LEAP vs. LWUA

A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is not a substitute for a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, and a preliminary injunction automatically dissolves upon dismissal of the principal action; employees affected by a government reorganization must first exhaust the remedies under RA 6656 before resorting to court.

Petitioners are employees of LWUA and members or officers of LEAP, the employees' association at LWUA. The dispute concerns the implementation of the government's rationalization of LWUA under E.O. Nos. 279, 366, and 421, and the statutory protection for civil service employees in government reorganization under RA 6656.

On February 2, 2004, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo enacted E.O. No. 279 for the purpose of reviewing and rationalizing the then existing financing policies for the Philippine water supply and sewerage sector to allow the efficient flow of resources thereto. Under the said E.O., all concerned government agencies and instrumentalities of the water supply and sewerage sector, including LWUA, were directed to pursue and implement reform objectives and policies, particularly the rationalization of LWUA's organizational structure and operations. On October 4, 2004, President Arroyo issued E.O. No. 366 directing all departments of the executive branch and their component units/bureaus, including government-owned and controlled corporations, boards, task forces, councils, commissions and all other agencies attached thereto or under the administrative supervision of a Department, to conduct a strategic review of the operations and organization of the Executive Branch and to prepare a rationalization plan which includes the phasing of activities and availment of incentives by affected employees. On April 13, 2005, President Arroyo issued E.O. No. 421 specifying LWUA's core functions and providing for shifts in its policy direction, functions, programs, activities and strategies; cognizant of the effect of the rationalization of LWUA's functions, the E.O. gave affected LWUA personnel the option to either remain or retire, or be separated from government service.

Pursuant to E.O. No. 421, then LWUA Administrator Lorenzo Zamora came up with Office Order No. 077-05 creating Task Force 421 and its Action Team. The Task Force was charged with preparing LWUA's staffing pattern and the corresponding plantilla positions therein as directed by E.O. No. 421, while the Action Team was given the responsibility of reporting to the Task Force and assisting it in the execution of its duties and responsibilities. Petitioner Melanio Cuchapin II, then Chairperson of petitioner LEAP, was among the appointed members of the Action Team. Task Force 421 subsequently came up with a staffing pattern consisting of 467 plantilla positions, which it submitted to the LWUA Board of Trustees for approval.

On April 18, 2006, the LWUA Board of Trustees issued Board Resolution No. 69 approving the staffing pattern proposed by Task Force 421. Thereafter, the approved staffing pattern was submitted to the DBM for review and approval. In its letter dated September 27, 2006, the DBM approved 447 plantilla positions out of the 467 proposed positions; twenty positions were excluded because they were classified as coterminous with the members of the LWUA Board of Trustees and were not considered critical in the agency's operations.

On October 18, 2006, LWUA issued Office Order No. 168-06 requiring the immediate implementation of the following: (a) posting of the DBM-approved staffing pattern; (b) finalization by the Staffing Committee of the staffing guidelines to be submitted to the Management and the Board of Trustees for approval; and (c) finalization by the Task Analysis Committee of the job descriptions under the rationalized LWUA structure. The said Office Order also provided that the guidelines for the implementation of the approved staffing pattern shall include a general provision declaring that all employees may apply for a maximum of five positions in the rationalized structure where they may qualify. On October 19, 2006, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for TRO and preliminary injunction with the RTC of Quezon City, alleging that LWUA and DBM acted with grave abuse of discretion in adopting and implementing the reorganization plan of LWUA; they prayed that LWUA and DBM be restrained from implementing the DBM-approved staffing pattern, Resolution No. 69 of the LWUA Board of Trustees, and E.O. Nos. 279, 366 and 421, on the ground that petitioners would suffer injustice and sustain irreparable injury as 233 LWUA employees faced immediate and outright dismissal from service.

Respondents filed their respective Oppositions to the prayer for TRO and/or preliminary injunction. After hearing, the RTC issued its December 7, 2006 Order granting the prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction, restraining respondents from enforcing and effecting the DBM-Approved Staffing Pattern dated September 27, 2006, LWUA Board Resolution No. 69, series of 2006, and E.O. Nos. 279, 366 and 421, including the issuance of any orders, resolutions and/or decisions relating to the same, upon the filing of a bond in the amount of one hundred thousand (P100,000.00) pesos for any damage that may be sustained by respondents by reason of the injunction if the RTC will finally decide that petitioners are not entitled thereto. LWUA and DBM filed separate Motions for Reconsideration, but these were denied in the RTC's June 6, 2007 Resolution. After trial, in its December 27, 2012 Decision, the RTC found that petitioners failed to establish the existence of an actual case or controversy ripe for judicial determination and dismissed the principal action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioners argued that the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its January 15, 2013 Resolution denying their motion for reconsideration, affirming the August 28, 2012 Decision, and reversing the trial court.
• Entitlement to Injunctive Writ: Petitioners argued that the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion in holding that they are not entitled to the injunctive writ.
• No Plain, Speedy, and Adequate Remedy: Petitioners contended that there is no appeal or any plain and speedy remedy in the ordinary course of law other than the instant petition, citing a very urgent need to resolve the issues and the alleged removal and deprivation of economic benefits causing great injury to petitioners and LWUA employees.

