Lerias vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal

Original election returns, duly authenticated and corroborated, prevail over a xerox copy of a certificate of canvass in an election protest to determine the actual winner, and rejection of such returns without convincing proof of manufacture or falsity constitutes grave abuse of discretion. Pre-proclamation reliance on a certificate of canvass determines only the prima facie winner and does not foreclose proof in the protest of the true vote, nor does conditional agreement to its temporary use estop such proof where public policy on the voters' will is involved.

Rosette Y. Lerias, official UPP-KBL candidate, and Roger G. Mercado, administration candidate, contested the May 11, 1987 election for Representative of the lone district of Southern Leyte. Under Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution, the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of its members, reviewable only on extraordinary jurisdiction for lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion.

Rosette Ynigues Lerias filed her certificate of candidacy as UPP-KBL candidate for the lone district of Southern Leyte in the May 11, 1987 elections under the name Rosette Ynigues Lerias, her maiden name being Rosette Ynigues. Roger G. Mercado ran as administration candidate for the same office. During the provincial canvass, excluding the questioned Libagon certificate, Mercado led with 34,442 votes against Lerias's 34,128 votes. The provincial board's copy for Libagon credited Lerias with 1,811 votes and Mercado with 1,351 votes, which would have given Lerias 35,939 votes against Mercado's 35,793 votes and a 146-vote margin, but the board rejected its copy for erasures, alterations and superimpositions.

Thereafter, on appeal to the Comelec, counsel for Lerias agreed on June 5, 1987 to use the Comelec copy if found authentic and genuine, with a similar reservation by Mercado. When opened, the Comelec copy credited Lerias with only 1,411 votes in Libagon, 100 votes less in each of Precincts 6, 10, 18 and 19 than the provincial board's copy: 62 instead of 162 in Precinct 6, 23 instead of 123 in Precinct 10, 32 instead of 132 in Precinct 18, and 56 instead of 156 in Precinct 19. On June 6, 1987 the Comelec Second Division ordered canvass on that basis, the board proclaimed Mercado on June 7, 1987 by 35,793 to 35,539, and subsequent Comelec and Supreme Court pre-proclamation challenges by Lerias failed.

On October 1, 1987 Lerias protested the four Libagon precincts before the HRET, praying for safekeeping of ballot boxes, recount, annulment of Mercado's proclamation, and declaration as winner with damages, while Mercado counter-protested 377 precincts alleging misreading, non-counting, marked ballots, tampering, stickers, altered returns, terrorism and vote-buying. On March 7, 1988 unidentified uniformed armed men raided the Libagon municipal building and stole ballot boxes for 20 precincts, overlooking one box in the election registrar's office containing all copies of election returns used in the municipal canvass, which the HRET representative took into custody on March 23 and 24, 1988. Revision in 81 counter-protested precincts initially showed Lerias ahead by 20 votes on screening, but the majority's final tabulation made Mercado win by 46 votes, later increased to 67 votes on reconsideration, while dissenters maintained Lerias won the counter-protest by 12 to 20 votes and, with 400 Libagon votes restored, by over 400 votes overall.

• Libagon Votes and Election Returns: Petitioner maintained that she actually obtained 1,811 votes in Libagon, not 1,411, her votes in Precincts 6, 10, 18 and 19 having been systematically reduced by 100 votes each, as proved by original copies of the municipal and provincial certificates of canvass and the original municipal-board copy of the election returns showing 162, 123, 132 and 156 votes respectively.
• Corroboration: Petitioner argued that the returns were corroborated by NAMFREL Operation Quick Count reports, certificates of votes (CE Form 13), UPP-KBL watcher reports, municipal and provincial certificates and statements of votes, reports of Lakas ng Bansa and PDP-Laban chairmen, and photographs of the tally board, plus testimonies of board of election inspectors and canvassers identifying serial numbers, envelopes, seals, signatures and thumbmarks.
• Ballot Appreciation in Counter-Protest: Petitioner in effect defended the original screening admitting her claimed ballots under the neighborhood rule and intent rule, including first-name votes, maiden-surname votes, assistor-written votes, and sticker ballots not invalidly marked by voters, which had given her a 20-vote plurality in the counter-protested precincts.

• Comelec Copy as Controlling: Respondent countered by relying mainly on the Comelec copy of the certificate of canvass, sustained as regular, genuine and authentic on its face in pre-proclamation proceedings and affirmed by the Supreme Court, and asserted that Lerias was estopped by her counsel's agreement to its use.
• Inauthenticity of Returns: Respondent in effect disputed the election returns for non-production during pre-proclamation, late surfacing after ballot theft, possible tampering, lack of proof of ballot-box integrity, and partisanship of affiant election officials.
• Counter-Protest and Ballot Objections: Respondent maintained through his counter-protest that votes for him were misread, uncounted or tallied for Lerias, marked or intentionally marked, tampered, filled in blanks, pasted with stickers, altered in returns, and procured by terrorism and vote-buying, supporting rejection of Lerias's claimed ballots under a strict neighborhood and intent rule.

