Lim vs. Court of Appeals

Mere possession of any good, article, item, object, or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or thievery constitutes prima facie evidence of fencing under Section 5 of PD 1612, and the burden rests upon the possessor to rebut such presumption with contrary evidence; where the possessor fails to do so, conviction is proper.

Juanito Lim was charged with violation of the Anti-Fencing Law of 1979 (Presidential Decree No. 1612) for allegedly receiving, possessing, keeping, and disposing of spare parts and tires stolen from heavy equipment owned by Loui Anton Bond, an Australian national and President and General Manager of ECG Mining Corporation. The case arose from the cannibalization of heavy equipment at the company's compound in Barangay Tuburan, Cagayan de Oro City, at a time when Bond was being held captive by the New People's Army. The Anti-Fencing Law of 1979, a special penal statute, carries under Section 5 a disputable presumption that mere possession of stolen goods constitutes fencing, and under Section 3(a) prescribes penalties graduated according to the value of the property involved, with accessory penalties drawn from the Revised Penal Code.

Sergio Pabilona, a former barangay captain of Barangay Tiglimao, Cagayan de Oro City, had vacated his house due to the worsening communist insurgency problem in that barangay and taken temporary residence in Barangay Pagatpat. On or about noon of March 1, 1986, Pabilona and eight men he had requested to help retrieve his belongings converged at the residence of Sgt. Delfin Bacalso at Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City. Sgt. Bacalso and nine other constabulary soldiers under his leadership were to serve as military escort. Pabilona had earlier requested the escort and had given Sgt. Bacalso P600.00 for truck rental. A Mercedes Benz truck owned by Juanito Lim arrived; Sgt. Bacalso had contracted for the truck, claiming he too had lumber to load in Barangay Tiglimao.

At about 2:00 p.m., the group left Lapasan for Barangay Tiglimao, arriving at about 5:00 p.m. After resting, Pabilona ordered his men to gather his belongings, but Sgt. Bacalso insisted they first proceed to Barangay Tuburan because his lumber was allegedly there. Pabilona protested, as his request for military escort was only up to Barangay Tiglimao, but he was prevailed upon. Upon arriving in Barangay Tuburan, Sgt. Bacalso ordered Pabilona's men to proceed to the compound of ECG Mining Corporation and remove parts from the heavy equipment found therein. He also ordered them to unload and carry acetylene equipment owned by Juanito Lim, which was covered by canvass, on board the truck. Because it was already dark and the men feared snake bites, they began removing the parts only in the early morning of March 2, 1986. Having completed the job, they brought the various heavy equipment parts, among which were nine tires with rims, to the Mercedes Benz truck and loaded them thereon.

The group returned to Barangay Tiglimao and loaded Pabilona's personal belongings, then drove back to Lapasan, stopping at the bodega of Juanito Lim, located a few meters from the residence of Sgt. Bacalso. After their arrival, Lim arrived in his pick-up vehicle. Sgt. Bacalso ordered Pabilona's men to unload the acetylene equipment and the various heavy equipment parts and deposit them inside Lim's bodega. Lim then ordered that his bodega be closed. Pabilona and his men rode the truck and proceeded to Barangay Pagatpat, where they unloaded Pabilona's belongings. The following morning, Pabilona's men went to Sgt. Bacalso's house as instructed, but he was out. While waiting, they saw Lim arrive at his bodega in his yellow pick-up vehicle, remove the nine tires with rims from the bodega, load them onto his pick-up, and drive away. Sgt. Bacalso arrived shortly after and told the men they had nothing more to collect because they had already incurred an overdraft, so the men left for their respective homes.

At the time the heavy equipment was being cannibalized, Loui Anton Bond, President and General Manager of ECG Mining Corporation, was being held captive by the New People's Army. After his release in June 1986, he reported the thievery to police authorities and caused the value of the items taken to be estimated by Engr. Kionisala, who placed the total at P470,310.00. Sgt. Dabatian of the Cagayan de Oro City Police conducted an investigation culminating in the filing of the case against Lim for violation of PD 1612. The accused denied the commission of the offense and set up the defense of alibi, which the trial court did not believe. The trial court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt, crediting the prosecution witnesses' testimony, which it found to be free from ulterior motive, over the accused's denial and alibi.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: Petitioner maintained that the prosecution witnesses testified against him so that the private complainant would not press charges against them, suggesting they were the real perpetrators of the theft or robbery and thus their testimony was polluted.
• Non-Inclusion of Prosecution Witnesses as Co-Defendants: Petitioner argued that the failure to include the prosecution witnesses as additional accused in the case undermined the prosecution's case against him.
• Absence of Animus Furandi: Petitioner contended that intent to gain was not clearly established by the People's evidence and that respondent court erred in presuming the existence of such intent.
• Unauthorized Civil Liability: Petitioner asserted that the order to pay P206,320.00, less the value of recovered spare parts, as civil indemnity was unauthorized under PD 1612, arguing that the Anti-Fencing Law does not contemplate the inclusion of civil liability as part of the penalty.

