Ledesma vs. Court of Appeals

A party's failure to personally appear before the barangay Lupon for conciliation, as required by Sections 6 and 9 of P.D. 1508, bars the filing of the complaint in court; only minors and incompetents may be assisted by a non-lawyer next of kin, and these express exceptions are exclusive of all others.

Petitioner Cecilia U. Ledesma owned an apartment building at 800-802 Remedios Street, Malate, Manila, two units of which were leased to private respondent Jose T. Dizon. P.D. 1508, the Katarungang Pambarangay Law, made barangay conciliation a precondition to the filing of certain actions in court and, under Section 9, required the parties to appear in person without counsel or representative, except minors and incompetents who may be assisted by a non-lawyer next of kin.

Petitioner Cecilia U. Ledesma owned an apartment building at 800-802 Remedios Street, Malate, Manila. Two of its units were leased to private respondent Jose T. Dizon at monthly rates of P3,450.00 for the unit at 800 Remedios Street and P2,300.00 for the unit at 802 Remedios Street. The leases were originally covered by written contracts both dated December 10, 1984, and except for the rates and duration, their terms and conditions were impliedly renewed on a month-to-month basis pursuant to Article 1670 of the Civil Code.

Private respondent violated the term on monthly rental payments, and as of October 31, 1988, he had incurred arrears for both units in the total sum of P14,039.00. Demand letters were sent to and received by him, but he did not pay. Petitioner then referred the matter to the barangay for conciliation, which eventually issued a certification to file action. During the barangay proceeding, petitioner was assisted by her son Raymond U. Ledesma, who is not a lawyer, because she claimed to be suffering from a recurring psychological and emotional ailment, as shown by receipts and prescriptions issued by her psychiatrist.

Because private respondent stubbornly refused to vacate the premises, petitioner retained counsel and initiated an ejectment proceeding before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila. In his Answer, private respondent denied the allegation that he had been duly summoned or subpoenaed by the Barangay Chairman to appear for hearing; averred that plaintiff had no cause of action against him; and alleged that the certification to file action was improperly or irregularly issued because he was never summoned or subpoenaed by the Barangay Chairman in connection with petitioner's complaint, so that the mandatory provision of P.D. 1508 was not complied with and the complaint warranted dismissal.

The CA found the record barren of any showing of compliance by petitioner with Section 6 of P.D. 1508, and the documentary evidence she herself attached to the complaint buttressed that conclusion. The demand letter dated October 18, 1988 for payment of rentals in the sum of P14,039.00 was signed by Raymund Ledesma, while the demand letter dated November 14, 1988 was signed by Atty. Epifania Navarro. More telling, the Certification to File Action signed by Barangay Chairman Alberto A. Solis showed that the complainant was Raymund U. Ledesma and not petitioner. The CA likewise found that for the entire year of 1988, specifically from September to December 6, there was no indication at all that petitioner went to see her psychiatrist for consultation, so that 1988 was a lucid interval for her.

• Waiver / Issue Raised Only on Appeal: Petitioner argued that private respondent raised the issue of non-compliance with Sections 6 and 9 of P.D. 1508 only in his petition for review with the CA, his answer and position paper having failed to do so, and that an issue not raised in the court below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, citing Saludes vs. Pajarillo; private respondent had therefore waived the objection, following Royales vs. Intermediate Appellate Court.
• Regularity of Barangay Proceedings: Petitioner argued that barangay authorities are presumed to have performed their official duties and to have acted regularly in issuing the certification to file action, and that the CA erred in concluding otherwise.
• Service of Summons: Petitioner argued that the CA gave undue weight and credence to private respondent's self-serving allegation that summons was not served on him.
• Repudiation of Settlement: Petitioner argued that the settlement was repudiated.
• Affirmance of the Lower Courts: Petitioner argued that the MTC and RTC judgments should be affirmed.

• Non-Compliance Raised in the Answer: Private respondent countered that he did not waive the defenses of non-compliance with Sections 6 and 9 of P.D. 1508, because his Answer before the MTC, specifically paragraphs 4, 7, and 8, substantially raised the fact of non-compliance and subjected petitioner's complaint to dismissal for lack of cause of action — alleging that he was never summoned or subpoenaed by the Barangay Chairman, that plaintiff had no cause of action, and that the certification to file action was improperly or irregularly issued.

• Waiver of the Barangay Conciliation Objection: Whether private respondent raised the issue of non-compliance with Sections 6 and 9 of P.D. 1508 in the lower court, or waived it by raising it only on appeal.
• Compliance with the Mandatory Personal Confrontation: Whether petitioner complied with Sections 6 and 9 of P.D. 1508 when she was represented before the barangay Lupon by her son and her lawyer.
• Psychological Ailment as Excuse: Whether petitioner's claimed recurring psychological and emotional ailment excused her from personally appearing before the barangay Lupon.

• Waiver of the Barangay Conciliation Objection: No. Private respondent's Answer substantially raised non-compliance; paragraph 4's allegation that he was never summoned by the Barangay Chairman was in effect an assertion that no personal confrontation ever took place.
• Compliance with the Mandatory Personal Confrontation: No. Petitioner did not personally appear before the Lupon; her son and her lawyer dealt with the barangay, and the certification to file action named her son as the complainant.
• Psychological Ailment as Excuse: No. Petitioner was not shown to be incompetent, and the records showed no psychiatric consultation from September to December 1988, making that period a lucid interval.

