Lim Se vs. Argel

Unjustified and disrespectful characterization of a Supreme Court resolution in a motion—such as charging that a preliminary mandatory injunction has no legal or factual basis and is unjust and a serious miscarriage of justice—constitutes direct contempt or contempt in facie curiae under Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. A preliminary mandatory injunction may issue ex parte in an ejectment case where petitioners make out a strong prima facie case and the lower court acted without jurisdiction as to venue and used the writ of possession oppressively.

Lim Se and Benito Lim occupied the ground floor, mezzanine, and basement of the Venancia Building at 72 Session Road, corner Calderon Street, Baguio City, first under a lease from Venancia Chiombon through Francisco San Pedro and later under a lease from the Estate of Florencio Reyes, Sr. Ownership and possession of the building were contested among the San Pedro-Ocampo/Bulotano claimants and the Reyes estate, with related litigation pending in Baguio and Cavite. The lease contract with San Pedro stipulated that venue of any suit arising from it would be Baguio City, and the property itself was located in Baguio City. The present resolution arose from a special civil action in the Supreme Court challenging an ejectment judgment and writ of possession issued by the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Caloocan City, over that Baguio property.

Lim Se and Benito Lim occupied the ground floor, mezzanine, and basement of the Venancia Building at 72 Session Road, corner Calderon Street, Baguio City. From 1965 to 1970, Lim Se leased these premises from Venancia Chiombon through her attorney-in-fact, Francisco San Pedro. When that lease expired in 1970, Lim Se leased the same premises from the Estate of Florencio Reyes, Sr. for the period from January 1971 to June 1973. The petition also alleged that on December 23, 1974, Lim Se and Benito Lim leased the same premises from the Estate of Florencio Reyes, Sr. through its special administrator, Florencio Reyes, Jr., and that they had leased the disputed premises up to March 31, 1977, with rentals paid up to April 1975. Benito Lim operated the New Life Cafe & Restaurant in the premises.

Ownership of the Venancia Building was disputed. Genaro Bulotano claimed to have purchased the building on December 19, 1970 from Juana San Pedro-Ocampo, who in turn allegedly bought it from Venancia Chiombon. In May 1971, Bulotano filed Civil Case No. N-1647 in the Court of First Instance of Cavite City against Lim Se, the Estate of Florencio Reyes, Sr., Juana San Pedro-Ocampo, and Remedios Sarmiento for recovery of rentals and damages in connection with their occupancy of the building. In Civil Case No. 2143 of the Court of First Instance of Baguio, an interpleader action instituted by Lim Se and other tenants against Francisco San Pedro and the Estate of Florencio Reyes, Sr., the court’s order of March 16, 1972 settled that the lessees would pay rentals to the Estate and not to San Pedro.

Without awaiting the outcome of the Cavite case, Bulotano in May 1975 filed Civil Case No. C-3547 in the Caloocan City Branch of the Court of First Instance of Rizal against Juana San Pedro-Ocampo and Francisco San Pedro to recover possession of Door No. 72 of the Venancia Building, its mezzanine floor, and basement—the premises leased by Lim Se and Benito Lim—and rentals and damages amounting to P94,800. The action, a real action to recover real property located in Baguio City, was filed in Caloocan City instead of Baguio City. The only circumstance that might justify venue in Caloocan City was that the defendants were supposedly residents of Malabon, Rizal, although in Civil Case No. 2143 Francisco San Pedro was alleged to be a resident of 61 Calderon Street, Baguio City.

In June 1975, or about a month after the main action was brought, Juana San Pedro and Francisco San Pedro filed against Lim Se and Benito Lim an unverified third-party complaint, which in reality was an ejectment suit, praying that they be ordered to vacate the ground floor, mezzanine, and basement of the Venancia Building and to pay rentals amounting to P71,200. That third-party complaint was based on the termination in 1970 of the 1965 lease contract between Lim Se and Francisco San Pedro, but the lease contract stipulated that venue of any suit arising from it would be Baguio City. Lim Se and Benito Lim filed a motion to dismiss the third-party complaint on the grounds of improper venue, lis pendens, and lack of jurisdiction over the res. The lower court denied the motion, and petitioners reiterated the grounds in their answer.