• Authenticity and Primacy of Election Returns: Whether the original election returns for Precinct Nos. 6, 10, 18 and 19 of Libagon proving 1,811 votes for Lerias should prevail over the xerox Comelec copy of the certificate of canvass crediting her with only 1,411 votes.
• Pre-Proclamation Finality and Estoppel: Whether the Comelec's pre-proclamation finding of genuineness, affirmed by the Supreme Court, and Lerias's conditional agreement to use the Comelec copy, bar relitigation of authenticity in the election protest.
• Ballot Appreciation in Counter-Protest: Whether the majority's strict application of the neighborhood and intent rules and rejection of claimed and sticker ballots to overturn the prior admission in Lerias's favor was valid.

• Authenticity and Primacy of Election Returns: Yes. The original election returns were authentic and constituted the best evidence in the absence of ballots, entitling Lerias to restoration of 400 votes and a 146-vote margin before revision.
• Pre-Proclamation Finality and Estoppel: No. Pre-proclamation use established only the prima facie winner summarily and without prejudice to the protest to determine the actual winner; conditional agreement and estoppel cannot defeat the voters' will and public policy.
• Ballot Appreciation in Counter-Protest: No. The post-appreciation reversal departing from settled neighborhood-rule interpretation and prior Tribunal admissions, without ocular review or identification, was arbitrary and could not defeat Lerias's victory even under any counter-protest result.

• Authenticity and Primacy of Election Returns: Where correctness of vote numbers is involved, ballots are best evidence, but where unavailable the election returns are best evidence, accorded prima facie status as bona fide reports where voting is shown to have occurred, rejectable only on most convincing proof of manufacture or fakery with the burden on the alleger of tampering. Here the evidence was the original returns while the Comelec certificate was merely a xerox copy, inadmissible under the best evidence rule absent Rule 130 exceptions and secondary-evidence requisites, disowned by canvassers as bearing forged signatures and thumbmarks. Authenticity was established because the returns appeared original and authentic on their faces, serial numbers matched minutes of voting and NAMFREL reports, envelopes and Comelec seals matched, chairmen and registrar identified signatures and thumbmarks, inspectors identified the returns as those they prepared, and overwhelming independent documents uniformly showed the same figures; speculative suspicion from delayed production was dispelled since recount of then-intact ballots had made resort to returns unnecessary, and affiant officials merely performed their duty with credible corroborated testimony.
• Pre-Proclamation Finality and Estoppel: Pre-proclamation controversies are summarily decided to avoid delaying canvass and proclamation, Comelec powers being essentially executive and administrative without authority to look beyond the face of returns once satisfied of authenticity, with fraud and irregularities reserved for the protest before the HRET as sole judge. Affirmance of Comelec's use of its facially unaltered copy, especially on parties' agreement, was merely affirmance for determining the prima facie winner, not final adjudication of genuineness, and did not foreclose proof of incorrect attribution. Estoppel was inapplicable because agreement was conditional, qualified and made without knowledge of alteration with immediate objection upon discovery, and in any event estoppel against asserting falsification of the voters' will would contravene public policy.
• Ballot Appreciation in Counter-Protest: The original screening admitting 334 claimed ballots for Lerias, rejecting 249, admitting 25 for Mercado, rejecting 363, restoring 2 to Lerias, and giving Lerias a 20-vote plurality was overturned by reducing admitted Lerias claims by 57, invalidating 3 more, and adjusting Mercado figures to produce a 42-vote then 67-vote Mercado lead through strict departures from Nograles vs. Dureza. Rejection of first-name votes like Rosette, roset or rosit violated Omnibus Election Code Section 211(1); rejection of R. Yniguez-type votes violated Section 211(3) favoring the incumbent woman using maiden surname where no other same-surname congressional candidate existed and senator Yniguez was also voted separately; rejection of assistor-written Lerias votes on line 1 disregarded settled allowance where the representative line was blank; and rejection of 170 sticker ballots ignored that surreptitiously and non-uniformly pasted stickers indicated invalidation by others rather than voters. Reconsideration without ocular review, without identification of the 57 ballots, and after prior Tribunal approval by majority vote with quorum was by sheer force of numbers and strange jurisprudence, thwarting the electorate's will, but immaterial to ultimate victory since restored 400 Libagon votes preserved Lerias's lead under any counter-protest tabulation.

