Lee v. Lee

A petition for correction of entries under Rule 108 whose commanding intent is to impugn a child's filiation constitutes a prohibited collateral attack and must be dismissed, and DNA testing may be ordered only when the party seeking it first presents prima facie evidence or establishes a reasonable possibility of filiation.

Lee Tek Sheng and Keh Shiok Cheng were married in China in 1931 and migrated to the Philippines. Their marital children—Rita, Leoncio, Rosa, Melody, Lucia, Julian, Henry, Martin, Victoriano, Natividad, and Thomas (collectively, Rita et al.)—were all born in the Philippines except Rita. In November 1948, Tek Sheng brought a young woman named Tiu Chuan from China to the Philippines, introducing her to the family as a housemaid. Rita et al. claim that Tek Sheng carried on an affair with Tiu, producing eight children, including respondent Emma Lee, and that Tek Sheng falsified the birth records of all his children with Tiu by recording Shiok Cheng as their mother. After Shiok Cheng's death on May 9, 1989, Tek Sheng's insistence on including Tiu's children in newspaper obituaries aroused the marital siblings' suspicions, prompting them to seek assistance from the National Bureau of Investigation, which produced a report noting age inconsistencies in the birth records. Rita et al. thereafter filed two Rule 108 petitions—one before the Regional Trial Court of Manila against Marcelo Lee et al., and one before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan against Emma Lee—seeking to delete Shiok Cheng's name as mother and substitute Tiu's name in the respective birth certificates.

Lee Tek Sheng and Keh Shiok Cheng were married in China sometime in 1931 and thereafter migrated to the Philippines. Their marital children—Rita, Leoncio, Lucia, Julian, Martin, Victoriano, and Thomas—were all born in the Philippines except Rita, who was born in China. In November 1948, Tek Sheng brought a young woman named Tiu Chuan from China to the Philippines, introducing her to the Lee siblings as their housemaid. According to the Lee siblings, Tek Sheng carried on an affair with Tiu, and their relations produced eight children, including respondent Emma Lee. The Lee siblings further contended that, without Shiok Cheng's knowledge, Tek Sheng falsified the entries in the birth records of all his children with Tiu by making it appear that Shiok Cheng was their mother. Emma's birth certificate listed "Tek Sheng T. Lee" as her father and "Shiok Cheng T. Keh" as her mother, and indicated that she was born in Caloocan.

When Tiu's alleged children became adults, they supposedly came to know that Tiu was their real mother, yet they continued to represent themselves as Shiok Cheng's children. After Shiok Cheng died on May 9, 1989, Tek Sheng allegedly insisted on including the names of his children with Tiu in newspaper obituaries, which roused the Lee siblings' suspicions and prompted them to seek aid from the National Bureau of Investigation. The NBI produced a report noting that Shiok Cheng's age "did not coincide with her actual age when she supposedly gave birth" to the children in question. For instance, the eldest was noted to have been born of a 17-year-old mother when Shiok Cheng was already 38, and another child was noted to have been born of a 23-year-old mother when Shiok Cheng was 40. The report concluded that "the mother of these 8 children is certainly not KEH SHIOK CHENG, but a much younger woman, most probably TIU CHUAN." However, the report contained no findings specific to Emma, noting only that she had no hospital record because, "as per complainant's allegation, she was born at their house."

Acting on this report, Rita et al. filed two Rule 108 petitions—one before the RTC of Manila on December 2, 1992, against Marcelo Lee et al., and one before the RTC of Caloocan on February 3, 1993, against Emma Lee—both seeking the deletion of Shiok Cheng's name as mother and the substitution of Tiu's name. After the motions to dismiss filed by the respondents in both petitions were denied, Marcelo et al. elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals and then to the Supreme Court. In Lee vs. Court of Appeals (2001), the Supreme Court sustained the propriety of the Rule 108 petitions, holding that they were not actions to impugn legitimacy and could prosper. Thereafter, on July 8, 2003, Rita et al. filed a Motion for the Use of DNA Analysis before the RTC of Caloocan to establish Emma's supposed maternal relation with Tiu, anchored on Rule 28, Sections 1 and 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Emma opposed the motion, arguing that it was based on mere suspicion and speculation and amounted to a fishing expedition unsupported by independently ascertained evidence.

The RTC of Caloocan denied the motion in its September 8, 2003 Order, reasoning that no evidence had yet been presented to establish any filial relationship between Emma and Tiu, and that a DNA analysis would be a "wild and unauthorized fishing expedition" tending to violate Tiu's right to privacy. The RTC denied reconsideration on April 6, 2005. Rita et al. then filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals, which, in its June 19, 2007 Decision, found no grave abuse of discretion on the RTC's part, approving of the RTC's observation that "no evidence has yet been adduced to establish a connection between Emma Lee and Tiu." The Court of Appeals denied Rita et al.'s Motion for Reconsideration on December 11, 2007, prompting the present Rule 45 Petition.

