Legaspi, Sr. vs. People of the Philippines

A public officer who performs official acts during a validly imposed and served suspension is criminally liable for usurpation of official functions under Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code, as the suspension creates a period of legal disentitlement to exercise the duties of the office.

Feliciano Palad Legaspi, Sr. was the elected Municipal Mayor of Norzagaray, Bulacan. An administrative complaint for oppression was filed against him by the Municipal Budget Officer, whom he had reassigned. The Office of the Ombudsman found him liable and imposed a penalty of six months and one day suspension. The Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) implemented the suspension order on December 12, 2012. Despite being suspended until June 13, 2013, Legaspi solemnized 37 marriages and issued a business permit, leading to the filing of 38 Informations for usurpation of official functions.

• Nature: The petitioner, Feliciano Palad Legaspi, Sr., was charged with 38 counts of usurpation of official functions under Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code for acts committed while he was suspended as Municipal Mayor of Norzagaray, Bulacan.
• The Suspension Order: The Office of the Ombudsman found Legaspi administratively liable for oppression and imposed a six-month-and-one-day suspension. The DILG implemented this order on December 12, 2012. Service was effected by leaving a copy with the Municipal Human Resource Management Officer, Silangan Rivas, after Legaspi initially refused to receive it personally. Legaspi later acknowledged receipt in a subsequent pleading.
• The Alleged Acts During Suspension: From December 14, 2012, to May 10, 2013, Legaspi solemnized 37 marriages. On February 22, 2013, he issued Mayor's Permit No. 2013-316 to Wacuman Incorporated. These acts were performed while he was under suspension and without legal authority.
• Prosecution Evidence: The prosecution presented certified true copies of the 37 marriage certificates from the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA) and the Local Civil Registrar, as well as a certified photocopy of the mayor's permit. Witnesses, including municipal employees, testified to witnessing the acts or identifying the documents.
• Defense: Legaspi denied the allegations, claiming he did not remember signing the documents and suggesting his signatures may have been forged. He challenged the admissibility of the photocopies and the validity of the service of the suspension order.

• Admissibility of Documentary Evidence: Petitioner argued that the marriage certificates and mayor's permit presented were mere photocopies, not properly authenticated as required by the Rules of Court, and thus inadmissible to prove the genuineness of his signatures.
• Defective Service of Suspension Order: Petitioner maintained that the service of the suspension order was defective because it was not personally served on him and was given to an unauthorized person, rendering his suspension invalid.
• Burden of Proof: Petitioner contended that the prosecution failed to prove that the signatures on the documents were his, as the burden of proof lies with the prosecution.

• Question of Law: Respondent countered that the petition raised factual questions inappropriate for a Rule 45 petition, which is limited to questions of law.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: Respondent argued that the guilt of the petitioner was proven beyond reasonable doubt through admissible public documents and witness testimony, establishing he performed official acts during his suspension.
• Valid Service: Respondent maintained that the service of the suspension order was valid under the Rules of Court, as it was left with a person in charge of the petitioner's office, and the petitioner was estopped from questioning it after acknowledging receipt.

• Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Whether the petitioner's guilt for 38 counts of usurpation of official functions under Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
• Admissibility of Evidence: Whether the certified copies of the marriage certificates and the certified photocopy of the mayor's permit were admissible as public documents without further proof of due execution.
• Validity of Service: Whether the service of the DILG suspension order was valid, thereby establishing the petitioner's legal disentitlement to perform official functions.

• Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt: The conviction was affirmed. All elements of usurpation of official functions were present: (1) the offender was a public officer; (2) he performed acts pertaining to a public officer (solemnizing marriages, issuing permits); (3) the acts were done under pretense of official function; and (4) he was not legally entitled to do so due to his valid suspension.
• Admissibility of Evidence: The documentary evidence was admissible. Marriage certificates are public documents under Articles 408 and 410 of the Civil Code and Section 19(a), Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. As public documents, they are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein and may be proven by a certified copy from the official custodian (PSA or Local Civil Registrar), without need for further authentication. The mayor's permit, also a public document, was properly proven by a certified photocopy from its custodian.
• Validity of Service: The service of the suspension order was valid. Pursuant to Section 6, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, service was properly made by leaving the order at the petitioner's office with a person having charge thereof (the Human Resource Officer). Furthermore, the petitioner was estopped from questioning the service after expressly acknowledging receipt in a subsequent pleading.

• Elements of Usurpation of Official Functions (Article 177, RPC) — The crime has four elements: (1) the offender is a private person or public officer; (2) the offender performs an act pertaining to a person in authority or public officer; (3) the act is performed under pretense of official position; and (4) the offender is not legally entitled to perform the act. The Court applied this by finding that Legaspi, a suspended mayor, performed official acts (marriage solemnization, permit issuance) under the color of his office while legally barred from doing so.
• Public Documents as Prima Facie Evidence — Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. Their contents may be proven by an official publication or a copy attested by the legal custodian. The Court relied on this doctrine to admit the certified marriage certificates and mayor's permit without requiring the original documents or additional testimony on their genuineness.
• Service of Pleadings and Orders — Personal service may be made by delivering a copy to the party or, if not found, by leaving it in his office with a clerk or person having charge thereof. The Court applied this rule to validate the service of the suspension order on Legaspi's subordinate.

• "During the period of suspension, the public officer 'shall not be entitled to all monetary benefits including leave credits.' As a consequence, the suspended public officer is barred from exercising the functions of his or her office during this period." — This passage clarifies the legal effect of an administrative suspension, which is central to establishing the "without being lawfully entitled" element of the crime.
• "Marriage certificates and mayor's permits are public documents because these are issuances of a municipal mayor in the performance of his/her official powers under Republic Act No. 7160. These constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein." — This excerpt establishes the evidentiary nature of the documents and the standard for their admissibility.

• Iwasawa v. Gangan, 717 Phil. 825 (2013) — Cited for the ruling that marriage certificates are public documents admissible as prima facie evidence of the facts stated, even without the testimony of the records custodian.
• Patungan, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 231827 (2020) — Cited to support that public documents like death certificates are admissible without further proof of due execution, reinforcing the principle applied to the marriage certificates.
• Quintano v. National Labor Relations Commission, 487 Phil. 412 (2004) — Cited for the principle that a "certified xerox copy" is equivalent to a "certified true copy" if certified by the proper officer as a faithful reproduction, which was applied to the mayor's permit.

• Article 177, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes usurpation of official functions. The Court applied its elements to convict Legaspi for performing official acts during suspension.
• Articles 408 and 410, Civil Code — Classify marriage certificates as public documents and prima facie evidence of the facts therein. Used to establish the admissibility of the marriage certificates.
• Section 19(a), Rule 132, Rules of Court — Defines public documents, including the written official acts of public officers. Applied to classify the marriage certificates and mayor's permit.
• Section 24, Rule 132, Rules of Court (prior to 2019 Amendments) — Provides that a public record may be evidenced by a copy attested by the officer having legal custody. Used to admit the certified copies from the PSA and Local Civil Registrar.
• Section 6, Rule 13, Rules of Court — Governs personal service of pleadings and orders. Applied to validate the service of the suspension order on Legaspi's subordinate.
• Section 444, Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code) — Grants municipal mayors the power to solemnize marriages and issue permits. These were the official acts Legaspi performed, forming the basis of the charges.

• Marvic M.V.F. Leonen (Chairperson)
• Henri Jean Paul B. Inting
• Rodil V. Zalameda
• Samuel H. Gaerlan