Ligtas vs. Court of Appeals

Pardon of adultery must be granted before the institution of the criminal action and must extend to both offenders; a mere declaration of intention to pardon, especially one whose conditions are admittedly void and which is followed by the filing of a criminal complaint, does not constitute effective pardon and does not bar prosecution.

Tomas Pigte and Lucia Estillore were married on November 26, 1959. Petronilo Ligtas knew of this marriage. At the time of the offense, Tomas was working with heavy equipment, as evidenced by the bulldozer parked near the couple's home. The case was prosecuted under Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes adultery committed by a married woman and her paramour, both of whom must be pardoned by the offended spouse for the pardon to be effective.

Tomas Pigte and Lucia Estillore were married on November 26, 1959. Petronilo Ligtas knew of this marriage. On December 14, 1972, at about 8:00 in the evening, Tomas and Lucia went to the house of Tomas's sister, Rosal, situated near their own home. After a short while, Lucia returned home upon hearing their baby cry. Tomas followed about three minutes later. Not finding Lucia in their house, Tomas called for her. Receiving no response, he checked a bulldozer parked nearby, thinking she might have gone there to answer the call of nature. Failing to find her there, he proceeded up a bulldozed hill about sixty meters away. Upon reaching the place, he saw his wife and Petronilo having sexual intercourse — Lucia standing panty-less, holding her raised dress with feet spread apart, while Petronilo, naked from the waist down, embraced her and performed a "push and pull" movement. Petronilo's trousers were on a stone, atop which rested his .38 caliber pistol. Lucia noticed Tomas's presence and instinctively pushed Petronilo away, who immediately reached for his gun. To save himself, Tomas turned away and went home to get a bolo, but had second thoughts and cooled off upon reaching his house.

The following morning, Tomas confronted his wife. Lucia confessed that her illicit relationship with Petronilo had started in 1969, during the absence of Tomas, who was then working in Cebu City. That same morning, Tomas reported the offense to the Chief of Police, and the police prepared the complaint and supporting affidavits. However, out of pity for his young children and his wife, and being financially distressed, Tomas asked the Chief of Police to hold the filing of the case in abeyance, stating he had "in mind of giving my wife apology." He expressed that the projected forgiveness was conditional: his wife would live separately from him, she would assume the duty of supporting their children, and he would relinquish his rights and prerogatives as her husband. This affidavit, Exhibit "C," was written in English — a language not understood by the illiterate complainant — and appeared on its face to be hastily prepared.

On December 19, 1972, Tomas appeared and swore before the Municipal Judge his complaint for adultery, demonstrating that he had relented in his plan to grant pardon. The Court of First Instance of Bohol found the facts as narrated and convicted Ligtas, crediting the eyewitness account of Tomas. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.

• Validity of Exhibit "3"/"C": Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals erred in not declaring Exhibit "3" (also Exhibit "C" for the prosecution) as validly executed.
• Nullity of Conditions: Petitioner maintained that the conditions found in Exhibit "3" — namely, (1) the co-accused Lucia and her husband would live separately, (2) Tomas would relinquish all his rights and prerogatives as husband to Lucia, (3) petitioner would support complainant's children, and (4) complainant would give up all his duties and rights in rearing their children — are null and void for being contrary to law, morals, and public policy.
• Severability of Valid Portions: Petitioner argued that the remaining portions of Exhibit "3" not contrary to law, morals, and public policy should be declared effective and enforceable.
• Bar to Prosecution: Petitioner contended that because the conditions in the affidavit are void and should be considered as not written, the affidavit should be treated as an absolute or unconditional pardon, thereby barring the People from criminally prosecuting him for the private crime of adultery.

• Nature of the Affidavit: Whether Exhibit "C" constitutes an express or unconditional pardon that bars prosecution for adultery.
• Effect of Void Conditions: Whether conditions in a purported pardon that are contrary to law, morals, and public policy may be severed, rendering the remaining instrument an absolute pardon.
• Propriety of Penalty: Whether the maximum penalty imposed by the trial court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, is correct under Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code and the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

• Nature of the Affidavit: No. The affidavit was not a pardon at all but a mere declaration of intention to pardon, which the complainant subsequently abandoned by filing the criminal complaint on December 19, 1972.
• Effect of Void Conditions: No. Because the affidavit was never a grant of pardon but only an expression of a desire to pardon, the invalidity of its conditions cannot transform it into an absolute pardon; there is no pardon to strip of conditions.
• Propriety of Penalty: No, as to the maximum. Adultery under Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code is penalized by prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods; the maximum penalty was reduced to four years, nine months, and ten days of prision correccional.