• Standing to Impugn Legitimacy: Petitioners maintained that they were not precluded from impugning respondent Emma's "legitimacy" because they were her "half brothers and sisters."
• Sufficiency of Evidence for DNA Testing: Petitioners argued that DNA testing should be allowed, as "there are sufficient documentary and testimonial evidence to prove that Keh Shiok Cheng is not the mother of respondent Emma Lee," specifically citing the NBI report, Dr. Novero's testimony, and petitioner Rita's own testimony.
• Binding Effect of Prior Ruling: Petitioners contended that Lee (2001) had already made a binding ruling on respondent Emma's parentage, confirming that Lee Tek Sheng had two families, one of which produced children by Tiu Chuan, including Emma.

• Lack of Prima Facie Case: Respondent Emma countered that DNA testing should not be allowed because petitioners had failed to establish a prima facie case concerning her maternal relation with Tiu, and that this lack belied DNA testing's capacity to serve any useful evidentiary purpose.
• No Binding Ruling on Parentage: Respondent Emma maintained that Lee (2001) made no binding statements on her parentage, its recitals having been merely summations of petitioners' allegations qualified by the word "allegedly."

• Propriety of Rule 108 Petition: Whether the Rule 108 petition before the RTC of Caloocan, though nominally for correction of entries, constitutes a prohibited collateral attack on respondent Emma's filiation.
• DNA Testing: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the RTC's denial of petitioners' motion to avail of DNA testing to determine if there is a maternal relation between Tiu Chuan and respondent Emma Lee.
• Law of the Case: Whether the doctrine of the law of the case, by virtue of the prior ruling in Lee vs. Court of Appeals (2001), precludes dismissal of the Rule 108 petition.

• Propriety of Rule 108 Petition: No. The Rule 108 petition must be dismissed because its commanding intent is to impugn respondent Emma's filiation, which cannot be collaterally attacked in a petition for correction of entries under Rule 108.
• DNA Testing: No. The Court of Appeals correctly sustained the RTC's denial of the DNA testing motion, petitioners having failed to present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of respondent Emma's filiation with Tiu.
• Law of the Case: No. The doctrine of the law of the case does not apply because adhering to Lee (2001) would result in an unjust decision, that ruling having failed to recognize that the intent was to collaterally impugn filiation, not merely legitimacy.

• Propriety of Rule 108 Petition: The Rule 108 petition's prayer sought the binary action of "deleting and/or cancelling the name of Keh Shiok Cheng as [Emma's] mother, [and] substituting the same with the name of [her] real and true mother, Tiu Chuan." Integral to the relief sought was the negation of Emma's filiation with Shiok Cheng. Petitioners' own pleadings revealed their commanding intent: they categorically declared that they were "impugning [Emma's] legitimacy" and framed an entire section of their Memorandum around the assertion that "there are sufficient documentary and testimonial evidence to prove that Keh Shiok Cheng is not the mother of respondent Emma Lee." The character of their evidence—the NBI report, Dr. Novero's testimony, and Rita's testimony—worked to impugn filiation with Shiok Cheng but did not positively establish Tiu as Emma's mother. Following Miller vs. Miller, Braza vs. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, and Ordoña vs. Local Civil Registrar, the legitimacy and filiation of children cannot be collaterally attacked in a petition for correction of entries in the certificate of live birth; impugning legitimacy is governed by Article 171 of the Family Code, not Rule 108. Accordingly, the Rule 108 petition was ordered dismissed.

• DNA Testing: Even assuming the Rule 108 petition could proceed, DNA testing could not be allowed. Under Lucas vs. Lucas, Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence merely provides conditions to safeguard the accuracy and integrity of DNA testing; it does not mean a DNA testing order will issue as a matter of right. A party seeking DNA testing must first present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of filiation. The NBI report never detailed or explored Tiu's own circumstances—her name never appeared in the eight paragraphs detailing the seeming errors in the birth records, and her consideration was borne largely by petitioner Rita's own proposition to the NBI rather than independent inquiry. The report was at its weakest regarding Emma, admitting that "EMMA LEE has no record in the hospital" and that no documents pertaining to Emma were found. Dr. Novero's testimony addressed only the improbability of Shiok Cheng giving birth at an advanced age, not the identity of the actual mother, and he conceded that "highly improbable" does not mean "absolute impossibility." Rita's testimony, standing alone, was bare and self-serving. The totality of petitioners' evidence tended more to impugn filiation with Shiok Cheng than to positively establish Tiu as Emma's mother, making the DNA test sought more in the nature of a fishing expedition than a confirmation of a reasonable possibility of filiation.

