LBC Air Cargo, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

A driver who makes a left turn under conditions of extremely poor visibility, without first ensuring that such movement can be made in safety and without giving a plainly visible signal to approaching vehicles, is guilty of negligence constituting the proximate cause of a collision. The victim's contributory negligence in driving at a fast speed despite poor visibility does not absolve the negligent driver from liability but only mitigates the damages recoverable.

The petitioners were LBC Air Cargo, Inc., a cargo transportation company; Fernando Yu, the Manager of its Mangagoy Branch Office; and Jaime Tano, Jr., a driver of LBC Air Cargo, Inc. The private respondents were the heirs of Rogelio Monterola, a licensed motorcycle driver who died in a vehicular collision with the LBC cargo van. The case involved the application of the doctrines of "proximate cause" and "last clear chance" to determine liability for damages arising from the collision. The relevant statutory backdrop included Section 44 of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code (R.A. 4136, as amended), which requires drivers to ensure that a turn can be made in safety and to give plainly visible signals to approaching vehicles, and Articles 2179 and 2180 of the New Civil Code on contributory negligence and employer liability.

At about 11:30 in the morning of 15 November 1987, Rogelio Monterola, a licensed driver, was traveling on board his Suzuki motorcycle towards Mangagoy on the right lane along a dusty national road in Bislig, Surigao del Sur. At approximately the same time, a cargo van of LBC Air Cargo, Incorporated, driven by defendant Jaime Tano, Jr., was coming from the opposite direction on its way to the Bislig Airport. On board were passengers Fernando Yu, Manager of LBC Air Cargo, and his son, who was seated beside Tano.

When Tano was approaching the vicinity of the airport road entrance on his left, he saw two vehicles racing against each other from the opposite direction. Tano stopped his vehicle and waited for the two racing vehicles to pass by. The stirred cloud of dust made visibility extremely bad. Instead of waiting for the dust to settle, Tano started to make a sharp left turn towards the airport road. When he was about to reach the center of the right lane, the motorcycle driven by Monterola suddenly emerged from the dust and smashed head-on against the right side of the LBC van. Monterola died from the severe injuries he sustained.

Tano admitted in his testimony that visibility was poor when he made the left turn, that he could not see incoming vehicles because of the cloud of dust, and that he could see clearly only big vehicles but not small vehicles like a motorcycle. He claimed that he did not enter the airport immediately but waited for the dust to clear a little before driving, and that he turned on his left signal and headlight. The trial court dismissed both the criminal and civil cases on the ground that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of deceased Rogelio Monterola. The Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal of the civil case, finding that Tano's negligence in making a left turn under poor visibility was the proximate cause of the collision, and that Monterola's fast driving constituted only contributory negligence.

• Negligence of Tano: Petitioners contended that the Court of Appeals erred in finding that Jaime Tano, Jr. was negligent in the driving of his vehicle and in failing to give a signal to approaching vehicles of his intention to make a left turn.
• Proximate Cause: Petitioners contended that the Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the proximate cause of the accident was the victim's negligence in driving his motorcycle at a very fast speed and thus hitting the petitioner's cargo van.
• Last Clear Chance: Petitioners invoked the doctrine of "last clear chance," arguing that the victim had the last clear opportunity to avoid the collision.

N/A — The decision does not separately recount the private respondents' arguments beyond the Court of Appeals' findings and reasoning, which the appellate court adopted in reversing the trial court's dismissal.

• Negligence of the Driver: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding that Jaime Tano, Jr. was negligent in driving his vehicle and in failing to give a signal to approaching vehicles of his intention to make a left turn.
• Proximate Cause: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the proximate cause of the accident was the victim's negligence in driving his motorcycle at a very fast speed and thus hitting the petitioner's cargo van.
• Last Clear Chance: Whether the doctrine of "last clear chance" applies to absolve the petitioners from liability.

