Ledesma, Jr. vs. National Labor Relations Commission

In illegal dismissal cases, the employee must first establish by substantial evidence the fact of his dismissal before the burden shifts to the employer to prove that the termination was for a valid or authorized cause. If there is no dismissal, there can be no question as to the legality or illegality thereof.

Petitioner Federico Ledesma, Jr. was employed as a bus/service driver by private respondent Philippine Nautical Training Institute (PNTI) on a probationary basis, reporting at the respondent's training site in Dasmariñas, Cavite, under the direct supervision of site administrator Pablo Manolo de Leon. The case involves a labor dispute arising from an alleged dismissal following a complaint filed by petitioner against his supervisor and a counter-report accusing petitioner of suspected drug use.

On 4 December 1998, Federico Ledesma, Jr. was employed as a bus/service driver by Philippine Nautical Training Institute (PNTI) on a probationary basis, reporting at the respondent's training site in Dasmariñas, Cavite, under the direct supervision of site administrator Pablo Manolo de Leon. On 11 November 2000, petitioner filed a complaint against de Leon for allegedly abusing his authority by using the company's vehicles and facilities for personal ends, and for immoral conduct within the premises. A copy of the complaint was received by the respondent's Chief Accountant, Nita Azarcon.

On 27 November 2000, de Leon filed a written report against petitioner addressed to Vice-President for Administration Ricky Ty, citing suspected drug use. In view of this report, Human Resource Manager Treena Cueva served a Notice to Explain on petitioner on 29 November 2000, requiring him to explain within 24 hours why no disciplinary action should be imposed for allegedly violating Section 14, Article IV of the respondent's Code of Conduct.

According to petitioner, he was asked to report to the main office in España, Manila, on 29 November 2000, where he was served the Notice to Explain and de Leon's report. After he received these documents, HR Manager Cueva went inside Ty's office and later came out with him. To petitioner's surprise, Cueva took back the Notice to Explain and declared there was no more need for him to explain since his drug test result was positive. When petitioner asked for a copy of the result, Cueva said it was with the company president, but later claimed it was with authorities at Camp Crame. Petitioner was then asked to sign a resignation letter and was told he was no longer considered an employee. Ty offered separation pay if he would resign voluntarily. Petitioner did not sign, asking for time to think. When he returned to the training site to get his bicycle, the guard refused to let him enter.

The following day, petitioner underwent a drug test at St. Dominic Medical Center and tested negative. He returned to the main office to show the result to Ty and Cueva, stating he decided to continue working. On 2 December 2000, petitioner reported for work but was not allowed to enter the training site, allegedly banned therefrom. This prompted him to file the complaint for illegal dismissal on 3 December 2000.

Private respondent countered that petitioner was never dismissed but merely served a Notice to Explain, and that it was petitioner who failed to report to work. Respondent denied banning petitioner, noting that on 3 December 2000, petitioner was able to claim his salary for 16-30 November 2000 at the training site, and on 9 December 2000, he claimed his 13th month pay there, both evidenced by pay vouchers bearing his signature.

• Misapprehension of Facts: Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals committed a misapprehension of facts, and that his dismissal was established by uncontradicted evidence on record which the NLRC misappreciated; had these been considered, the Labor Arbiter's finding of illegal dismissal would have been affirmed.
• Due Process — Lack of Just Cause: Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals subverted due process when it did not consider evidence showing there was no just cause for dismissal, as he was not a drug user and there was no evidence to support this ground.
• Due Process — Subversion of Rights: Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in not finding that respondents subverted his right to due process of law.
• Receipt of Salary Not Inconsistent with Dismissal: Petitioner maintained that his receipt of earned salary for 16-30 November 2000 and his 13th month pay was neither inconsistent with nor a negation of his allegation of illegal dismissal, as he received these only from the guardhouse, having been banned from the work premises.

• No Dismissal Occurred: Private respondent countered that petitioner was never dismissed from employment but merely served a Notice to Explain why no disciplinary action should be filed against him in view of his superior's report that he was suspected of using illegal drugs.
• Premature Filing: Respondent argued that instead of filing an answer to the Notice to Explain, petitioner prematurely lodged a complaint for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter.
• Petitioner's Failure to Report: Respondent denied banning petitioner from its premises, asserting that it was petitioner who failed or refused to report to work after being asked to explain his alleged drug use, as evidenced by his ability to claim his salary and 13th month pay at the training site.

