Lim Kieh Tong, Inc. vs. The Court of Appeals

The nature of an action is determined by the allegations in the complaint, and where the allegations show that a person was deprived of possession of a building or part thereof through stealth, the action is one for forcible entry and detainer under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, regardless of the amount of damages claimed, because the damages are merely incidental to the main action. Jurisdiction over such an action properly lies with the inferior court, not the Regional Trial Court.

The petitioner, Lim Kieh Tong, Inc., is a domestic corporation that owns a building located at 1231 Piedad Street corner Benavidez Street, Manila. The private respondent, Reginaldo Y. Lim, is the son of Lim Eng Piao, who had occupied the premises as a dwelling unit together with his family. After Lim Eng Piao died, the private respondent continued the occupancy and, even after acquiring his own house and lot, retained Room 301 of the building as a storage place for his belongings. The building has only one common main door through which all occupants of the various rooms must pass.

The petitioner, Lim Kieh Tong, Inc., is a domestic corporation that owns a building at 1231 Piedad Street corner Benavidez Street, Manila. Lim Eng Piao, father of private respondent Reginaldo Y. Lim, occupied the premises as a dwelling unit together with his family. After Lim Eng Piao died, the private respondent continued the occupancy. Later, the private respondent acquired a house and lot at No. 3 Igdalig Street, Quezon City, but despite transferring residence, he did not vacate Room 301 of the building, instead utilizing it as a place to keep his important belongings, such as law books, important documents, appliances, and similar items.

The building has only one common main door through which all occupants of the various rooms therein, including the private respondent, can get in and out. Accordingly, each occupant was given a key or a duplicate key to the doorlock by Rafael Lim, the Officer-in-Charge of the petitioner corporation. On or about September 1987, the petitioner changed the lock of the common main door of the building. On the morning of September 30, 1987, the private respondent tried to go to Room 301 to fetch three of his law books, which he needed to read in connection with a case he was handling, but he was surprised to find that the key given him could no longer fit the door lock, which had already been changed. Consequently, the private respondent had to buy three new law books, incurring expenses in the sum of ₱1,253.00, to prepare for his cases.

The following day, October 1, 1987, the private respondent was able to contact the petitioner through its Officer-in-Charge, Rafael Lim, but his request to be provided with the appropriate key produced a negative result. The private respondent demanded from the petitioner's officer-in-charge the delivery of the appropriate keys to the common main door so that he could enter the premises and be restored to possession of Room No. 301, but his efforts proved futile as the officer in charge did not heed his demand. On October 2, 1987, by reason of the unjustifiable ouster, the private respondent instituted Civil Case No. 122546 before the Metropolitan Trial Court, which was raffled to Branch 25, denominated as an action for damages with injunction; the case was subsequently dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. On October 23, 1987, the private respondent again instituted another action at the Metropolitan Trial Court, docketed as Civil Case No. 122775, raffled to Branch 16, reiterating the same allegations and praying for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction commanding the petitioner to provide him the appropriate key or a duplicate key to the lock of the main door, actual compensatory damages of ₱1,253.00, attorney's fees of ₱5,000.00, and costs of suit.

• Nature of the Action: Petitioner contended that the action is one for specific performance, not forcible entry and detainer, and therefore jurisdiction over the case is vested in the Regional Trial Court, not the Metropolitan Trial Court.
• Jurisdictional Amount: Petitioner argued that when the amount of damages claimed is not specifically alleged in the complaint, jurisdiction over the case would fall under the Regional Trial Courts, as the failure to so allege would characterize the subject matter as one which is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
• Prohibited Pleading: Petitioner contended that the motion to dismiss should not have been denied, as the respondent judge found the applicability of the Rule on Summary Procedure, under which a motion to dismiss is a prohibited pleading.