• Presumption of Fencing: Respondent countered that the prosecution duly proved that petitioner dealt with the stolen items and possessed them, as the spare parts and tires subject of the thievery were unloaded from his truck and kept in his bodega, with petitioner present during the unloading and ordering the bodega closed thereafter.
• Civil Liability: Respondent argued that the order to pay P206,320.00 less the value of recovered spare parts referred to civil liability, consistent with the penal axiom that a person criminally liable is also civilly liable.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: Whether the prosecution witnesses' testimony should be disregarded on the ground that they testified against petitioner to avoid being charged themselves.
• Prosecutorial Discretion: Whether the non-inclusion of prosecution witnesses as co-defendants affects the validity of petitioner's conviction.
• Intent to Gain: Whether animus furandi was sufficiently established to sustain the conviction under the Anti-Fencing Law.
• Civil Liability: Whether the imposition of civil indemnity in the amount of P206,320.00 is authorized under PD 1612.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: No. The witnesses had no ulterior motive to prevaricate, and their testimony was worthy of credence when juxtaposed with petitioner's defense of denial and alibi.
• Prosecutorial Discretion: No. The fiscal, as a quasi-judicial officer, assumes full discretion and control of the case and may not be compelled to file a criminal information where convinced the evidence is insufficient.
• Intent to Gain: No error in presuming intent to gain. Intent to gain is a mental state demonstrated by overt acts, and the presumption of fencing under Section 5 of PD 1612 applies; dolo is not required in crimes punished by special statutes.
• Civil Liability: No. Section 3(a) of PD 1612 expressly incorporates the accessory penalties pertaining to reclusion temporal under the Revised Penal Code, including civil liability under Article 104.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: Petitioner's theory that the prosecution witnesses testified solely to save themselves from prosecution was found logically untenable. If accepted, every collective accusation would have to be construed as a ploy to save one's own skin. Petitioner candidly admitted he did not know Navarro, Bahian, and Pabilona who testified against him, undermining any claim of bias. The open-court declaration of private complainant Bond — that people from Tuburan informed him his heavy equipment was cannibalized by Sgt. Bacalso and Barangay Captain Pabilona — did not exclude petitioner's culpability, as it conveyed who carted away the spare parts but did not negate that the items were loaded on and unloaded from petitioner's truck and kept in his bodega, which he ordered closed thereafter. The witnesses' testimony was thus deemed credible and sufficient.

• Prosecutorial Discretion: The non-inclusion of prosecution witnesses as co-defendants was not a ground for reversal. The fiscal, as a quasi-judicial officer, exercises full discretion and control over the case, and this faculty may not be interfered with. A prosecutor may not be compelled by mandamus to file a criminal information where convinced the evidence is insufficient. Petitioner did not impugn the resolution of the inquest fiscal who conducted the preliminary investigation. The matter of prosecuting witnesses is within the prosecutor's purview, and the bare assertion of non-inclusion overlooked this principle.

• Intent to Gain: Intent to gain is a mental state, the existence of which is demonstrated by the overt acts of a person. The external demeanor from which the trial court and the Court of Appeals inferred animus furandi included the circumstances that petitioner owned the truck that transported the removed spare parts, that the truck did not immediately proceed to unload Pabilona's belongings but went first to petitioner's bodega, that he owned the acetylene equipment used to detach the spare parts, and that the following morning he brought out the tires from his bodega and loaded them on his pick-up. The sinister mental state is presumed from the commission of an unlawful act. Moreover, dolo is not required in crimes punished by special statutes like the Anti-Fencing Law, because it is the act alone, irrespective of motive, that constitutes the offense. When it was proved that petitioner committed the unlawful acts alleged in the information, it was properly presumed they were committed with full knowledge and criminal intent, and the burden shifted to him to rebut such presumption — a burden he failed to discharge. The presumption of fencing under Section 5 of PD 1612, providing that mere possession of stolen goods constitutes prima facie evidence of fencing, was sufficient as a disputable presumption until overcome by contrary evidence, which petitioner's shallow demurrer premised on denial and alibi failed to do.

• Civil Liability: Section 3(a) of PD 1612 provides that where the value of the property exceeds P22,000.00, the penalty shall be termed reclusion temporal and the accessory penalty pertaining thereto provided in the Revised Penal Code shall also be imposed. This provision, read with Article 104 of the Revised Penal Code, encompasses civil liability. There was no ambiguity in the statutory text, and the order to pay P206,320.00 less the value of recovered spare parts was properly imposed as civil indemnity consistent with the axiom that a person criminally liable is also civilly liable.

