Legaspi vs. COMELEC

A motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc is an incidental matter; if the COMELEC en banc fails to muster the required four votes, the motion is deemed denied and the COMELEC Division's ruling stands. The Mendoza doctrine, which allowed dismissal of the entire original action upon such failure, is unconstitutional for circumventing the four-vote requirement and diminishing the adjudicatory powers of the COMELEC Divisions.

Feliciano Legaspi, Alfredo D. Germar, and Rogelio P. Santos, Jr. were candidates in the May 13, 2013 elections in Norzagaray, Bulacan, with Legaspi and Germar running for mayor and Santos for councilor. Under Sec. 3, Art. IX-C of the 1987 Constitution, the COMELEC may sit en banc or in two divisions, and all election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc. Sec. 7, Art. IX-A requires each Commission to decide by a majority vote of all its Members, and Sec. 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure governs the procedure when the en banc is equally divided or the necessary majority cannot be had. The Court had previously applied that rule in Mendoza vs. COMELEC, 630 Phil. 432 (2010), where failure to muster the required majority on reconsideration led to dismissal of the election protest.

Feliciano Legaspi and Alfredo D. Germar both ran as mayoralty candidates in Norzagaray, Bulacan, while Rogelio P. Santos, Jr. was a candidate for councilor in the May 13, 2013 elections. On May 14, 2013, Legaspi filed a Petition for Disqualification against private respondents, docketed as SPA No. 13-353 (DC). He alleged that from May 11, 2013 until election day, private respondents engaged in massive vote-buying, using their political leaders as conduits.

According to witness accounts, those political leaders, while camped inside the North Hills Village Homeowners Association Office in Brgy. Bitungol, Norzagaray, Bulacan, distributed to voters envelopes containing Php 500.00 each and a sample ballot bearing the names of private respondents. Through military efforts, the vote-buying was foiled and the office, which served as the venue for distribution, was padlocked. The newly-minted Chief of Police, P/Supt. Dale Soliba, and his subordinates then attempted to force open the office and retrieve from inside four boxes containing the remaining undistributed envelopes with an estimated aggregate amount of Php800,000.00, but a group of concerned citizens thwarted their plan in flagrante delicto and intercepted the said evidence of vote-buying.

In answer, private respondents denied the allegations and raised the alibi that from 3:00 o'clock to 11:00 o'clock in the evening of May 11, 2013, they attended the Liberal Party's meeting de avance at the San Andres Parish church grounds, and that they did not go to nor visit the office of the Homeowner's Association of North Hills Village at the time the election offenses were allegedly committed.

The COMELEC Special First Division gave due credence and consideration to the evidence adduced by petitioner.

• Effect of En Banc Vote: Petitioner maintained that he could not be defeated before the COMELEC en banc when three commissioners voted to deny private respondents' motion for reconsideration and only two voted to reverse the judgment in his favor.
• Assailed COMELEC en banc Order: Petitioner assailed the January 28, 2015 COMELEC en banc Order, which dismissed the administrative aspect of his Petition for Disqualification for failure to obtain the necessary majority votes after re-deliberation/rehearing.

• Denial and Alibi: Private respondents denied the vote-buying allegations and claimed that from 3:00 to 11:00 o'clock in the evening of May 11, 2013, they attended the Liberal Party's meeting de avance at the San Andres Parish church grounds and did not go to nor visit the Homeowners Association office at the time the election offenses were allegedly committed.

• Effect of COMELEC en banc Failure to Muster Four Votes: Whether the COMELEC en banc may reverse a COMELEC Division ruling when it fails to obtain the required four votes on a motion for reconsideration.
• Constitutionality of Mendoza Doctrine / Sec. 6, Rule 18 Interpretation: Whether the Mendoza doctrine, as reiterated in the September 1, 2015 Decision, which dismisses the entire action or proceeding upon the COMELEC en banc's failure to muster the required majority vote, is constitutional under Sec. 7, Art. IX-A and Sec. 3, Art. IX-C.
• Classification of Motion for Reconsideration: Whether a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc is an "incidental matter" under Sec. 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, such that failure to muster the required majority results in denial of the motion only.

