Lecaroz vs. Sandiganbayan

The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over offenses committed by public officers in relation to their office, as determined by law, even where the offense is not one of graft and corrupt practices, provided the public officer took advantage of his position in committing the charged acts. Where jurisdiction was properly acquired before a subsequent amendment withdrew concurrent jurisdiction, a savings clause retains the case in the court that first acquired jurisdiction.

Petitioner Francisco Lecaroz was the mayor of Sta. Cruz, Marinduque. The 1973 Constitution, through Section 5, Article XIII, mandated the creation of the Sandiganbayan as a special court with jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices and "such other offenses committed by public officers and employees … in relation to their office as may be determined by law." Presidential Decree No. 1486 (later superseded by Presidential Decree No. 1606) implemented this constitutional mandate by defining the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction, including in Section 4(c) thereof jurisdiction over "other crimes or offenses committed by public officers or employees … in relation to their office." At the time of filing, the Sandiganbayan held concurrent jurisdiction with the regular courts over such offenses; Presidential Decree No. 1861, issued on March 23, 1983, subsequently withdrew that concurrency for offenses carrying penalties not exceeding prision correccional or six years' imprisonment, but contained a savings clause preserving pending cases in their original fora.

Petitioner Francisco Lecaroz served as mayor of Sta. Cruz, Marinduque. On October 21, 1980, an information was filed before the Sandiganbayan charging him with the crime of grave coercion. The information alleged that on or about July 2, 1979, petitioner, taking advantage of his public position as mayor, wilfully and unlawfully took over the operation and control of the gasoline station owned by Pedro Par, sold the gasoline therein to the public using the station's invoices and pieces of yellow pad paper, and padlocked the dispensing pumps without authority of law, thereby depriving Pedro Par of the possession and exercise of a lawful trade or occupation by means of threat, force, and/or violence.

On November 27, 1980, the information was amended to insert the phrase "by ordering his policemen companions" between the words "Pedro Par" and "to sell the gasoline," clarifying that petitioner had directed policemen under his authority to carry out the acts charged. Petitioner thereupon filed a motion to quash the information, principally contending that the Sandiganbayan lacked jurisdiction over the offense and that the case should have been filed with the ordinary courts in Marinduque where the alleged crime was committed. He also sought transfer of the case to the Court of First Instance of Marinduque on the ground of convenience, as all witnesses of both prosecution and defense would have to come from that distant island province.

The Sandiganbayan denied the motion to quash. Petitioner then instituted the present petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court, reiterating his jurisdictional objections and seeking the same relief. A temporary restraining order was issued on March 12, 1982. In the interim, on March 23, 1983, Presidential Decree No. 1861 amended Presidential Decree No. 1606, providing that offenses committed by public officers in relation to their office carrying penalties not exceeding prision correccional or six years' imprisonment, or a fine of ₱6,000.00, would no longer fall within the concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and the regular courts but would be vested exclusively in the latter — though with a savings clause preserving pending cases in their original fora.

• Lack of Relation to Office: Petitioner contended that the offense of grave coercion for which he was charged is not related to his office as mayor, and therefore does not fall within the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction.
• Statutory Exclusion: Petitioner argued that grave coercion is not among the offenses mentioned or determined by Section 4(c) of Presidential Decree No. 1486, as amended, and that said provision is violative of Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution because it enlarges what the Constitution limited.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion — Transfer of Venue: Assuming the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction, petitioner maintained that it committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the transfer of the hearing to the Court of First Instance of Marinduque, because all witnesses of both prosecution and defense would have to come from Marinduque, a faraway island.

• Constitutionality of Statutory Grant: Whether Section 4(c) of Presidential Decree No. 1486, as amended, is violative of Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution for enlarging the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction beyond what the Constitution authorized.
• Relation to Office: Whether the offense of grave coercion charged against petitioner was committed in relation to his office as mayor so as to fall within the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction.
• Concurrent Jurisdiction and Transfer: Whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the transfer of the case to the Court of First Instance of Marinduque.
• Effect of Subsequent Amendment: Whether Presidential Decree No. 1861, which withdrew concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over offenses carrying penalties not exceeding prision correccional, divested the Sandiganbayan of jurisdiction over the case.

