Ledesma de Jesus-Paras vs. Vailoces

A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from office as an attorney upon a final conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. Falsification of a public document is a crime involving moral turpitude because the act is clearly contrary to justice, honesty, and good morals. Once a conviction has become final, the Court will not review its sufficiency in a disbarment proceeding; the only issue is whether the attorney was found guilty and convicted by a final judgment of a crime involving moral turpitude.

The respondent, Quinciano Vailoces, was a member of the Philippine bar and, in his capacity as a notary public, acknowledged the execution of a document purporting to be the last will and testament of Tarcila Visitacion de Jesus. The complainant, Ledesma de Jesus-Paras, was the offended party who instituted the disbarment proceedings against the respondent. The case is governed by Section 25, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, which provides for the removal or suspension of a member of the bar upon conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude.

Quinciano Vailoces, a member of the Philippine bar and a notary public, on December 14, 1950, acknowledged the execution of a document purporting to be the last will and testament of one Tarcila Visitacion de Jesus. The will was presented for probate before the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental, where it was impugned by the decedent's surviving spouse and daughter. The probate court, finding that the will was a forgery, rendered a decision denying probate to the will, and this decision became final.

On the basis of the probate court's decision, a criminal action for falsification of public document was filed against Vailoces and the three attesting witnesses to the will before the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental. After trial, they were found guilty and convicted. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision with regard to Vailoces but modified it with respect to his co-accused. As finally adjudged, Vailoces was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of falsification of public document defined and penalized in Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from 2 years, 4 months and 1 day of prision correccional as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day of prison mayor as maximum, with the accessories of the law, fines, and costs. This sentence became final, and Vailoces began serving it in the insular penitentiary.

As a consequence of the conviction, the offended party instituted the present disbarment proceedings against Vailoces. In his answer, the respondent disputed the judgment of conviction rendered against him in the criminal case, contending that it was based on insufficient and inconclusive evidence, that the charge was motivated by sheer vindictiveness, malice, and spite on the part of the complainant, and that giving course to the disbarment proceeding would be tantamount to placing him in double jeopardy. He pleaded that the complaint be dismissed.

• Grounds for Disbarment: The complainant instituted the disbarment proceedings against the respondent on the basis of his final conviction for falsification of a public document, a crime involving moral turpitude, which renders a member of the bar amenable to removal under Section 25, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court.

• Insufficient Evidence: Respondent disputed the judgment of conviction rendered against him in the criminal case, contending that it was based on insufficient and inconclusive evidence.
• Vindictiveness of Complainant: Respondent contended that the charge was merely motivated by sheer vindictiveness, malice, and spite on the part of the complainant.
• Double Jeopardy: Respondent pleaded that to give course to the disbarment proceeding would be tantamount to placing him in double jeopardy, as he had already been convicted and deprived of his liberty and his office as Justice of the Peace of Bais, Negros Oriental.

• Moral Turpitude: Whether falsification of a public document is a crime involving moral turpitude that renders a member of the bar amenable to disbarment under Section 25, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court.
• Review of Conviction: Whether the respondent may dispute the sufficiency of his conviction in the disbarment proceeding.
• Double Jeopardy: Whether the disbarment proceeding after the respondent's conviction would place him in double jeopardy.

• Moral Turpitude: Yes. Falsification of a public document is a crime involving moral turpitude, as the act is clearly contrary to justice, honesty, and good morals. The respondent, having been found guilty and convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, rendered himself amenable to disbarment under Section 25, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court.
• Review of Conviction: No. The sufficiency of the respondent's conviction is a matter that the Court cannot look into in the disbarment proceeding, as the judgment has become final and has been executed. The only issue is that he was found guilty and convicted by a final judgment of a crime involving moral turpitude.
• Double Jeopardy: No. The defense of double jeopardy is untenable because disbarment does not partake of a criminal proceeding. The defense can only be availed of when one is prosecuted for the same offense, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense necessarily included therein, within the meaning of Section 9, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.

• Moral Turpitude: Under Section 25, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, a member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney if it appears that he has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Moral turpitude, as used in this section, includes any act deemed contrary to justice, honesty, or good morals. The crime of which the respondent was convicted, falsification of a public document, is indeed of this nature, for the act is clearly contrary to justice, honesty, and good morals. The Court cited the general rule that "embezzlement, forgery, robbery, and swindling are crimes which denote moral turpitude and, as a general rule, all crimes of which fraud is an element are looked on as involving moral turpitude" (58 C.J.S., 1206). Since the respondent was found guilty and convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, he rendered himself amenable to disbarment under Section 25, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court.