• Effect of COMELEC en banc Failure to Muster Four Votes: No. The COMELEC en banc cannot validly reverse a Division ruling without the required four votes; failure to muster the majority means there is no valid ruling to grant reconsideration.
• Constitutionality of Mendoza Doctrine / Sec. 6, Rule 18 Interpretation: No. The Mendoza doctrine is unconstitutional because it circumvents the four-vote requirement under Sec. 7, Art. IX-A and diminishes the adjudicatory powers of COMELEC Divisions under Sec. 3, Art. IX-C.
• Classification of Motion for Reconsideration: Yes. A motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc is an incidental matter; under Sec. 6, Rule 18, failure to muster the required majority results in denial of the motion, and the prior Division ruling subsists.

• Effect of COMELEC en banc Failure to Muster Four Votes: Under Sec. 7, Art. IX-A of the 1987 Constitution, each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or matter brought before it. For the COMELEC en banc, four votes are necessary to decide a case or matter. The party moving for reconsideration, as the party seeking affirmative relief, bears the burden of convincing four Commissioners to grant the plea. The Mendoza doctrine, as reiterated in the September 1, 2015 Decision, allowed the grant of a motion for reconsideration even though the movant failed to secure four votes, in violation of Sec. 7, Art. IX-A. In this case, private respondents secured only two votes to grant their motion for reconsideration, yet they were declared the victors in the January 28, 2015 COMELEC en banc Resolution. The Court held that the failure to muster four votes to sustain the motion for reconsideration should be understood as the COMELEC en banc finding no reversible error in its Division's ruling; the Division's decision ought to be affirmed, not reversed or vacated. The Mendoza doctrine was therefore unconstitutional because it circumvented the four-vote requirement and diminished the adjudicatory powers of the COMELEC Divisions under Sec. 3, Art. IX-C.

• Constitutionality of Mendoza Doctrine / Sec. 6, Rule 18 Interpretation: The Court interpreted Sec. 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, which provides three effects when the en banc is equally divided or the necessary majority cannot be had: (1) if the action or proceeding was originally commenced in the COMELEC, it shall be dismissed; (2) in appealed cases, the judgment or order appealed from shall stand affirmed; and (3) in incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be denied. The September 1, 2015 Decision had categorized SPA No. 13-353 (DC) as an action originally commenced with the Commission and applied the first effect, dismissing the entire case. The Court rejected that interpretation. At the time Sec. 6, Rule 18 was invoked, the pending matter was no longer Legaspi's Petition for Disqualification but private respondents' motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc; the issue was whether the COMELEC Division committed reversible error. For the first effect to apply, the pending case or matter must be an original action or proceeding originally commenced before the COMELEC. Actions originally commenced before a COMELEC Division consist of contests relating to elections, returns, and qualifications of elective regional, provincial, and city officials under Art. IX-C, Sec. 2(2); cases directly filed with the en banc are those specifically provided in the COMELEC Rules, such as petitions for postponement of elections, failure of election, indirect contempt, preliminary investigation of election offenses, and all other cases where the Division is not authorized to act. A motion for reconsideration filed with the en banc is not an "action or proceeding" originally commenced with the Commission as contemplated by the rules; the phrase is limited to those itemized in Part V of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure (Rules 20-34). Since the pending matter was a motion for reconsideration, neither an action nor a proceeding within Part V, the first effect could not apply. The second effect also could not apply because a motion for reconsideration is not an appeal; Mendoza held that a motion for reconsideration is a constitutionally guaranteed remedial mechanism, not an appeal, and Apo Fruits Corporation vs. Court of Appeals held that the Supreme Court en banc is not an appellate court vis-a-vis its Divisions. The third effect therefore applied: the motion for reconsideration was an incidental matter and should be denied if no majority vote was reached.