• HRET as sole judge; extraordinary review only for grave abuse — Article VI, Section 17 makes the HRET the sole judge of all contests relating to election, returns and qualifications of members, reviewable only where rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to arbitrary, whimsical, despotic exercise equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, denial of due process, or clear unmitigated error.
• Best evidence in election contests; prima facie status of returns — In contests on correctness of vote counts, ballots are best and most conclusive evidence; where ballots cannot be produced or are unavailable, election returns are best evidence and, where voting is duly shown to have occurred, must be accorded prima facie status as bona fide reports, rejectable only on most convincing proof of being manufactured or fake, with the burden on the party alleging tampering and extreme caution required to avoid disenfranchisement.
• Pre-proclamation vs. protest; no estoppel against voters' will — Acceptance of a certificate of canvass as genuine for canvass determines only the prima facie winner in summary pre-proclamation proceedings, executive and administrative in nature, without prejudice to unhurried determination of the actual winner in the protest; conditional agreement to temporary use does not estop proof of falsity, since estoppel defeating the voters' will contravenes public policy.
• Ballot appreciation; intent, neighborhood, and name rules — Under Omnibus Election Code Section 211(1), a ballot bearing only the first name or surname is counted for the candidate with no same-name rival for the same office; under Section 211(3), a surname-only ballot is counted for the incumbent woman using maiden or married surname against a same-surname rival; under Nograles vs. Dureza, names written on line 1 for senators or shaded box above are counted for the congressional candidate where the representative line is blank and no other representative name appears elsewhere, without distinction between voter-written and assistor-written ballots; stickers pasted by others to invalidate do not mark the ballot under Section 211, Rule 20 where hastily and non-uniformly placed.

• "Politicians who are members of electoral tribunals, must think and act like judges, accordingly, they must resolve election controversies with judicial, not political, integrity." — States the standard exacted of legislator-members exercising purely judicial functions, framing the finding of politically driven grave abuse.
• "In an election contest where what is involved is the correctness of the number of votes of each candidate, the best and most conclusive evidence are the ballots themselves. But where the ballots cannot be produced or are not available, the election returns would be the best evidence." — Defines the evidentiary hierarchy applied to prefer original returns after ballot loss over the xerox certificate.
• "Acceptance of a certificate of canvass as genuine and authentic for purposes of canvass simply means that said certificate of canvass is genuine and authentic for the purpose of determining the prima facie winner in the election. But the very purpose of an election contest is to establish who is the actual winner in the election." — Distinguishes summary pre-proclamation finality from protest adjudication, negating res judicata and estoppel.
• "the genuine returns must be ascertained and the obvious forgery disregarded" — Invoked from Espino vs. Zaldivar to require enforcement of true returns against a forged canvass and rejection of win-the-proclamation-and-delay-the-protest tactics.

• Lazatin vs. House Electoral Tribunal, 168 SCRA 391 — Cited as upholding HRET independence and sole-judge power, framing the limited extraordinary review standard.
• Robles vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 181 SCRA 780 — Cited for the same independence and sole-judge doctrine and for the formulation of grave-abuse review.
• Morrero vs. Bocar, 66 Phil. 429 — Cited as early authority limiting judicial interference to decisions rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
• Enrile vs. COMELEC — Cited for the policy that pre-proclamation controversies should be summarily decided to avoid delaying canvass and proclamation.
• Espino vs. Zaldivar, 21 SCRA 1204 — Invoked for the rule against winking at brazen subversion of the people's will and for ascertaining genuine returns while disregarding obvious forgery.
• Nograles vs. Dureza, HRET Case No. 34 — Followed as the settled neighborhood-rule guideline for counting congressional names written on senatorial lines, departed from without warrant by the majority.
• Mandac vs. Samaoante, 54 Phil. 706 — Cited as basis for the Nograles neighborhood rule on misplaced votes.
• Timbol vs. Lazatin, HRET Case No. 46 — Cited as authority admitting assistor-written ballots under the neighborhood rule.

• Section 17, Article VI, 1987 Constitution — Confers on the HRET sole-judge jurisdiction over contests on election, returns and qualifications of members; applied to delimit Supreme Court review to extraordinary jurisdiction for grave abuse.
• Section 211(1) and (3) and Rule 20, Omnibus Election Code — Govern counting of first-name/surname-only ballots, surname ballots for incumbent women using maiden surname, and marked ballots; applied to validate Rosette, Yniguez-variant, assistor-written and sticker ballots for Lerias.
• Sections 2 and 4, Rule 130, Rules of Court — State the best evidence rule requiring the original writing and requisites for secondary evidence; applied to reject the xerox Comelec certificate where exceptions and requisites were unmet.
• Section 246, Omnibus Election Code — Provides five-day finality of pre-proclamation rulings absent restraining order; applied in the earlier dismissal sustaining summary proclamation without prejudice to protest.
• Section 28, Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal — Requires transmittal of final decision to the President, House through the Speaker, and Commission on Audit; directed upon finality.

Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur. Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano and Sarmiento, JJ., took no part.

• Padilla, J. — Maintained that the controversy turned solely on factual appreciation of alleged election abnormalities within HRET's exclusive sole-judge jurisdiction, with no arbitrary denial of due process or clear unmitigated grave abuse shown, the close 5-4 division proving susceptibility to either appreciation; argued the Supreme Court, not a trier of facts, must apply law on HRET's factual findings and cannot revise them without usurping constitutional power and blurring boundaries, voting to DISMISS the petition.