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Letran Calamba Faculty and Employees Association vs. National Labor Relations Commission and Colegio de San Juan de Letran Calamba, Inc.

The petition was denied and the Court of Appeals decision affirming the National Labor Relations Commission was upheld. Petitioner union sought various monetary claims against private respondent school, principally inclusion of faculty overload pay performed within eight hours a day in 13th-month pay computation. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the money claims for lack of merit, the National Labor Relations Commission affirmed, and the Court of Appeals dismissed certiorari for failure to show grave abuse of discretion. Exclusion was sustained on the ground that overload is extra work beyond the regular teaching load and thus not part of basic salary.

Primary Holding

Overload pay, as compensation for teaching work in excess of the regular teaching load, is additional compensation distinct from regular or basic salary and is excluded as basis in computing 13th-month pay under Presidential Decree No. 851, even when performed within the normal eight-hour working day.

Background

Petitioner Letran Calamba Faculty and Employees Association is the union of faculty members and employees of respondent Colegio de San Juan de Letran Calamba, Inc., a private educational institution. The controversy concerns the meaning of basic salary under Presidential Decree No. 851 and its implementing rules for purposes of 13th-month pay of teachers with regular teaching loads and additional overload assignments. Conflicting interpretations had been issued by the Bureau of Working Conditions and the Legal Services Department of the Department of Labor and Employment, later addressed by DOLE-DECS-CHED-TESDA Order No. 02, Series of 1996.

History

  1. Regional Arbitration Branch No. IV, NLRC, October 8, 1992 — petitioner filed complaint for collection of monetary claims, docketed as NLRC Case No. RAB-IV-10-4560-92-L; separate money-claims complaint earlier filed with DOLE Regional Office No. IV later docketed as NLRC Case No. RAB-IV-11-4624-92-L.

  2. Regional Arbitration Branch No. IV, NLRC, January 1994 — respondent filed petition to declare illegal the strike staged by petitioner, docketed as NLRC Case No. RAB-IV-3-6555-94-L; the three cases were subsequently consolidated.

  3. Labor Arbiter, September 28, 1998 — dismissed both money-claims cases for lack of merit and dismissed the petition to declare strike illegal, but reprimanded and sternly warned union officers, particularly President Edmundo F. Marifosque, Sr.

  4. NLRC, July 28, 1999 — dismissed both parties' appeals; on June 21, 2000, denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.

  5. Court of Appeals, May 14, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 61552 — dismissed petitioner's special civil action for certiorari; on November 28, 2002, denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, leading to the present Rule 45 petition.

Facts

On October 8, 1992, petitioner, acting in behalf of its members listed in Annex A of its Position Paper, filed a complaint against respondent school for collection of various monetary claims. Petitioner alleged that respondent excluded compensation for teaching overloads from the computation of thirteenth-month pay of academic personnel, taking into account only pay for teaching loads not exceeding eighteen units although overloads were rendered within eight hours a day. It further alleged non-payment of wage increases under Wage Order No. 5, non-compliance with the formula under DECS Memorandum Circular No. 2 dated March 10, 1989 in computing compensation per unit of excess load or overload, non-payment of salary increases for non-academic personnel as a result of job grading annually practiced since 1980, non-payment of balances of seventy percent of tuition fee increases for 1990, 1991 and 1992, and non-payment of holiday pay for ten regular holidays under Article 94 of the Labor Code despite repeated demands. Respondent denied all allegations in its Position Paper filed January 29, 1993, after which petitioner filed its Reply on March 10, 1993.

Pending resolution, respondent sought a declaration of illegality of the strike staged by petitioner in January 1994, and the three related cases were consolidated for joint resolution. The Labor Arbiter found that after the one-year exemption from Wage Order No. 5 granted by then Labor Minister Blas Ople, the school settled its obligations conformably with the June 26, 1985 management-employees agreement signed by then Faculty President Porferio Ferrer, with payroll journals showing payment of Wage Order No. 5 and even Wage Order No. 6 benefits beginning June 16, 1985. The claim for differentials for excess load was rejected because there were no classes from June 1-14 and October 17-31 during the schoolyears in point and extra load is payable only when actually performed. Job grading was found to be a merit-like classification system initiated only in schoolyear 1989-1990 with a new process in 1992, hence neither consistent nor long-standing enough to create a non-diminishable benefit under Article 100. On tuition fee increases, the testimony of Accounting Coordinator Rosario Manlapaz and reports from journals and general ledgers showed a deficit of P445,942.25 in schoolyear 1989-1990 and payouts of 91% and 77% of tuition fee increments in schoolyears 1990-1991 and 1991-1992. On holiday pay, individual pay records showed employees paid for all days worked in the year using factor 365, indicating monthly salaries already included legal holidays.