• Review of Conviction: It is futile for the respondent to dispute the sufficiency of his conviction in the disbarment proceeding, as this is a matter that the Court cannot look into. The judgment not only has become final but has been executed. As the Court stated in In the Matter of Disbarment Proceedings against Narciso N. Jaramillo (Adm. Case No. 229, April 30, 1957), "The review of respondent's conviction no longer rests upon us. The judgment not only has become final but has been executed. No elaborate argument is necessary to hold the respondent unworthy of the privilege bestowed on him as a member of the bar. Suffice it to say that, by his conviction, the respondent has proved himself unfit to protect the administration of justice."

• Double Jeopardy: The plea of double jeopardy is untenable because such defense can only be availed of when one is placed in the predicament of being prosecuted for the same offense, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense necessarily included therein, within the meaning of Section 9, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. The disbarment of an attorney does not partake of a criminal proceeding. Rather, it is intended "to protect the court and the public from the misconduct of officers of the court" (In re Montagne and Dominguez, 3 Phil. 588), and its purpose is "to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable and reliable; men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence" (In re McDougall, 3 Phil. 77).

• Moral Turpitude in Disbarment Cases — Moral turpitude includes any act deemed contrary to justice, honesty, or good morals. Crimes such as embezzlement, forgery, robbery, and swindling denote moral turpitude, and as a general rule, all crimes of which fraud is an element are looked on as involving moral turpitude. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that falsification of a public document, being clearly contrary to justice, honesty, and good morals, is a crime involving moral turpitude that renders a lawyer amenable to disbarment under Section 25, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court.

• Finality of Conviction in Disbarment Proceedings — Once a lawyer's conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude has become final and has been executed, the Court will not review the sufficiency of the conviction in a disbarment proceeding. The only issue is whether the attorney was found guilty and convicted by a final judgment of a crime involving moral turpitude. The Court applied this doctrine to reject the respondent's attempt to dispute the sufficiency of his conviction.

• Disbarment as Non-Criminal Proceeding — Disbarment proceedings do not partake of a criminal proceeding; they are intended to protect the court and the public from the misconduct of officers of the court, and their purpose is to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable, and reliable. The Court applied this doctrine to reject the respondent's defense of double jeopardy.

• "Moral turpitude, as used in this section, includes any act deemed contrary to justice, honesty or good morals." — This passage defines the scope of moral turpitude for purposes of disbarment under Section 25, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, and is the controlling definition applied to the respondent's crime.

• "The crime of which respondent was convicted is falsification of public document, which is indeed of this nature, for the act is clearly contrary to justice, honesty and good morals. Hence, such crime involves moral turpitude." — This passage states the ratio decidendi for holding that falsification of a public document is a crime involving moral turpitude, which is the basis for the respondent's disbarment.

• "The review of respondent's conviction no longer rests upon us. The judgment not only has become final but has been executed. No elaborate argument is necessary to hold the respondent unworthy of the privilege bestowed on him as a member of the bar. Suffice it to say that, by his conviction, the respondent has proved himself unfit to protect the administration of justice." — This passage, quoted from In the Matter of Disbarment Proceedings against Narciso N. Jaramillo, establishes the principle that a final conviction is conclusive in disbarment proceedings and that the Court will not review its sufficiency.

• "The disbarment of an attorney does not partake of a criminal proceeding. Rather, it is intended 'to protect the court and the public from the misconduct of officers of the court' (In re Montagne and Dominguez, 3 Phil. 588), and its purpose is 'to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable and reliable; men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence' (In re McDougall, 3 Phil. 77)." — This passage articulates the non-criminal nature of disbarment proceedings, which is the basis for rejecting the respondent's double jeopardy defense.

• In re Basa, 41 Phil. 275 — Cited as authority for the definition of moral turpitude as including any act deemed contrary to justice, honesty, or good morals.
• In re Basa, 60 Phil. 915 — Cited as authority for the examples of crimes involving moral turpitude, such as seduction and concubinage.
• In the Matter of Disbarment Proceedings against Narciso N. Jaramillo, Adm. Case No. 229, April 30, 1957 — Followed as controlling precedent for the principle that the Court will not review a final conviction in a disbarment proceeding and that a convicted lawyer has proved himself unfit to protect the administration of justice.
• In re Montagne and Dominguez, 3 Phil. 588 — Cited for the proposition that disbarment is intended to protect the court and the public from the misconduct of officers of the court.
• In re McDougall, 3 Phil. 77 — Cited for the proposition that the purpose of disbarment is to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable, and reliable.

• Section 25, Rule 127, Rules of Court — Provides that a member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney if it appears that he has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. This is the primary basis for the respondent's disbarment.
• Article 171, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes the crime of falsification of public document, of which the respondent was convicted. The Court held that this crime involves moral turpitude.
• Section 9, Rule 113, Rules of Court — Defines the scope of the double jeopardy defense, which the Court held is not applicable to disbarment proceedings because they are not criminal in nature.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, and Dizon, JJ., concurred.