Juana San Pedro-Ocampo and Francisco San Pedro filed an urgent motion for summary judgment. They attached Bulotano’s affidavit stating that on December 19, 1970 he bought the Venancia Building from Juana San Pedro-Ocampo for P27,000. The deed of sale stated that the building was constructed on two lots registered in the name of Florencio Reyes but which were under litigation in Civil Case No. 2043 of the Court of First Instance of Baguio entitled “Pedro Carantes, et al. vs. City of Baguio, Florencio Reyes, et al.” Juana and Francisco also annexed an agreement dated January 12, 1971 between Bulotano and Francisco San Pedro wherein San Pedro would deliver to Bulotano possession of the portions of the Venancia Building occupied by Lim Se, Jose T. Zabala, and Remedios Sarmiento. The lower court, in its summary judgment dated November 27, 1975, ordered Lim Se and Benito Lim to vacate Door No. 72 of the Venancia Building and its mezzanine and basement and to pay damages.

Juana and Francisco filed a motion for execution dated December 11, 1975 on the grounds that the appeal of Lim Se and Benito Lim would be frivolous and dilatory, that they had been withholding possession of the premises for the last five years without paying rentals, and that the appeals of Lim Se’s co-tenants, Jose Zabala and Remedios Sarmiento, were dismissed by the Court of Appeals. Lim Se and Benito Lim filed a motion for reconsideration and to hold case in abeyance dated January 2, 1976, together with an affidavit of merits. They called the lower court’s attention to the fact that the lots on which the Venancia Building was constructed were registered in the name of Florencio Reyes, that they had leased the premises up to March 31, 1977 from the administrator of the Estate of Florencio Reyes, and that they had paid rentals up to April 1975.

They also called attention to the fact that in July 1975 the special administrator of the intestate estate of Florencio Reyes, Sr. filed Civil Case No. 2817 against San Pedro, Genaro Bulotano, Juana San Pedro-Ocampo, Ricardo Gonzales, Lim Se, Amando Masangkay, Del Rosario Bros. Marketing Corporation, and Remigio T. Sature to settle once and for all the question of ownership and possession of the Venancia Building. In that complaint, it was alleged that Florencio Reyes, Sr. became the owner of the Venancia Building in 1962 upon the expiration of the lease contract between Reyes and Venancia Chiombon, represented by her son Francisco San Pedro, and that the lease contract stipulated that the lessor would become the owner of the building. It was further alleged that Venancia Chiombon and Francisco San Pedro executed a simulated and fraudulent sale of the building to Juana San Pedro-Ocampo to prevent the building from becoming the lessor’s property, and that Juana in turn executed a simulated sale to Genaro Bulotano; both sales were alleged to be void because in 1962 the building was already the property of Florencio Reyes, Sr.

Lim Se and Benito Lim also called attention to the order dated March 20, 1973 of the City Court of Baguio in Civil Case No. 2631, an unlawful detainer action filed by the Estate of Florencio Reyes, Sr. against Venancia Chiombon and Genaro Bulotano regarding the Venancia Building. The City Court dismissed the action, holding that it was necessary to determine first the ownership of the building in a proper action in the Court of First Instance before the question of possession could be resolved. The lower court denied the motion for reconsideration and to hold case in abeyance in its order of January 13, 1976. In its ex parte order of January 29, 1976, the lower court declared its summary judgment final and executory, found that Lim Se and Benito Lim should have perfected their appeal on or before January 26, 1976, and, as no appeal was perfected, ordered that a writ of possession be issued against them.