Arguments of the Petitioners

  • Scope of Certiorari Review: Petitioner argued that in a special civil action for certiorari brought before the Court of Appeals, the appellate court can review the factual findings and legal conclusions of the NLRC, citing Agustilo vs. Court of Appeals.
  • Inclusion of Overload Pay in 13th-Month Pay: Petitioner maintained that under the Revised Guidelines on the Implementation of the 13th-Month Pay Law of November 16, 1987, basic pay includes all remunerations for services rendered except cash equivalents of unused vacation and sick leave credits, overtime, premium, night differential, holiday pay and cost-of-living allowances, and since overload pay falls under none of the exclusions and is performed within eight hours a day, it must be included, as supported by Bureau of Working Conditions opinions.
  • Non-Retroactivity and Protection of Labor: Petitioner argued that DOLE-DECS-CHED-TESDA Order No. 02, Series of 1996 cannot apply retroactively to complaints commenced in 1992, that the prevailing rule at commencement required inclusion, that retroactive application would deprive workers of vested benefits in violation of constitutional protection of labor, and that doubts in interpretation of labor laws must be resolved in favor of labor.
  • Lack of Substantial Evidence: Petitioner contended that the Court of Appeals failed to specify what constituted substantial evidence supporting the NLRC decision and thus acted arbitrarily in affirming dismissal of the monetary claims.

Arguments of the Respondents

  • Limited Scope of Certiorari: Respondent countered that judicial review in certiorari does not extend to sufficiency of evidence but is limited to jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, requiring a convincing showing of capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic action which petitioner failed to prove.
  • Inapplicability of Agustilo: Respondent argued that Agustilo vs. Court of Appeals is an exception applicable only where LA and NLRC findings are at variance, whereas here their findings of fact and conclusions of law coincide, and that the discretion to review facts rests with the Court of Appeals absent unclear or ambiguous findings warranting certiorari.
  • Mandatory Nature of DOLE Order: Respondent maintained that the DOLE Order interprets the 13th-Month Pay Law, P.D. No. 851, and was therefore mandatory for the Labor Arbiter to apply, affirming the March 4, 1992 opinion of the DOLE Legal Services Office that remunerations for teaching in excess of regular load are excluded from basic salary unless included by company practice or policy.
  • Prevailing Rule and Money Claims: Respondent averred that prior to the DOLE Order the prevailing rule excluded excess teaching load, akin to overtime, from basic salary and 13th-month pay, and that the Labor Arbiter's findings on Wage Order No. 5, overload differentials, job grading, tuition fee shares and holiday pay, as affirmed by the NLRC and Court of Appeals, rest on clear factual and legal bases.

Issues

  • Scope of Review in Certiorari: Whether the factual findings of the NLRC may be reviewed in certiorari proceedings before the Court of Appeals and in a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.
  • Overload Pay in 13th-Month Pay: Whether the pay of faculty members for teaching overloads should be included as basis in the computation of their 13th-month pay.
  • Sufficiency of Evidence for Money Claims: Whether the NLRC decision denying petitioner's monetary claims is supported by substantial evidence.

Ruling

  • Scope of Review in Certiorari: No. Review in certiorari is confined to jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion and does not include re-evaluation of evidence or factual findings, which are accorded respect and finality absent capriciousness or total disregard of material evidence.
  • Overload Pay in 13th-Month Pay: No. Overload pay is additional compensation for work in excess of the regular teaching load, not part of regular or basic salary, and is therefore excluded from 13th-month pay computation under P.D. No. 851 and its implementing rules.
  • Sufficiency of Evidence for Money Claims: Yes. The unanimous factual findings of the Labor Arbiter, NLRC and Court of Appeals are binding and sustained, being supported by substantial evidence with no cogent basis for reversal.