• Negligence of the Driver: No. Tano was negligent in making a left turn under conditions of extremely poor visibility, in violation of Section 44 of R.A. 4136, which requires a driver to first see that a turn can be made in safety and to give a plainly visible signal to approaching vehicles.
• Proximate Cause: No. The proximate cause of the accident was Tano's negligence in hastily executing a left turn without first waiting for the dust to settle, which placed his vehicle directly on the path of the oncoming motorcycle. Monterola's fast driving was at most contributory negligence under Article 2179 of the New Civil Code.
• Last Clear Chance: No. The doctrine of "last clear chance" does not apply because no appreciable time elapsed from the moment Tano swerved to his left to the actual impact that could have afforded the victim a last clear opportunity to avoid the collision.

• Negligence of the Driver: The Court adopted the Court of Appeals' detailed analysis, which found that Tano admitted that visibility was poor when he made the left turn and that he could not see small vehicles like a motorcycle. Under Section 44 of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code (R.A. 4136, as amended), a driver before starting, stopping, or turning from a direct line must first see that such movement can be made in safety, and whenever the operation of any other vehicle approaching may be affected by such movement, shall give a signal plainly visible to the driver of such other vehicles. Tano did neither — he recklessly made a left turn even as visibility was still very poor, failed to see the approaching motorcycle, and failed to warn the latter of his intention to make a left turn. This constituted plain and simple negligence.

• Proximate Cause: The Court found that from every indication, the proximate cause of the accident was Tano's negligence. Despite extremely poor visibility, he hastily executed a left turn towards the Bislig airport road entrance without first waiting for the dust to settle. This negligent act placed the LBC van directly on the path of the motorcycle coming from the opposite direction, almost instantaneously causing the collision. Simple prudence required him not to attempt to cross the other lane until it would have been safe from and clear of any oncoming vehicle. While Monterola was not entirely free from negligence in evidently speeding too closely behind the vehicle he was following, his negligence would at most be contributory under Article 2179 of the New Civil Code, warranting a mitigation of the petitioners' liability for damages.

• Last Clear Chance: The Court rejected the petitioners' invocation of the doctrine of "last clear chance," also referred to as "supervening negligence" or "discovered peril." The doctrine holds that where both parties are negligent, but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in time than that of the other, or when it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence should be attributed to the incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so is chargeable with the consequences thereof. In this case, the victim was traveling along the lane where he was rightly supposed to be, and the incident occurred in an instant. No appreciable time had elapsed from the moment Tano swerved to his left to the actual impact that could have afforded the victim a last clear opportunity to avoid the collision.

• Employer Liability: The Court affirmed the appellate court's finding that Tano's proven negligence created a presumption of negligence on the part of his employer, LBC Air Cargo Corporation, in supervising its employees properly and adequately, which may only be destroyed by proof of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees to prevent the damage under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code. No such defense was interposed by the defendants in their answer. However, Fernando Yu's liability as Manager of LBC-Mangagoy Branch Office was not sustained because there was no employer-employee relationship between him and Jaime Tano, who was a driver of LBC Air Cargo, Inc. The term "Manager" in Article 2180 is used in the sense of "employer."

• Proximate Cause — The proximate cause of an injury is that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. In this case, the Court held that Tano's negligent left turn under poor visibility was the proximate cause of the collision because it placed his vehicle directly on the path of the oncoming motorcycle, almost instantaneously causing the accident to occur.

• Last Clear Chance (Supervening Negligence / Discovered Peril) — Where both parties are negligent, but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in time than that of the other, or when it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence should be attributed to the incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so is chargeable with the consequences thereof. An antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude the recovery of damages for supervening negligence of, or bar a defense against the liability sought by, another if the latter, who had the last fair chance, could have avoided the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence. The doctrine was held inapplicable because no appreciable time elapsed between Tano's swerve and the impact that would have afforded the victim a last clear opportunity to avoid the collision.

• Contributory Negligence — Under Article 2179 of the New Civil Code, when the plaintiff's own negligence was a contributory and immediate cause of the injury, the plaintiff may recover damages but the damages shall be mitigated. In this case, Monterola's fast driving despite poor visibility constituted contributory negligence, warranting a twenty percent reduction of the damages awarded.

