Lejano vs. People of the Philippines

A conviction cannot stand on the testimony of an incredible witness, and a documented alibi supported by official records prevails over speculative assertions of physical possibility; moreover, the State’s failure to preserve DNA evidence does not violate due process absent a showing of bad faith.

On June 30, 1991, Estrellita Vizconde and her daughters Carmela and Jennifer were found brutally slain in their Parañaque home. Initial police investigation led to the arrest and charging of members of an "Akyat-Bahay" gang, but the trial court discharged them after finding the confessions were fabricated. Four years later, in 1995, the NBI presented Jessica Alfaro, an informer, who claimed to have witnessed the crime and implicated Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio Lejano, Artemio Ventura, Michael Gatchalian, Hospicio Fernandez, Peter Estrada, Miguel Rodriguez, and Joey Filart. Police officer Gerardo Biong was charged as an accessory after the fact.

• The Crime: On June 30, 1991, Estrellita Vizconde and her daughters Carmela and Jennifer were found dead in their home, having been stabbed. Carmela showed signs of having been raped.
• The Witness: Jessica Alfaro, an NBI "asset" or stool pigeon, surfaced in 1995 claiming to have witnessed the crime. She testified that Webb, Lejano, and Ventura entered the house while the others stood guard outside. She claimed to have seen Webb raping Carmela while the mother and sister lay dead on the bed.
• The Quality of the Witness: Alfaro was not an ordinary citizen but an NBI informer who admitted to being a habitual drug user. NBI handler Artemio Sacaguing testified that Alfaro volunteered to play the role of a witness ("papapelan ko na lang yan") after failing to produce the actual informant she had promised.
• The Suspicious Details: Alfaro’s testimony contained details that matched physical evidence but in ways that appeared contrived. For instance, she claimed Ventura climbed a car hood to loosen a garage light—matching the crime scene—but this made no sense since they supposedly had an open invitation to enter. She claimed Webb threw a stone at the front door on the way out—matching the broken glass—but this was bizarre behavior for someone trying to escape quietly. Her story also mirrored details found in the fabricated confessions of the earlier "Akyat-Bahay" gang suspects.
• The Alibi: Webb presented evidence that he was in the United States from March 9, 1991, to October 27, 1992. This was supported by his passport, U.S. Immigration certifications, airline passenger manifests, and testimonies of witnesses in the U.S. The lower courts rejected this, suggesting he could have sneaked back to commit the crime and then returned to the U.S.
• The DNA Issue: Webb sought DNA testing of the semen specimen taken from Carmela. The trial court denied the motion in 1997. In 2010, the Supreme Court granted a similar request, but the NBI reported the specimen was lost.

• Due Process (DNA Evidence): Petitioner Webb argued that the State’s failure to produce the semen specimen for DNA testing, despite a court order, deprived him of due process and the right to present a complete defense, citing Brady v. Maryland.
• Credibility of Alfaro: Petitioners contended that Alfaro was an incredible witness whose testimony was rehearsed, inherently improbable, and riddled with inconsistencies between her two affidavits and her court testimony.
• Alibi: Petitioners maintained that Webb’s alibi was supported by overwhelming documentary and testimonial evidence proving he was in the U.S. when the crime occurred, and that the lower courts erred in speculating he could have secretly returned to the Philippines.

• Positive Identification: Respondent argued that Alfaro positively identified the accused, and her testimony was corroborated by physical evidence and other witnesses (security guards, laundrywoman, Biong’s girlfriend).
• Alibi is Weak: Respondent contended that alibi is a weak defense that cannot prevail over positive identification, asserting that it was not physically impossible for Webb to travel between the U.S. and the Philippines given his family's resources.
• Loss of DNA Evidence: Respondent argued that the loss of the specimen did not warrant acquittal, as the prosecution was not in bad faith, and the identity of the rapist was established by eyewitness testimony.

• DNA Evidence: Whether the State’s failure to preserve the semen specimen warrants the outright acquittal of the accused on the ground of violation of due process.
• Credibility: Whether the testimony of prosecution star witness Jessica Alfaro is credible and sufficient to sustain a conviction.
• Alibi: Whether the accused Webb presented sufficient evidence to prove his alibi and rebut the prosecution’s evidence.