• Law of the Case: The doctrine of the law of the case, as explained in Villa vs. Sandiganbayan, is "merely a rule of procedure and does not go to the power of the court, and will not be adhered to where its application will result in an unjust decision." Lee (2001) held that the Rule 108 petitions were not actions to impugn legitimacy because "there is nothing to impugn as there is no blood relation at all between Keh Shiok Cheng and petitioners." However, Lee (2001) failed to recognize that the intent was to collaterally impugn filiation—an act no more permitted in a Rule 108 petition than a collateral attack on legitimacy. Following Mercury Group of Companies, Inc. vs. Home Development Mutual Fund, where the Court refused to apply the doctrine because it would produce an unjust result, the Court held that to sustain the continuation of proceedings animated by a commanding intent to impugn filiation, even nominally asking only for correction, would work an injustice by compelling Emma to suffer the consequences of Lee (2001)'s shortsightedness. Additionally, under Article 171 of the Family Code, the right to impugn filiation belongs to the husband or his heirs only in specified circumstances; petitioners, as marital children and inchoate heirs, did not have the right to call Emma's legitimacy into question on that basis alone.

• Prohibition Against Collateral Attack on Filiation in Rule 108 Proceedings — The legitimacy and filiation of children cannot be collaterally attacked in a petition for correction of entries in the certificate of live birth. Legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attack. Impugning the legitimacy of a child is governed by Article 171 of the Family Code, not Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The Court applied this doctrine by examining the commanding intent behind the petition—revealed through the pleadings, the prayer, and the character of the evidence—rather than the nominal label of the petition. Where the petition's true intent is to repudiate a child's maternal relation with the parent identified in birth records, rather than to harmonize those records with self-evident facts, it must be dismissed as a collateral attack.

• Prima Facie Evidence Requirement for DNA Testing — While DNA testing is a valid means of determining paternity and filiation, it is not available as a matter of right upon mere instance. A party seeking DNA testing must first present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of filiation. Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence provides conditions aimed at safeguarding the accuracy and integrity of DNA testing, but does not guarantee issuance of a testing order. The requirement of a prima facie case serves as a counterpart of a finding of probable cause, protecting the putative parent from harassment suits and preventing fishing expeditions. The Court applied this by finding that petitioners' evidence—the NBI report (which contained no findings specific to Emma and never detailed Tiu's circumstances), Dr. Novero's testimony (which addressed only improbability, not identity), and Rita's testimony (which was bare and self-serving)—failed to establish any reasonable possibility of maternal relation between Emma and Tiu.

• Doctrine of the Law of the Case (Exception) — The doctrine provides that determinations of questions of law on a prior appeal will generally govern a case through all subsequent stages. However, it is merely a rule of procedure and will not be adhered to where its application will result in an unjust decision. The Court declined to follow Lee (2001) because that ruling failed to distinguish between collateral attacks on legitimacy and collateral attacks on filiation, and adhering to it would unjustly compel Emma to suffer the consequences of that error.

• Evidentiary Value of Birth Certificates — Birth certificates offer prima facie evidence of filiation, and a high degree of proof is needed to overthrow the presumption of truth contained therein. The circumstances of registration—immediacy of reporting, participation of disinterested attendants at birth, and joint signing by parents in the case of illegitimate children—obviate the possibility that registration is caused by ulterior motives. The Court noted that Emma's birth certificate was definite in declaring Tek Sheng and Shiok Cheng as her parents, and that even under the contingent means of establishing filiation (open and continuous possession of status), the evidence supported Emma's maternal relation with Shiok Cheng.

• "The legitimacy and filiation of children cannot be collaterally attacked in a petition for correction of entries in the certificate of live birth." — This is the opening pronouncement of the decision, articulating the controlling doctrine that governs the disposition and anchoring the dismissal of the Rule 108 petition.

• "While it is a viable means for ascertaining filiation, DNA testing shall be allowed only when the party seeking it is first able to present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of filiation." — This passage states the threshold requirement for obtaining a DNA testing order, supplementing Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence as articulated in Lucas vs. Lucas.

• "A petition for correction whose commanding intent is to impugn a child's filiation with a parent identified in birth records—and not merely to harmonize those records with self-evident facts—will be disallowed for being such a collateral attack." — This formulation distinguishes permissible corrections from prohibited collateral attacks, providing the analytical framework for determining when a Rule 108 petition must be dismissed.

• "It is one thing to cast doubt on relations with one person, but another to establish relations with someone else. Petitioners have hardly done the latter." — This passage encapsulates the Court's assessment of the evidentiary insufficiency: petitioners' evidence impugned filiation with Shiok Cheng but did not positively establish Tiu as Emma's mother.

