Legaspi vs. Minister of Finance

Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution, granting the President (Prime Minister) concurrent legislative authority to issue decrees in times of emergency or when the Batasang Pambansa fails to act, was not repealed, modified, or rendered inoperable by the constitutional amendments of April 7, 1981, and the President's exercise of such power does not require the concurrence of the Batasang Pambansa.

Petitioner Valentino L. Legaspi was an incumbent member of the interim Batasang Pambansa. The respondents were the Minister of Finance and the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, who were implementing Presidential Decree 1840, a decree granting tax amnesty and requiring the filing of statements of assets and liabilities. The decree was issued by President Ferdinand E. Marcos purportedly under the authority of Amendment No. 6 to the 1973 Constitution, which had been ratified in the October 1976 plebiscite-referendum. The 1976 Amendment No. 6 granted the President (Prime Minister) the power to issue decrees forming part of the law of the land in times of grave emergency or when the Batasang Pambansa failed to act adequately on matters requiring immediate action. The case arose after the April 7, 1981 plebiscite, which amended the Constitution to establish a modified parliamentary system, separating the offices of President and Prime Minister — the first presidential decree issued after the lifting of martial law and the 1981 amendments.

Petitioner Valentino L. Legaspi, an incumbent member of the interim Batasang Pambansa, filed a petition before the Supreme Court seeking to declare Presidential Decree 1840 — "granting tax amnesty and filing of statement of assets and liabilities and some other purposes" — unconstitutional. The decree had been issued by President Ferdinand E. Marcos under the legislative powers purportedly granted by Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution, which was ratified in the plebiscite-referendum of October 16-17, 1976. Amendment No. 6 authorized the President (Prime Minister) to issue decrees, orders, or letters of instruction forming part of the law of the land whenever, in his judgment, a grave emergency existed or the interim Batasang Pambansa or the regular National Assembly failed or was unable to act adequately on any matter requiring immediate action.

Petitioner alleged that the decree was issued despite the constitutional provision vesting legislative power in the Batasang Pambansa and the requirement that the President may grant amnesty only with the concurrence of the Batasang Pambansa. He further contended that Amendment No. 6 was rendered inoperable, deleted, or repealed by the amendments approved in the April 7, 1981 plebiscite, which established a modified parliamentary system and separated the offices of President and Prime Minister. Since the 1981 amendments abolished the dual position of President (Prime Minister) previously held by Marcos, and since Amendment No. 6 referred specifically to the "President (Prime Minister)," petitioner argued that no one in the existing governmental structure could exercise the power conferred by that amendment.

The questioned decree was the first presidential decree issued after the lifting of martial law and the April 7, 1981 amendments, thus bringing to a test the validity of the exercise of the standby emergency powers invoked under Amendment No. 6. Petitioner, as a member of the Batasang Pambansa, asserted that the subject of the decree had not been brought to the attention of the Batasan requiring immediate action, noting that the original tax amnesty decree which P.D. 1840 amended or modified had long been effective and implemented while the Batasan was in session. Respondents, through the Solicitor General, countered that P.D. 1840 was issued pursuant to the President's power to legislate under Amendment No. 6, not as an exercise of executive clemency, and therefore did not require Batasan concurrence.

• Repeal of Amendment No. 6 by the 1981 Amendments: Petitioner maintained that Amendment No. 6 was rendered inoperable, deleted, or repealed by the constitutional amendments of April 7, 1981, because the 1981 amendments separated the offices of President and Prime Minister, and Amendment No. 6 referred to the "President (Prime Minister)" — a position that no longer existed under the new governmental setup.
• Repeal by Omission: Petitioner argued that the constitutional provisions on the Presidency under the 1981 amendments did not restate the provisions of Amendment No. 6, which was tantamount to a withdrawal or deletion of the grant of legislative power, applying the rule that only those provisions of the original act repeated in the amendment are retained.
• Exclusive Legislative Power in the Batasan: Petitioner contended that the 1981 amendments clearly intended to repose legislative power only upon the Batasang Pambansa, as reflected in the ballot question for the plebiscite, and that nowhere in the approved amendments was it indicated that the President would enjoy conditional or qualified legislative powers under the modified parliamentary system.
• Invalidity of P.D. 1840 for Lack of Batasan Concurrence: Petitioner argued that P.D. 1840 was likewise invalid because it granted amnesty without the concurrence of the Batasang Pambansa, as required by Article VII, Section 11 of the Constitution.
• No Emergency Requiring Immediate Action: Petitioner asserted that, as a member of the Batasang Pambansa, he knew the subject of the questioned decree had not been brought to the attention of the Batasan requiring immediate action, the original tax amnesty decree having long been effective and implemented while the Batasan was in session.