Ruling Rationale

  • Scope of Review in Certiorari: The jurisdiction to review an NLRC decision by certiorari is limited to errors of jurisdiction including grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, following Odango vs. National Labor Relations Commission. No acceptable demonstration was made that the Labor Arbiter or NLRC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, so there was no reason to examine correctness of evidentiary evaluation. Findings of the Labor Arbiter affirmed by the NLRC and Court of Appeals bind the Supreme Court unless patently erroneous, the Court not being a trier of facts, especially in labor cases where administrative expertise commands great respect and finality.
  • Overload Pay in 13th-Month Pay: Basic salary under P.D. No. 851 excludes earnings and other remunerations not part of basic salary, as clarified by the Supplementary Rules and Regulations, which broadly exclude overtime pay, earnings and other remunerations. Following San Miguel Corporation vs. Inciong, overtime pay, premium for special holidays and similar payments are additional compensation added to regular wage or basic salary. By the same reasoning, overload pay compensates additional teaching work performed after completion of the regular teaching load prescribed by DECS, CHED, TESDA or school policies. Its performance within eight hours does not convert it into basic pay; it remains extra work, paid by the hour rather than monthly, dependent on availability of extra loads and varying per semester, hence not integrated into regular salary. While the 1996 DOLE Order was not given retroactive effect as an administrative ruling, the same result follows from proper construction of basic salary, with courts finally determining the law's meaning despite advisory agency opinions.
  • Sufficiency of Evidence for Money Claims: The Labor Arbiter's detailed findings, affirmed by the NLRC and Court of Appeals, were supported by the June 26, 1985 settlement and payroll journals on Wage Order No. 5, unrefuted absence of classes negating extra-load differentials, non-consistent and short-lived job grading negating a vested Article 100 benefit, accounting testimony and ledgers showing deficit and 91% and 77% payouts of tuition fee increments, and pay records using factor 365 showing holiday pay inclusion. In petitions for review on certiorari, unanimous findings supported by substantial evidence are invariably sustained absent a showing that they are devoid of record support or glaringly erroneous, none of which was present.

Doctrines

  • Limited office of certiorari against NLRC decisions — Certiorari corrects only errors of jurisdiction including grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; it does not correct the NLRC's evaluation of evidence or factual findings. Applied to deny re-examination of labor tribunals' findings where no jurisdictional error or capricious disregard of evidence was demonstrated.
  • Finality of unanimous labor factual findings — Findings of the Labor Arbiter when affirmed by the NLRC and the Court of Appeals are binding on the Supreme Court unless patently erroneous, devoid of record support, or arrived at arbitrarily or in utter disregard of evidence. Applied to sustain dismissal of Wage Order, overload differential, job grading, tuition-fee share and holiday pay claims supported by payrolls, ledgers and testimony.
  • Supreme Court not a trier of facts in labor cases — In a petition for review on certiorari, jurisdiction is limited to errors of law, with greater restraint in labor cases where specialized agencies have expertise confined to specific matters. Applied to refuse reweighing of evidence already considered below.
  • Basic salary for 13th-month pay excludes additional compensation — Under Presidential Decree No. 851, its Implementing Rules and Supplementary Rules as construed in San Miguel Corporation vs. Inciong, basic salary strips fringe benefits, allowances, overtime pay, earnings and other remunerations not integrated into regular salary; the broad exclusionary phrase covers payments for work beyond regular requirements. Applied to hold overload honorarium distinct from regular teaching salary.
  • Overload vs. overtime distinction — Overload is teaching load in excess of the normal or regular teaching load prescribed by education authorities or school policies; overtime is work beyond eight hours daily under Article 83 and Article 87 of the Labor Code. Overload performed within eight hours remains extra assignment after completion of regular load and does not form part of regular or basic pay, while overload beyond eight hours is overtime work. Applied to reject the Bureau of Working Conditions view equating within-eight-hours overload with basic wage.
  • Administrative interpretation advisory; courts construe law — When an agency renders an opinion or policy statement, it merely interprets pre-existing law and is at best advisory, with courts finally determining legal meaning; administrative rulings generally lack retroactive effect. Applied to decline retroactive application of the 1996 DOLE Order yet reach exclusion through independent construction of basic salary.