• Classification of Motion for Reconsideration: The Court relied on League of Cities vs. COMELEC, which applied Sec. 7, Rule 56 of the Rules of Court, a provision bearing striking similarity to Sec. 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. In that case, Justice Carpio explained that a motion for reconsideration is an incidental matter, and A.M. No. 99-1-09-SC clarified that a motion for reconsideration may be granted upon a vote of a majority of the members who actually took part in the deliberation, and if the voting results in a tie, the motion is deemed denied. Defensor-Santiago vs. COMELEC served as jurisprudential basis: eight Justices voted to declare R.A. No. 6735 insufficient, and on reconsideration the Court was equally divided 6-6, yet the prior Decision was never deemed overturned; the deadlock meant the opposite view failed to muster enough votes to modify or reverse the majority ruling, so the motion for reconsideration was denied and the original Decision upheld. Mendoza preceded League of Cities, and League of Cities set the precedent that failure to reach the majority vote on reconsideration results only in denial of the motion alone. With Sec. 6, Rule 18 and Sec. 7, Rule 56 almost identical, their interpretation should not deviate; A.M. No. 99-1-09-SC should be given suppletory application to election cases. Thus, private respondents' motion for reconsideration was an incidental matter; when they failed to get the required four votes, their motion was defeated and lost, and there was no valid ruling to sustain the plea for reconsideration. The prior valid action—the COMELEC Special First Division's October 3, 2013 Resolution—subsisted and was affirmed by the denial of the motion for reconsideration.

• Four-Vote Requirement for COMELEC en banc Decisions — Under Sec. 7, Art. IX-A of the 1987 Constitution, each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or matter brought before it. For the COMELEC en banc, four votes are necessary to decide a case or matter. The Court applied this to hold that a motion for reconsideration cannot be granted without four votes; failure to muster four votes means there is no valid ruling to grant the motion.

• Adjudicatory Powers of COMELEC Divisions — Under Sec. 3, Art. IX-C of the 1987 Constitution, the COMELEC may sit en banc or in two divisions, and all election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc. Division decisions are capable of attaining finality without need of any affirmative or confirmatory action on the part of the COMELEC en banc. The Court used this to protect Division rulings from being reversed by the en banc without the required four votes.

• Motion for Reconsideration as Incidental Matter — A motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc is an incidental matter under Sec. 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. If the en banc fails to muster the required majority, the motion is denied, and the prior Division ruling stands. The Court applied this to deny private respondents' motion for reconsideration and reinstate the Division's disqualification resolution.

• Unconstitutionality of the Mendoza Doctrine — The Mendoza doctrine, which allowed dismissal of the entire original action when the COMELEC en banc failed to muster the required majority vote on reconsideration, is unconstitutional because it circumvents the four-vote requirement and diminishes the adjudicatory powers of COMELEC Divisions. The Court modified the doctrine and held that its interpretation of Sec. 6, Rule 18 renders the rule unconstitutional.

• Suppletory Application of A.M. No. 99-1-09-SC to COMELEC Rules — Sec. 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is almost identical to Sec. 7, Rule 56 of the Rules of Court. A.M. No. 99-1-09-SC clarifies that if the voting on a motion for reconsideration results in a tie, the motion is deemed denied. This clarification should be given suppletory application to election cases for a singular interpretation of the similarly phrased rules, particularly on the treatment of less than majority votes on motions for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc.

• "The interpretation of Sec. 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure in Mendoza and in the September 1, 2015 Decision renders the rule unconstitutional" — This passage states the Court's conclusion that the prevailing interpretation of the COMELEC rule suffers from constitutional infirmities and calls for nullification.

• "The Mendoza doctrine, as reiterated in the September 1, 2015 Decision, deviated from the 1987 Constitution. Not only does it circumvent the four-vote requirement under Sec. 7, Art. IX-A of the Constitution, it likewise diminishes the adjudicatory powers of the COMELEC Divisions under Sec. 3, Article IX-C." — This is the ratio decidendi for striking down the Mendoza doctrine: it violates the constitutional voting threshold and weakens the adjudicatory authority of the COMELEC Divisions.

• "The Court now determines whether the motion for reconsideration of private respondents is an 'incidental matter' to which the third effect will apply. Without doubt, the answer is in the affirmative." — This passage is the Court's definitive classification of a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc as an incidental matter under Sec. 6, Rule 18.

