Ledesma vs. Climaco

A lawyer appointed as counsel de oficio has a high duty to the accused that is not diminished by the fact that his services are rendered without remuneration, and the denial of a motion to withdraw as counsel de oficio does not constitute grave abuse of discretion where the motion's principal effect would be to delay the case and the prosecution has already rested.

Petitioner Adelino H. Ledesma was a member of the Philippine Bar who served as counsel de parte for one of the accused in a criminal case pending before respondent Judge Rafael C. Climaco of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch I, Silay City. On October 13, 1964, petitioner was appointed Election Registrar for the Municipality of Cadiz, Province of Negros Occidental, by the Commission on Elections. The case involved a crime allegedly committed on February 17, 1962, with proceedings having started in the municipal court of Cadiz on July 11, 1962. The constitutional right to counsel, enshrined in the present Constitution, formed the backdrop against which the Court evaluated the petitioner's motion to withdraw.

Petitioner Adelino H. Ledesma, a member of the Philippine Bar, was counsel de parte for one of the accused in a criminal case pending before respondent Judge Rafael C. Climaco of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch I, Silay City. On October 13, 1964, petitioner was appointed Election Registrar for the Municipality of Cadiz, Province of Negros Occidental, and commenced to discharge its duties. As he was counsel de parte for one of the accused, he filed a motion to withdraw as such. Respondent Judge denied the motion and instead appointed him counsel de oficio for the two defendants.

On November 3, 1964, petitioner filed an urgent motion to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio, premised on the policy of the Commission on Elections to require full-time service as well as on the volume or pressure of work of petitioner, which could prevent him from handling adequately the defense. Respondent Judge, in the challenged order of November 6, 1964, denied said motion, stating that its "principal effect [being] to delay this case." It was likewise noted that the prosecution had already rested and that petitioner was previously counsel de parte, his designation in the former category being precisely to protect him in his new position without prejudicing the accused.

The challenged order of November 6, 1964 began with a reminder that a crime was allegedly committed on February 17, 1962, with the proceedings having started in the municipal court of Cadiz on July 11, 1962. Respondent Judge then quoted his earlier order of October 16, 1964, which noted that the defense had obtained postponements on May 17, 1963, June 13, 1963, June 14, 1963, October 28, 1963, November 27, 1963, February 11, 1964, March 9, 1964, June 8, 1964, July 26, 1964, and September 7, 1964. Reference was also made to another order of February 11, 1964, which stated: "Upon petition of Atty. Adelino H. Ledesma, alleging indisposition, the continuation of the trial of this case is hereby transferred to March 9, 1964 at 8:30 in the morning. The defense is reminded that at its instance, this case has been postponed at least eight (8) times, and that the government witnesses have to come all the way from Manapala."

After which, it was noted in such order that there was no incompatibility between the duty of petitioner to the accused and to the court and the performance of his task as an election registrar of the Commission on Elections and that the ends of justice "would be served by allowing and requiring Mr. Ledesma to continue as counsel de oficio, since the prosecution has already rested its case." A motion for reconsideration having proved futile, petitioner instituted the certiorari proceeding before the Supreme Court.

• Incompatibility of Duties: Petitioner argued that with his appointment as Election Registrar by the Commission on Elections, he was not in a position to devote full time to the defense of the two accused, premised on the policy of the Commission on Elections to require full-time service.
• Volume of Work: Petitioner argued that the volume or pressure of his work as Election Registrar could prevent him from handling adequately the defense of the accused.

• Delay of the Case: Respondent Judge denied the motion to withdraw, stating that its principal effect would be to delay the case, noting that the prosecution had already rested.
• Protection of Petitioner's Status: Respondent Judge noted that petitioner was previously counsel de parte, and his designation as counsel de oficio was precisely to protect him in his new position without prejudicing the accused.
• No Incompatibility: Respondent Judge found that there was no incompatibility between the duty of petitioner to the accused and to the court and the performance of his task as an election registrar of the Commission on Elections.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Whether respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari in denying petitioner's motion to withdraw as counsel de oficio.
• Right to Counsel: Whether the denial of the motion to withdraw as counsel de oficio violated the accused's constitutional right to counsel.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: No. The denial of the motion to withdraw as counsel de oficio did not constitute grave abuse of discretion, as the motion's principal effect would be to delay the case, and the prosecution had already rested.
• Right to Counsel: No. The denial did not render the accused's right to counsel nugatory, as petitioner remained obligated to fulfill his duties as counsel de oficio, and the Court assumed he would exert himself sufficiently to perform his task as defense counsel with competence.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: The Court held that it cannot be plausibly asserted that the failure to allow withdrawal of de oficio counsel could ordinarily be characterized as a grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari. The challenged order of November 6, 1964 spoke for itself, beginning with a reminder that a crime was allegedly committed on February 17, 1962, with the proceedings having started in the municipal court of Cadiz on July 11, 1962. The order noted that the defense had obtained numerous postponements, and that the prosecution had already rested its case. The Court observed that what was easily discernible was the obvious reluctance of petitioner to comply with the responsibilities incumbent on the counsel de oficio. The Court further noted that even on the assumption that he continues in his position, his volume of work is likely to be very much less at present, and there is not now the slightest pretext for him to shirk an obligation a member of the bar, who expects to remain in good standing, should fulfill.

