied. She then filed a petition for review with the Secretary of Justice, which was denied on April 3, 2002 for lack of reversible error and for failure to furnish the prosecution office. Her motion for reconsideration was denied on October 15, 2002.

Limson assailed the Secretary of Justice's resolutions before the Court of Appeals via certiorari, claiming grave abuse of discretion. The CA dismissed the petition on July 31, 2003, affirming the assailed resolutions, and denied her motion for reconsideration on January 30, 2004. The CA found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Secretary of Justice. Limson then elevated the matter to the Supreme Court, arguing that the CA's findings of fact did not conform to the evidence on record and that the CA's conclusions were based on speculation and surmise. She pointed to alleged material discrepancies between Gonzalez's 1941 graduation photograph and his 1996 driver's license photograph, and submitted documents purporting to show that Gonzalez used aliases from birth and passed himself off as persons he was not.

• Misappreciation of Facts: Petitioner averred that the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals did not conform to the evidence on record, and that the CA misapprehended facts and failed to notice relevant points that would justify a different conclusion.
• Speculative Conclusions: Petitioner argued that the CA's conclusions were based on speculation and surmise, and that the inferences drawn were manifestly mistaken.
• Identity Discrepancy: Petitioner insisted that the names "Eugenio Gonzalez" and "Eugenio Juan Gonzalez y Regalado" did not refer to one and the same individual, and that respondent was not a registered architect contrary to his claim. She pointed to material discrepancies between respondent's 1941 graduation photograph and his 1996 driver's license photograph, arguing they depicted different individuals.
• Illegal Use of Aliases: Petitioner submitted documents showing that respondent used aliases from birth and passed himself off as such persons, warranting the filing of criminal cases for falsification of public document and illegal use of alias.

• Factual Issues Only: Respondent countered that the petition for review should be denied due course for presenting only factual issues, and that the factual findings of the OCP, the Secretary of Justice, and the CA should remain undisturbed.
• No Falsification or Alias: Respondent argued that he did not commit any falsification and did not use any aliases, and that his use of conflicting names was the product of erroneous entry, inadvertence, and innocent mistake on the part of other people.
• Malice of Petitioner: Respondent maintained that Limson was motivated by malice and ill will, and that her charges were the product of prevarication. He asserted that he was a distinguished architect and a respected member of the community.

• Nature of the Petition: Whether the petition for review on certiorari raises questions of law or questions of fact.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Whether the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the charges against respondent.
• Photographic Discrepancy: Whether the alleged discrepancy between respondent's 1941 and 1996 photographs supports the allegation of grave abuse of discretion.
• Illegal Use of Aliases: Whether respondent's use of various name combinations constitutes illegal use of aliases under Republic Act No. 6085.

• Nature of the Petition: No. The petition raises only questions of fact, which are improper under Section 1 of Rule 45, which requires that only questions of law be raised in a petition for review on certiorari.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: No. The Secretary of Justice did not commit grave abuse of discretion; the assailed resolutions were exhaustive and supported by evidence and law, and petitioner failed to demonstrate arbitrariness, capriciousness, or whimsicality.
• Photographic Discrepancy: No. It is absurd to expect respondent to look the same after 55 years; the discrepancy does not support the allegation of grave abuse of discretion.
• Illegal Use of Aliases: No. The names used by respondent contained his true names, albeit at times joined with an erroneous middle or second name or a misspelled family name, and were not fictitious names within the purview of the Anti-Alias Law; nor were they shown to have been used for unscrupulous purposes or to deceive the public.

• Nature of the Petition: The petition for review projects issues of fact, urging the Court to undo the findings of fact of the OCP, the Secretary of Justice, and the CA on the basis of documents submitted with the petition. The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts and cannot analyze or weigh evidence. Section 1 of Rule 45 explicitly requires that a petition for review on certiorari raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth. The petition was therefore outrightly rejected on this ground.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: The CA's conclusion that the Secretary of Justice did not commit grave abuse of discretion was fully warranted. Limson did not persuasively demonstrate to the CA how the Secretary of Justice had been gravely wrong in upholding the OCP's dismissal. The assailed resolutions of the Secretary of Justice were exhaustive in their exposition of reasons for dismissal. Even assuming error, Limson should have shown that arbitrariness, capriciousness, or whimsicality tainted the error. Grave abuse of discretion means that judicial or quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the Secretary of Justice evaded a positive duty or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined, or acted in a capricious or whimsical manner equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. No such showing was made.

• Photographic Discrepancy: The discrepancy between photographs supposedly taken in 1941 and 1996 did not support Limson's allegation of grave abuse of discretion. It is absurd to expect the respondent to look the same after 55 long years, rendering the comparison unpersuasive as evidence of imposture.