• Fact of Dismissal: Whether petitioner was illegally dismissed from employment.
• Misapprehension of Facts: Whether the Court of Appeals committed a misapprehension of facts in affirming the NLRC Decision.
• Due Process — Just Cause: Whether the Court of Appeals subverted due process when it did not consider evidence showing there was no just cause for dismissal.
• Due Process — Right to Due Process: Whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in not finding that respondents subverted petitioner's right to due process of law.

• Fact of Dismissal: No. Petitioner failed to establish by substantial evidence the fact of his dismissal from employment; his claim was supported only by his own bare, uncorroborated, and self-serving allegations, which were incoherent, inconsistent, and contradictory.
• Misapprehension of Facts: No. The Court of Appeals did not commit a misapprehension of facts, as its conclusion that petitioner was not dismissed was more in accord with the evidence on record and the attendant circumstances.
• Due Process — Just Cause: No. Since petitioner failed to establish the fact of dismissal, there was no need to reach the question of whether there was just cause for dismissal.
• Due Process — Right to Due Process: No. The Court of Appeals did not subvert petitioner's right to due process, as the dismissal of the petition was based on the evidence on record.

• Fact of Dismissal: The Court noted that the issues raised by petitioner are factual in nature, which are not within the office of a Petition for Review. However, when the findings of the Labor Arbiter contradict those of the NLRC, departure from the general rule is warranted, and the Court must examine the records to determine which findings should be preferred. The Court applied the settled evidentiary rule that before the burden of proof shifts to the employer to prove the validity of dismissal, the employee must first sufficiently establish that he was indeed dismissed. The NLRC did not give credence to petitioner's allegation that he was banned from the workplace, opining that had it been true that he was no longer allowed to enter the training site on 2 December 2000, it is quite a wonder he was able to do so the very next day to claim his salary. The Court found that petitioner's claim of illegal dismissal was supported by no other than his own bare, uncorroborated, and self-serving allegations, which were also incoherent, inconsistent, and contradictory. The offer of separation pay by Ty did not constitute dismissal, as petitioner was only being given the option to either resign and receive separation pay or not resign but face possible disciplinary charges; the final decision rested with petitioner. The Court also noted that petitioner's ability to claim his salary on 3 December 2000 and his 13th month pay on 9 December 2000 at the training site raised doubt as to his purported ban. Finally, the presentation of the payroll bearing petitioner's name proved he remained an employee up to December 2000; entries in the payroll, being entries in the course of business, enjoy the presumption of regularity under Rule 130, Section 43 of the Rules of Court, and petitioner failed to adduce clear and convincing evidence to overcome this presumption.
• Misapprehension of Facts: The Court found that there was hardly any evidence on record to meet the quantum of substantial evidence required. The Court cited the rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it, and the evidence to prove this fact must be clear, positive, and convincing. The rule that the employer bears the burden of proof in illegal dismissal cases finds no application where the employer denies having dismissed the employee.
• Due Process — Just Cause: The Court held that before the private respondent must bear the burden of proving that the dismissal was legal, petitioner must first establish by substantial evidence the fact of his dismissal from service. Logically, if there is no dismissal, then there can be no question as to the legality or illegality thereof.
• Due Process — Right to Due Process: The Court emphasized that while the Constitution affords full protection to labor, this does not mean that the Court is bound to uphold the working class in every labor dispute. The law in protecting the rights of employees authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of the employer. When the law tilts the scales of justice in favor of labor, it is in recognition of the inherent economic inequality between labor and management, but never should the scale be so tilted if the result is an injustice to the employer.

