Liga ng mga Barangay National vs. City Mayor of Manila, et al.

A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 does not lie against a local legislative body or a local chief executive acting in their respective legislative and executive capacities, as the writ is available only against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; a petition that in substance seeks a declaration of the invalidity of an ordinance is one for declaratory relief over which the Supreme Court has only appellate, not original, jurisdiction.

Petitioner Liga ng mga Barangay National is the national organization of all barangays in the Philippines, constituted under Republic Act No. 7160 (the Local Government Code of 1991). Section 493 of that law provides that the Liga at various levels directly elects its officers, while all other matters affecting its internal organization are governed by its own constitution and by-laws, which must conform to the Constitution and existing laws. Pursuant to this authority, the Liga adopted and ratified its own Constitution and By-laws on 16 March 2000, and thereafter its own Election Code, which set synchronized elections for provincial, metropolitan, and highly urbanized city (HUC) chapters. The Liga's Calendar of Activities scheduled synchronized HUC chapter elections, including the Manila chapter, for 21 October 2002.

The Liga ng mga Barangay National is the national organization of all barangays in the Philippines, constituted under Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991. Section 493 of that law provides that the Liga at the municipal, city, provincial, metropolitan political subdivision, and national levels directly elects a president, a vice-president, and five members of the board of directors, while all other matters affecting the Liga's internal organization are governed by its respective constitution and by-laws, which must conform to the Constitution and existing laws. Pursuant to this authority, the Liga adopted and ratified its own Constitution and By-laws on 16 March 2000, and thereafter its own Election Code. The Election Code provided for nationwide synchronized elections for provincial, metropolitan, and HUC/ICC chapters, to be convened by the incumbent Liga chapter president assisted by the proper government agency. The Liga subsequently issued its Calendar of Activities and Guidelines for 2002, scheduling synchronized HUC chapter elections, including the Liga Chapter of Manila, for 21 October 2002.

On 28 June 2002, the Manila City Council enacted Ordinance No. 8039, Series of 2002, which prescribed a different procedure for electing Liga officers in the City of Manila. The ordinance provided for district chapter elections, in which all elected barangay chairmen in each district would elect from among themselves a president, vice-president, and five board members, and for a city chapter election, in which the district chapter representatives would automatically become board members and elect from among themselves the city chapter officers. The ordinance set both district and city chapter elections thirty days after the barangay elections. The Liga, upon learning that the ordinance had been forwarded to the Office of the City Mayor, sent a letter on 16 July 2002 requesting that the ordinance be vetoed, arguing that it encroached upon the Liga's functions. Respondent Mayor nonetheless signed and approved the ordinance and, on 15 August 2002, issued Executive Order No. 011, Series of 2002, to implement it.

On 27 August 2002, the Liga filed the instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65, seeking nullification of both the ordinance and the executive order. Barangay Chairman Arnel Peña later filed a complaint in intervention supporting the Liga's position. The Office of the Solicitor General likewise filed a manifestation supporting the petition, arguing that the ordinance and executive order were inconsistent with the express public policy enunciated in the Local Government Code. The respondents defended the validity of the challenged measures and moved for dismissal, asserting that certiorari was an improper remedy, that the hierarchy of courts was disregarded, that the petitioner was guilty of forum-shopping, and that the act sought to be enjoined had become fait accompli following the elections held on 15 September 2002.

• Encroachment on Liga Autonomy: Petitioner argued that City Ordinance No. 8039 and Executive Order No. 011 contradicted the Liga Election Code and were therefore invalid, there being neither rhyme nor reason nor legal basis for the Manila City Council to encroach upon or assume the functions of the Liga by prescribing through legislation the manner of conducting Liga elections other than what had been provided for by the Liga Constitution and By-laws and the Liga Election Code.
• Ultra Vires Act: Petitioner maintained that the subject ordinance was an ultra vires act of the respondents and, as such, should be declared null and void.
• Need for Provisional Relief: Petitioner cited the fact that under Section 5 of the assailed ordinance, the Manila District Chapter elections would be held thirty days after the regular barangay elections, arguing that the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction was imperative to prevent implementation of the ordinance and executive order.