• Improper Remedy: Respondents raised that petitioners availed of the wrong remedy by filing a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 instead of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
• Dissolution of Injunction: Respondents raised that the dismissal of petitioners' principal action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus filed with the RTC results in the automatic dissolution of the ancillary writ of preliminary injunction issued by the same court.

• Propriety of Rule 65 Petition: Whether a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy to challenge a CA judgment where a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is available.
• Dissolution of Preliminary Injunction: Whether the dismissal of the principal action results in the automatic dissolution of the ancillary writ of preliminary injunction.
• Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: Whether petitioners should have first exhausted the administrative remedies under Sections 7 and 8 of RA 6656 before filing a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with the RTC.

• Propriety of Rule 65 Petition: No. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is not a substitute for a lost appeal; where a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is available, certiorari will not prosper even if grave abuse of discretion is alleged.
• Dissolution of Preliminary Injunction: Yes. The dismissal of the principal action operates as a dissolution of the preliminary injunction, which is merely an ancillary remedy dependent on the main case.
• Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: Yes. Petitioners should have first appealed to the appointing authority and then to the Civil Service Commission under Sections 7 and 8 of RA 6656; their premature resort to court was fatal.

• Propriety of Rule 65 Petition: A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is limited to correction of errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Its principal office is to keep the inferior court within the parameters of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such grave abuse. It may issue only when the following requirements are alleged in and established by the petition: (1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The SC has repeatedly held that certiorari is proper only when there is neither appeal nor plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. It is not a substitute for a lost appeal and is not allowed when a party fails to appeal a judgment to the proper forum, especially if one's own negligence or error in one's choice of remedy occasioned such loss or lapse. Section 1, Rule 45 provides that the proper remedy to question a judgment, final order or resolution of the CA is a petition for review on certiorari regardless of the nature of the action or proceeding involved, filed within fifteen days from notice of the judgment, final order or resolution appealed from or of the denial of the petitioner's motion for reconsideration filed in due time after notice of the judgment. Because an appeal was available, the action for certiorari would not be entertained; the remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not alternative or successive. Where an appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper even if the ground is grave abuse of discretion. By filing the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, petitioners availed themselves of the wrong remedy. Under Supreme Court Circular 2-90, an appeal taken to the SC or to the CA by a wrong or inappropriate mode merits outright dismissal. On this score alone, the petition is dismissible.
• Dissolution of Preliminary Injunction: A writ of preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts. It is merely a provisional remedy, adjunct to the main case subject to the latter's outcome; it is not a cause of action in itself. It is provisional because it constitutes a temporary measure availed of during the pendency of the action, and it is ancillary because it is a mere incident in and is dependent upon the result of the main action. As an ancillary or auxiliary remedy, it is available during the pendency of the action to preserve and protect certain rights and interests pending rendition, and for purposes of the ultimate effects, of a final judgment. The sole object of a preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or mandatory, is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard. It is usually granted when there is a substantial controversy between the parties and one of them is committing an act or threatening the immediate commission of an act that will cause irreparable injury or destroy the status quo before a full hearing can be had on the merits. It persists until it is dissolved or until the termination of the action without the court issuing a final injunction. Here, the RTC granted the writ based on its finding that there was a need to protect petitioners' rights to security of tenure during the pendency of the principal action. After trial, the RTC found that petitioners failed to establish the existence of an actual case or controversy ripe for judicial determination and dismissed the principal action. The principal action having been heard and found dismissible as it was in fact dismissed, the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the RTC is deemed lifted, its purpose as a provisional remedy having been served, the appeal from the main case notwithstanding. In Unionbank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, the SC held that a dismissal, discontinuance or non-suit of an action in which a restraining order or temporary injunction has been granted operates as a dissolution of the restraining order or temporary injunction, regardless of whether the period for filing a motion for reconsideration of the order dismissing the case or appeal therefrom has expired. The rationale is that even in cases where an appeal is taken from a judgment dismissing an action on the merits, the appeal does not suspend the judgment, hence the general rule applies that a temporary injunction terminates automatically on the dismissal of the action.
• Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: Sections 7 and 8 of RA 6656 provide that a list of the personnel appointed to the authorized positions in the approved staffing pattern shall be made known to all the officers and employees of the department or agency; any aggrieved officer or employee may file an appeal with the appointing authority, which shall make a decision within thirty days from the filing thereof. An officer or employee who is still not satisfied with the decision of the appointing authority may further appeal within ten days from receipt thereof to the Civil Service Commission, which shall render a decision within thirty days and whose decision shall be final and executory. Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, he or she should have availed himself or herself of all the means of administrative processes afforded him or her. If resort to a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be made by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his or her jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of the intervention of the court is fatal to one's cause of action. The doctrine is based on practical and legal reasons: the availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies; and courts of justice, for reasons of comity and convenience, will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with, so as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and dispose of the case. Corollary to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction: courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that question by the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact. Petitioners should have first brought their case to the appointing authority, the LWUA Board of Trustees, and thereafter to the Civil Service Commission, which has primary jurisdiction over the case. They failed to exhaust the administrative remedies given them by law before resorting to the filing of a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.