• P.D. 1840 as Exercise of Legislative Power: Respondent, through the Solicitor General, countered that P.D. 1840 was issued pursuant to the President's power to legislate under Amendment No. 6, not as an exercise of executive clemency under Article VII, Section 11, and therefore did not require the concurrence of the Batasang Pambansa.
• No Repeal of Amendment No. 6 by Implication: Respondent argued that it was neither sound nor in consonance with settled principles of constitutional construction to recognize amendments or repeals of constitutional provisions by implication, especially on a transcendental matter, and that since Amendment No. 6 was not mentioned in the 1981 amendments and nothing in the latter was intrinsically inconsistent with the former, it remained in force.

• Validity of Amendment No. 6 after the 1981 Amendments: Whether Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution, ratified in 1976, was repealed, modified, or rendered inoperable by the constitutional amendments approved on April 7, 1981.
• Validity of P.D. 1840: Whether Presidential Decree 1840, issued under Amendment No. 6, was valid notwithstanding the lack of concurrence by the Batasang Pambansa.

• Validity of Amendment No. 6 after the 1981 Amendments: No, Amendment No. 6 was not repealed, modified, or rendered inoperable. The 1981 amendments neither expressly nor impliedly altered it, and the present Batasang Pambansa remained interim in character, subject to the concurrent legislative authority vested in the President by Amendment No. 6.
• Validity of P.D. 1840: Yes, P.D. 1840 was valid. The decree was issued pursuant to the President's concurrent legislative authority under Amendment No. 6, not as an exercise of executive clemency requiring Batasan concurrence under Article VII, Section 11.

• Validity of Amendment No. 6 after the 1981 Amendments: The Court reasoned that the present Batasang Pambansa was still the interim body created by Amendment No. 2 in 1976, not the regular Batasang Pambansa contemplated under the 1981 amendments, which was to be elected in May 1984. The 1981 amendments altered Amendment No. 2 only by removing the "incumbent President" as a member of the assembly, in pursuance of the objective to separate the Presidency from the legislative body. The legislative authority vested in the interim Batasan by Amendment No. 2 was, from its inception, subject to the concurrent legislative prerogative conferred by Amendment No. 6, which was approved simultaneously. The Court rejected the argument that Amendment No. 6 was repealed by omission, holding that constitutional provisions are not repealed by implication, especially on transcendental matters. The reference to "President (Prime Minister)" in Amendment No. 6 was descriptive of the person vested with the totality of executive power, not limited to the incumbent President, as evidenced by the amendment's reference to both the interim and the regular Batasang Pambansa. The parenthetical mention of "Prime Minister" was necessary because, under the governmental system then existing, the substantive executive powers were vested in the Prime Minister. The Court further explained that the fundamental rationale of Amendment No. 6 was to provide a fifth constitutional measure for coping with emergencies — one that would make the proclamation of martial law less necessary by allowing the President to legislate without the repressive concomitants of martial law, such as military assertion of prerogatives over civilian authority.

• Validity of P.D. 1840: The Court agreed with the Solicitor General that Article VII, Section 11 of the Constitution, requiring Batasan concurrence for the grant of amnesty, applies only when the President exercises the power of executive clemency. P.D. 1840 was issued pursuant to the President's power to legislate under Amendment No. 6, and when the President acts as legislator, he exercises concurrent authority vested by the Constitution and does not need the concurrence of the Batasan.

• Constitutional Construction — Beyond Literal Interpretation — Constitutional law is not simply the literal application of the words of the Charter. The meaning conveyed by the language of any provision must be understood in light of the historical background and environment at the time of its adoption. The Court applied this principle to determine that the reference to "President (Prime Minister)" in Amendment No. 6 was descriptive of the official vested with executive power, not limited to the person who simultaneously held both offices.
• No Repeal of Constitutional Provisions by Implication — It is neither sound nor consonant with settled principles of constitutional construction to recognize amendments or repeals of constitutional provisions by implication, especially regarding transcendental matters. The Court applied this doctrine to reject petitioner's claim that Amendment No. 6 was repealed by omission through the 1981 amendments, noting that the amendment was not mentioned in the 1981 proposals and nothing in the latter was intrinsically inconsistent with the former.
• Fifth Emergency Measure Doctrine — Amendment No. 6 was conceived as a fifth constitutionally authorized measure for coping with emergencies, in addition to the four traditional measures: (1) emergency powers delegated by the Batasan, (2) calling out the armed forces, (3) suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and (4) martial law. Its purpose was to make the proclamation of martial law less necessary by allowing the President to legislate during crises without the repressive concomitants of martial law.
• Interim Nature of the Batasang Pambansa after 1981 Amendments — The Batasang Pambansa existing after the 1981 amendments remained the interim body created by Amendment No. 2 in 1976, not the regular Batasang Pambansa contemplated by the 1981 amendments, which was to be elected in May 1984. The 1981 amendments altered Amendment No. 2 only by removing the incumbent President as a member of the assembly.