• Burden of Proof in Illegal Dismissal Cases — The employee must first establish by substantial evidence the fact of his dismissal before the burden shifts to the employer to prove that the termination was for a valid or authorized cause. The rule that the employer bears the burden of proof in illegal dismissal cases finds no application where the employer denies having dismissed the employee. The Court applied this doctrine in finding that petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case of dismissal.
• Substantial Evidence — Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla; it means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The Court applied this standard in evaluating petitioner's claim of illegal dismissal, finding that his bare, uncorroborated, and self-serving allegations did not meet this quantum of evidence.
• Presumption of Regularity of Entries in the Course of Business — Under Rule 130, Section 43 of the Rules of Court, entries in the payroll, being entries in the course of business, enjoy the presumption of regularity. It is incumbent upon the party claiming fabrication to adduce clear and convincing evidence to overcome such presumption. The Court applied this doctrine in giving credence to the payroll presented by private respondent.
• Ei incumbit probatio, qui dicit, non qui negat — The burden of proof is on the part of the party who makes the allegations; if he claims a right granted by law, he must prove his claim by competent evidence, relying on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of that of his opponent. The Court applied this principle in finding that petitioner failed to discharge his burden of proving the fact of dismissal.

• "The rule is that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it; thus, petitioners were burdened to prove their allegation that respondents dismissed them from their employment. It must be stressed that the evidence to prove this fact must be clear, positive and convincing. The rule that the employer bears the burden of proof in illegal dismissal cases finds no application here because the respondents deny having dismissed the petitioners." — This passage from Machica vs. Roosevelt Services Center, Inc. states the controlling doctrine on burden of proof in illegal dismissal cases where the employer denies the dismissal.
• "It is a basic rule in evidence, however, that the burden of proof is on the part of the party who makes the allegations – ei incumbit probatio, qui dicit, non qui negat. If he claims a right granted by law, he must prove his claim by competent evidence, relying on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of that of his opponent." — This passage from Rufina Patis Factory vs. Alusitain articulates the fundamental evidentiary principle applied by the Court in this case.
• "It is true that the Constitution affords full protection to labor, and that in light of this Constitutional mandate, we must be vigilant in striking down any attempt of the management to exploit or oppress the working class. However, it does not mean that we are bound to uphold the working class in every labor dispute brought before this Court for our resolution." — This passage articulates the Court's balancing principle in labor disputes, recognizing that the constitutional protection of labor does not require automatic favor for the employee in every case.

• Machica vs. Roosevelt Services Center, Inc., G.R. No. 168664, 4 May 2006, 389 SCRA 534 — Controlling precedent cited for the rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it, and that the employer bears the burden of proof in illegal dismissal cases only when the employer does not deny having dismissed the employee.
• Rufina Patis Factory vs. Alusitain, G.R. No. 146202, 14 July 2004, 434 SCRA 418 — Followed for the basic rule in evidence that the burden of proof is on the party who makes the allegations, and that he must prove his claim by competent evidence.
• Sta. Catalina College vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 461 Phil. 720, 730 (2003) — Cited for the rule that when the findings of the Labor Arbiter contradict those of the NLRC, the Court must examine the records to determine which findings should be preferred.
• Schering Employees Labor Union (SELU) vs. Schering Plough Corporation, G.R. No. 142506, 17 February 2005, 451 SCRA 689, 695 — Cited for the proposition that the facts and evidence must establish a prima facie case of dismissal before the employer bears the burden of proving the validity of termination.
• Government Service Insurance System vs. Court of Appeals, 357 Phil. 511, 531 (1998) — Cited for the definition of substantial evidence as more than a mere scintilla, meaning such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

• Section 43, Rule 130, Rules of Court — Provides that entries in the course of business enjoy the presumption of regularity. The Court applied this provision in giving credence to the payroll presented by private respondent, holding that petitioner failed to adduce clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption of regularity.
• Section 14, Article IV, Private Respondent's Code of Conduct — The provision petitioner was accused of violating in the Notice to Explain served upon him, relating to the alleged drug use charge.
• Rule 45, Revised Rules of Court — The procedural basis for the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner, which the Court noted is not the proper vehicle for raising factual issues.
• Rule 65, Revised Rules of Court — The procedural basis for the Petition for Certiorari filed by petitioner before the Court of Appeals.

Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson), Austria-Martinez, Corona, and Nachura, JJ., concurred.