• Forcible Entry and Detainer: Private respondent argued that the complaint was one for forcible entry and detainer, as he was deprived of possession of Room 301 through stealth when the petitioner changed the lock of the common main door without his knowledge and consent.
• Physical Possession: Private respondent maintained that the issue involved is mere physical possession (possession de facto) and not juridical possession (possession de jure) nor ownership, citing Mercado vs. Go Bio and Masallo vs. Cesar.
• Jurisdiction: Private respondent argued that what confers jurisdiction on the inferior court in forcible entry and illegal detainer cases is not the amount of unpaid rentals or damages involved, but rather the nature of the action, because the rents or damages are only incidental to the main action, citing Vichanco vs. Laurilla.

• Nature of the Action: Whether the complaint filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila is one for forcible entry and detainer or one for specific performance.
• Jurisdiction: Whether jurisdiction over the case properly lies with the Metropolitan Trial Court or the Regional Trial Court.
• Damages Claim: Whether the failure to specifically allege the amount of damages in the complaint affects the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court.

• Nature of the Action: The complaint is one for forcible entry and detainer under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. The allegations show that private respondent retained possession of Room 301, but petitioner prevented him from enjoying his right by depriving him of the right of egress and ingress through the main door of the building through stealth.
• Jurisdiction: Jurisdiction properly lies with the Metropolitan Trial Court. What confers jurisdiction on the inferior court in forcible entry and illegal detainer cases is not the amount of unpaid rentals or damages involved, but rather the nature of the action, because the rents or damages are only incidental to the main action.
• Damages Claim: The failure to specifically allege the amount of damages does not divest the Metropolitan Trial Court of jurisdiction. In Singson vs. Aragon, the Supreme Court held that exemplary damages must be specified, but if not, the municipal trial court could still grant it if, together with the other money claims, the amount of the total claim does not exceed the jurisdictional amount.

• Nature of the Action: The Court held that a reading of the allegations of the complaint shows that private respondent and his family resided in Room 301 of the building of petitioner until they transferred to their present residence, but private respondent retained possession of said room to keep his important belongings. The building has only one common main door through which all occupants of the various rooms therein can get in and out. Accordingly, all occupants including private respondent were given a key to the main doorlock by petitioner. However, when private respondent wanted to go inside his room on September 30, 1987, he found that the key he possessed was no longer compatible with the lock, as the same was changed. Through stealth, petitioner changed the key to the main door, thus depriving private respondent of the possession of his rented room. From these facts alleged in the complaint, the Court held that the suit is one for forcible entry and detainer under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.
• Jurisdiction: The Court ruled that any person deprived of possession of any land or building or part thereof may file an action for forcible entry and detainer in the proper inferior court against the person unlawfully depriving or withholding possession from him, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. This relief is not only available to a landlord, vendor, or vendee, but also to a lessee or tenant or any other person against whom the possession of any land or building, or a part thereof, is unlawfully withheld, or is otherwise unlawfully deprived possession thereof, within one year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession.
• Damages Claim: The Court applied the ruling in Singson vs. Aragon, which held that exemplary damages must be specified, and if not, the municipal trial court could still grant it if, together with the other money claims, the amount of the total claim does not exceed the jurisdictional amount. The same ruling was made to apply to moral damages. The Court further cited Vichanco vs. Laurilla for the proposition that what confers jurisdiction on the inferior court in forcible entry and illegal detainer cases is not the amount of unpaid rentals or damages involved, but rather the nature of the action, because the rents or damages are only incidental to the main action.
• Prohibited Pleading: The Court noted that the respondent judge found the applicability of the Rule on Summary Procedure, and since a motion to dismiss is one of the prohibited pleadings and motions under Section 15 of the 1983 Rules on Summary Procedure, the motion to dismiss was correctly denied, and the petition must fail on this score alone.

• Nature of the action determined by allegations in the complaint — The character of an action is determined by the allegations in the complaint, not by the defendant's characterization of the action. In this case, the Court looked to the allegations of the complaint, which showed that the private respondent was deprived of possession of Room 301 through stealth when the lock to the common main door was changed, and held that the suit was one for forcible entry and detainer under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.
• Forcible entry and detainer available to any person deprived of possession — Under Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, any person deprived of possession of any land or building or part thereof may file an action for forcible entry and detainer in the proper inferior court against the person unlawfully depriving or withholding possession from him. This relief is available not only to a landlord, vendor, or vendee, but also to a lessee or tenant or any other person against whom possession is unlawfully withheld or deprived, within one year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession.
• Jurisdiction in forcible entry cases determined by nature of action, not damages — What confers jurisdiction on the inferior court in forcible entry and illegal detainer cases is not the amount of unpaid rentals or damages involved, but rather the nature of the action, because the rents or damages are only incidental to the main action. The failure to specifically allege the amount of damages does not divest the inferior court of jurisdiction, provided the total claim does not exceed the jurisdictional amount.

