Lezama vs. Rodriguez

A wife who is co-defendant with her husband in an action charging fraudulent conspiracy between them cannot be compelled by the adverse party to testify as a hostile or adverse-party witness concerning her participation in the alleged fraud, for such examination violates the prohibition in Section 20(b) of Rule 130 against examining a wife for or against her husband without his consent.

Jose Manuel Lezama and Paquita Lezama were the president-manager and secretary, respectively, of the La Paz Ice Plant & Cold Storage Co., Inc., a company placed under the receivership of Jose S. Dineros allegedly because of mismanagement. Section 20(b) of Rule 130 disqualifies and privileges spouses from testifying for or against each other except in specified cases, while Section 6 of Rule 132 permits interrogation of an unwilling, hostile, or adverse-party witness by leading questions.

Jose Manuel Lezama and Paquita Lezama were connected with the La Paz Ice Plant & Cold Storage Co., Inc. in Iloilo as its president-manager and secretary. Because of alleged mismanagement by the Lezamas, the company was placed under the receivership of Jose S. Dineros. During the pendency of the receivership, Marciano C. Roque brought an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila in civil case 39827 against the company for collection of P150,000 allegedly lent to it, with summons served not on the receiver but on the Lezama spouses.

Through alleged collusion of the Lezamas, Roque obtained judgment by default against the company in the Manila case. On July 18, 1960 Dineros, together with C.N. Hodges and Ricardo Gurrea, filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo for annulment of that Manila judgment, naming Roque and the Lezama spouses as defendants. The complaint alleged that summons having been served on Jose Manuel Lezama instead of on the receiver, the Manila court acquired no jurisdiction, rendering its decision void, and that in paragraph 13 defendants in gross and evident bad faith and in fraudulent conspiracy made it appear that the company had obtained a P150,000 loan from Roque through Jose Manuel Lezama under authority evidenced by board minutes signed by him and attested by Benjamin Luis Borja and Paquita Lezama, with the spouses manipulating corporate books to reflect the fictitious loan.

In their answer the Lezama spouses admitted the receivership but maintained that Jose Manuel Lezama nevertheless remained president with authority to receive summons for the company in civil case 39827. According to petitioners, they did not contest Roque's claim because as president-manager and secretary they believed the obligation to be legitimate, incurred pursuant to board resolution, duly entered in corporate books and spent for corporate benefit, and they specifically denied conspiracy and bad faith. They did not deny that Paquita Lezama as secretary signed the minutes authorizing negotiation of the loan and made the corresponding book entry.

After issues were joined and hearing commenced, Dineros asked the court to issue a subpoena to Paquita Lezama to testify as a witness summoned by plaintiffs in accordance with the Rules of Court, evidently to test the claim that the loan transaction was above board. Petitioners objected on the ground of marital disqualification and privilege. The trial court overruled the objection and required the wife to appear and testify, and the Court of Appeals dismissed certiorari therefrom.

• Marital Privilege Under Section 20(b): Petitioner argued that Paquita Lezama could not be examined for or against her husband without his consent, except in a civil case by one against the other or in specified criminal cases, and objected to the subpoena on that ground.
• Effect of Compelled Testimony in Conspiracy Charge: Petitioner insisted that compelling Paquita Lezama to testify would transgress Section 20(b) of Rule 130, especially if her testimony would support the plaintiff's charge of collusive fraud.
• Interrelated Spousal Interests: Petitioner maintained that testimony adverse to the wife's own interests would show collusive fraud between the spouses and destroy their common defense that the loan was not fictitious, while self-exculpatory testimony could disparage the husband's interests.

• Adverse-Party Examination Under Section 6: Respondent countered that Paquita Lezama was sought to be called merely as an adverse party witness and could be interrogated by leading questions, contradicted and impeached as if called by the adverse party, pursuant to Section 6 of Rule 132.
• Receivability Against Herself Alone: Respondent argued that the wife could be compelled to testify with her testimony receivable only against her, and that each spouse may testify in his or her own behalf or against his or her own interest even if the testimony inures to the benefit of or militates against the other spouse.
• Separate Testimony Theory: Respondent maintained that when husband and wife are parties to an action, either may be examined as a witness for or against himself or herself alone, with testimony operating only against himself or herself.
• Fraud Discovery Necessity: Respondent urged that barring spousal testimony would encourage husband-wife alliance as an instrument of fraud by making a co-conspirator immune to the most convenient mode of discovery available to the opposite party.

• Marital Privilege vs. Adverse-Party Examination: Whether a wife, who is a co-defendant of her husband in an action, may be examined as a hostile witness by the adverse party under Section 6 of Rule 132 without infringing her marital privilege not to testify against her husband under Section 20(b) of Rule 130.
• Collusive Fraud Charge: Whether, in a suit charging fraudulent conspiracy between the spouses and a third person, the wife may be compelled to testify as an adverse-party witness concerning her participation in the alleged fraud.