• Constitutionality of Statutory Grant: No. Section 4(c) of Presidential Decree No. 1486, as amended, is not violative of the Constitution, the constitutional provision having expressly delegated to the lawmaking authority the determination of "such other offenses" committed by public officers over which the Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction.
• Relation to Office: Yes. The offense was committed in relation to the petitioner's office as mayor, the information alleging that he took advantage of his position to direct policemen to take over the gasoline station and padlock its pumps.
• Concurrent Jurisdiction and Transfer: No grave abuse of discretion was committed. Where jurisdiction is concurrent, the court first acquiring jurisdiction excludes all others, and the Sandiganbayan's denial of the transfer request was well-grounded.
• Effect of Subsequent Amendment: No. Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 1861 contains a savings clause providing that all cases pending in the Sandiganbayan as of the date of effectivity shall remain with and be disposed of by the courts where they are pending; the information having been filed in 1980, the Sandiganbayan retains jurisdiction.

• Constitutionality of Statutory Grant: Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution provides that the Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over "criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses committed by public officers and employees … in relation to their office as may be determined by law." The phrase "as may be determined by law" constitutes an express delegation to the lawmaking body of the authority to specify which public-office-related offenses fall within the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction. When the President, exercising lawmaking authority, issued Presidential Decree No. 1486 mandating in Section 4(c) that the Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over "other crimes or offenses committed by public officers or employees … in relation to their office," the decree operated squarely within the constitutional grant. The courts will not review questions of legislative policy where the act is within the constitutional power of the lawmaking authority.

• Relation to Office: The original and amended information clearly alleged that petitioner took advantage of his position as mayor when he intimidated the gasoline station's owner, ordered his policemen to sell the gasoline, and padlocked the dispensing pumps without legal authority. If petitioner were not the mayor, he would not have been able to direct the policemen, and the latter would not have followed his orders. The fact that he is mayor did not vest him with legal authority to take over the operations of complainant's gasoline station and padlock it without observing due process. The offense was thus committed in relation to his office.

• Concurrent Jurisdiction and Transfer: Grave coercion under the first paragraph of Article 286 of the Revised Penal Code is penalized by arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding ₱500.00. At the time of filing, pursuant to Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended, the Sandiganbayan had concurrent jurisdiction with the regular courts over such offenses. The established rule is that once a court acquires jurisdiction in a case where jurisdiction is concurrent with another court, it must continue exercising the same to the exclusion of all other courts. The Sandiganbayan's denial of the transfer request was therefore well-grounded and not a grave abuse of discretion.

• Effect of Subsequent Amendment: Presidential Decree No. 1861, issued on March 23, 1983, amended Presidential Decree No. 1606 to provide that offenses carrying penalties not exceeding prision correccional or six years' imprisonment, or a fine of ₱6,000.00, are no longer within the concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and the regular courts but are vested in the latter. However, Section 2 of the same decree provides that all cases pending in the Sandiganbayan or in the appropriate courts as of the date of effectivity shall remain with and be disposed of by the courts where they are pending. Because the information against petitioner was filed in 1980, the Sandiganbayan retains jurisdiction over the case.

• Jurisdiction in Relation to Office — The Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction under the 1973 Constitution extends not only to graft and corrupt practices but also to other crimes committed by public officers in relation to their office, as determined by law. An offense is committed "in relation to office" when the public officer took advantage of his position in committing the charged acts, such that the acts would not have been possible or would not have been obeyed but for the officer's official authority. In this case, the mayor's direction of policemen to take over a gasoline station and padlock its pumps constituted acts made possible only by virtue of his office.

• Concurrent Jurisdiction — First to Acquire Excludes Others — Where two or more courts have concurrent jurisdiction over a case, the court that first acquires jurisdiction retains it to the exclusion of all other courts. The Sandiganbayan, having first acquired jurisdiction when the information was filed in 1980, was not obligated to transfer the case to the Court of First Instance of Marinduque.