• Certiorari Not a Substitute for Appeal — A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is limited to errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion and is proper only when there is no appeal or plain, speedy and adequate remedy. It is not a substitute for a lost appeal; where a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is available, certiorari will not prosper even if grave abuse of discretion is alleged. The SC applied this to dismiss the petition because the proper remedy was Rule 45.
• Ancillary Nature of Preliminary Injunction — A writ of preliminary injunction is a provisional and ancillary remedy dependent on the main action; its sole object is to preserve the status quo until the merits can be heard, and it persists only until dissolved or until termination of the action without a final injunction. The SC applied this to hold that the dismissal of the principal action dissolved the writ.
• Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies — Before a party may seek court intervention, it must avail itself of all administrative processes afforded by law; premature resort to court is fatal to the cause of action. The SC applied this to require petitioners to appeal first to the appointing authority and then to the CSC under RA 6656.
• Primary Jurisdiction — Courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal before that tribunal resolves it, where the question demands sound administrative discretion and special knowledge, experience, and services to determine technical and intricate matters of fact. The SC applied this to hold that the CSC had primary jurisdiction over petitioners' reorganization and security-of-tenure claims.
• Wrong Mode of Appeal — Under SC Circular 2-90, an appeal taken by a wrong or inappropriate mode merits outright dismissal. The SC applied this to the Rule 65 petition.

• "This Court has repeatedly held that a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is proper only when there is neither appeal nor plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The extraordinary remedy of certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal; it is not allowed when a party to a case fails to appeal a judgment to the proper forum, especially if one's own negligence or error in one's choice of remedy occasioned such loss or lapse." — The SC uses this passage to establish that petitioners' Rule 65 petition was the wrong remedy because a Rule 45 appeal was available.
• "The principal action having been heard and found dismissible as it was in fact dismissed, the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the RTC is deemed lifted, its purpose as a provisional remedy having been served, the appeal from the main case notwithstanding." — This passage states the rule that the dismissal of the principal action dissolves the ancillary preliminary injunction.
• "Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, he or she should have availed himself or herself of all the means of administrative processes afforded him or her." — This passage defines the exhaustion doctrine applied against petitioners.
• "The premature invocation of the intervention of the court is fatal to one's cause of action." — This passage explains the consequence of petitioners' failure to exhaust administrative remedies under RA 6656.

• Tan vs. Spouses Antazo, 659 Phil. 400 (2011) — Cited for the requisites of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
• Leonardo L. Villalon vs. Renato E. Lirio, G.R. No. 183869, August 3, 2015 — Cited for the rule that certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal and that appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive.
• Indoyon, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 706 Phil. 200 (2013) — Cited for the rule that a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is the proper remedy to question a CA judgment or final order.
• Buyco vs. Baraquia, 623 Phil. 596 (2009) — Cited for the ancillary and provisional nature of a writ of preliminary injunction.
• Unionbank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 370 Phil. 837 (1999) — Cited for the rule that dismissal of the principal action dissolves the temporary injunction.
• United Alloy Philippines Corporation vs. United Coconut Planters Bank, et al., G.R. No. 179257, November 23, 2015 — Cited for the rule that a preliminary injunction persists until dissolved or until termination of the action without final injunction.
• Maglalang vs. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, 723 Phil. 546 (2013) — Cited for the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the consequences of premature judicial intervention.
• Addition Hills Mandaluyong Civic & Social Organization, Inc. vs. Megaworld Properties & Holdings, Inc., et al., 686 Phil. 76 (2012) — Cited for the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.

• Rule 65, Rules of Court — Special civil action for certiorari; limited to correction of errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion; requires no appeal or plain, speedy and adequate remedy. Applied to dismiss the petition because Rule 45 was available.
• Rule 45, Rules of Court — Petition for review on certiorari; proper remedy to question a CA judgment, final order or resolution, filed within fifteen days from notice or denial of the motion for reconsideration. Applied to show petitioners used the wrong remedy.
• Supreme Court Circular 2-90 — An appeal taken by a wrong or inappropriate mode merits outright dismissal. Applied against the Rule 65 petition.
• Sections 7 and 8, Republic Act No. 6656 — Section 7 requires that the list of personnel appointed to authorized positions in the approved staffing pattern be made known to all officers and employees, with an appeal to the appointing authority within thirty days; Section 8 allows a further appeal within ten days to the Civil Service Commission, whose decision is final and executory. Applied to require petitioners to exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit.