Libanan vs. Sandiganbayan

Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 mandates the preventive suspension pendente lite of any incumbent public officer against whom a valid information for violation of that Act is pending, regardless of whether the office currently held is different from the office held when the offense was charged; public office is not property protected by due process, and reelection does not bar such suspension.

Marcelino C. Libanan was the incumbent Vice-Governor of Eastern Samar and had been a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan prior to the 11 May 1992 elections. Agustin B. Docena claimed appointment as a duly qualified replacement of deceased Sangguniang Panlalawigan member Luis A. Capito, while Atty. Socrates B. Alar was recognized by provincial officials as the official replacement. The controversy implicated Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, which penalizes causing undue injury or giving unwarranted benefits through evident bad faith or manifest partiality, and Section 13 of the same statute, which provides for suspension pendente lite of incumbent public officers facing valid informations under the Act.

Marcelino C. Libanan was the incumbent Vice-Governor of Eastern Samar and had been a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of that province prior to the 11 May 1992 elections. On or about 08 January 1991, in Borongan, Eastern Samar, an information alleged that Governor Lutgardo B. Barbo, Vice-Governor Camilo A. Camenforte, and Sangguniang Panlalawigan Members Marcos B. Alido, Nonato A. Gerna, Ismael G. Kho, Marcelino C. Libanan, Nicolas O. Pimentel, and Generoso A. Yu conspired with one another, through evident bad faith and manifest partiality, to prevent and exclude Agustin B. Docena, a duly appointed and qualified replacement of deceased Sangguniang Panlalawigan member Luis A. Capito, from exercising his rights and prerogatives as a member of the body. The alleged means was the promulgation, in their official capacities, of Sangguniang Panlalawigan Resolution No. 01, Series of 1991, wherein the accused expressed recognition of Atty. Socrates B. Alar as the official replacement of the deceased member, notwithstanding the recall of his appointment by the Department of Local Government, to the damage and prejudice of Docena.

On 25 May 1992, an information docketed Criminal Case No. 17756 was filed before the Sandiganbayan, charging the accused with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. On motion of the prosecution for suspension of the accused public officials pendente lite, and upon finding that the accused were charged under a valid information, the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution dated 26 July 1993 suspending Gov. Lutgardo Barbo, Vice-Gov. Marcelino C. Libanan, and Sangguniang Panlalawigan members Nonato A. Gerna and Generoso A. Yu from their respective public positions, or from any other public office they might be holding, for a period of ninety (90) days.

Accused Barbo and Libanan filed their respective motions for reconsideration, which the Sandiganbayan denied in its resolution of 30 September 1993. From the orders, Libanan appealed to the Supreme Court.

• Due Process: Petitioner argued that the order of suspension, if executed, would constitute an affront on his constitutional right to due process; he contended that the order was predicated on acts supposedly committed while he was still a member of the Sangguniang Bayan and could no longer attach to him now that he was the duly elected and incumbent Vice-Governor of Eastern Samar, and that its implementation would amount to a deprivation of property without due process of law.
• Electoral Covenant: Petitioner maintained that the order of suspension, once implemented, would amount to an assault on the sacred covenant reposed in him by the people of Eastern Samar.
• Obsolete Purpose: Petitioner asserted that the reasons sought to be prevented by the suspension order pendente lite no longer existed.

• Due Process and Applicability to Current Office: Whether the Sandiganbayan’s order suspending petitioner pendente lite violated his constitutional right to due process, particularly because the acts charged were allegedly committed while he held a different office and he was already the incumbent Vice-Governor.
• Electoral Covenant: Whether the suspension order amounted to an assault on the covenant reposed in petitioner by the people of Eastern Samar.
• Obsolete Purpose: Whether the suspension order should be denied because the reasons sought to be prevented by pendente lite suspension no longer existed.

• Due Process and Applicability to Current Office: No. Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 mandates suspension of any incumbent public officer against whom a valid information is pending, and the term “office” applies to any office the officer currently holds, not necessarily the office under which he was charged; public office is not property for due process.
• Electoral Covenant: No. The covenant with the people is not equivalent to a license and cannot cut athwart the law; reelection does not abate the criminal prosecution or bar suspension under Section 13.
• Obsolete Purpose: No. The statute is clear and explicit; Republic Act No. 3019 unequivocally mandates suspension, which is mandatory, with no “ifs” and “buts.”

• Due Process and Applicability to Current Office: Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 provides that any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under the Act, under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property is pending in court shall be suspended from office. Petitioner contended that the suspension order, being predicated on acts committed while he was still a member of the Sangguniang Bayan, could no longer attach to him as the duly elected and incumbent Vice-Governor, and that implementation would deprive him of property without due process. In Deloso vs. Sandiganbayan, the Court rejected a similar argument advanced by Governor Deloso, who at the time of issuance of the suspension order was already occupying the office of governor and not the position of municipal mayor that he held previously when charged with violating the Anti-Graft Law. Prior to Deloso, in Bayot vs. Sandiganbayan, the suspension of then Cavite mayor Bayot was sustained even as he was charged for acts committed as a government auditor of the Commission on Audit. In both instances, the Court ruled that the term “office” used in the law could apply to any office which the officer charged might currently be holding and not necessarily the particular office under which he was charged. The suspension order could not amount to a deprivation of property without due process of law because public office is a public agency or trust, and it is not the property envisioned by the constitutional provision invoked by petitioner.
• Electoral Covenant: Petitioner’s so-called covenant with the people of Eastern Samar is not synonymous to, or the equivalent of, a license, and it cannot cut athwart the long arm of the law. In Oliveros vs. Villaluz, the Court said that since the criminal prosecution against the petitioner-accused was concededly not abated by the fact of his reelection, the pendency of such criminal case under a valid information under Republic Act No. 3019 clearly supplies the legal basis for his suspension from office in a subsequent term in the event of his reelection by virtue of Section 13 of the Act.
• Obsolete Purpose: The third assigned error need not be delved into. When the statute is clear and explicit, there is hardly room for any extended court ratiocination or rationalization of the law. Republic Act No. 3019 unequivocally mandates the suspension of a public official from office pending a criminal prosecution against him. The Court has repeatedly held that such preventive suspension is mandatory, and there are no “ifs” and “buts” about it, as shown in Bunye, et al. vs. Associate Justices Escareal, et al., Gonzaga vs. Sandiganbayan, People vs. Albano, and People vs. Court of Appeals.

• Preventive suspension pendente lite under Section 13, Republic Act No. 3019 is mandatory — Any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under Republic Act No. 3019, under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property is pending in court shall be suspended from office. The Court applied the provision after the Sandiganbayan found a valid information and ordered suspension, holding that the suspension is mandatory and admits of no “ifs” and “buts.”
• The term “office” in Section 13 refers to any office currently held — The term “office” used in the law applies to any office which the officer charged might currently be holding and not necessarily the particular office under which he was charged. The Court applied this to Libanan, who was charged for acts committed as a Sangguniang Panlalawigan member but was already incumbent Vice-Governor; the suspension still attached to his current office.
• Public office is not property for purposes of due process — Public office is a public agency or trust, and it is not the property envisioned by the constitutional due process provision. The Court applied this to reject petitioner’s claim that the suspension order deprived him of property without due process of law.
• Reelection does not abate criminal prosecution or bar suspension under Section 13 — The pendency of a criminal case under a valid information under Republic Act No. 3019 supplies the legal basis for suspension from office in a subsequent term in the event of the officer’s reelection. The Court applied this to hold that Libanan’s election as Vice-Governor did not shield him from the suspension order.

• "Any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under title 7, book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. . . ." — This is the Court’s quotation of Section 13, Republic Act No. 3019, the controlling provision that makes preventive suspension mandatory.
• "In both instances, this Court ruled that the term "office" used in the law could apply to any office which the officer charged might currently be holding and not necessarily the particular office under which he was charged." — This passage states the ratio for rejecting petitioner’s argument that the suspension could not attach to his current office as Vice-Governor.
• "Public office is "a public agency or trust," and it is not the property envisioned by the Constitutional provision which petitioner invokes." — This defines the Court’s due process holding: suspension from public office does not amount to deprivation of property without due process.
• "Since the criminal prosecution against petitioner-accused is concededly not abated by the fact of his reelection, the pendency of such criminal case under a valid information under Republic Act 3019 may clearly be and supplies the legal basis for his suspension from office in a subsequent term in the event of his reelection by virtue of the provisions of section 13 of the Act." — This excerpt, quoted from Oliveros vs. Villaluz, supplies the rule that reelection does not bar suspension under Section 13.

• Deloso vs. Sandiganbayan, 173 SCRA 409 — Controlling precedent; the Court rejected a similar argument by Governor Deloso, who was already governor and not municipal mayor when the suspension order issued, and sustained the suspension.
• Bayot vs. Sandiganbayan, 128 SCRA 383 — Controlling precedent; the suspension of then Cavite mayor Bayot was sustained even though he was charged for acts committed as a government auditor of the Commission on Audit, supporting the rule that “office” refers to the current office.
• Oliveros vs. Villaluz, 57 SCRA 163 — Cited for the rule that reelection does not abate the criminal prosecution and that a valid information under Republic Act No. 3019 supplies the legal basis for suspension in a subsequent term.
• Bunye, et al. vs. Associate Justices Escareal, et al., G.R. No. 110216, 10 September 1993 — Cited for the mandatory nature of preventive suspension under Republic Act No. 3019.
• Gonzaga vs. Sandiganbayan, 201 SCRA 417 — Cited for the mandatory nature of preventive suspension.
• People vs. Albano, 163 SCRA 511 — Cited for the mandatory nature of preventive suspension.
• People vs. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 372 — Cited for the mandatory nature of preventive suspension.

• Section 13, Republic Act No. 3019 — Provides that any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under the Act, under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property is pending in court shall be suspended from office. The Court applied it to affirm the Sandiganbayan’s 90-day suspension of Libanan.
• Section 3(e), Republic Act No. 3019 — The offense charged in the information: causing undue injury or giving unwarranted benefits through evident bad faith or manifest partiality. The information alleged that Libanan and others violated this provision by promulgating the resolution excluding Docena.
• Constitutional due process provision invoked by petitioner — Petitioner claimed the suspension order deprived him of property without due process. The Court held that public office is a public agency or trust, not the property envisioned by the constitutional provision invoked.

Feliciano, Bidin, Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.