On January 30, 1976, the Branch Clerk of Court issued a writ of possession instead of the usual writ of execution. The City Sheriff of Baguio was ordered to take possession of the premises occupied by Lim Se and Benito Lim, to eject them and anybody claiming under them, and to deliver possession to Juana San Pedro-Ocampo and Francisco San Pedro. At around ten-thirty in the morning of February 2, Deputy Sheriff Esteban S. Par addressed an ultimatum to Lim Se and Benito Lim, ejecting them from Door No. 72 of the Venancia Building and giving them two hours to bring out all their properties, with the warning that if they failed to leave, they would be ousted. According to Lim Se and Benito Lim, Par executed the writ of possession in a most cruel and oppressive manner. They had stayed in the premises for more than ten years; instead of giving them the usual period of at least five days to vacate peacefully, the deputy sheriff gave them only two hours, an impossible demand because the premises constituted both their business establishment—the New Life Cafe & Restaurant—and their residence. When they failed to comply, Par, with the aid of able-bodied men, physically threw out some of their personal properties into the streets, forced Benito Lim, his eight-month pregnant wife, and one-year-old son out of the premises into the street, together with other family members, and padlocked the premises with most of their properties still inside.

Petitioners further alleged that the writ of possession was consummated even before their counsel had received a copy of the order of execution. They underscored that the lower court acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in rendering summary judgment in an ejectment case where the venue was improperly laid and in ordering execution pending appeal. They prayed for an injunction to restrain the lower court from further hearing the ejectment case and to order the sheriff to restore them to possession, and they asked for the annulment of all proceedings in the lower court. Respondents were directed to answer the petition. A temporary restraining order was issued, and after petitioners filed a bond in the sum of P10,000, a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction was issued directing the City Sheriff of Baguio to place petitioners in possession of the premises from which they had been ousted.

Respondent Bulotano filed his separate answer through his lawyer of record, Atty. Ulysses P. Ortillo. The respondents, presumably including Bulotano, also filed an answer through Atty. Igmidio G. Baclit, the same lawyer of Francisco San Pedro in the interpleader case, Civil Case No. 2143. On March 16, 1976, Atty. Antonio V. Raquiza and the law office of Adaza, Amante & Tiu, through Atty. Adaza, filed a motion for the lifting of the mandatory injunction. These lawyers, who never appeared in the lower court, apparently acted independently of Bulotano’s counsel and of Francisco San Pedro’s lawyer. Atty. Adaza set his motion for hearing on March 22, which the Court noted showed unfamiliarity with appellate court practice. The Court also noted that Atty. Adaza, in making it appear that all the respondents had moved for the lifting of the injunction, gave the impression that respondent Judge had participated in that motion, although trial judges made respondents in certiorari and prohibition cases are only formal or nominal parties.

• Improper Venue and Lack of Jurisdiction: Petitioners maintained that the lower court acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in rendering summary judgment in an ejectment case where the venue was improperly laid, because the real action involved property located in Baguio City but was filed in Caloocan City.
• Lis Pendens and Pending Ownership Case: Petitioners argued that the ejectment case was barred by lis pendens and that ownership of the Venancia Building was already in issue in Civil Case No. 2817, which was intended to settle the controverted ownership of the building.
• Oppressive Execution: Petitioners alleged that the writ of possession was issued and executed in a cruel and oppressive manner, with only two hours given to vacate, their personal properties thrown into the streets, and their family forcibly ejected and the premises padlocked.
• Relief Sought: Petitioners prayed for an injunction to restrain the lower court from further hearing the ejectment case, to order the sheriff to restore them to possession, and to annul all proceedings in the lower court.

• No Legal or Factual Basis for Injunction: Atty. Adaza, in his motion to lift the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, contended that its issuance had no legal nor factual basis and was unjust and constituted a serious miscarriage of justice.
• Notice and Hearing Under Rule 58: Movants-respondents invoked Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, which generally directs that a preliminary injunction should be issued upon notice and hearing.
• Canons of Judicial Ethics: Movants-respondents invoked paragraph 17 (15) of the Canons of Judicial Ethics adopted by the American and Philippine Bar Associations and by the Secretary of Justice in Administrative Order No. 162 dated August 1, 1946.
• Injunction Operates Only on Unperformed Acts: Atty. Adaza cited the rule that injunction operates upon unperformed acts but not those already consummated.