• "From the foregoing facts alleged in the complaint, the Court holds that the suit is one for forcible entry and detainer under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. Private respondent retained the possession of Room 301 of petitioner's building which he claimed to have the right to use and enjoy, but petitioner prevented him from enjoying his right by depriving him of the right of egress and ingress through the main door of the building. Through stealth, petitioner changed the key to the main door thus depriving private respondent of the possession of his rented room." — This passage states the ratio decidendi: the nature of the action is determined by the allegations in the complaint, and the allegations here showed deprivation of possession through stealth, constituting forcible entry and detainer.
• "What confers jurisdiction on the inferior court in forcible entry and illegal detainer cases is NOT the amount of unpaid rentals or damages involved, but rather the nature of the action because the rents or damages are only incidental to the main action." — This passage defines the controlling doctrine on jurisdiction in forcible entry and detainer cases, citing Vichanco vs. Laurilla, and is the canonical formulation of the rule that damages are merely incidental to the main action.
• "Any person deprived of possession of any land or building or part thereof, may file an action for forcible entry and detainer in the proper inferior court against the person unlawfully depriving or withholding possession from him. This relief is not only available to a landlord, vendor, or vendee, but also to a lessee or tenant or any other person against whom the possession of any land or building, or a part thereof, is unlawfully withheld, or is otherwise unlawfully deprived possession thereof, within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession." — This passage articulates the scope of the remedy of forcible entry and detainer under Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, emphasizing that the relief is available to any person deprived of possession, not just to landlords or owners.

• Singson vs. Aragon, 92 Phil. 514 — Cited as controlling authority for the proposition that exemplary damages must be specified in the complaint, but if not, the municipal trial court could still grant it if, together with the other money claims, the amount of the total claim does not exceed the jurisdictional amount; the same ruling was applied to moral damages.
• Vichanco vs. Laurilla, L-13935, June 30, 1960 — Cited as controlling authority for the doctrine that what confers jurisdiction on the inferior court in forcible entry and illegal detainer cases is not the amount of unpaid rentals or damages involved, but rather the nature of the action, because the rents or damages are only incidental to the main action.
• Mercado vs. Go Bio, 78 Phil. 279 — Cited by the respondent judge for the proposition that the issue involved in forcible entry cases is mere physical possession (possession de facto) and not juridical possession (possession de jure) nor ownership.
• Masallo vs. Cesar, 39 Phil. 134 — Cited by the respondent judge for the same proposition that the issue in forcible entry cases is mere physical possession, not juridical possession or ownership.
• Supia and Batioco vs. Quintero and Ayala, 59 Phil. 312 — Cited for the purpose of forcible entry: regardless of the actual condition of the title to property, the party in peaceable and quiet possession shall not be turned out by strong hand, violence, or terror; a party out of possession must respect and resort to the law alone to obtain what he claims is his.

• Section 1, Rule 70, Rules of Court — The provision governing actions for forcible entry and detainer. The Court applied this provision to hold that any person deprived of possession of any land or building or part thereof may file an action for forcible entry and detainer in the proper inferior court against the person unlawfully depriving or withholding possession from him, within one year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession.
• Section 15, 1983 Rules on Summary Procedure — The provision prohibiting certain pleadings and motions, including motions to dismiss, in cases governed by summary procedure. The Court applied this provision to hold that the respondent judge correctly denied the petitioner's motion to dismiss, as it was a prohibited pleading under the Rules on Summary Procedure.

Narvasa, Cruz, Griño-Aquino, and Medialdea, JJ., concurred.