• Certiorari Unavailing: Respondents maintained that certiorari under Rule 65 is available only against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions, and that the City Council and City Mayor of Manila are not such bodies or officers because both do not exercise judicial functions—the enactment of the ordinance and issuance of the executive order being legislative and executive functions, respectively.
• Absence of Grave Abuse of Discretion: Respondents asserted that the petition failed to show with certainty that the respondents acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
• Pendency of Other Actions: Respondents argued that the petition should not be entertained by the Supreme Court in view of the pendency before the RTC of Manila of two actions questioning the subject ordinance and executive order, and that the petitioner could seek relief from the RTC or the Court of Appeals instead.
• Forum-Shopping: Respondents contended that the petitioner transgressed the proscription against forum-shopping, asserting that although the parties in the other pending cases and in this petition were different individuals or entities, they represented the same interest.
• Fait Accompli: Respondents maintained that the petitioner's prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction had become moot and academic in view of the elections of officers of the City Liga ng mga Barangay on 15 September 2002 and their subsequent assumption of office, rendering the acts sought to be enjoined fait accompli.

• Propriety of Certiorari: Whether certiorari under Rule 65 lies against the Manila City Council and City Mayor, who enacted the ordinance and issued the executive order in the exercise of legislative and executive functions, respectively.
• Nature of the Petition: Whether the petition, though styled as certiorari, is in substance one for declaratory relief over which the Supreme Court lacks original jurisdiction.
• Hierarchy of Courts: Whether direct recourse to the Supreme Court was justified despite the hierarchy-of-courts rule.
• Forum-Shopping: Whether the petitioner is guilty of forum-shopping by reason of the pendency of other cases involving the same ordinance and executive order.

• Propriety of Certiorari: No. Certiorari under Rule 65 lies only against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; the respondents acted in their legislative and executive capacities, respectively, and thus do not fall within the ambit of the writ.
• Nature of the Petition: The petition is in substance one for declaratory relief. The Supreme Court has only appellate, not original, jurisdiction over declaratory relief, even if only questions of law are involved.
• Hierarchy of Courts: No special and important reason or exceptional and compelling circumstance was adduced to justify direct recourse to the Supreme Court; the hierarchy-of-courts rule was disregarded.
• Forum-Shopping: No. Forum-shopping does not exist because the parties in this case and in the alleged other pending cases are different individuals or entities, as admitted by the respondents themselves.

• Propriety of Certiorari: Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a petition for certiorari may be invoked only against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. A respondent exercises judicial function where he has the power to determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are, and undertakes to determine these questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the parties. Quasi-judicial function applies to the actions of public administrative officers required to investigate facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions as a basis for their official action, exercising discretion of a judicial nature. The City Council of Manila enacted the assailed ordinance in the exercise of its legislative function, and respondent Mayor issued the executive order in the exercise of his executive function. Neither function falls within the scope of judicial or quasi-judicial action. On this ground alone, certiorari will not lie.

• Nature of the Petition: Although styled as a petition for certiorari, the petition in essence seeks a declaration by the Supreme Court of the unconstitutionality or illegality of the questioned ordinance and executive order. It thus partakes of the nature of a petition for declaratory relief. Under Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction extends to petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus, but not to declaratory relief. The Court's jurisdiction over cases involving the validity of ordinances is appellate in nature. The petition must therefore fail, as the Court does not have original jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief even if only questions of law are involved.

• Hierarchy of Courts: The Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs is concurrent with the Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals in certain cases, but this concurrence does not accord parties an absolute freedom of choice of forum. A becoming regard for the judicial hierarchy indicates that petitions for extraordinary writs against lower courts should be filed with the RTC or the Court of Appeals, and direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. No such reason or exceptional and compelling circumstance was adduced by the petitioner or the intervenor. Petitioner's reliance on Pimentel vs. Aguirre was misplaced, because the non-observance of the hierarchy-of-courts rule was not an issue in that case, and what was sought to be nullified therein was an act of the President of the Philippines, which would have greatly affected all local government units.

• Forum-Shopping: Forum-shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or when a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other. For litis pendentia to exist, there must be identity of parties—or at least parties representing the same interests—identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for founded on the same facts, and identity such that any judgment in the pending case would amount to res judicata in the other. In the instant petition, the respondents themselves admitted that the parties in this case and in the alleged other pending cases are different individuals or entities. Forum-shopping therefore cannot be said to exist. Moreover, the respondents failed to furnish the Court with copies of the alleged pending petitions, leaving only speculation as to their causes of action and issues.