• Nature of the Affidavit: Pardon for adultery and concubinage must come before the institution of the criminal action, and both offenders must be pardoned by the offended party for the pardon to be effective. Express pardon occurs when the offended party in writing or in an affidavit asserts that he or she is pardoning the erring spouse and paramour; implied pardon occurs when the offended party continues to live with the spouse even after the commission of the offense. Here, the affidavit executed by Tomas was not a grant of pardon but a mere declaration of his desire to pardon, born out of pity and financial distress. The conditions he imposed — separate living arrangements, relinquishment of marital rights, and transfer of child-rearing duties — were themselves proposed by petitioner as contrary to morals and public policy, underscoring that no effective pardon was ever extended. Critically, Tomas's subsequent act of swearing out the complaint before the Municipal Judge on December 19, 1972, demonstrated that he changed his mind and decided to proceed with prosecution. There was neither express nor implied pardon.

• Effect of Void Conditions: Petitioner's argument that the void conditions should be treated as not written, leaving an absolute pardon, fails because the affidavit was never a pardon in the first place. It was a statement of intention, not a completed act of forgiveness. Severance of void conditions presupposes a valid underlying grant; where no grant exists, there is nothing from which to sever conditions and nothing to which an "absolute" character may attach. The complainant's illiteracy, the haste of the affidavit's preparation, and the fact that it was in English — a language he did not understand — further support the conclusion that it did not embody a knowing and deliberate act of pardon.

• Propriety of Penalty: Although the commission of the offense was not in question, the maximum penalty imposed by the trial court was incorrect. Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code penalizes adultery with prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, while the minimum penalty was within the proper range, the maximum penalty should be four years, nine months, and ten days of prision correccional. The indeterminate penalty was accordingly modified to two years and four months of prision correccional as minimum to four years, nine months, and ten days of prision correccional as maximum.

• Pardon in Adultery and Concubinage — Pardon by the offended spouse must be granted before the institution of the criminal action and must extend to both offenders (the erring spouse and the paramour). The pardon may be express (where the offended party in writing or in an affidavit asserts that he or she is pardoning the erring spouse and paramour) or implied (where the offended party continues to live with the spouse after the commission of the offense). Implied pardon cannot be inferred when the offended party allows the spouse to remain in the conjugal home after arrest only to care for the children. In this case, the affidavit was neither express nor implied pardon but a mere declaration of intention, subsequently abandoned by the filing of the criminal complaint.

• Declaration of Intention vs. Grant of Pardon — A statement expressing a desire or intention to pardon, especially one made under emotional or financial distress and subject to conditions, does not constitute an effective pardon. The offended party's subsequent act of filing the criminal complaint negates any intent to pardon. The Court applied this distinction to reject petitioner's argument that the affidavit, stripped of its void conditions, amounted to an absolute pardon.

• "In this jurisdiction pardon for adultery and concubinage must come before the institution of the criminal action and both offenders must be pardoned by the offended party if said pardon is to be effective." — This passage states the controlling rule on the requisites of pardon in adultery and concubinage cases, frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence on private crimes.

• "There is no doubt that this is no pardon at all but a mere expression of a desire to pardon home out of pity and imposing conditions to its grant which no less than petitioner insists is against morals and public policy" — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi distinguishing a declaration of intention from an effective grant of pardon, and highlights the irony that petitioner's own characterization of the conditions as void undermines his claim of absolute pardon.

• "In the present case there is neither such express or implied pardon. It is obvious that the affidavit that the complainant executed (Exh. C) was a mere declaration of intention to pardon his wife and petitioner." — This is the Court's direct application of the express/implied pardon framework to the facts, concluding that neither form of pardon existed.

• People vs. Infants, 57 Phil. 138 — Controlling precedent establishing that pardon for adultery and concubinage must come before the institution of the criminal action and must extend to both offenders. The Court relied on this rule to hold that no effective pardon existed.
• People vs. Boca (CA), O.G. 2248 — Cited for the distinction between express pardon (where the offended party in writing or affidavit asserts pardoning the erring spouse and paramour) and implied pardon (where the offended party continues to live with the spouse after the offense). Also cited for the rule that implied pardon cannot be inferred when the spouse is allowed to remain in the conjugal home after arrest only to care for the children.

• Article 334, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes adultery with prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods. The Court applied this provision to correct the maximum penalty imposed by the trial court, reducing it to four years, nine months, and ten days of prision correccional.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Applied to determine the proper minimum and maximum terms of the indeterminate penalty. The minimum was within the proper range; the maximum was modified to conform with Article 334.

Yap (Chairman), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano, and Sarmiento, JJ., concurred.