• Contempt: Whether Atty. Homobono A. Adaza is guilty of direct contempt or contempt in facie curiae for using vicious, abusive, and disrespectful language in his motion to lift the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.
• Propriety of the Mandatory Injunction: Whether the ex parte issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction had legal and factual basis.
• Applicability of Rule 58 and Judicial Ethics Canons: Whether Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court and the Canons of Judicial Ethics apply to the Supreme Court and preclude the ex parte mandatory injunction.
• Venue and Jurisdiction: Whether the lower court acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in the ejectment case because venue was improperly laid and the property was outside its territorial jurisdiction.
• Writ of Possession: Whether the issuance and enforcement of the writ of possession, instead of the usual writ of execution, was proper.

• Contempt: Yes. Atty. Adaza is guilty of direct contempt or contempt in facie curiae; his unjustified and disrespectful characterization of the Court’s mandatory injunction as “unjust,” “a serious miscarriage of justice,” and devoid of factual and legal basis carried derogatory implications or innuendos under Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.
• Propriety of the Mandatory Injunction: Yes. The ex parte mandatory injunction had factual and legal basis; petitioners made out a strong prima facie case, and the lower court acted without jurisdiction as far as venue was concerned and used the writ of possession oppressively.
• Applicability of Rule 58 and Judicial Ethics Canons: No. Section 5, Rule 58 and the Canons of Judicial Ethics apply to trial judges, not to the Supreme Court as a collegiate court; they do not bar the ex parte mandatory injunction.
• Venue and Jurisdiction: The lower court acted without jurisdiction as far as the venue of the action was concerned; the real action over Baguio property was filed in Caloocan City, and the lease contract stipulated Baguio City as venue.
• Writ of Possession: No. No basis for the issuance of the writ of possession was shown, and the ejectment was allegedly effected in a ruthless manner.

• Contempt: The motion to lift the writ recklessly and sweepingly contended that the injunction had no legal or factual basis and was unjust and a serious miscarriage of justice. The verified petition, which movants ignored, showed the contention was flagrantly false because petitioners made out a strong prima facie case for the ex parte issuance of a mandatory injunction. Atty. Adaza also set his motion for hearing, showing unfamiliarity with appellate court practice, and made it appear that all respondents, including the respondent judge, moved to lift the injunction, although trial judges in certiorari and prohibition cases are only formal or nominal parties. His unjustified and disrespectful characterization of the Court’s resolution carried obvious derogatory implications or innuendos and clearly constituted direct contempt or contempt in facie curiae under Section 1, Rule 71. The Court cited Salcedo vs. Hernandez, De Joya vs. CFI of Rizal, Pasay City Branch, Malolos vs. Reyes, and Sison vs. Sandejas. Considering his manifest inexperience in appellate court practice, the Court imposed severe reprimand and warning instead of imprisonment or fine, and ordered a copy of the resolution attached to his record in the Bar Confidant’s office.

• Propriety of the Mandatory Injunction: The injunction was found to have factual and legal basis. The lower court sitting in Caloocan City ejected petitioners from premises outside its territorial jurisdiction despite their objections to venue. The ejection was at the instance of Francisco San Pedro and Juana San Pedro-Ocampo; Juana, as alleged owner, had already sold the building to Genaro Bulotano, while Francisco was the alleged attorney-in-fact of his mother Venancia Chiombon who sold the building to Juana. Bulotano did not file the ejectment suit in Baguio City and was a defendant in Civil Case No. 2817, a pending litigation intended to settle the controverted ownership of the Venancia Building. The lower court ignored the allegations that ownership was involved in Civil Case No. 2817, that the Estate of Florencio Reyes claimed to be the owner, that the City Court of Baguio refused to entertain an ejectment suit against Chiombon because ownership had to be adjudicated first, and that petitioners had leased the disputed premises up to March 1977. The ejectment was made by summary judgment; petitioners were dispossessed by means of a writ of possession and not by the usual writ of execution; no basis for the writ of possession was shown; and the ejectment was allegedly effected in a ruthless manner. The verified petition thus revealed that the lower court acted without jurisdiction as far as venue was concerned and that the strong arm of the law was used oppressively against petitioners.