• Savings Clause and Retention of Jurisdiction — A savings clause in an amendatory decree, providing that pending cases shall remain with and be disposed of by the courts where they are pending, preserves the jurisdiction of the original court notwithstanding a subsequent narrowing of that court's jurisdictional scope. Presidential Decree No. 1861's savings clause ensured the Sandiganbayan retained jurisdiction over cases filed before its effectivity.

• Impeachment and Criminal Prosecution (Obiter Dictum) — Constitutional officers removable solely by impeachment — the President, Members of the Supreme Court, and Members of the Constitutional Commissions — may not be charged criminally while holding office with an offense carrying the penalty of removal from office, as this would circumvent the constitutional mandate that such officers be removed only by impeachment. However, a party convicted in an impeachment proceeding remains liable to prosecution, trial, and punishment under ordinary law; and if impeachment does not result in conviction and removal, a criminal action may not prosper during the officer's tenure. This discussion was not necessary to the disposition of the case and appears to be obiter dictum.

• "It is clear from the above-quoted constitutional provision that respondent court has jurisdictional competence not only over criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices committed by public officers and employees but also over other crimes committed by them in relation to their office, though not involving graft and corrupt practices, as may be determined by law." — This passage articulates the breadth of the Sandiganbayan's constitutional jurisdiction, encompassing all public-office-related offenses as determined by law, not merely graft and corruption cases.

• "if petitioner were not the mayor he would not have allegedly directed the policeman and the latter would not have followed his orders and instructions to sell Pedro Par's gasoline and padlocked the station." — This formulation provides the practical test for determining whether an offense was committed "in relation to office": whether the charged acts were made possible by virtue of the public officer's position and authority.

• "Well established is the rule that once a court acquires jurisdiction in a case where said jurisdiction is concurrent with another court, it must continue exercising the same to the exclusion of all other courts." — This states the canonical rule on concurrent jurisdiction, frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence on venue and jurisdictional conflicts.

• Laquian vs. Baltazar, 31 SCRA 551 — Cited as controlling authority for the rule that where jurisdiction is concurrent, the court first acquiring jurisdiction excludes all other courts. The Court applied this principle to uphold the Sandiganbayan's retention of the case and its denial of the transfer request.

• Section 5, Article XIII, 1973 Constitution — Mandates the creation of the Sandiganbayan and defines its jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices and "such other offenses committed by public officers and employees … in relation to their office as may be determined by law." The Court construed the phrase "as may be determined by law" as an express delegation to the lawmaking authority to specify the covered offenses.

• Section 1, Article XIII, 1973 Constitution — Declares that public office is a public trust and that public officers shall serve with responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, and remain accountable to the people. Cited to underscore the constitutional intent behind the Sandiganbayan's creation.

• Section 2, Article XIII, 1973 Constitution — Provides that the President, Members of the Supreme Court, and Members of the Constitutional Commissions shall be removed from office only on impeachment. Discussed in the context of the limitation on criminal prosecution of impeachable officers during tenure.

• Section 4(c), Presidential Decree No. 1486 (as amended) — Grants the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction over "other crimes or offenses committed by public officers or employees … in relation to their office." Upheld as a valid exercise of the lawmaking authority delegated by the Constitution.

• Section 4, Presidential Decree No. 1606 (as amended) — Provided for concurrent jurisdiction between the Sandiganbayan and regular courts over the offenses described therein. Applied to determine that the Sandiganbayan properly acquired jurisdiction when the information was filed in 1980.

• Section 2, Presidential Decree No. 1861 — Savings clause providing that all cases pending in the Sandiganbayan or appropriate courts as of the date of effectivity shall remain with and be disposed of by the courts where they are pending. Applied to preserve the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction over the case filed in 1980.

• Article 286, first paragraph, Revised Penal Code (as amended) — Defines and penalizes grave coercion with arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding ₱500.00. The penalty prescribed was relevant to determining the applicable jurisdictional framework under the governing decrees.

Makasiar, Aquino, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro, Plana, Escolin, Gutierrez, Jr., and De la Fuente, JJ., concurred. Melencio-Herrera, J., concurred in the result. Fernando, C.J. and Teehankee, J., were on leave. Concepcion, Jr., J., took no part.