Libuit vs. People of the Philippines

One who receives another's personal property for repair — personally or through a mechanic in his employ and in his presence — assumes an obligation to return or deliver the same, and his misappropriation of that property, coupled with prejudice and demand, constitutes estafa under Article 315(1)(b) of the Revised Penal Code. The trial court's duty to appoint a counsel de oficio for an accused who has no counsel of choice is mandatory only at the time of arraignment; no such duty exists where the accused has proceeded to arraignment and trial with a counsel of his own choice, and the appointment of a counsel de oficio thereafter rests in the sound discretion of the trial court.

Joel P. Libuit operated Paeng Motorworks, a motor repair shop located at Barangay Sico, Lipa City, where Jose Bautista worked as a mechanic. Domingo del Mundo owned a Chevrolet 2-door hardtop, Plate No. EDD-725, Motor No. 18R-9597750, Chassis No. 1Y17H4W151340, valued at P60,000.00. Article 315(1)(b) of the Revised Penal Code penalizes swindling or estafa committed with unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, defined as the misappropriation or conversion, to the prejudice of another, of money, goods, or other personal property received by the offender in trust, on commission, for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same.

Joel P. Libuit operated Paeng Motorworks, a motor repair shop situated at Barangay Sico, Lipa City, where Jose Bautista was employed as a mechanic. Domingo del Mundo owned a Chevrolet 2-door hardtop, Plate No. EDD-725, Motor No. 18R-9597750, Chassis No. 1Y17H4W151340, valued at P60,000.00. Sometime in May 1993, del Mundo brought the car to the shop for repair of its damaged parts. Bautista received the vehicle in the presence of the petitioner, who assured del Mundo that the car would be safe in his motor shop.

When del Mundo returned to the motor shop in January 1994, he saw his car by the roadside while its engine was inside the shop. Bautista explained that the engine had been pulled out because it likewise needed repairs. Both the petitioner and Bautista nevertheless assured del Mundo that the repair work would be finished and that the car would be delivered to his house after two weeks. The petitioner failed to deliver the car, and del Mundo gave him another two-week extension. When the car was still not delivered, del Mundo returned to the motor shop and discovered that his car was already missing.

Del Mundo reported the matter to the police, whose investigation disclosed that the petitioner had sold the car's differential and cylinder head, while the engine could no longer be found.

For the defense, the petitioner testified on direct examination, but his counsel, Atty. Glenn P. Mendoza of De Jesus Linatoc and Associates, withdrew from the case after the initial cross-examination. On the petitioner's motion, the continuation of his cross-examination was reset to give him time to engage the services of another counsel, and he eventually secured the services of Atty. Jose Dimayuga. At the subsequent hearings on October 13, 1997 and November 26, 1997, however, Atty. Dimayuga failed to appear despite notices. On motion of the prosecution, the trial court issued an Order dated November 26, 1997 striking the petitioner's direct testimony from the records and declaring the case submitted for decision on the basis of the evidence already on record.

The petitioner alleged that at the time the car was left, it was Bautista who operated the motor shop by virtue of a verbal lease with his mother, and that Bautista abandoned the motor shop in October 1993. He never denied, however, that when del Mundo returned to the motor shop in January 1994, the car and its engine were still there.

The trial court gave credence to the prosecution's evidence, finding that the elements of estafa with abuse of confidence were present, and the Court of Appeals affirmed these findings, noting that del Mundo had categorically identified the petitioner as the owner of the shop, that the car had been received at the shop operated by the petitioner who was obliged to repair and deliver it to del Mundo's house, and that the petitioner was present and had assured del Mundo of the car's safety when it was left with Bautista.

• Entrustment: Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in not considering that the prosecution failed to prove that the subject vehicle was entrusted to him, contending that the car was not entrusted to him and that he had no duty to deliver it to the private complainant.
• Absence of Demand: Petitioner maintained that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in affirming the trial court's finding of guilt despite the absence of a formal demand for him to fulfill the trust or to return the thing received, and that the private complainant did not demand the return of his car.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: Petitioner contended that the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in convicting him without sufficient evidence of his guilt, the trial court having gravely misapprehended the facts in finding that the elements of estafa with abuse of confidence under Article 315(1)(b) of the Revised Penal Code were present.
• Right to Counsel: Petitioner contended that the trial court should have appointed a counsel de oficio when his counsel consistently failed to appear for his cross-examination, thereby depriving him of his constitutional right to counsel.

• Entrustment of the Vehicle: Whether the prosecution proved that the subject vehicle was entrusted to the petitioner so as to give rise to an obligation to make delivery of or to return the same under Article 315(1)(b) of the Revised Penal Code.
• Demand: Whether a formal demand for the fulfillment of the trust or the return of the thing received was necessary, and whether demand was in fact made upon the petitioner.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: Whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain the petitioner's conviction for estafa.
• Right to Counsel: Whether the petitioner was deprived of his constitutional right to counsel when the trial court struck his direct testimony from the records and submitted the case for decision after his newly engaged counsel repeatedly failed to appear.