• Requisites of Certiorari under Rule 65 — For a writ of certiorari to issue, the following requisites must concur: (1) it must be directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) the tribunal, board, or officer must have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the first requisite was absent, the respondents having acted in legislative and executive capacities.

• Judicial Function vs. Quasi-Judicial Function — A respondent exercises judicial function where he has the power to determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are, and undertakes to determine these questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the parties. Quasi-judicial function applies to the actions of public administrative officers or bodies required to investigate facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official action, exercising discretion of a judicial nature. The Court relied on this distinction to exclude legislative and executive acts from the scope of certiorari.

• Hierarchy of Courts — The Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs is concurrent with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals, but this concurrence does not give parties an absolute freedom of choice of forum. Direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This policy is necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court's time and to prevent overcrowding of its docket.

• Forum-Shopping and Litis Pendentia — Forum-shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or when a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other. The requisites of litis pendentia are: (1) identity of parties, or at least such parties as representing the same interests in both actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; and (3) identity with respect to the two preceding particulars such that any judgment in the pending case would amount to res judicata in the other. The Court found no forum-shopping because the parties were different individuals or entities.

• "The respondents do not fall within the ambit of tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. As correctly pointed out by the respondents, the enactment by the City Council of Manila of the assailed ordinance and the issuance by respondent Mayor of the questioned executive order were done in the exercise of legislative and executive functions, respectively, and not of judicial or quasi-judicial functions. On this score alone, certiorari will not lie." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on the first ground for dismissal, defining the boundary of certiorari as a remedy available only against judicial or quasi-judicial action.

• "although the instant petition is styled as a petition for certiorari, in essence, it seeks the declaration by this Court of the unconstitutionality or illegality of the questioned ordinance and executive order. It, thus, partakes of the nature of a petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has only appellate, not original, jurisdiction." — This passage articulates the principle that the substance, not the form, of a petition determines the proper remedy and the Court's jurisdiction.

• "A becoming regard of that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level ('inferior') courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition." — This is the canonical formulation of the hierarchy-of-courts doctrine as quoted from People vs. Cuaresma, frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence on direct recourse to the Supreme Court.

• People vs. Cuaresma, G.R. No. 67787, 18 April 1989, 172 SCRA 415 — Followed as the controlling authority on the hierarchy-of-courts doctrine, establishing that direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction for extraordinary writs should be allowed only when special and important reasons are clearly set out in the petition.
• Santiago vs. Vasquez, G.R. Nos. 99289-90, 27 January 1993, 217 SCRA 633 — Followed for the proposition that the propensity of litigants and lawyers to disregard the hierarchy of courts must be halted, as it imposes on the Court's time and causes delay in adjudication.
• Pimentel vs. Aguirre, G.R. No. 132988, 19 July 2000, 336 SCRA 201 — Distinguished; petitioner's reliance was misplaced because the hierarchy-of-courts rule was not an issue therein, and the act sought to be nullified was that of the President, not a local government unit.
• Tano vs. Socrates, G.R. No. 110249, 21 August 1997, 278 SCRA 154 — Followed for the rule that the Supreme Court does not have original jurisdiction over declaratory relief even if only questions of law are involved, and for reaffirming the hierarchy-of-courts policy.
• Veluz vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139951, 23 November 2000, 345 SCRA 756 — Followed for the elements of litis pendentia and the test for forum-shopping.

• Section 1, Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Defines the scope of certiorari as a remedy available only against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions, acting without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Applied to hold that the writ does not lie against respondents acting in legislative and executive capacities.
• Section 5, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution — Enumerates the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction (over certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus) and its appellate jurisdiction (including cases involving the validity of ordinances). Applied to hold that the Court lacks original jurisdiction over declaratory relief, which is the true nature of the petition.
• Section 493, Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) — Provides that the Liga at various levels directly elects its officers, with all other internal organizational matters governed by the Liga's constitution and by-laws. Cited as the statutory backdrop for the Liga's authority to govern its own elections.
• Section 507, Republic Act No. 7160 — Provides that all matters not covered by the law affecting the internal organization of the leagues of local government units shall be governed by their respective constitution and by-laws, which must conform to the Constitution and existing laws. Cited as the legal basis for the Liga's Constitution and By-laws.

Puno, Vitug, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concurred. Panganiban, J., concurred in the result.