• Presumed Negligence of Employer — Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, the employer is presumed negligent in the supervision of its employees, and this presumption may only be destroyed by proof of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees. The employer bears the burden of proving such diligence; failure to interpose this defense results in liability for the employee's negligence.

• "Tano should not have made a left turn under the conditions admitted by him. Under the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the driver of any vehicle upon a highway, before starting, stopping or turning from a direct line, is called upon to first see that such movement can be made in safety, and whenever the operation of any other vehicle approaching may be affected by such movement, shall give a signal plainly visible to the driver of such other vehicles of the intention to make such movement (Sec. 44, R.A. 4136, as amended)." — This passage articulates the statutory standard of care for drivers making turns and forms the basis for finding Tano negligent.

• "From every indication, the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of Tano who, despite extremely poor visibility, hastily executed a left turn (towards the Bislig airport road entrance) without first waiting for the dust to settle. It was this negligent act of Tano, which had placed his vehicle (LBC van) directly on the path of the motorcycle coming from the opposite direction, that almost instantaneously caused the collision to occur." — This passage states the Court's core finding on proximate cause, which is the ratio decidendi of the case.

• "The doctrine, in essence, is to the effect that where both parties are negligent, but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in time than that of the other, or when it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence should be attributed to the incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so is chargeable with the consequences thereof." — This passage provides the canonical formulation of the "last clear chance" doctrine as applied in this jurisdiction.

• "In the case at bench, the victim was traveling along the lane where he was rightly supposed to be. The incident occurred in an instant. No appreciable time had elapsed, from the moment Tano swerved to his left to the actual impact; that could have afforded the victim a last clear opportunity to avoid the collision." — This passage explains why the "last clear chance" doctrine was inapplicable to the facts of the case.

• Picart vs. Smith, 37 Phil. 809 — Cited for the definition of the "last clear chance" doctrine, specifically that the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so is chargeable with the consequences thereof.
• Pantranco North Express, Inc. vs. Baesa, 179 SCRA 384 — Cited for the proposition that an antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude recovery of damages for supervening negligence of another if the latter, who had the last fair chance, could have avoided the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence.
• Glan People's Lumber and Hardware vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 173 SCRA 464 — Cited alongside Pantranco for the same proposition regarding the "last fair chance" rule.
• Phoenix Construction, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court — Cited for the rule that an employee's proven negligence creates a presumption of negligence on the part of the employer in supervising its employees, and for the reduction of damages by twenty percent in cases of contributory negligence.
• Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines Inc. et al. vs. Phil. American Forwarders, Inc., 63 SCRA 231 — Cited for the rule that the term "Manager" in Article 2180 of the New Civil Code is used in the sense of "employer," thus absolving a branch manager from liability absent an employer-employee relationship with the negligent driver.
• People vs. Sazon, 189 SCRA 700 — Cited for the pegged amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity for death, per the Resolution En Banc of August 30, 1990.

• Section 44, R.A. 4136 (Land Transportation and Traffic Code, as amended) — Requires a driver, before starting, stopping, or turning from a direct line, to first see that such movement can be made in safety, and to give a signal plainly visible to the driver of other vehicles whenever the operation of any approaching vehicle may be affected by such movement. The Court held that Tano violated this provision by making a left turn under poor visibility without ensuring safety or giving a plainly visible signal.
• Article 2179, New Civil Code — Provides that when the plaintiff's own negligence was a contributory and immediate cause of the injury, the plaintiff may recover damages but the damages shall be mitigated. The Court applied this provision to reduce the damages by twenty percent due to Monterola's contributory negligence.
• Article 2180, New Civil Code — Provides that employers are liable for damages caused by their employees acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, and that the employer may be relieved of liability only by proving due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee. The Court applied this provision to hold LBC Air Cargo, Inc. liable for Tano's negligence, and to absolve Fernando Yu for lack of employer-employee relationship.

Feliciano, Romero, Melo, and Francisco, JJ., concurred.

N/A — No dissenting opinions were noted in the provided case text.