• Entrustment of the Vehicle: Yes. The car was received at the motor shop operated by the petitioner, who was under an obligation to repair and deliver it; the petitioner could not disclaim responsibility merely because his mechanic received it, since he was present and assured the complainant that the car would be safe in his shop.
• Demand: No formal demand was required. Demand was properly made when the private complainant returned to the motor shop after giving the petitioner a two-week extension to complete the repair, and again after a further two-week extension, only to discover that the car was missing.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: Yes. All four elements of estafa under Article 315(1)(b) of the Revised Penal Code were established, and the factual findings of the trial court, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are entitled to great weight and respect absent any showing of overlooked facts or grave abuse of discretion.
• Right to Counsel: No. The duty to appoint a counsel de oficio is mandatory only at the time of arraignment and does not exist where the accused has proceeded to arraignment and trial with a counsel of his own choice; the appointment of a counsel de oficio thereafter is discretionary with the trial court.

• Entrustment of the Vehicle: The elements of estafa under Article 315(1)(b) of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) that money, goods, or other personal properties are received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return, the same; (2) that there is a misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial on his part of such receipt; (3) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (4) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender. On the evidence, the Court entertained no doubt that the petitioner operated Paeng Motorworks, private complainant Domingo del Mundo having categorically identified him as the owner. Jose Bautista, to whom the car was entrusted, was a mechanic in the petitioner's shop, and the petitioner could not disclaim responsibility for the return of the car simply because it was his mechanic who received it; when the car was left with Bautista, the petitioner was present and even assured the private complainant that it would be safe in his motor shop. Even crediting the petitioner's allegation that at the time the car was left it was Bautista who operated the motor shop by virtue of a verbal lease with his mother, the petitioner remained liable, because by his own allegation Bautista abandoned the motor shop in October 1993, yet the petitioner never denied that when the private complainant returned in January 1994 the car and its engine were still there. By then the petitioner should have been put on notice as to the car's ownership; notwithstanding that information, he still sold its differential and cylinder head.

• Demand: Demand was properly made when the private complainant returned to the motor shop after giving the petitioner a two-week extension to complete the car's repair. When del Mundo went to the motor shop in January 1994, the petitioner promised to deliver the car after two weeks; when he failed in that promise, he was given another two-week extension by the private complainant; it was only when the car was still not delivered that del Mundo went back to the motor shop again and finally discovered that his car was missing there. The petitioner's acts were thus found inexcusable and his testimony on the witness stand unconvincing.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: Except for the petitioner's claim that he was deprived of his constitutional right to counsel, all the grounds he raised involved factual issues already passed upon twice below and were inappropriate in a petition for review under Rule 45, which allows only questions of law to be raised. Factual findings and conclusions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are entitled to great weight and respect and will not be disturbed on review in the absence of any clear showing that the lower courts overlooked certain facts or circumstances which would substantially affect the disposition of the case. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over cases elevated from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing or revising errors of law ascribed to the Court of Appeals, and the factual findings of the appellate court generally are conclusive, carrying even more weight when that court affirms the findings of the trial court, absent any showing that the findings are totally devoid of support in the record or are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute grave abuse of discretion.

• Right to Counsel: The duty of the court to appoint a counsel de oficio for the accused who has no counsel of choice and desires to employ the services of one is mandatory only at the time of arraignment. No such duty exists where the accused has proceeded to arraignment and then trial with a counsel of his own choice. Since the petitioner was represented by a counsel de parte at the arraignment and trial, the trial court could not be deemed duty-bound to appoint a counsel de oficio for the continuation of his cross-examination. After his initial cross-examination, the trial court granted the petitioner's motion to postpone, giving him sufficient time to engage the services of another counsel; the failure of Atty. Jose Dimayuga, his newly hired lawyer, to appear at the subsequent hearings without reason was sufficient legal basis for the trial court to order the striking from the records of his direct testimony and thereafter render judgment upon the evidence already presented. The repeated failure of the defendant's counsel to appear at the trial may even be taken as a deliberate attempt to delay the court's proceedings. At most, the appointment of a counsel de oficio in such a situation would be discretionary with the trial court, which discretion will not be interfered with in the absence of grave abuse; the trial court had been liberal in granting postponements asked by the petitioner himself, and such liberality removed any doubt that its order was tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

• Elements of estafa under Article 315(1)(b), Revised Penal Code — Estafa committed with unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence requires: (1) that money, goods, or other personal properties are received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return, the same; (2) that there is a misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial on his part of such receipt; (3) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (4) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender. The Court applied the test to the facts and found all four elements present, the vehicle having been received at the petitioner's motor shop for repair, sold in part by the petitioner, to the prejudice of the owner, and demanded back.

• Entrustment through an employee or mechanic — A shop operator who receives a customer's property for repair cannot disclaim the resulting obligation to return it merely because the property was physically received by his mechanic. The Court held that the petitioner could not disclaim responsibility for the return of the car simply because it was his mechanic who received it, since the petitioner was present when the car was left and even assured the private complainant that it would be safe in his motor shop. The doctrine extends liability even where the accused alleges that another person operated the shop under a verbal lease, where the accused subsequently dealt with the property as his own after being placed on notice of its ownership.