• Marital Privilege vs. Adverse-Party Examination: No. Section 6 of Rule 132, a mere concession for discovery, cannot be expanded to permit examination of a spouse where the natural repugnance against compelling one spouse to become the means of the other's condemnation obtains.
• Collusive Fraud Charge: No. Compulsion is barred where the wife's testimony on the board minutes and book entries would inevitably pit her against her husband because their interests and common defense are interrelated.

• Marital Privilege vs. Adverse-Party Examination: Section 20(b) of Rule 130 embodies both disqualification based on spousal relationship and privilege not to testify against each other, grounded on repugnance to compelling a spouse to be the means of the other's condemnation and subjecting the culprit to humiliation of condemnation by an intimate life partner. Section 6 of Rule 132 allowing leading interrogation, contradiction and impeachment of an adverse party or corporate officer is merely a concession for discovery from that protective rule. Accordingly, discovery was not to be expanded to allow examination of one's spouse where such repugnance obtains, particularly as respondent had not demonstrated absence of other available evidence.
• Collusive Fraud Charge: The complaint charged fraudulent conspiracy to fabricate a P150,000 loan, specifying Paquita Lezama's participation as secretary in signing the authorizing minutes and making the book entry, which petitioners did not deny while asserting legitimacy of the obligation. Examination would necessarily concern what transpired at the meeting and veracity or falsity of the entry, and whether adverse or beneficial to herself, would pit wife against husband given necessarily interrelated interests. Testimony adverse to herself would tend to prove collusive fraud and destroy the common defense; testimony softening her own guilt could unwittingly disparage the husband. Jurisdictions permitting hostile examination of a spouse-party do so only where spousal interests are separate or separable or the spouse is merely formal or nominal, conditions absent where the evident purpose is to prove the conspiracy charge itself.

• Marital disqualification and marital privilege — Section 20(b) of Rule 130 contains two distinct concepts resting on different policy grounds: disqualification of husband and wife to testify in each other's behalf, based on spousal relationship rather than pecuniary interest, and privilege not to testify against each other, grounded on natural repugnance to compelling a spouse to become the means of the other's condemnation. Both were applied to bar compelled adverse-party testimony in a conspiracy suit between spouses.
• Adverse-party or hostile witness examination as limited discovery concession — Section 6 of Rule 132 permits a party to call an adverse party or corporate officer and interrogate by leading questions and contradict and impeach as if called by the adverse party. The rule is a mere concession for discovery from the marital protection and must not be expanded to allow spousal examination where the protected repugnance obtains.
• Limitation on spousal hostile-witness exception — Even where one spouse may be examined as hostile witness when both spouses are parties, admissibility is confined to cases where spousal interests are separate or separable or the spouse offered is merely a formal or nominal party. The exception is inapplicable where the main charge is collusive fraud between the spouses and examination is sought to prove that charge.

• "A husband cannot be examined for or against his wife without her consent; nor a wife for or against her husband without his consent, except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other." — States the controlling text of Section 20(b) of Rule 130 invoked to bar compulsory spousal testimony.
• "Whether her testimony will turn out to be adverse or beneficial to her own interest, the inevitable result would be to pit her against her husband." — Explains why examination concerning the minutes and book entries violates the privilege where spousal interests are interrelated in a conspiracy charge.
• "The said rule of discovery should therefore not be expanded in meaning or scope as to allow examination of one's spouse in a situation where this natural repugnance obtains." — Limits Section 6 of Rule 132 discovery and furnishes the ratio for reversal and remand.

• United States vs. Concepcion, 31 Phil. 182 (1915) — Cited for the rationale that public policy growing out of the marital relation bars spousal testimony for or against each other to avoid temptation to perjury and endangerment of marital harmony and confidence.
• People vs. Francisco, 78 Phil. 694 (1947) — Cited for the four reasons for the privilege: identity of interests, danger of perjury, guarding security and confidences of private life even at risk of occasional failure of justice, and danger of punishing one spouse through hostile testimony of the other where domestic tranquility is wanting.
• Menzel vs. Tubbs, et al., 53 NW 653, 656 — Cited as authority for the view that when husband and wife are parties, either may be examined for or against himself or herself alone, a view held inapplicable where collusive fraud between spouses is charged.

• Section 20(b), Rule 130, Rules of Court — Prohibits examination of a husband for or against his wife without her consent, nor a wife for or against her husband without his consent, except in specified civil and criminal cases; applied to bar compelling Paquita Lezama to testify against her co-defendant husband on the conspiracy charge.
• Section 6, Rule 132, Rules of Court — Allows interrogation of unwilling or hostile witnesses by leading questions and calling of an adverse party or corporate officer for such examination with contradiction and impeachment; construed as a limited discovery concession that does not override marital privilege in the circumstances presented.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Sanchez, Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur. Makalintal and Zaldivar, JJ., took no part.