• Illegal Use of Aliases: The names used by respondent — "Eugenio Gonzalez," "Eugenio Gonzales," "Eugenio Juan Gonzalez," "Eugenio Juan Gonzalez y Regalado," "Eugenio C.R. Gonzalez," "Eugenio J. Gonzalez," and "Eugenio Juan Robles Gonzalez" — all contained his true names, albeit at times joined with an erroneous middle or second name or a misspelled family name. The records disclosed that the erroneous names resulted from error or inadvertence left unchecked and unrectified over time. These names were not fictitious within the purview of the Anti-Alias Law and were not different from each other in the sense contemplated by the statute. An alias is a name different from the individual's true name; a name that is not different from the true name is not an alias. Because respondent was not shown to have used the names for unscrupulous purposes or to deceive or confuse the public, the dismissal of the charge was justified in fact and in law. The Court cited Ursua vs. Court of Appeals for the proposition that the Anti-Alias Law was enacted primarily to curb the practice among Chinese nationals of adopting scores of different names and aliases creating confusion in trade, and that the law penalizes the use of an alias name unless duly authorized by proper judicial proceedings and recorded in the civil register.

• Rule 45: Questions of Law Only — A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court must raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth. The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts and cannot analyze or weigh evidence. Questions of fact are improper in such a petition and warrant outright rejection.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion — Grave abuse of discretion means that judicial or quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the tribunal evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such as when it acted in a capricious or whimsical manner equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere error, absent arbitrariness or capriciousness, does not constitute grave abuse of discretion.

• Definition of Alias under the Anti-Alias Law (C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A. No. 6085) — An alias is a name or names used by a person publicly and habitually, usually in business transactions, in addition to the real name by which he was registered at birth or baptized the first time, or to the substitute name authorized by a competent authority. An alias is thus a name that is different from the individual's true name, and does not refer to a name that is not different from his true name. Variations of a person's true name caused by inadvertence or error — not fictitious names used for deceptive purposes — do not constitute illegal aliases.

• "An alias is thus a name that is different from the individual's true name, and does not refer to a name that is not different from his true name." — This passage articulates the Court's definition of an alias for purposes of the Anti-Alias Law, distinguishing a true alias from mere variations of a person's real name caused by error or inadvertence.

• "Considering that he was not also shown to have used the names for unscrupulous purposes, or to deceive or confuse the public, the dismissal of the charge against him was justified in fact and in law." — This statement establishes that intent to deceive or use names for unscrupulous purposes is an essential element in determining whether variations of a true name constitute illegal aliases.

• "But the Court is not a trier of facts, and cannot analyze and weigh evidence. Indeed, Section 1 of Rule 45, Rules of Court explicitly requires the petition for review on certiorari to raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth." — This passage states the controlling procedural rule that governs the threshold disposition of the petition, reaffirming the limitation of Rule 45 to questions of law.

• De los Santos vs. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, G.R. No. 153852, October 24, 2012 — Cited for the definition of grave abuse of discretion, supplying the formulation that grave abuse of discretion requires arbitrariness, capriciousness, or whimsicality equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, not mere error.

• Ursua vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112170, April 10, 1996 — Cited for its enlightening discourse on the history and objective of the Anti-Alias Law (C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A. No. 6085), including the law's origin in Act No. 3883 and its primary purpose of curbing the practice among Chinese nationals of adopting numerous aliases causing confusion in trade. Also cited for the definition of "alias."

• Yu Kheng Chiau vs. Republic — Cited within the Ursua discourse for explaining the meaning, concept, and ill effects of the use of an alias, illustrating that the use of a name different from one's real name creates confusion and is contrary to Filipino practice of using only one name.

• Section 1, Rule 45, Rules of Court — Requires that a petition for review on certiorari raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth. Applied to reject Limson's petition outright for presenting only factual issues.

• Section 12, in relation to Section 7, Department Circular No. 70 (July 3, 2000) — Authorizes the Secretary of Justice to dismiss outright a petition for review where there is no showing of reversible error in the assailed resolution or when the issues raised are too unsubstantial to require consideration. Applied by the Secretary of Justice in denying Limson's petition for review on April 3, 2002.

• Section 5, Department Circular No. 70 — Requires that a copy of the petition be furnished the prosecution office concerned. Noted as an additional ground for the Secretary of Justice's denial, as Limson failed to comply.

• Commonwealth Act No. 142, as amended by Republic Act No. 6085 (Anti-Alias Law) — Regulates the use of aliases, prohibiting the use of any name different from the one registered at birth or used at baptism (or authorized by a competent court), except as a pseudonym for literary, entertainment, or athletic purposes. Applied to determine that respondent's name variations did not constitute illegal aliases because they were not fictitious names different from his true name and were not used for deceptive purposes.

• Act No. 3883, as amended by Act No. 4147 — An earlier statute regulating the use in business transactions of names other than true names, cited as the origin and basis of the objective and purpose of C.A. No. 142.

Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno, Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo, and Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. concurred. No separate concurring opinions were written.