• Presumption of Fencing (Section 5, PD 1612) — Mere possession of any good, article, item, object, or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing. This is a disputable presumption sufficient until overcome by contrary evidence. The Court applied this doctrine by finding that the stolen spare parts and tires were unloaded from petitioner's truck, stored in his bodega, and that he was seen the following morning loading the tires onto his pick-up and driving away — circumstances that triggered the presumption, which petitioner failed to rebut with his defense of denial and alibi.

• Intent to Gain as a Mental State — Intent to gain (animus furandi) is a mental state whose existence is demonstrated by the overt acts of a person. The sinister mental state is presumed from the commission of an unlawful act. The Court applied this by examining petitioner's external conduct — owning the truck, possessing the acetylene equipment, ordering the bodega closed, and removing the tires the next morning — as sufficient indicia of intent to gain.

• Dolo Not Required in Special Penal Statutes — In crimes punished by special statutes like the Anti-Fencing Law, dolo (fraud or deceit) is not required because it is the act alone, irrespective of motive, that constitutes the offense. When unlawful acts are proved, they are presumed committed with full knowledge and criminal intent, shifting the burden to the accused to rebut such presumption.

• Prosecutorial Discretion — The fiscal, as a quasi-judicial officer, assumes full discretion and control of the case and may not be compelled by mandamus to file a criminal information where convinced the evidence is insufficient. The decision of whom to prosecute rests within the prosecutor's purview and may not be interfered with by the courts.

• "Mere possession of any good, article, item, object, or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing." — This is the statutory text of Section 5 of PD 1612 as quoted in the decision, constituting the controlling presumption upon which the conviction was sustained.

• "In the case at bar, the prosecution has duly proved that the appellant had dealt with the stolen items and had possession of the same because the said spare parts and tires which were the subject of thievery or robbery for they were removed from the heavy equipment of Loui Bond, the private complainant, without the latter's knowledge and consent, were unloaded from the truck of the appellant and kept in his bodega. And appellant was present during such unloading and had even ordered the bodega closed after such unloading to his bodega." — This passage from the Court of Appeals' decision, quoted and adopted by the Supreme Court, articulates the factual basis for applying the presumption of fencing.

• "dolo is not required in crimes punished by a special statute like the Anti-Fencing Law of 1979 because it is the act alone, irrespective of the motives which constitutes the offense" — This formulation distinguishes the mental element required under special penal statutes from that under the Revised Penal Code, clarifying that the act itself constitutes the offense regardless of motive.

• Quizo vs. Sandiganbayan, 149 SCRA 108 (1987) — Cited for the proposition that a prosecutor may not be compelled by mandamus to file a criminal information where convinced the evidence is insufficient; followed as controlling authority on prosecutorial discretion.
• Reyes vs. Camilon, 192 SCRA 445 (1990) — Cited in support of the principle that the matter of prosecuting witnesses is within the prosecutor's purview; followed.
• Soriano vs. People, 88 Phil. 368 (1951) — Cited for the proposition that intent to gain is a mental state demonstrated by the overt acts of a person; followed.
• People vs. Sia Teb Ban, 54 Phil. 52 (1929) — Cited for the rule that the sinister mental state is presumed from the commission of an unlawful act; followed.
• U.S. vs. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 128 (1909) — Cited for the proposition that dolo is not required in crimes punished by special statutes; followed.
• U.S. vs. Siy Cong Bieng, 30 Phil. 577 (1915) — Cited for the principle that in special penal statutes, it is the act alone, irrespective of motive, that constitutes the offense; followed.
• United States vs. Tria, 17 Phil. 303 (1910) — Cited for the rule that when unlawful acts are proved, they are presumed committed with full knowledge and criminal intent, shifting the burden to the accused to rebut; followed.

• Section 5, Presidential Decree No. 1612 (Anti-Fencing Law of 1979) — Provides that mere possession of any good, article, item, object, or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing. Applied as the controlling presumption: petitioner's possession of the stolen spare parts in his bodega triggered the presumption, which he failed to overcome.
• Section 3(a), Presidential Decree No. 1612 — Prescribes the penalty for fencing where the value of property exceeds P22,000.00: the penalty shall be termed reclusion temporal, and the accessory penalty pertaining thereto provided in the Revised Penal Code shall also be imposed. Applied to sustain both the penalty imposed and the civil liability award.
• Article 104, Revised Penal Code — Governs civil liability arising from criminal offenses. Read in conjunction with Section 3(a) of PD 1612 to authorize the award of civil indemnity in the amount of P206,320.00 less the value of recovered spare parts.
• Section 3(b), Rule 131, Revised Rules of Evidence — Provides that intent to gain is presumed from the commission of an unlawful act. Applied to sustain the inference of animus furandi from petitioner's overt acts.
• Section 5, Rule 110, Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure — Governs the fiscal's discretion and control over criminal prosecutions. Applied to reject petitioner's argument regarding the non-inclusion of prosecution witnesses as co-defendants.

Feliciano, Bidin, Davide, Jr., and Romero, JJ., concurred.