• Right to Counsel: The Court acknowledged the overriding concern for the right to counsel of the accused that must be taken seriously into consideration, and that in appropriate cases, it should tilt the balance. However, this was not one of them. The Court cited Chief Justice Moran in People vs. Holgado: "In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel." The Court noted that the present Constitution is even more emphatic, with the new provision: "Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right." The Court held that such a consideration could have sufficed for petitioner not being allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio, for he did betray by his moves his lack of enthusiasm for the task entrusted to him. The Court assumed that petitioner would exert himself sufficiently to perform his task as defense counsel with competence, if not with zeal, if only to erase doubts as to his fitness to remain a member of the profession in good standing.

• Duty of Counsel De Oficio — Membership in the bar carries with it a responsibility to live up to its exacting standards. The law is a profession, not a trade or a craft. Those enrolled in its ranks are called upon to aid in the performance of one of the basic purposes of the State, the administration of justice. To avoid any frustration thereof, especially in the case of an indigent defendant, a lawyer may be required to act as counsel de oficio. The fact that his services are rendered without remuneration should not occasion a diminution in his zeal. Rather the contrary. The Court applied this doctrine in finding that petitioner's reluctance to fulfill his obligations as counsel de oficio was not justified by his appointment as Election Registrar.

• Right to Counsel — In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence. The Court applied this doctrine in recognizing the importance of the right to counsel, but found that the denial of petitioner's motion to withdraw did not violate this right, as petitioner remained obligated to render effective assistance.

• "There is need anew in this disciplinary proceeding to lay stress on the fundamental postulate that membership in the bar carries with it a responsibility to live up to its exacting standard. The law is a profession, not a trade or a craft. Those enrolled in its ranks are called upon to aid in the performance of one of the basic purposes of the State, the administration of justice. To avoid any frustration thereof, especially in the case of an indigent defendant, a lawyer may be required to act as counsel de oficio. The fact that his services are rendered without remuneration should not occasion a diminution in his zeal. Rather the contrary." — This passage from People vs. Daban, quoted by the Court, articulates the fundamental duty of counsel de oficio and the professional standards expected of members of the bar.

• "It is true that he is a court-appointed counsel. But we do say that as such counsel de oficio, he has as high a duty to the accused as one employed and paid by defendant himself. Because, as in the case of the latter, he must exercise his best efforts and professional ability in behalf of the person assigned to his care. He is to render effective assistance. The accused-defendant expects of him due diligence, not mere perfunctory representation. For, indeed a lawyer who is a vanguard in the bastion of justice is expected to have a bigger dose of social conscience and a little less of self-interest." — This passage from People vs. Estebia, quoted by the Court, defines the standard of care required of counsel de oficio, emphasizing that they must render effective assistance, not mere perfunctory representation.

• "In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and; without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence." — This passage from People vs. Holgado, quoted by the Court, articulates the constitutional importance of the right to counsel in criminal cases.

• People vs. Daban, L-31429, January 31, 1972, 43 SCRA 185 — Controlling precedent cited for the doctrine that membership in the bar carries with it a responsibility to live up to its exacting standards, and that a lawyer may be required to act as counsel de oficio.
• People vs. Estebia, L-26868, February 27, 1969, 27 SCRA 106 — Followed for the proposition that counsel de oficio has as high a duty to the accused as one employed and paid by defendant himself, and must render effective assistance.
• People vs. Holgado, 85 Phil. 752, 756-757 (1950) — Followed for the doctrine that in criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity to be heard by counsel.
• In re Robles Lahesa, 4 Phil. 298 — Followed for the proposition that the Court should exact from its officers and subordinates the most scrupulous performance of their official duties, especially when negligence results in delays in the prosecution of criminal cases.

• Article IV, Section 19, 1973 Constitution — The provision reiterating that the accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel." The Court cited this provision in recognizing the constitutional importance of the right to counsel.
• Article IV, Section 20, 1973 Constitution — The new provision stating: "Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence." The Court cited this provision to emphasize the indispensable role of a member of the Bar in the defense of an accused.

Justice Zaldivar (Chairman), Justice Antonio, Justice Fernandez, and Justice Aquino concurred. Justice Barredo took no part.