• Applicability of Rule 58 and Judicial Ethics Canons: Movants invoked Section 5, Rule 58, which generally requires notice and hearing for a preliminary injunction, and paragraph 17 (15) of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. Section 5, Rule 58 applies to trial judges, not to the Supreme Court; its purpose is to prevent trial judges from resorting to the arbitrary, corrupt, and abusive exercise of the power to issue injunctions. The Canons of Judicial Ethics were adopted for the guidance of and observance by judges under the administrative supervision of the Department of Justice, including municipal judges and justices of the peace, and do not apply to the Supreme Court as a collegiate court. The rule that injunction operates upon unperformed acts but not those already consummated refers to preventive injunctions, not to mandatory injunctions, which require the performance of a particular act. In an ejectment suit where petitioners had been ejected by the trial court, the Supreme Court in a certiorari action issued ex parte a writ of mandatory injunction to restore them to possession, as in Leduna vs. Hon. Enriquez and M. E. R. & L. Co. vs. Del Rosario and Jose.

• Venue and Jurisdiction: The action was a real action to recover real property located in Baguio City but was filed in Caloocan City instead of Baguio City, contrary to Section 2(a), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court. The only circumstance that might justify venue in Caloocan City was that the defendants were supposedly residents of Malabon, Rizal, but in Civil Case No. 2143 Francisco San Pedro was alleged to be a resident of 61 Calderon Street, Baguio City. The lease contract with San Pedro also stipulated that venue of any suit arising from it would be Baguio City. The lower court denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss based on improper venue, lis pendens, and lack of jurisdiction over the res. The Court found that the lower court acted without jurisdiction as far as the venue of the action was concerned.

• Writ of Possession: The lower court’s January 29, 1976 order declared the summary judgment final and executory and ordered that a writ of possession be issued. The Branch Clerk of Court issued a writ of possession instead of the usual writ of execution. No basis for the issuance of the writ of possession was shown, and the ejectment was allegedly effected in a ruthless manner. Deputy Sheriff Esteban S. Par gave petitioners only two hours to vacate, then, with the aid of able-bodied men, physically threw out some of their personal properties into the streets, forced Benito Lim, his eight-month pregnant wife, and one-year-old son out of the premises, and padlocked the premises with most of their properties still inside. This supported the finding that the strong arm of the law was used oppressively against petitioners.

• Direct contempt / contempt in facie curiae — A lawyer’s unjustified and disrespectful characterization of a Supreme Court resolution in a motion, carrying derogatory implications or innuendos, constitutes direct contempt or contempt in facie curiae under Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. The Court applied this to Atty. Adaza’s motion calling the injunction baseless, unjust, and a serious miscarriage of justice.
• Preliminary mandatory injunction in ejectment — A preliminary mandatory injunction may issue ex parte to restore possession in an ejectment case where petitioners make out a strong prima facie case and the lower court acted without jurisdiction as to venue and used the writ of possession oppressively. The Court cited Leduna vs. Hon. Enriquez and M. E. R. & L. Co. vs. Del Rosario and Jose.
• Applicability of Rule 58 and judicial ethics canons — Section 5, Rule 58 and the Canons of Judicial Ethics govern trial judges, not the Supreme Court as a collegiate court; hence they do not bar the Supreme Court from issuing an ex parte mandatory injunction.
• Preventive vs. mandatory injunction — The rule that injunction operates only upon unperformed acts applies to preventive injunctions, not to mandatory injunctions, which require performance of a particular act.
• Venue in real actions — A real action to recover real property must be filed in the place where the property is located, subject to the residence exception; the lease also stipulated Baguio City as venue.
• Writ of possession vs. writ of execution — The lower court’s use of a writ of possession instead of the usual writ of execution had no basis and contributed to the oppressive ejectment.
• Trial judges as nominal parties — Trial judges made respondents in certiorari and prohibition cases are only formal or nominal parties and should not be made to appear as parties seeking reversal of an appellate court’s action.
• Motions in appellate court — Motions in the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals are usually not set for hearing; oral argument is not required unless expressly directed, and the adverse party may file objections within five days, after which the motion is deemed submitted.
• Contempt sanction — Although direct contempt is punishable, the Court may impose severe reprimand and warning instead of imprisonment or fine where the contemner’s manifest inexperience in appellate practice explains the disrespectful language.