• Waiver of the Barangay Conciliation Objection: The SC rejected the claim that the issue surfaced only for the first time in the CA. When private respondent stated that he was never summoned or subpoenaed by the Barangay Chairman, he was in effect stating that since he was never summoned, he could not appear in person for the needed confrontation of the parties before the Lupon Chairman for conciliation and/or amicable settlement. Without the mandatory personal confrontation, no complaint could be filed with the MTC. Paragraph 4 of the Answer (never summoned or subpoenaed by the Barangay Chairman), paragraph 7 (plaintiff has no cause of action), and paragraph 8 (the certification to file action was improperly or irregularly issued, resulting in non-compliance with the mandatory requirements of P.D. 1508) were in substantial compliance with the raising of the issues and objections in the court below. The objection was therefore seasonably raised and not waived.

• Compliance with the Mandatory Personal Confrontation: Section 6 of P.D. 1508 forbids the filing of a complaint within the Lupon's authority unless there has been a confrontation of the parties before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat and no conciliation or settlement has been reached, as certified. Section 9 mandates that in all proceedings the parties must appear in person without the assistance of counsel or representative, with the exception of minors and incompetents who may be assisted by their next of kin who are not lawyers. The CA found the record barren of any showing of compliance by petitioner, and her own documentary evidence confirmed it: the October 18, 1988 demand letter for P14,039.00 was signed by Raymund Ledesma, the November 14, 1988 demand letter was signed by Atty. Epifania Navarro, and the Certification to File Action signed by Barangay Chairman Alberto A. Solis named Raymund U. Ledesma, not petitioner, as complainant. The personal confrontation requirement exists because a confrontation between the parties without the intervention of counsel or a representative would generate spontaneity and a favorable disposition to amicable settlement on the part of the disputants, a procedure deemed conducive to the successful resolution of the dispute at the barangay level. Petitioner's non-compliance with Sections 6 and 9 legally barred her from pursuing the ejectment case in the MTC of Manila.

• Psychological Ailment as Excuse: Petitioner sought to justify her non-appearance by her recurring psychological ailments, but for the entire year of 1988 — specifically September to December 6 — there was no indication at all that she went to see her psychiatrist for consultation. The only conclusion was that 1988 was a lucid interval for petitioner, leaving no excuse for her non-appearance at the Lupon Chairman's office. Petitioner, not having shown that she is incompetent, cannot be represented by counsel or even by an attorney-in-fact who is next of kin. As explained by the Minister of Justice, whose opinion the SC adopted, Section 9 is couched in mandatory language to ensure compliance with the requirement of personal confrontation, and pursuant to the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the express exceptions for minors and incompetents must be construed as exclusive of all others not mentioned.

• Katarungang Pambarangay personal confrontation — Sections 6 and 9 of P.D. 1508 require the parties themselves to appear before the Lupon Chairman or Pangkat, without counsel or representative, as a precondition to filing suit. The SC applied this strictly: petitioner's son and her lawyer dealt with the barangay, and the certification to file action named the son as complainant, so no valid confrontation occurred and the ejectment complaint was correctly dismissed.
• Expressio unius est exclusio alterius — The express exceptions in Section 9 for minors and incompetents, who may be assisted by a non-lawyer next of kin, are exclusive of all others not mentioned. Applied to reject petitioner's attempt to justify representation by her son and her lawyer on the ground of recurring psychological ailment.
• Incompetency must be shown — A party claiming the benefit of the incompetency exception must actually establish incompetency; absent such a showing, she cannot be represented by counsel or by an attorney-in-fact who is next of kin. Petitioner's failure to show any psychiatric consultation during the material period defeated her claim.
• Substantial compliance in pleading objections — An answer alleging that the defendant was never summoned by the Barangay Chairman, that plaintiff has no cause of action, and that the certification to file action was irregularly issued substantially raises the objection of non-compliance with P.D. 1508, so the issue is not raised for the first time on appeal.

• "a personal confrontation between the parties without the intervention of a counsel or representative would generate spontaneity and a favorable disposition to amicable settlement on the part of the disputants." — The rationale behind Section 9's personal appearance requirement, quoted by the SC to explain why the rule is mandatory rather than directory.
• "the express exceptions made regarding minors and incompetents must be construed as exclusive of all others not mentioned." — The SC's application of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, foreclosing any other ground for representation before the Lupon.
• "Petitioner, not having shown that she is incompetent, cannot be represented by counsel or even by attorney-in-fact who is next of kin." — The direct holding on representation, tying the exception to an actual showing of incompetency.
• "Petitioner's non-compliance with Secs. 6 and 9 of P.D. 1508 legally barred her from pursuing the ejectment case in the MTC of Manila." — The conclusion that resolves the case and justifies the dismissal for lack of cause of action.

• Saludes vs. Pajarillo, 44 O.G. 12, pp. 4892, 4894 — Cited by petitioner for the rule that an issue not raised in the court below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; not applied, because the SC found the issue was in fact raised in the Answer.
• Royales vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 127 SCRA 470 — Cited by petitioner on waiver of the objection; not applied for the same reason.
• Ramos vs. Court of Appeals, 174 SCRA 690, 695 — Relied on by the SC for the rule that a party not shown to be incompetent cannot be represented by counsel or by an attorney-in-fact who is next of kin.

• Section 6, P.D. 1508 — Conciliation precondition to filing of complaint: no complaint within the Lupon's authority may be filed in court unless there has been a confrontation of the parties before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat and no settlement has been reached, as certified. Applied: no valid confrontation took place, so the ejectment complaint could not be filed.
• Section 9, P.D. 1508 — Appearance of parties in person without the assistance of counsel or representative, except minors and incompetents who may be assisted by a non-lawyer next of kin. Applied: petitioner's representation by her son and her lawyer violated the mandatory requirement.
• Section 4(d), P.D. 1508 — Cited by the SC in concluding that non-compliance with Sections 6 and 9 legally barred petitioner from pursuing the ejectment case.
• Article 1670, Civil Code — Cited in the facts as the basis for the implied month-to-month renewal of the expired lease contracts.