Key Excerpts

  • "The sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction including the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It does not include correction of the NLRC's evaluation of the evidence or of its factual findings." — States the controlling limitation on certiorari review of NLRC decisions and the deference accorded to labor factual findings.
  • "when an administrative or executive agency renders an opinion or issues a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law and the administrative interpretation is at best advisory for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means." — Defines the weight of conflicting DOLE opinions and justifies independent judicial construction despite non-retroactivity of the 1996 Order.
  • "Overload partakes of the nature of temporary extra assignment and compensation therefore shall be considered as an overload honorarium if performed within the 8-hour work period and does not form part of the regular or basic pay." — Provides the regulatory formulation adopted in reasoning that within-eight-hours overload remains extra compensation excluded from basic salary.
  • "In the light of the foregoing discussions, it is the position of this Department that all basic salary/wage representing payments earned for actual work performed during or within the eight hours in a day, including payments for overload work within eight hours, form part of basic wage and therefore are to be included in the computation of 13th-month pay mandated by PD 851, as amended." — Reproduces the contrary Bureau of Working Conditions position that was considered and rejected in favor of treating overload as additional compensation.

Precedents Cited

  • Odango vs. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 147420, June 10, 2004, 431 SCRA 633 — Controlling precedent limiting appellate certiorari review of NLRC decisions to jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion and affirming finality of factual findings absent capriciousness.
  • San Miguel Corporation vs. Inciong, G.R. No. L-49774, February 24, 1981, 103 SCRA 139 — Controlling precedent construing basic salary under P.D. No. 851 to exclude overtime, premium and other earnings and remunerations not part of basic salary; extended by analogy to overload pay.
  • Agustilo vs. Court of Appeals, 417 Phil. 218 (2001) — Cited by petitioner as basis for factual review in certiorari; respondent distinguished it as an exception where LA and NLRC findings were at variance, unlike the unanimous findings here.
  • German Machineries Corporation vs. Endaya, G.R. No. 156810, November 25, 2004, 444 SCRA 329 — Cited for the rule that LA findings affirmed by NLRC and Court of Appeals bind the Supreme Court and that reweighing evidence is not its function.
  • Colegio de San Juan de Letran-Calamba vs. Villas, 447 Phil. 692, 700 (2003) — Cited for deference to administrative and quasi-judicial factual findings absent grave abuse of discretion or arbitrary disregard of evidence.

Provisions

  • Presidential Decree No. 851, 13th-Month Pay Law, and Implementing and Supplementary Rules — Basis for computing mandatory 13th-month pay as 1/12 of total basic salary; basic salary excludes cost-of-living allowances, profit-sharing, allowances and monetary benefits not integrated into regular salary, and overtime pay, earnings and other remunerations; applied to exclude overload honorarium.
  • Article 83, Labor Code — Provides normal hours of work shall not exceed eight hours a day; used to define normal working days and hours and to distinguish regular teaching load from overload and overtime.
  • Article 87, Labor Code — Provides overtime work beyond eight hours is paid additional compensation of regular wage plus at least 25%; supports characterization of extra-work pay as additional to basic salary.
  • Article 93, Labor Code — Provides work on special holidays is paid additional compensation of at least 30% of regular wage; similarly supports exclusion of premium pay from basic salary.
  • Article 94, Labor Code — Provides holiday pay for regular holidays; petitioner's claim rejected on evidence that monthly salaries using factor 365 already included legal holidays.
  • Article 100, Labor Code — Prohibits diminution of benefits; held inapplicable to job grading increases because grants were neither consistent nor for a considerable period to constitute a vested benefit.
  • DOLE-DECS-CHED-TESDA Order No. 02, Series of 1996 — Provides normal hours of academic personnel shall not exceed eight hours, excess teaching load is overload, and overload honorarium within eight hours does not form part of regular or basic pay; relied on by LA but held not retroactively applicable, though its construction was sustained by independent analysis.
  • Wage Order No. 5 — Basis for wage-increase claim; held satisfied after one-year exemption through June 26, 1985 settlement and payroll payments beginning June 16, 1985.

Notable Concurring Opinions

Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, Chairperson, Renato C. Corona, Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, and Ruben T. Reyes, Associate Justices, concurred. No separate concurring opinions with additional reasoning appear in the text.