• DNA Evidence: The outright acquittal based on the loss of the DNA specimen was denied. Citing Arizona v. Youngblood, due process does not require the State to preserve potentially useful evidence unless the accused can show bad faith on the part of the prosecution or police. Webb failed to show bad faith. Furthermore, the idea of preserving the specimen was not raised until years after the trial court rejected the DNA motion, so the State was not on reasonable notice to preserve it.
• Credibility: Alfaro’s testimony was found to be incredible. She was an NBI asset who volunteered to act as a witness when she could not produce the informant she promised. Her story contained inherent improbabilities, such as Webb throwing a stone at the front door while trying to escape quietly, and Ventura rummaging a bag for a key to a door they had already entered through. Her testimony appeared tailored to fit the crime scene details, much like the fabricated confessions of the earlier "Akyat-Bahay" gang suspects.
• Alibi: Webb’s alibi was found to be strong and credible. The lower courts’ theory that Webb could have sneaked back to the Philippines was based on speculation and not evidence. The official documents—passport, U.S. Immigration certifications, and passenger manifests—carry a presumption of regularity. The prosecution presented no evidence to impeach these entries. The Court rejected the paradigm that the only acceptable alibi is if the accused were in another planet.

• Arizona v. Youngblood — The Due Process Clause does not require the State to preserve evidence that might be useful to the accused unless the accused can show bad faith on the part of the police or prosecution. The failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process absent bad faith.
• Positive Identification vs. Alibi — Positive identification of the offender must meet two criteria to jettison a defense of alibi: (1) the identification must come from a credible witness, and (2) the witness’s story of what she personally saw must be believable, not inherently contrived. A lying witness can make as positive an identification as a truthful one.
• Presumption of Regularity in Official Records — Entries in official records, such as passports and immigration certifications, are presumed true. This presumption can be overcome by evidence, but not by mere suspicion or speculation of the unknown.

• "A lying witness can make as positive an identification as a truthful witness can. The lying witness can also say as forthrightly and unequivocally, 'He did it!' without blinking an eye."
• "If the Court were to subscribe to this extremely skeptical view [that Webb could have sneaked back], it might as well tear the rules of evidence out of the law books and regard suspicions, surmises, or speculations as reasons for impeaching evidence."
• "Courts must abandon this unjust and inhuman paradigm [that alibi can only be accepted if the accused were on another planet]." (Quoting Justice Tagle's dissent in the CA)
• "Will the Court send the accused to spend the rest of their lives in prison on the testimony of an NBI asset who proposed to her handlers that she take the role of the witness to the Vizconde massacre that she could not produce?"

• Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) — Cited by Webb but distinguished; Brady applies to the suppression of material evidence, whereas the DNA specimen here was merely potentially useful and lost, not suppressed in bad faith.
• Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 41 (1988) — Followed; established the "bad faith" requirement for due process violations concerning the failure to preserve evidence.
• People v. Yatar, G.R. No. 150224 (2004) — Cited regarding the uniqueness of DNA fingerprints.
• People v. Larrañaga — Distinguished in the concurring opinion; Larrañaga rejected an alibi involving domestic travel, whereas Webb's alibi involved foreign travel supported by official documents.

• Rule on DNA Evidence, Section 4 — The Court granted the request for DNA testing pursuant to this section, but the testing became moot due to the loss of the specimen.
• Article 335, Revised Penal Code — The crime charged was Rape with Homicide under this article.

Renato C. Corona (CJ), Antonio T. Carpio, Conchita Carpio Morales, Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, Arturo D. Brion, Diosdado M. Peralta, Lucas P. Bersamin, Mariano C. Del Castillo, Jose Portugal Perez, Jose Catral Mendoza, Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno.

• Carpio Morales, J. — Wrote a concurring opinion emphasizing that the prosecution failed to rebut the defense’s evidence and that Alfaro’s inconsistencies, status as a drug addict, and the similarities between her story and the fabricated "Akyat-Bahay" confessions cast serious doubt on her credibility. She also noted that the loss of the DNA specimen deprived the accused of scientific evidence.
• Sereno, J. — Wrote a separate concurring opinion arguing that the Youngblood bad faith standard should not be adopted in the Philippines. She contended that the loss of the DNA specimen, combined with other instances of prosecutorial misconduct and the trial judge's bias, resulted in a fundamentally unfair trial warranting acquittal.

• Villarama, Jr., J. — Argued that the conviction should be affirmed. He maintained that Alfaro was a credible witness whose detailed testimony was corroborated by physical evidence and other witnesses. He found Webb’s alibi fabricated, noting inconsistencies in his documentary evidence (e.g., driver’s license date, passport condition) and asserting that it was not physically impossible for Webb to have traveled back to the Philippines. He also argued that the loss of the DNA specimen did not exculpate Webb, as a negative result would not necessarily prove his absence from the scene, and that the prosecution had no duty to preserve the specimen absent a court order at the time.