• "Constitutional law is not simply the literal application of the words of the Charter. The ancient and familiar rule of constitutional construction that has consistently maintained its intrinsic and transcendental worth is that the meaning and understanding conveyed by the language, albeit plain, of any of its provisions do not only portray the influence of current events and developments but likewise the inescapable imperative considerations rooted in the historical background and environment at the time of its adoption and thereby caused their being written as part and parcel thereof." — This passage articulates the Court's foundational approach to constitutional construction, grounding the ruling in historical context rather than literal text, and is the analytical framework for the entire decision.

• "it is neither sound nor in consonance with well and long settled principles of constitutional construction to recognize amendments or repeals of constitutional provisions by implications, specially in regard to a transcendental matter as that herein under discussion." — This formulation states the doctrine against implied repeal of constitutional provisions, which the Court applied to reject petitioner's claim that Amendment No. 6 was repealed by omission through the 1981 amendments.

• "Article VII, sec. 11, applies only when the President is exercising his power of executive clemency. In the case at bar, Presidential Decree 1840 was issued pursuant to his power to legislate under Amendment No. 6. It ought to be indubitable that when the President acts as legislator as in the case at bar, he does not need the concurrence of the Batasan. Rather, he exercises concurrent authority vested by the Constitution." — This passage, drawn from the Solicitor General's brief and adopted by the Court, distinguishes the President's power of executive clemency from his concurrent legislative authority under Amendment No. 6, resolving the validity of P.D. 1840.

• Aquino vs. Commission on Elections, 62 SCRA 275 — Cited for the proposition that the term "Incumbent President" in the transitory provisions referred to President Ferdinand E. Marcos. This case was referenced to establish the context of the 1976 amendments and the identity of the official described in the transitory provisions.
• Paras vs. Land Registration Commission, July 26, 1960, L-16011 — Cited by petitioner for the rule that when an amendatory act states the original law is amended to "read as follows," only those provisions repeated in the amendment are retained. The Court did not apply this rule to constitutional amendments but acknowledged petitioner's reliance on it.

• Amendment No. 6, 1973 Constitution (1976) — Granted the President (Prime Minister) the power to issue decrees, orders, or letters of instruction forming part of the law of the land whenever a grave emergency exists or the interim Batasang Pambansa or regular National Assembly fails to act adequately on any matter requiring immediate action. The Court held this amendment remained in full force and effect after the 1981 amendments.
• Article VIII, Section 1, 1973 Constitution (as amended in 1981) — Provides that "[t]he legislative power shall be vested in a Batasang Pambansa." The Court interpreted this as referring to the regular Batasang Pambansa to be elected in May 1984, not displacing the interim Batasan's subjection to Amendment No. 6.
• Article VII, Section 11, 1973 Constitution — Provides that the President may grant amnesty with the concurrence of the Batasang Pambansa. The Court held this provision applies only to exercises of executive clemency, not to legislative decrees issued under Amendment No. 6.
• Amendment No. 2, 1973 Constitution (1976) — Created the interim Batasang Pambansa in lieu of the interim National Assembly. The Court held that the 1981 amendments altered this provision only by removing the incumbent President as a member of the assembly, and that the interim Batasan remained subject to Amendment No. 6.

• Makasiar, J. — Concurred.
• Concepcion, Jr., J. — Concurred.
• Guerrero, J. — Concurred.
• Plana, J. — Concurred.
• Escolin, J. — Concurred.
• Vasquez, J. — Concurred.
• Relova, J. — Concurred.
• Melencio-Herrera, J. — Concurred in the result.
• Aquino, J. (separate concurring opinion) — Viewed Amendment No. 6 as qualifying or limiting Amendment No. 5, which provided that the incumbent President shall continue to exercise legislative powers until martial law shall have been lifted. Aquino, J. read Amendment No. 6 as if it begins with the clause: "However, despite the lifting of martial law, ..."
• Abad Santos, J. (separate concurring opinion) — Noted that as Secretary of Justice he participated in the drafting of the 1976 amendments; stated that Amendment No. 6 was intended to give the President (Prime Minister) the power to issue decrees even after the lifting of martial law, as shown by its reference to both the interim Batasang Pambansa and the regular National Assembly; and that the present governmental structure is essentially presidential, with the Prime Minister being but an alter ego of the President.
• De Castro, J. (separate concurring opinion) — Agreed that Amendment No. 6 was not repealed by the 1981 amendments, but offered a different rationale: the words "President (Prime Minister)" in Amendment No. 6 were intended to indicate that when a regular Prime Minister takes over executive powers from the President, the power under Amendment No. 6 would automatically pertain to the Prime Minister. Under the 1981 amendments, however, executive powers were transferred back to the President, making the President the proper official to exercise the power. De Castro, J. emphasized that the effectiveness of Amendment No. 6 was intended to continue into the future as a permanent feature of the constitutional system, and its abrogation could be effected only by a clear and express repeal.
• Fernando, C.J. — Concurred and reserved the right to file a brief statement of his views.