• "Atty. Homobono A. Adaza in his "motion to lift the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction" in this case recklessly and sweepingly contended that its issuance "has no legal nor factual basis" and was "unjust and constitutes a serious miscarriage of justice"." — The Court identified the offending language that triggered the contempt inquiry.
• "His unjustified and disrespectful characterization carries with it obvious derogatory implications or innuendos which clearly constitute direct contempt or contempt facie curiae (Sec. 1, Rule 71, Rules of Court; Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724, 728; De Joya vs. CFI of Rizal, Pasay City Branch, 99 Phil. 907,916; Malolos vs. Reyes, 111 Phil. 1113; Sison vs. Sandejas, 105 Phil. 1279)." — This is the ratio decidendi for the direct contempt holding.
• "The petitioners made out a strong prima facie case for the ex parte issuance of a mandatory injunction." — The Court upheld the factual and legal basis of the mandatory injunction.
• "We hold Atty. Adaza guilty of direct contempt. However, considering his manifest inexperience in appellate court practice, instead of punishing him with imprisonment or fine, he is hereby severely reprimanded and warned that a repetition of the said act would be more drastically dealt with." — This is the dispositive ruling and the penalty imposed.

• Leduna vs. Hon. Enriquez, 108 Phil. 141, 147 — Cited to support the ex parte issuance of a writ of mandatory injunction in a certiorari action to restore petitioners to possession in an ejectment suit after they had been ejected by the trial court.
• M. E. R. & L. Co. vs. Del Rosario and Jose, 22 Phil. 433 — Cited together with Leduna as authority for mandatory injunction in ejectment cases.
• Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724, 728; De Joya vs. CFI of Rizal, Pasay City Branch, 99 Phil. 907, 916; Malolos vs. Reyes, 111 Phil. 1113; Sison vs. Sandejas, 105 Phil. 1279 — Cited as jurisprudence supporting the finding of direct contempt or contempt facie curiae for unjustified and disrespectful characterization of the Court’s resolution.
• Hon. Alcasid vs. Samson, 102 Phil. 735-6; Taroma vs. Sayo, L-37296, October 30, 1975, 67 SCRA 508, 514 — Cited for the rule that trial judges made respondents in certiorari and prohibition cases are only formal or nominal parties and should not be made to appear as parties seeking reversal of an appellate court’s action.

• Section 2(a), Rule 4, Rules of Court — Cited in connection with venue: a real action to recover real property located in Baguio City should be filed in Baguio City, not Caloocan City, unless justified by the defendants’ residence.
• Section 5, Rule 58, Rules of Court — Generally requires notice and hearing for preliminary injunction, but the Court held it applies to trial judges, not to the Supreme Court.
• Section 1, Rule 58, Rules of Court — Defines injunction and distinguishes preventive from mandatory injunction; mandatory injunction requires performance of a particular act.
• Articles 539 and 1674, Civil Code; Section 3, Rule 70, Rules of Court — Cited as authority for mandatory injunction in forcible entry cases.
• Section 1, Rule 71, Rules of Court — Basis for direct contempt or contempt in facie curiae.
• Section 2, Rule 49 and Section 1, Rule 56, Rules of Court — Motions in appellate court are usually not set for hearing; adverse party may file objections within five days, after which the motion is deemed submitted.
• Paragraph 17 (15), Canons of Judicial Ethics; Administrative Order No. 162 dated August 1, 1946 (42 O.G. 1803) — Cited by movants but held inapplicable to the Supreme Court, a collegiate court; the canons apply to judges under administrative supervision.

Barredo, Antonio, Concepcion, Jr., and Martin, JJ., concurred. Fernando, J., was on leave. Martin, J., was designated to take part in this case.