• "Hence, when the private respondents failed to get the four-vote requirement on their motion for reconsideration, their motion is defeated and lost as there was NO valid ruling to sustain the plea for reconsideration. The prior valid action - the COMELEC Special First Division's October 3, 2013 Resolution in this case - therefore subsists and is affirmed by the denial of the motion for reconsideration." — This excerpt states the operative consequence of the Court's ruling: failure to obtain four votes denies the motion and leaves the Division's prior valid action standing.

• Mendoza vs. COMELEC, 630 Phil. 432 (2010) — The Court modified the doctrine laid down in this case, holding that its interpretation of Sec. 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure renders the rule unconstitutional for circumventing the four-vote requirement and diminishing the adjudicatory powers of the COMELEC Divisions.

• League of Cities vs. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 176951, 177499, and 178056 — The Court relied on this ruling, which applied Sec. 7, Rule 56 of the Rules of Court and held that a motion for reconsideration is an incidental matter and that failure to reach the majority vote on reconsideration results only in denial of the motion.

• Apo Fruits Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 164195, April 30, 2008, 553 SRA 237 — Cited for the principle that the Supreme Court en banc is not an appellate court vis-a-vis its Divisions, and each Division sits veritably as the Court en banc itself. This supported the holding that a motion for reconsideration is not an appeal.

• Defensor-Santiago vs. COMELEC, 336 Phil. 848 (1997) — Served as jurisprudential basis for the League of Cities ruling; on reconsideration, the Court was equally divided 6-6, yet the prior Decision was never deemed overturned. The deadlock meant the motion for reconsideration was denied and the original Decision upheld.

• Dreamwork Construction, Inc. vs. Janiola, G.R. No. 184861, June 30, 2009 — Cited for the rule that a statute must be construed not only to be consistent with itself but also to harmonize with other laws so as to form a complete, coherent, and intelligible system.

• Legaspi vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 216572, September 1, 2015 — The prior Decision in this case, which was reversed and set aside by the April 19, 2016 Resolution.

• Sec. 7, Art. IX-A, 1987 Constitution — Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or matter brought before it. The Court applied this to hold that four votes are necessary for the COMELEC en banc to grant a motion for reconsideration, and failure to muster four votes means no valid ruling to grant the motion.

• Sec. 3, Art. IX-C, 1987 Constitution — The COMELEC may sit en banc or in two divisions, and all election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc. The Court used this to protect the adjudicatory powers of the COMELEC Divisions and to hold that their decisions are capable of attaining finality without affirmative action by the en banc.

• Sec. 2(2), Art. IX-C, 1987 Constitution — The COMELEC exercises exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over contests involving elective municipal and barangay officials. Cited to describe actions originally commenced before a COMELEC Division.

• Sec. 6, Rule 18, COMELEC Rules of Procedure — Procedure if opinion is equally divided: if the action or proceeding was originally commenced in the COMELEC, it shall be dismissed; in appealed cases, the judgment or order appealed from shall stand affirmed; and in incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be denied. Interpreted by the Court to mean that a motion for reconsideration before the en banc is an incidental matter, so failure to muster the required majority denies the motion only.

• Sec. 7, Rule 56, Rules of Court — Procedure if opinion is equally divided in the Supreme Court: original actions are dismissed, appealed cases are affirmed, and incidental matters result in denial of the petition or motion. The Court noted its striking similarity to Sec. 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure and used it to guide interpretation.

• A.M. No. 99-1-09-SC — Clarifies that a motion for reconsideration may be granted upon a vote of a majority of the members who actually took part in the deliberation, and if the voting results in a tie, the motion for reconsideration is deemed denied. The Court gave this suppletory application to election cases.

• Rule 41, COMELEC Rules of Procedure — In the absence of any applicable provisions in the COMELEC Rules, the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court shall be applicable by analogy or in suppletory character and effect. Cited to support the suppletory application of A.M. No. 99-1-09-SC and Sec. 7, Rule 56 of the Rules of Court.

Justice Velasco, Jr. authored the Resolution. Chief Justice Sereno and Justices Carpio, Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Del Castillo, Reyes, and Caguioa concurred.

• Justice Perez — The provided text records a dissenting opinion by Justice Perez, joined by Justices Brion, Bersamin, Mendoza, Leonen, and Jardeleza, but it does not set out the dissent's reasoning.