• Demand in estafa by abuse of confidence — Demand is an essential element of estafa under Article 315(1)(b), but it need not be formal. The Court treated the private complainant's repeated returns to the motor shop and his grant of successive two-week extensions for the completion of the repairs as sufficient demand, culminating in the discovery that the car was missing.

• Right to counsel — counsel de oficio mandatory only at arraignment — The duty of the court to appoint a counsel de oficio for an accused who has no counsel of choice and desires to employ the services of one is mandatory only at the time of arraignment. No such duty exists where the accused has proceeded to arraignment and then trial with a counsel of his own choice. Thereafter, the appointment of a counsel de oficio is discretionary with the trial court and will not be interfered with absent grave abuse of discretion.

• Striking of testimony for the repeated failure of defense counsel to appear — The unexplained failure of the accused's newly hired counsel to appear at subsequent hearings is a sufficient legal basis for the trial court to order the striking from the records of the accused's direct testimony and to render judgment upon the evidence already presented. Repeated failure of defense counsel to appear may even be taken as a deliberate attempt to delay the court's proceedings.

• Conclusiveness of factual findings affirmed by the Court of Appeals; Rule 45 limited to questions of law — Factual findings and conclusions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are entitled to great weight and respect and will not be disturbed on review absent a clear showing that the lower courts overlooked facts or circumstances that would substantially affect the disposition of the case. A petition for review under Rule 45 allows only questions of law to be raised, and the Supreme Court's jurisdiction over cases elevated from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing or revising errors of law ascribed to that court.

• "The elements of estafa under Article 315 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code are as follows: (1) that money, goods, or other personal properties are received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return, the same; (2) that there is a misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial on his part of such receipt; (3) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and, (4) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender." — This is the Court's canonical enumeration of the elements of estafa with abuse of confidence under Article 315(1)(b), the framework against which the petitioner's conviction was tested.

• "Petitioner could not disclaim responsibility for the return of the car simply because it was his mechanic who received it." — This states the ratio decidendi on the first element of estafa, holding that receipt of the property by an employee in the operator's presence and with his assurance of safekeeping binds the operator to the obligation to return it.

• "On the issue of demand, it is our view that demand was properly made when the private complainant returned to the motor shop after giving the petitioner a two-week extension to complete the car's repair." — This resolves the fourth element of estafa, establishing that the complainant's repeated returns and grant of extensions constituted sufficient demand notwithstanding the absence of a formal written demand.

• "The duty of the court to appoint a counsel de oficio for the accused who has no counsel of choice and desires to employ the services of one is mandatory only at the time of arraignment. No such duty exists where the accused has proceeded to arraignment and then trial with a counsel of his own choice." — This is the controlling formulation on the right to counsel, delimiting the mandatory appointment of a counsel de oficio to the arraignment stage.

• Filadams Pharma, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132422, 30 March 2004, 426 SCRA 460, 467-468 — Cited as the authority for the four elements of estafa under Article 315(1)(b) of the Revised Penal Code, which the Court applied to sustain the conviction.
• Ty vs. People, G.R. No. 149275, 27 September 2004, 439 SCRA 220, 228-229 — Cited for the rule that factual findings and conclusions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are entitled to great weight and respect and will not be disturbed on review absent a clear showing that the lower courts overlooked facts or circumstances substantially affecting the disposition of the case.
• Lim vs. People, G.R. No. 143231, 26 October 2001, 368 SCRA 436, 441 — Cited together with Ty vs. People for the same proposition on the conclusiveness of the lower courts' factual findings.
• Sayson vs. People, No. L-51745, 28 October 1988, 166 SCRA 680, 690-691 — Cited on the right to counsel, supporting the rule that the appointment of a counsel de oficio in a situation such as the present case is discretionary with the trial court and will not be interfered with absent grave abuse of discretion.
• People vs. Serzo, Jr., G.R. No. 118435, 20 June 1997, 274 SCRA 553, 567 — Cited with Sayson vs. People on the duty to appoint a counsel de oficio and the consequences of the absence of counsel during trial.

• Article 315(1)(b), Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes swindling or estafa committed with unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely, by misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any other personal property received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return, the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond, or by denying having received such money, goods, or other property. The provision supplied the elements the Court applied in sustaining the petitioner's conviction for selling the car's differential and cylinder head after receiving the vehicle for repair.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Applied by the trial court in imposing the penalty of imprisonment ranging from eight (8) years and eight (8) months of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years and ten (10) months of reclusion temporal as maximum, a sentence left undisturbed on review.
• Rule 45, Rules of Court — Governs the petition for review on certiorari, which allows only questions of law to be raised. The Court invoked it in declining to revisit the factual issues raised by the petitioner, leaving the alleged deprivation of the constitutional right to counsel as the only properly raised question of law.
• Constitutional right to counsel — The Court resolved the petitioner's claim of deprivation of his constitutional right to counsel by holding that the duty to appoint a counsel de oficio is mandatory only at the time of arraignment and does not arise where the accused has proceeded to arraignment and trial with a counsel of his own choice.

Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman); Ynares-Santiago, J.; Carpio, J.; and Azcuna, J., all concurring.