• Miller vs. Miller, G.R. No. 200344, August 28, 2019 — Controlling precedent. The Court relied on Miller for the doctrine that legitimacy and filiation cannot be collaterally attacked in a Rule 108 petition. Miller nullified the lower courts' declarations on filiation and ordered the dismissal of the Rule 108 petition without prejudice to refiling the appropriate action.

• Braza vs. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, 622 Phil. 654 (2009) — Followed. The Court cited Braza for the proposition that "legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attack," and that impugning legitimacy is governed by Article 171 of the Family Code, not Rule 108.

• Ordoña vs. Local Civil Registrar, G.R. No. 215370, November 9, 2021 — Followed. The Court cited this en banc decision as reiterating the pronouncements in Miller and Braza that a collateral attack to impugn filiation cannot be allowed in a Rule 108 proceeding.

• Lee vs. Court of Appeals, 419 Phil. 392 (2001) — Distinguished and effectively overruled on point. The Court held that Lee (2001) erred in failing to recognize that the intent was to collaterally impugn filiation, not merely legitimacy. The doctrine of the law of the case was held inapplicable because adherence would produce an unjust result.

• Lucas vs. Lucas, 665 Phil. 795 (2011) — Followed. The Court relied on Lucas for the requirement that a party seeking DNA testing must first present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of filiation, supplementing Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence.

• Mercury Group of Companies, Inc. vs. Home Development Mutual Fund, 565 Phil. 510 (2007) — Followed on the law of the case exception. The Court cited Mercury as an instance where the doctrine of the law of the case was held inapplicable because it would lead to an unjust result.

• Herrera vs. Alba, 499 Phil. 185 (2005) — Cited for context. The Court referenced Herrera's discussion of filiation proceedings and the legal rights associated with paternity, including citizenship, support, and inheritance, to underscore the consequences of disturbing filiation.

• Ara vs. Pizarro, 805 Phil. 759 (2017) — Cited for the evidentiary value of birth certificates. The Court relied on Ara for the proposition that birth certificates offer prima facie evidence of filiation and that a high degree of proof is needed to overthrow the presumption of truth.

• Rule 108, Sections 1 and 2, Rules of Court — Governs proceedings for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil register. The Court noted that while the petition's nominal objective was in keeping with the purpose and scope of Rule 108, the petition's true commanding intent—to impugn filiation—exceeded what Rule 108 may accomplish, rendering it a prohibited collateral attack.

• Article 171, Family Code — Provides that the heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the child only in specified cases (if the husband dies before expiration of the period for bringing the action, dies after filing the complaint without desisting, or if the child was born after the husband's death). The Court held that the cause of action to impugn Emma's filiation belonged to Tek Sheng, not to petitioners, who as inchoate heirs did not have the right to impugn on that basis alone.

• Article 170, Family Code — Prescribes the prescriptive periods for actions to impugn legitimacy: one year from knowledge of birth or its recording if the husband or heirs reside in the city or municipality of birth; two years if residing elsewhere in the Philippines; three years if abroad. The Court noted that the right to impugn must be exercised within these periods.

• Article 172, Family Code — Provides that the filiation of legitimate children is established by the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or in the absence thereof, by open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child. The Court held that Emma's birth certificate sufficed to establish her filiation, and that even under the contingent means, indications supported her maternal relation with Shiok Cheng.

• Article 164, Family Code — Provides that children conceived or born during the marriage of the parties are legitimate. The Court referenced this provision in discussing the presumption of legitimacy.

• Section 4, Rule on DNA Evidence (A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC) — Sets forth the conditions for issuance of a DNA testing order: (a) a biological sample exists relevant to the case; (b) the sample was not previously subjected to the type of testing requested or results require confirmation; (c) the testing uses a scientifically valid technique; (d) the testing has scientific potential to produce new relevant information; and (e) other factors affecting accuracy or integrity. The Court held that these conditions safeguard accuracy and integrity but do not guarantee issuance of an order as a matter of right; a prima facie showing is additionally required.

• Article 347, Revised Penal Code — Penalizes simulation of births, substitution of one child for another, and concealment or abandonment of a legitimate child. The Court noted that petitioners may pursue criminal cases under this provision for the alleged fictitious registration of Emma's birth.

• Section 21, Republic Act No. 8552 (Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) — Penalizes fictitious registration of birth. The Court noted this as a potential avenue for petitioners' allegations of simulation of birth.

• Republic Act No. 11222 (Simulated Birth Rectification Act) — Facilitates amnesty for simulation of birth made prior to its enactment when done in the child's best interest. The Court noted that any reckoning of liability must grapple with the terms of this law.

Lazaro-Javier, M. Lopez, and J. Lopez, JJ., concurred. Kho, Jr., J., was on leave.